- 13 Dec, 2015 37 commits
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Krzysztof Kozlowski authored
commit 824ead03 upstream. During probe if the regulator could not be enabled, the error exit path would still disable it. This could lead to unbalanced counter of regulator enable/disable. The patch moves code for getting and enabling the regulator from exynos_map_dt_data() to probe function because it is really not a part of getting Device Tree properties. Acked-by: Lukasz Majewski <l.majewski@samsung.com> Tested-by: Lukasz Majewski <l.majewski@samsung.com> Reviewed-by: Alim Akhtar <alim.akhtar@samsung.com> Signed-off-by: Krzysztof Kozlowski <k.kozlowski@samsung.com> Fixes: 5f09a5cb ("thermal: exynos: Disable the regulator on probe failure") Signed-off-by: Eduardo Valentin <edubezval@gmail.com> [ luis: backported to 3.16: adjusted context ] Signed-off-by: Luis Henriques <luis.henriques@canonical.com>
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Radim Krčmář authored
commit 656ec4a4 upstream. The comment in code had it mostly right, but we enable paging for emulated real mode regardless of EPT. Without EPT (which implies emulated real mode), secondary VCPUs won't start unless we disable SM[AE]P when the guest doesn't use paging. Signed-off-by: Radim Krčmář <rkrcmar@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Luis Henriques <luis.henriques@canonical.com>
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libin authored
commit c84da8b9 upstream. In nop_mcount, shdr->sh_offset and welp->r_offset should handle endianness properly, otherwise it will trigger Segmentation fault if the recordmcount main and file.o have different endianness. Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/563806C7.7070606@huawei.comSigned-off-by: Li Bin <huawei.libin@huawei.com> Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org> Signed-off-by: Luis Henriques <luis.henriques@canonical.com>
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Max Filippov authored
commit ab45fb14 upstream. There are multiple factors adding to the issue in different configurations: - commit 17290231 ("xtensa: add fixup for double exception raised in window overflow") added function window_overflow_restore_a0_fixup to double exception vector overlapping reset vector location of secondary processor cores. - on MMUv2 cores RESET_VECTOR1_VADDR may point to uncached kernel memory making code overlapping depend on cache type and size, so that without cache or with WT cache reset vector code overwrites double exception code, making issue even harder to detect. - on MMUv3 cores RESET_VECTOR1_VADDR may point to unmapped area, as MMUv3 cores change virtual address map to match MMUv2 layout, but reset vector virtual address is given for the original MMUv3 mapping. - physical memory region of the secondary reset vector is not reserved in the physical memory map, and thus may be allocated and overwritten at arbitrary moment. Fix it as follows: - move window_overflow_restore_a0_fixup code to .text section. - define RESET_VECTOR1_VADDR so that it points to reset vector in the cacheable MMUv2 map for cores with MMU. - reserve reset vector region in the physical memory map. Drop separate literal section and build mxhead.S with text section literals. Signed-off-by: Max Filippov <jcmvbkbc@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Luis Henriques <luis.henriques@canonical.com>
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Arik Nemtsov authored
commit 254d3dfe upstream. In TDLS channel-switch operations the chandef can sometimes be NULL. Avoid an oops in the trace code for these cases and just print a chandef full of zeros. Fixes: a7a6bdd0 ("mac80211: introduce TDLS channel switch ops") Signed-off-by: Arik Nemtsov <arikx.nemtsov@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Emmanuel Grumbach <emmanuel.grumbach@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Luis Henriques <luis.henriques@canonical.com>
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Janusz.Dziedzic@tieto.com authored
commit 519ee691 upstream. In case of one shot NOA the interval can be 0, catch that instead of potentially (depending on the driver) crashing like this: divide error: 0000 [#1] SMP [...] Call Trace: <IRQ> [<ffffffffc08e891c>] ieee80211_extend_absent_time+0x6c/0xb0 [mac80211] [<ffffffffc08e8a17>] ieee80211_update_p2p_noa+0xb7/0xe0 [mac80211] [<ffffffffc069cc30>] ath9k_p2p_ps_timer+0x170/0x190 [ath9k] [<ffffffffc070adf8>] ath_gen_timer_isr+0xc8/0xf0 [ath9k_hw] [<ffffffffc0691156>] ath9k_tasklet+0x296/0x2f0 [ath9k] [<ffffffff8107ad65>] tasklet_action+0xe5/0xf0 [...] Signed-off-by: Janusz Dziedzic <janusz.dziedzic@tieto.com> Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Luis Henriques <luis.henriques@canonical.com>
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sumit.saxena@avagotech.com authored
commit 323c4a02 upstream. This is an issue on SMAP enabled CPUs and 32 bit apps running on 64 bit OS. Do not access user memory from kernel code. The SMAP bit restricts accessing user memory from kernel code. Signed-off-by: Sumit Saxena <sumit.saxena@avagotech.com> Signed-off-by: Kashyap Desai <kashyap.desai@avagotech.com> Reviewed-by: Tomas Henzl <thenzl@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Martin K. Petersen <martin.petersen@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Luis Henriques <luis.henriques@canonical.com>
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Max Filippov authored
commit 5029615e upstream. Build-time fixes: - make lbeg/lend/lcount save/restore conditional on kernel entry; - don't clear lcount in platform_restart functions unconditionally. Run-time fixes: - use correct end of range register in __endla paired with __loopt, not the unused temporary register. This fixes .bss zero-initialization. Update comments in asmmacro.h; - don't clobber a10 in the usercopy that leads to access to unmapped memory. Signed-off-by: Max Filippov <jcmvbkbc@gmail.com> [ luis: backported to 3.16: adjusted context ] Signed-off-by: Luis Henriques <luis.henriques@canonical.com>
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Herbert Xu authored
commit 4afa5f96 upstream. The hash_accept call fails to work on sockets that have not received any data. For some algorithm implementations it may cause crashes. This patch fixes this by ensuring that we only export and import on sockets that have received data. Reported-by: Harsh Jain <harshjain.prof@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au> Tested-by: Stephan Mueller <smueller@chronox.de> Signed-off-by: Luis Henriques <luis.henriques@canonical.com>
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Jani Nikula authored
