Userspace could enable guest LBR feature when the exactly supported
LBR format value is initialized to the MSR_IA32_PERF_CAPABILITIES
and the LBR is also compatible with vPMU version and host cpu model.

The LBR could be enabled on the guest if host perf supports LBR
(checked via x86_perf_get_lbr()) and the vcpu model is compatible
with the host one.
Signed-off-by: Like Xu <like.xu@linux.intel.com>
Message-Id: <20210201051039.255478-11-like.xu@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>

The vPMU uses GUEST_LBR_IN_USE_IDX (bit 58) in 'pmu->pmc_in_use' to
indicate whether a guest LBR event is still needed by the vcpu. If the
vcpu no longer accesses LBR related registers within a scheduling time
slice, and the enable bit of LBR has been unset, vPMU will treat the
guest LBR event as a bland event of a vPMC counter and release it
as usual. Also, the pass-through state of LBR records msrs is cancelled.
Signed-off-by: Like Xu <like.xu@linux.intel.com>
Message-Id: <20210201051039.255478-10-like.xu@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>

The current vPMU only supports Architecture Version 2. According to
Intel SDM "17.4.7 Freezing LBR and Performance Counters on PMI", if
IA32_DEBUGCTL.Freeze_LBR_On_PMI = 1, the LBR is frozen on the virtual
PMI and the KVM would emulate to clear the LBR bit (bit 0) in
IA32_DEBUGCTL. Also, guest needs to re-enable IA32_DEBUGCTL.LBR
to resume recording branches.
Signed-off-by: Like Xu <like.xu@linux.intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com>
Message-Id: <20210201051039.255478-9-like.xu@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>

When the LBR records msrs has already been pass-through, there is no
need to call vmx_update_intercept_for_lbr_msrs() again and again, and
vice versa.
Signed-off-by: Like Xu <like.xu@linux.intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com>
Message-Id: <20210201051039.255478-8-like.xu@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>

In addition to DEBUGCTLMSR_LBR, any KVM trap caused by LBR msrs access
will result in a creation of guest LBR event per-vcpu.

If the guest LBR event is scheduled on with the corresponding vcpu context,
KVM will pass-through all LBR records msrs to the guest. The LBR callstack
mechanism implemented in the host could help save/restore the guest LBR
records during the event context switches, which reduces a lot of overhead
if we save/restore tens of LBR msrs (e.g. 32 LBR records entries) in the
much more frequent VMX transitions.

To avoid reclaiming LBR resources from any higher priority event on host,
KVM would always check the exist of guest LBR event and its state before
vm-entry as late as possible. A negative result would cancel the
pass-through state, and it also prevents real registers accesses and
potential data leakage. If host reclaims the LBR between two checks, the
interception state and LBR records can be safely preserved due to native
save/restore support from guest LBR event.

The KVM emits a pr_warn() when the LBR hardware is unavailable to the
guest LBR event. The administer is supposed to reminder users that the
guest result may be inaccurate if someone is using LBR to record
hypervisor on the host side.
Suggested-by: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com>
Co-developed-