commit 9be64eee upstream. Reported-by: Keith Webb <khwebb@gmail.com> Suggested-by: Keith Webb <khwebb@gmail.com> Bugzilla: https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=106671Reviewed-by: Clint Taylor <Clinton.A.Taylor@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Jani Nikula <jani.nikula@intel.com> Link: http://patchwork.freedesktop.org/patch/msgid/1446209424-28801-1-git-send-email-jani.nikula@intel.comSigned-off-by: Luis Henriques <luis.henriques@canonical.com>
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Mauricio Faria de Oliveira authored
commit 47796938 upstream. This reverts commit a1989b33. That commit introduced a regression at least for the case of the SG_IO ioctl() running without CAP_SYS_RAWIO capability (e.g., unprivileged users) when there are no active paths: the ioctl() fails with the ENOTTY errno immediately rather than blocking due to queue_if_no_path until a path becomes active, for example. That case happens to be exercised by QEMU KVM guests with 'scsi-block' devices (qemu "-device scsi-block" [1], libvirt "<disk type='block' device='lun'>" [2]) from multipath devices; which leads to SCSI/filesystem errors in such a guest. More general scenarios can hit that regression too. The following demonstration employs a SG_IO ioctl() with a standard SCSI INQUIRY command for this objective (some output & user changes omitted for brevity and comments added for clarity). Reverting that commit restores normal operation (queueing) in failing scenarios; tested on linux-next (next-20151022). 1) Test-case is based on sg_simple0 [3] (just SG_IO; remove SG_GET_VERSION_NUM) $ cat sg_simple0.c ... see [3] ... $ sed '/SG_GET_VERSION_NUM/,/}/d' sg_simple0.c > sgio_inquiry.c $ gcc sgio_inquiry.c -o sgio_inquiry 2) The ioctl() works fine with active paths present. # multipath -l 85ag56 85ag56 (...) dm-19 IBM ,2145 size=60G features='1 queue_if_no_path' hwhandler='0' wp=rw |-+- policy='service-time 0' prio=0 status=active | |- 8:0:11:0 sdz 65:144 active undef running | `- 9:0:9:0 sdbf 67:144 active undef running `-+- policy='service-time 0' prio=0 status=enabled |- 8:0:12:0 sdae 65:224 active undef running `- 9:0:12:0 sdbo 68:32 active undef running $ ./sgio_inquiry /dev/mapper/85ag56 Some of the INQUIRY command's response: IBM 2145 0000 INQUIRY duration=0 millisecs, resid=0 3) The ioctl() fails with ENOTTY errno with _no_ active paths present, for unprivileged users (rather than blocking due to queue_if_no_path). # for path in $(multipath -l 85ag56 | grep -o 'sd[a-z]\+'); \ do multipathd -k"fail path $path"; done # multipath -l 85ag56 85ag56 (...) dm-19 IBM ,2145 size=60G features='1 queue_if_no_path' hwhandler='0' wp=rw |-+- policy='service-time 0' prio=0 status=enabled | |- 8:0:11:0 sdz 65:144 failed undef running | `- 9:0:9:0 sdbf 67:144 failed undef running `-+- policy='service-time 0' prio=0 status=enabled |- 8:0:12:0 sdae 65:224 failed undef running `- 9:0:12:0 sdbo 68:32 failed undef running $ ./sgio_inquiry /dev/mapper/85ag56 sg_simple0: Inquiry SG_IO ioctl error: Inappropriate ioctl for device 4) dmesg shows that scsi_verify_blk_ioctl() failed for SG_IO (0x2285); it returns -ENOIOCTLCMD, later replaced with -ENOTTY in vfs_ioctl(). $ dmesg <...> [] device-mapper: multipath: Failing path 65:144. [] device-mapper: multipath: Failing path 67:144. [] device-mapper: multipath: Failing path 65:224. [] device-mapper: multipath: Failing path 68:32. [] sgio_inquiry: sending ioctl 2285 to a partition! 5) The ioctl() only works if the SYS_CAP_RAWIO capability is present (then queueing happens -- in this example, queue_if_no_path is set); this is due to a conditional check in scsi_verify_blk_ioctl(). # capsh --drop=cap_sys_rawio -- -c './sgio_inquiry /dev/mapper/85ag56' sg_simple0: Inquiry SG_IO ioctl error: Inappropriate ioctl for device # ./sgio_inquiry /dev/mapper/85ag56 & [1] 72830 # cat /proc/72830/stack [<c00000171c0df700>] 0xc00000171c0df700 [<c000000000015934>] __switch_to+0x204/0x350 [<c000000000152d4c>] msleep+0x5c/0x80 [<c00000000077dfb0>] dm_blk_ioctl+0x70/0x170 [<c000000000487c40>] blkdev_ioctl+0x2b0/0x9b0 [<c0000000003128e4>] block_ioctl+0x64/0xd0 [<c0000000002dd3b0>] do_vfs_ioctl+0x490/0x780 [<c0000000002dd774>] SyS_ioctl+0xd4/0xf0 [<c000000000009358>] system_call+0x38/0xd0 6) This is the function call chain exercised in this analysis: SYSCALL_DEFINE3(ioctl, <...>) @ fs/ioctl.c -> do_vfs_ioctl() -> vfs_ioctl() ... error = filp->f_op->unlocked_ioctl(filp, cmd, arg); ... -> dm_blk_ioctl() @ drivers/md/dm.c -> multipath_ioctl() @ drivers/md/dm-mpath.c ... (bdev = NULL, due to no active paths) ... if (!bdev || <...>) { int err = scsi_verify_blk_ioctl(NULL, cmd); if (err) r = err; } ... -> scsi_verify_blk_ioctl() @ block/scsi_ioctl.c ... if (bd && bd == bd->bd_contains) // not taken (bd = NULL) return 0; ... if (capable(CAP_SYS_RAWIO)) // not taken (unprivileged user) return 0; ... printk_ratelimited(KERN_WARNING "%s: sending ioctl %x to a partition!\n" <...>); return -ENOIOCTLCMD; <- ... return r ? : <...> <- ... if (error == -ENOIOCTLCMD) error = -ENOTTY; out: return error; ... Links: [1] http://git.qemu.org/?p=qemu.git;a=commit;h=336a6915bc7089fb20fea4ba99972ad9a97c5f52 [2] https://libvirt.org/formatdomain.html#elementsDisks (see 'disk' -> 'device') [3] http://tldp.org/HOWTO/SCSI-Generic-HOWTO/pexample.html (Revision 1.2, 2002-05-03) Signed-off-by: Mauricio Faria de Oliveira <mauricfo@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Mike Snitzer <snitzer@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Luis Henriques <luis.henriques@canonical.com>
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Brian Norris authored
commit f3c63795 upstream. Commit 073db4a5 ("mtd: fix: avoid race condition when accessing mtd->usecount") fixed a race condition but due to poor ordering of the mutex acquisition, introduced a potential deadlock. The deadlock can occur, for example, when rmmod'ing the m25p80 module, which will delete one or more MTDs, along with any corresponding mtdblock devices. This could potentially race with an acquisition of the block device as follows. -> blktrans_open() -> mutex_lock(&dev->lock); -> mutex_lock(&mtd_table_mutex); -> del_mtd_device() -> mutex_lock(&mtd_table_mutex); -> blktrans_notify_remove() -> del_mtd_blktrans_dev() -> mutex_lock(&dev->lock); This is a classic (potential) ABBA deadlock, which can be fixed by making the A->B ordering consistent everywhere. There was no real purpose to the ordering in the original patch, AFAIR, so this shouldn't be a problem. This ordering was actually already present in del_mtd_blktrans_dev(), for one, where the function tried to ensure that its caller already held mtd_table_mutex before it acquired &dev->lock: if (mutex_trylock(&mtd_table_mutex)) { mutex_unlock(&mtd_table_mutex); BUG(); } So, reverse the ordering of acquisition of &dev->lock and &mtd_table_mutex so we always acquire mtd_table_mutex first. Snippets of the lockdep output follow: # modprobe -r m25p80 [ 53.419251] [ 53.420838] ====================================================== [ 53.427300] [ INFO: possible circular locking dependency detected ] [ 53.433865] 4.3.0-rc6 #96 Not tainted [ 53.437686] ------------------------------------------------------- [ 53.444220] modprobe/372 is trying to acquire lock: [ 53.449320] (&new->lock){+.+...}, at: [<c043fe4c>] del_mtd_blktrans_dev+0x80/0xdc [ 53.457271] [ 53.457271] but task is already holding lock: [ 53.463372] (mtd_table_mutex){+.+.+.}, at: [<c0439994>] del_mtd_device+0x18/0x100 [ 53.471321] [ 53.471321] which lock already depends on the new lock. [ 53.471321] [ 53.479856] [ 53.479856] the existing dependency chain (in reverse order) is: [ 53.487660] -> #1 (mtd_table_mutex){+.+.+.}: [ 53.492331] [<c043fc5c>] blktrans_open+0x34/0x1a4 [ 53.497879] [<c01afce0>] __blkdev_get+0xc4/0x3b0 [ 53.503364] [<c01b0bb8>] blkdev_get+0x108/0x320 [ 53.508743] [<c01713c0>] do_dentry_open+0x218/0x314 [ 53.514496] [<c0180454>] path_openat+0x4c0/0xf9c [ 53.519959] [<c0182044>] do_filp_open+0x5c/0xc0 [ 53.525336] [<c0172758>] do_sys_open+0xfc/0x1cc [ 53.530716] [<c000f740>] ret_fast_syscall+0x0/0x1c [ 53.536375] -> #0 (&new->lock){+.+...}: [ 53.540587] [<c063f124>] mutex_lock_nested+0x38/0x3cc [ 53.546504] [<c043fe4c>] del_mtd_blktrans_dev+0x80/0xdc [ 53.552606] [<c043f164>] blktrans_notify_remove+0x7c/0x84 [ 53.558891] [<c04399f0>] del_mtd_device+0x74/0x100 [ 53.564544] [<c043c670>] del_mtd_partitions+0x80/0xc8 [ 53.570451] [<c0439aa0>] mtd_device_unregister+0x24/0x48 [ 53.576637] [<c046ce6c>] spi_drv_remove+0x1c/0x34 [ 53.582207] [<c03de0f0>] __device_release_driver+0x88/0x114 [ 53.588663] [<c03de19c>] device_release_driver+0x20/0x2c [ 53.594843] [<c03dd9e8>] bus_remove_device+0xd8/0x108 [ 53.600748] [<c03dacc0>] device_del+0x10c/0x210 [ 53.606127] [<c03dadd0>] device_unregister+0xc/0x20 [ 53.611849] [<c046d878>] __unregister+0x10/0x20 [ 53.617211] [<c03da868>] device_for_each_child+0x50/0x7c [ 53.623387] [<c046eae8>] spi_unregister_master+0x58/0x8c [ 53.629578] [<c03e12f0>] release_nodes+0x15c/0x1c8 [ 53.635223] [<c03de0f8>] __device_release_driver+0x90/0x114 [ 53.641689] [<c03de900>] driver_detach+0xb4/0xb8 [ 53.647147] [<c03ddc78>] bus_remove_driver+0x4c/0xa0 [ 53.652970] [<c00cab50>] SyS_delete_module+0x11c/0x1e4 [ 53.658976] [<c000f740>] ret_fast_syscall+0x0/0x1c [ 53.664621] [ 53.664621] other info that might help us debug this: [ 53.664621] [ 53.672979] Possible unsafe locking scenario: [ 53.672979] [ 53.679169] CPU0 CPU1 [ 53.683900] ---- ---- [ 53.688633] lock(mtd_table_mutex); [ 53.692383] lock(&new->lock); [ 53.698306] lock(mtd_table_mutex); [ 53.704658] lock(&new->lock); [ 53.707946] [ 53.707946] *** DEADLOCK *** Fixes: 073db4a5 ("mtd: fix: avoid race condition when accessing mtd->usecount") Reported-by: Felipe Balbi <balbi@ti.com> Tested-by: Felipe Balbi <balbi@ti.com> Signed-off-by: Brian Norris <computersforpeace@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Luis Henriques <luis.henriques@canonical.com>
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Marek Vasut authored
commit 562b103a upstream. The sizeof() is invoked on an incorrect variable, likely due to some copy-paste error, and this might result in memory corruption. Fix this. Signed-off-by: Marek Vasut <marex@denx.de> Cc: Wolfgang Grandegger <wg@grandegger.com> Cc: netdev@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Marc Kleine-Budde <mkl@pengutronix.de> Signed-off-by: Luis Henriques <luis.henriques@canonical.com>
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Robin Murphy authored
commit 5accd17d upstream. For reasons not entirely apparent, but now enshrined in history, the architectural mapping of AArch32 banked registers to AArch64 registers actually orders SP_<mode> and LR_<mode> backwards compared to the intuitive r13/r14 order, for all modes except FIQ. Fix the compat_<reg>_<mode> macros accordingly, in the hope of avoiding subtle bugs with KVM and AArch32 guests. Signed-off-by: Robin Murphy <robin.murphy@arm.com> Acked-by: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com> Signed-off-by: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com> Signed-off-by: Luis Henriques <luis.henriques@canonical.com>
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David Hildenbrand authored
commit c5c2c393 upstream. We seemed to have missed a few corner cases in commit f6c137ff ("KVM: s390: randomize sca address"). The SCA has a maximum size of 2112 bytes. By setting the sca_offset to some unlucky numbers, we exceed the page. 0x7c0 (1984) -> Fits exactly 0x7d0 (2000) -> 16 bytes out 0x7e0 (2016) -> 32 bytes out 0x7f0 (2032) -> 48 bytes out One VCPU entry is 32 bytes long. For the last two cases, we actually write data to the other page. 1. The address of the VCPU. 2. Injection/delivery/clearing of SIGP externall calls via SIGP IF. Especially the 2. happens regularly. So this could produce two problems: 1. The guest losing/getting external calls. 2. Random memory overwrites in the host. So this problem happens on every 127 + 128 created VM with 64 VCPUs. Acked-by: Christian Borntraeger <borntraeger@de.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: David Hildenbrand <dahi@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Christian Borntraeger <borntraeger@de.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Luis Henriques <luis.henriques@canonical.com>
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sumit.saxena@avagotech.com authored
commit 357ae967 upstream. Do not use PAGE_SIZE marco to calculate max_sectors per I/O request. Driver code assumes PAGE_SIZE will be always 4096 which can lead to wrongly calculated value if PAGE_SIZE is not 4096. This issue was reported in Ubuntu Bugzilla Bug #1475166. Signed-off-by: Sumit Saxena <sumit.saxena@avagotech.com> Signed-off-by: Kashyap Desai <kashyap.desai@avagotech.com> Reviewed-by: Tomas Henzl <thenzl@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Martin K. Petersen <martin.petersen@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Martin K. Petersen <martin.petersen@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Luis Henriques <luis.henriques@canonical.com>
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Vineet Gupta authored
commit 9acdc911 upstream. Signed-off-by: Vineet Gupta <vgupta@synopsys.com> Signed-off-by: Luis Henriques <luis.henriques@canonical.com>
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Kailang Yang authored
commit 6ed1131f upstream. This machine had I2S codec for speaker output. It need to refill the I2S codec initial verb after resume back. Signed-off-by: Kailang Yang <kailang@realtek.com> Reported-and-tested-by: George Gugulea <gugulea@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.de> [ luis: backported to 3.16: adjusted context ] Signed-off-by: Luis Henriques <luis.henriques@canonical.com>
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Chen Yu authored
commit 49e4b843 upstream. Currently when the system is trying to uninstall the ACPI interrupt handler, it uses acpi_gbl_FADT.sci_interrupt as the IRQ number. However, the IRQ number that the ACPI interrupt handled is installed for comes from acpi_gsi_to_irq() and that is the number that should be used for the handler removal. Fix this problem by using the mapped IRQ returned from acpi_gsi_to_irq() as appropriate. Acked-by: Lv Zheng <lv.zheng@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Chen Yu <yu.c.chen@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Rafael J. Wysocki <rafael.j.wysocki@intel.com> [ luis: backported to 3.16: adjusted context ] Signed-off-by: Luis Henriques <luis.henriques@canonical.com>
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Larry Finger authored
commit 1e6e6328 upstream. This adds the USB ID for the Sitecom WLA2100. The Windows 10 inf file was checked to verify that the addition is correct. Reported-by: Frans van de Wiel <fvdw@fvdw.eu> Signed-off-by: Larry Finger <Larry.Finger@lwfinger.net> Cc: Frans van de Wiel <fvdw@fvdw.eu> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> Signed-off-by: Luis Henriques <luis.henriques@canonical.com>
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Bjørn Mork authored
commit f504ab18 upstream. New device IDs shamelessly lifted from the vendor driver. Signed-off-by: Bjørn Mork <bjorn@mork.no> Acked-by: Johan Hovold <johan@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> Signed-off-by: Luis Henriques <luis.henriques@canonical.com>
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David Mosberger-Tang authored
commit 06515f83 upstream. The DMA-slave configuration depends on the whether <= 8 or > 8 bits are transferred per word, so we need to call atmel_spi_dma_slave_config() with the correct value. Signed-off-by: David Mosberger <davidm@egauge.net> Signed-off-by: Nicolas Ferre <nicolas.ferre@atmel.com> Signed-off-by: Mark Brown <broonie@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Luis Henriques <luis.henriques@canonical.com>
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Dmitry Tunin authored
commit 18e0afab upstream. T: Bus=04 Lev=02 Prnt=02 Port=04 Cnt=01 Dev#= 3 Spd=12 MxCh= 0 D: Ver= 1.10 Cls=e0(wlcon) Sub=01 Prot=01 MxPS=64 #Cfgs= 1 P: Vendor=0cf3 ProdID=817b Rev=00.02 C: #Ifs= 2 Cfg#= 1 Atr=e0 MxPwr=100mA I: If#= 0 Alt= 0 #EPs= 3 Cls=e0(wlcon) Sub=01 Prot=01 Driver=btusb I: If#= 1 Alt= 0 #EPs= 2 Cls=e0(wlcon) Sub=01 Prot=01 Driver=btusb BugLink: https://bugs.launchpad.net/bugs/1506615Signed-off-by: Dmitry Tunin <hanipouspilot@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org> Signed-off-by: Luis Henriques <luis.henriques@canonical.com>
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Dmitry Tunin authored
commit cd355ff0 upstream. This adapter works with the existing linux-firmware. T: Bus=01 Lev=01 Prnt=01 Port=03 Cnt=02 Dev#= 3 Spd=12 MxCh= 0 D: Ver= 1.10 Cls=e0(wlcon) Sub=01 Prot=01 MxPS=64 #Cfgs= 1 P: Vendor=0930 ProdID=021c Rev=00.01 C: #Ifs= 2 Cfg#= 1 Atr=e0 MxPwr=100mA I: If#= 0 Alt= 0 #EPs= 3 Cls=e0(wlcon) Sub=01 Prot=01 Driver=btusb I: If#= 1 Alt= 0 #EPs= 2 Cls=e0(wlcon) Sub=01 Prot=01 Driver=btusb BugLink: https://bugs.launchpad.net/bugs/1502781Signed-off-by: Dmitry Tunin <hanipouspilot@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org> Signed-off-by: Luis Henriques <luis.henriques@canonical.com>
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David Herrmann authored
commit 660f0fc0 upstream. The HIDP specs define an idle-timeout which automatically disconnects a device. This has always been implemented in the HIDP layer and forced a synchronous shutdown of the hidp-scheduler. This works just fine, but lacks a forced disconnect on the underlying l2cap channels. This has been broken since: commit 5205185d Author: David Herrmann <dh.herrmann@gmail.com> Date: Sat Apr 6 20:28:47 2013 +0200 Bluetooth: hidp: remove old session-management The old session-management always forced an l2cap error on the ctrl/intr channels when shutting down. The new session-management skips this, as we don't want to enforce channel policy on the caller. In other words, if user-space removes an HIDP device, the underlying channels (which are *owned* and *referenced* by user-space) are still left active. User-space needs to call shutdown(2) or close(2) to release them. Unfortunately, this does not work with idle-timeouts. There is no way to signal user-space that the HIDP layer has been stopped. The API simply does not support any event-passing except for poll(2). Hence, we restore old behavior and force EUNATCH on the sockets if the HIDP layer is disconnected due to idle-timeouts (behavior of explicit disconnects remains unmodified). User-space can still call getsockopt(..., SO_ERROR, ...) ..to retrieve the EUNATCH error and clear sk_err. Hence, the channels can still be re-used (which nobody does so far, though). Therefore, the API still supports the new behavior, but with this patch it's also compatible to the old implicit channel shutdown. Reported-by: Mark Haun <haunma@keteu.org> Reported-by: Luiz Augusto von Dentz <luiz.dentz@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: David Herrmann <dh.herrmann@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org> Signed-off-by: Luis Henriques <luis.henriques@canonical.com>
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Tiffany Lin authored
commit d9a98588 upstream. In videobuf2 dma-contig memory type the prepare and finish ops, instead of passing the number of entries in the original scatterlist as the "nents" parameter to dma_sync_sg_for_device() and dma_sync_sg_for_cpu(), the value returned by dma_map_sg() was used. Albeit this has been suggested in comments of some implementations (which have since been corrected), this is wrong. Fixes: 199d101e ("v4l: vb2-dma-contig: add prepare/finish to dma-contig allocator") Signed-off-by: Tiffany Lin <tiffany.lin@mediatek.com> Signed-off-by: Sakari Ailus <sakari.ailus@linux.intel.com> Signed-off-by: Mauro Carvalho Chehab <mchehab@osg.samsung.com> Signed-off-by: Luis Henriques <luis.henriques@canonical.com>
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Andy Shevchenko authored
commit 02f20387 upstream. The following warning occurs when DW SPI is compiled as a module and it's a PCI device. On the removal stage pcibios_free_irq() is called earlier than free_irq() due to the latter is called at managed resources free strage. ------------[ cut here ]------------ WARNING: CPU: 1 PID: 1003 at /home/andy/prj/linux/fs/proc/generic.c:575 remove_proc_entry+0x118/0x150() remove_proc_entry: removing non-empty directory 'irq/38', leaking at least 'dw_spi1' Modules linked in: spi_dw_midpci(-) spi_dw [last unloaded: dw_dmac_core] CPU: 1 PID: 1003 Comm: modprobe Not tainted 4.3.0-rc5-next-20151013+ #32 00000000 00000000 f5535d70 c12dc220 f5535db0 f5535da0 c104e912 c198a6bc f5535dcc 000003eb c198a638 0000023f c11b4098 c11b4098 f54f1ec8 f54f1ea0 f642ba20 f5535db8 c104e96e 00000009 f5535db0 c198a6bc f5535dcc f5535df0 Call Trace: [<c12dc220>] dump_stack+0x41/0x61 [<c104e912>] warn_slowpath_common+0x82/0xb0 [<c11b4098>] ? remove_proc_entry+0x118/0x150 [<c11b4098>] ? remove_proc_entry+0x118/0x150 [<c104e96e>] warn_slowpath_fmt+0x2e/0x30 [<c11b4098>] remove_proc_entry+0x118/0x150 [<c109b96a>] unregister_irq_proc+0xaa/0xc0 [<c109575e>] free_desc+0x1e/0x60 [<c10957d2>] irq_free_descs+0x32/0x70 [<c109b1a0>] irq_domain_free_irqs+0x120/0x150 [<c1039e8c>] mp_unmap_irq+0x5c/0x60 [<c16277b0>] intel_mid_pci_irq_disable+0x20/0x40 [<c1627c7f>] pcibios_free_irq+0xf/0x20 [<c13189f2>] pci_device_remove+0x52/0xb0 [<c13f6367>] __device_release_driver+0x77/0x100 [<c13f6da7>] driver_detach+0x87/0x90 [<c13f5eaa>] bus_remove_driver+0x4a/0xc0 [<c128bf0d>] ? selinux_capable+0xd/0x10 [<c13f7483>] driver_unregister+0x23/0x60 [<c10bad8a>] ? find_module_all+0x5a/0x80 [<c1317413>] pci_unregister_driver+0x13/0x60 [<f80ac654>] dw_spi_driver_exit+0xd/0xf [spi_dw_midpci] [<c10bce9a>] SyS_delete_module+0x17a/0x210 Explicitly call free_irq() at removal stage of the DW SPI driver. Fixes: 04f421e7 (spi: dw: use managed resources) Signed-off-by: Andy Shevchenko <andriy.shevchenko@linux.intel.com> Signed-off-by: Mark Brown <broonie@kernel.org> [ luis: backported to 3.16: adjusted context ] Signed-off-by: Luis Henriques <luis.henriques@canonical.com>
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Hon Ching \\(Vicky\\) Lo authored
commit 60ecd86c upstream. At ibm vtpm initialzation, tpm_ibmvtpm_probe() registers its interrupt handler, ibmvtpm_interrupt, which calls ibmvtpm_crq_process to allocate memory for rtce buffer. The current code uses 'GFP_KERNEL' as the type of kernel memory allocation, which resulted a warning at kernel/lockdep.c. This patch uses 'GFP_ATOMIC' instead so that the allocation is high-priority and does not sleep. Signed-off-by: Hon Ching(Vicky) Lo <honclo@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Peter Huewe <peterhuewe@gmx.de> Signed-off-by: Luis Henriques <luis.henriques@canonical.com>
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Daeho Jeong authored
commit 4327ba52 upstream. If a EXT4 filesystem utilizes JBD2 journaling and an error occurs, the journaling will be aborted first and the error number will be recorded into JBD2 superblock and, finally, the system will enter into the panic state in "errors=panic" option. But, in the rare case, this sequence is little twisted like the below figure and it will happen that the system enters into panic state, which means the system reset in mobile environment, before completion of recording an error in the journal superblock. In this case, e2fsck cannot recognize that the filesystem failure occurred in the previous run and the corruption wouldn't be fixed. Task A Task B ext4_handle_error() -> jbd2_journal_abort() -> __journal_abort_soft() -> __jbd2_journal_abort_hard() | -> journal->j_flags |= JBD2_ABORT; | | __ext4_abort() | -> jbd2_journal_abort() | | -> __journal_abort_soft() | | -> if (journal->j_flags & JBD2_ABORT) | | return; | -> panic() | -> jbd2_journal_update_sb_errno() Tested-by: Hobin Woo <hobin.woo@samsung.com> Signed-off-by: Daeho Jeong <daeho.jeong@samsung.com> Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu> Signed-off-by: Luis Henriques <luis.henriques@canonical.com>
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Andy Leiserson authored
commit 904dad47 upstream. "group" is the group where the backup will be placed, and is initialized to zero in the declaration. This meant that backups for meta_bg descriptors were erroneously written to the backup block group descriptors in groups 1 and (desc_per_block-1). Reproduction information: mke2fs -Fq -t ext4 -b 1024 -O ^resize_inode /tmp/foo.img 16G truncate -s 24G /tmp/foo.img losetup /dev/loop0 /tmp/foo.img mount /dev/loop0 /mnt resize2fs /dev/loop0 umount /dev/loop0 dd if=/dev/zero of=/dev/loop0 bs=1024 count=2 e2fsck -fy /dev/loop0 losetup -d /dev/loop0 Signed-off-by: Andy Leiserson <andy@leiserson.org> Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu> Signed-off-by: Luis Henriques <luis.henriques@canonical.com>
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Lukas Czerner authored
commit 6934da92 upstream. There is a use-after-free possibility in __ext4_journal_stop() in the case that we free the handle in the first jbd2_journal_stop() because we're referencing handle->h_err afterwards. This was introduced in 9705acd6 and it is wrong. Fix it by storing the handle->h_err value beforehand and avoid referencing potentially freed handle. Fixes: 9705acd6Signed-off-by: Lukas Czerner <lczerner@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Andreas Dilger <adilger@dilger.ca> Signed-off-by: Luis Henriques <luis.henriques@canonical.com>
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Filipe Manana authored
commit 0305cd5f upstream. When truncating a file to a smaller size which consists of an inline extent that is compressed, we did not discard (or made unusable) the data between the new file size and the old file size, wasting metadata space and allowing for the truncated data to be leaked and the data corruption/loss mentioned below. We were also not correctly decrementing the number of bytes used by the inode, we were setting it to zero, giving a wrong report for callers of the stat(2) syscall. The fsck tool also reported an error about a mismatch between the nbytes of the file versus the real space used by the file. Now because we weren't discarding the truncated region of the file, it was possible for a caller of the clone ioctl to actually read the data that was truncated, allowing for a security breach without requiring root access to the system, using only standard filesystem operations. The scenario is the following: 1) User A creates a file which consists of an inline and compressed extent with a size of 2000 bytes - the file is not accessible to any other users (no read, write or execution permission for anyone else); 2) The user truncates the file to a size of 1000 bytes; 3) User A makes the file world readable; 4) User B creates a file consisting of an inline extent of 2000 bytes; 5) User B issues a clone operation from user A's file into its own file (using a length argument of 0, clone the whole range); 6) User B now gets to see the 1000 bytes that user A truncated from its file before it made its file world readbale. User B also lost the bytes in the range [1000, 2000[ bytes from its own file, but that might be ok if his/her intention was reading stale data from user A that was never supposed to be public. Note that this contrasts with the case where we truncate a file from 2000 bytes to 1000 bytes and then truncate it back from 1000 to 2000 bytes. In this case reading any byte from the range [1000, 2000[ will return a value of 0x00, instead of the original data. This problem exists since the clone ioctl was added and happens both with and without my recent data loss and file corruption fixes for the clone ioctl (patch "Btrfs: fix file corruption and data loss after cloning inline extents"). So fix this by truncating the compressed inline extents as we do for the non-compressed case, which involves decompressing, if the data isn't already in the page cache, compressing the truncated version of the extent, writing the compressed content into the inline extent and then truncate it. The following test case for fstests reproduces the problem. In order for the test to pass both this fix and my previous fix for the clone ioctl that forbids cloning a smaller inline extent into a larger one, which is titled "Btrfs: fix file corruption and data loss after cloning inline extents", are needed. Without that other fix the test fails in a different way that does not leak the truncated data, instead part of destination file gets replaced with zeroes (because the destination file has a larger inline extent than the source). seq=`basename $0` seqres=$RESULT_DIR/$seq echo "QA output created by $seq" tmp=/tmp/$$ status=1 # failure is the default! trap "_cleanup; exit \$status" 0 1 2 3 15 _cleanup() { rm -f $tmp.* } # get standard environment, filters and checks . ./common/rc . ./common/filter # real QA test starts here _need_to_be_root _supported_fs btrfs _supported_os Linux _require_scratch _require_cloner rm -f $seqres.full _scratch_mkfs >>$seqres.full 2>&1 _scratch_mount "-o compress" # Create our test files. File foo is going to be the source of a clone operation # and consists of a single inline extent with an uncompressed size of 512 bytes, # while file bar consists of a single inline extent with an uncompressed size of # 256 bytes. For our test's purpose, it's important that file bar has an inline # extent with a size smaller than foo's inline extent. $XFS_IO_PROG -f -c "pwrite -S 0xa1 0 128" \ -c "pwrite -S 0x2a 128 384" \ $SCRATCH_MNT/foo | _filter_xfs_io $XFS_IO_PROG -f -c "pwrite -S 0xbb 0 256" $SCRATCH_MNT/bar | _filter_xfs_io # Now durably persist all metadata and data. We do this to make sure that we get # on disk an inline extent with a size of 512 bytes for file foo. sync # Now truncate our file foo to a smaller size. Because it consists of a # compressed and inline extent, btrfs did not shrink the inline extent to the # new size (if the extent was not compressed, btrfs would shrink it to 128 # bytes), it only updates the inode's i_size to 128 bytes. $XFS_IO_PROG -c "truncate 128" $SCRATCH_MNT/foo # Now clone foo's inline extent into bar. # This clone operation should fail with errno EOPNOTSUPP because the source # file consists only of an inline extent and the file's size is smaller than # the inline extent of the destination (128 bytes < 256 bytes). However the # clone ioctl was not prepared to deal with a file that has a size smaller # than the size of its inline extent (something that happens only for compressed # inline extents), resulting in copying the full inline extent from the source # file into the destination file. # # Note that btrfs' clone operation for inline extents consists of removing the # inline extent from the destination inode and copy the inline extent from the # source inode into the destination inode, meaning that if the destination # inode's inline extent is larger (N bytes) than the source inode's inline # extent (M bytes), some bytes (N - M bytes) will be lost from the destination # file. Btrfs could copy the source inline extent's data into the destination's # inline extent so that we would not lose any data, but that's currently not # done due to the complexity that would be needed to deal with such cases # (specially when one or both extents are compressed), returning EOPNOTSUPP, as # it's normally not a very common case to clone very small files (only case # where we get inline extents) and copying inline extents does not save any # space (unlike for normal, non-inlined extents). $CLONER_PROG -s 0 -d 0 -l 0 $SCRATCH_MNT/foo $SCRATCH_MNT/bar # Now because the above clone operation used to succeed, and due to foo's inline # extent not being shinked by the truncate operation, our file bar got the whole # inline extent copied from foo, making us lose the last 128 bytes from bar # which got replaced by the bytes in range [128, 256[ from foo before foo was # truncated - in other words, data loss from bar and being able to read old and # stale data from foo that should not be possible to read anymore through normal # filesystem operations. Contrast with the case where we truncate a file from a # size N to a smaller size M, truncate it back to size N and then read the range # [M, N[, we should always get the value 0x00 for all the bytes in that range. # We expected the clone operation to fail with errno EOPNOTSUPP and therefore # not modify our file's bar data/metadata. So its content should be 256 bytes # long with all bytes having the value 0xbb. # # Without the btrfs bug fix, the clone operation succeeded and resulted in # leaking truncated data from foo, the bytes that belonged to its range # [128, 256[, and losing data from bar in that same range. So reading the # file gave us the following content: # # 0000000 a1 a1 a1 a1 a1 a1 a1 a1 a1 a1 a1 a1 a1 a1 a1 a1 # * # 0000200 2a 2a 2a 2a 2a 2a 2a 2a 2a 2a 2a 2a 2a 2a 2a 2a # * # 0000400 echo "File bar's content after the clone operation:" od -t x1 $SCRATCH_MNT/bar # Also because the foo's inline extent was not shrunk by the truncate # operation, btrfs' fsck, which is run by the fstests framework everytime a # test completes, failed reporting the following error: # # root 5 inode 257 errors 400, nbytes wrong status=0 exit Signed-off-by: Filipe Manana <fdmanana@suse.com> Signed-off-by: Luis Henriques <luis.henriques@canonical.com>
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David Woodhouse authored
commit d14053b3 upstream. The VT-d specification says that "Software must enable ATS on endpoint devices behind a Root Port only if the Root Port is reported as supporting ATS transactions." We walk up the tree to find a Root Port, but for integrated devices we don't find one — we get to the host bridge. In that case we *should* allow ATS. Currently we don't, which means that we are incorrectly failing to use ATS for the integrated graphics. Fix that. We should never break out of this loop "naturally" with bus==NULL, since we'll always find bridge==NULL in that case (and now return 1). So remove the check for (!bridge) after the loop, since it can never happen. If it did, it would be worthy of a BUG_ON(!bridge). But since it'll oops anyway in that case, that'll do just as well. Signed-off-by: David Woodhouse <David.Woodhouse@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Luis Henriques <luis.henriques@canonical.com>
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Peter Ujfalusi authored
commit 696d8b70 upstream. In case when the interrupt happened for the second eDMA the channel number was incorrectly passed to the client driver. Signed-off-by: Peter Ujfalusi <peter.ujfalusi@ti.com> Signed-off-by: Vinod Koul <vinod.koul@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Luis Henriques <luis.henriques@canonical.com>
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Filipe Manana authored
commit 8039d87d upstream. Currently the clone ioctl allows to clone an inline extent from one file to another that already has other (non-inlined) extents. This is a problem because btrfs is not designed to deal with files having inline and regular extents, if a file has an inline extent then it must be the only extent in the file and must start at file offset 0. Having a file with an inline extent followed by regular extents results in EIO errors when doing reads or writes against the first 4K of the file. Also, the clone ioctl allows one to lose data if the source file consists of a single inline extent, with a size of N bytes, and the destination file consists of a single inline extent with a size of M bytes, where we have M > N. In this case the clone operation removes the inline extent from the destination file and then copies the inline extent from the source file into the destination file - we lose the M - N bytes from the destination file, a read operation will get the value 0x00 for any bytes in the the range [N, M] (the destination inode's i_size remained as M, that's why we can read past N bytes). So fix this by not allowing such destructive operations to happen and return errno EOPNOTSUPP to user space. Currently the fstest btrfs/035 tests the data loss case but it totally ignores this - i.e. expects the operation to succeed and does not check the we got data loss. The following test case for fstests exercises all these cases that result in file corruption and data loss: seq=`basename $0` seqres=$RESULT_DIR/$seq echo "QA output created by $seq" tmp=/tmp/$$ status=1 # failure is the default! trap "_cleanup; exit \$status" 0 1 2 3 15 _cleanup() { rm -f $tmp.* } # get standard environment, filters and checks . ./common/rc . ./common/filter # real QA test starts here _need_to_be_root _supported_fs btrfs _supported_os Linux _require_scratch _require_cloner _require_btrfs_fs_feature "no_holes" _require_btrfs_mkfs_feature "no-holes" rm -f $seqres.full test_cloning_inline_extents() { local mkfs_opts=$1 local mount_opts=$2 _scratch_mkfs $mkfs_opts >>$seqres.full 2>&1 _scratch_mount $mount_opts # File bar, the source for all the following clone operations, consists # of a single inline extent (50 bytes). $XFS_IO_PROG -f -c "pwrite -S 0xbb 0 50" $SCRATCH_MNT/bar \ | _filter_xfs_io # Test cloning into a file with an extent (non-inlined) where the # destination offset overlaps that extent. It should not be possible to # clone the inline extent from file bar into this file. $XFS_IO_PROG -f -c "pwrite -S 0xaa 0K 16K" $SCRATCH_MNT/foo \ | _filter_xfs_io $CLONER_PROG -s 0 -d 0 -l 0 $SCRATCH_MNT/bar $SCRATCH_MNT/foo # Doing IO against any range in the first 4K of the file should work. # Due to a past clone ioctl bug which allowed cloning the inline extent, # these operations resulted in EIO errors. echo "File foo data after clone operation:" # All bytes should have the value 0xaa (clone operation failed and did # not modify our file). od -t x1 $SCRATCH_MNT/foo $XFS_IO_PROG -c "pwrite -S 0xcc 0 100" $SCRATCH_MNT/foo | _filter_xfs_io # Test cloning the inline extent against a file which has a hole in its # first 4K followed by a non-inlined extent. It should not be possible # as well to clone the inline extent from file bar into this file. $XFS_IO_PROG -f -c "pwrite -S 0xdd 4K 12K" $SCRATCH_MNT/foo2 \ | _filter_xfs_io $CLONER_PROG -s 0 -d 0 -l 0 $SCRATCH_MNT/bar $SCRATCH_MNT/foo2 # Doing IO against any range in the first 4K of the file should work. # Due to a past clone ioctl bug which allowed cloning the inline extent, # these operations resulted in EIO errors. echo "File foo2 data after clone operation:" # All bytes should have the value 0x00 (clone operation failed and did # not modify our file). od -t x1 $SCRATCH_MNT/foo2 $XFS_IO_PROG -c "pwrite -S 0xee 0 90" $SCRATCH_MNT/foo2 | _filter_xfs_io # Test cloning the inline extent against a file which has a size of zero # but has a prealloc extent. It should not be possible as well to clone # the inline extent from file bar into this file. $XFS_IO_PROG -f -c "falloc -k 0 1M" $SCRATCH_MNT/foo3 | _filter_xfs_io $CLONER_PROG -s 0 -d 0 -l 0 $SCRATCH_MNT/bar $SCRATCH_MNT/foo3 # Doing IO against any range in the first 4K of the file should work. # Due to a past clone ioctl bug which allowed cloning the inline extent, # these operations resulted in EIO errors. echo "First 50 bytes of foo3 after clone operation:" # Should not be able to read any bytes, file has 0 bytes i_size (the # clone operation failed and did not modify our file). od -t x1 $SCRATCH_MNT/foo3 $XFS_IO_PROG -c "pwrite -S 0xff 0 90" $SCRATCH_MNT/foo3 | _filter_xfs_io # Test cloning the inline extent against a file which consists of a # single inline extent that has a size not greater than the size of # bar's inline extent (40 < 50). # It should be possible to do the extent cloning from bar to this file. $XFS_IO_PROG -f -c "pwrite -S 0x01 0 40" $SCRATCH_MNT/foo4 \ | _filter_xfs_io $CLONER_PROG -s 0 -d 0 -l 0 $SCRATCH_MNT/bar $SCRATCH_MNT/foo4 # Doing IO against any range in the first 4K of the file should work. echo "File foo4 data after clone operation:" # Must match file bar's content. od -t x1 $SCRATCH_MNT/foo4 $XFS_IO_PROG -c "pwrite -S 0x02 0 90" $SCRATCH_MNT/foo4 | _filter_xfs_io # Test cloning the inline extent against a file which consists of a # single inline extent that has a size greater than the size of bar's # inline extent (60 > 50). # It should not be possible to clone the inline extent from file bar # into this file. $XFS_IO_PROG -f -c "pwrite -S 0x03 0 60" $SCRATCH_MNT/foo5 \ | _filter_xfs_io $CLONER_PROG -s 0 -d 0 -l 0 $SCRATCH_MNT/bar $SCRATCH_MNT/foo5 # Reading the file should not fail. echo "File foo5 data after clone operation:" # Must have a size of 60 bytes, with all bytes having a value of 0x03 # (the clone operation failed and did not modify our file). od -t x1 $SCRATCH_MNT/foo5 # Test cloning the inline extent against a file which has no extents but # has a size greater than bar's inline extent (16K > 50). # It should not be possible to clone the inline extent from file bar # into this file. $XFS_IO_PROG -f -c "truncate 16K" $SCRATCH_MNT/foo6 | _filter_xfs_io $CLONER_PROG -s 0 -d 0 -l 0 $SCRATCH_MNT/bar $SCRATCH_MNT/foo6 # Reading the file should not fail. echo "File foo6 data after clone operation:" # Must have a size of 16K, with all bytes having a value of 0x00 (the # clone operation failed and did not modify our file). od -t x1 $SCRATCH_MNT/foo6 # Test cloning the inline extent against a file which has no extents but # has a size not greater than bar's inline extent (30 < 50). # It should be possible to clone the inline extent from file bar into # this file. $XFS_IO_PROG -f -c "truncate 30" $SCRATCH_MNT/foo7 | _filter_xfs_io $CLONER_PROG -s 0 -d 0 -l 0 $SCRATCH_MNT/bar $SCRATCH_MNT/foo7 # Reading the file should not fail. echo "File foo7 data after clone operation:" # Must have a size of 50 bytes, with all bytes having a value of 0xbb. od -t x1 $SCRATCH_MNT/foo7 # Test cloning the inline extent against a file which has a size not # greater than the size of bar's inline extent (20 < 50) but has # a prealloc extent that goes beyond the file's size. It should not be # possible to clone the inline extent from bar into this file. $XFS_IO_PROG -f -c "falloc -k 0 1M" \ -c "pwrite -S 0x88 0 20" \ $SCRATCH_MNT/foo8 | _filter_xfs_io $CLONER_PROG -s 0 -d 0 -l 0 $SCRATCH_MNT/bar $SCRATCH_MNT/foo8 echo "File foo8 data after clone operation:" # Must have a size of 20 bytes, with all bytes having a value of 0x88 # (the clone operation did not modify our file). od -t x1 $SCRATCH_MNT/foo8 _scratch_unmount } echo -e "\nTesting without compression and without the no-holes feature...\n" test_cloning_inline_extents echo -e "\nTesting with compression and without the no-holes feature...\n" test_cloning_inline_extents "" "-o compress" echo -e "\nTesting without compression and with the no-holes feature...\n" test_cloning_inline_extents "-O no-holes" "" echo -e "\nTesting with compression and with the no-holes feature...\n" test_cloning_inline_extents "-O no-holes" "-o compress" status=0 exit Signed-off-by: Filipe Manana <fdmanana@suse.com> Signed-off-by: Luis Henriques <luis.henriques@canonical.com>
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Andrey Ryabinin authored
commit 0ad95472 upstream. Commit cb7323ff ("lockd: create and use per-net NSM RPC clients on MON/UNMON requests") introduced per-net NSM RPC clients. Unfortunately this doesn't make any sense without per-net nsm_handle. E.g. the following scenario could happen Two hosts (X and Y) in different namespaces (A and B) share the same nsm struct. 1. nsm_monitor(host_X) called => NSM rpc client created, nsm->sm_monitored bit set. 2. nsm_mointor(host-Y) called => nsm->sm_monitored already set, we just exit. Thus in namespace B ln->nsm_clnt == NULL. 3. host X destroyed => nsm->sm_count decremented to 1 4. host Y destroyed => nsm_unmonitor() => nsm_mon_unmon() => NULL-ptr dereference of *ln->nsm_clnt So this could be fixed by making per-net nsm_handles list, instead of global. Thus different net namespaces will not be able share the same nsm_handle. Signed-off-by: Andrey Ryabinin <aryabinin@virtuozzo.com> Signed-off-by: J. Bruce Fields <bfields@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Luis Henriques <luis.henriques@canonical.com>
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Vignesh R authored
commit bc27a539 upstream. Writing invalid command to QSPI_SPI_CMD_REG will terminate current transfer and de-assert the chip select. This has to be done before calling spi_finalize_current_message(). Because spi_finalize_current_message() will mark the end of current message transfer and schedule the next transfer. If the chipselect is not de-asserted before calling spi_finalize_current_message() then the next transfer will overlap with the previous transfer leading to data corruption. __spi_pump_message() can be called either from kthread worker context or directly from the calling process's context. It is possible that these two calls can race against each other. But race is serialized by checking whether master->cur_msg == NULL (pointer to msg being handled by transfer_one() at present). The master->cur_msg is set to NULL when spi_finalize_current_message() is called on that message, which means calling spi_finalize_current_message() allows __spi_sync() to pump next message in calling process context. Now if spi-ti-qspi calls spi_finalize_current_message() before we terminate transfer at hardware side, if __spi_pump_message() is called from process context then the successive transactions can overlap. Fix this by moving writing invalid command to QSPI_SPI_CMD_REG to before calling spi_finalize_current_message() call. Signed-off-by: Vignesh R <vigneshr@ti.com> Signed-off-by: Mark Brown <broonie@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Luis Henriques <luis.henriques@canonical.com>
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- 09 Dec, 2015 3 commits
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Marek Szyprowski authored
commit 7e312103 upstream. IOMMU-based dma_mmap() implementation lacked proper support for offset parameter used in mmap call (it always assumed that mapping starts from offset zero). This patch adds support for offset parameter to IOMMU-based implementation. Signed-off-by: Marek Szyprowski <m.szyprowski@samsung.com> Signed-off-by: Russell King <rmk+kernel@arm.linux.org.uk> Signed-off-by: Luis Henriques <luis.henriques@canonical.com>
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Marek Szyprowski authored
commit 371f0f08 upstream. dma_mmap() function in IOMMU-based dma-mapping implementation lacked a check for valid range of mmap parameters (offset and buffer size), what might have caused access beyond the allocated buffer. This patch fixes this issue. Signed-off-by: Marek Szyprowski <m.szyprowski@samsung.com> Signed-off-by: Russell King <rmk+kernel@arm.linux.org.uk> Signed-off-by: Luis Henriques <luis.henriques@canonical.com>
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Boris BREZILLON authored
commit e5bae867 upstream. If we fail to allocate a partition structure in the middle of the partition creation process, the already allocated partitions are never removed, which means they are still present in the partition list and their resources are never freed. Signed-off-by: Boris Brezillon <boris.brezillon@free-electrons.com> Signed-off-by: Brian Norris <computersforpeace@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Luis Henriques <luis.henriques@canonical.com>
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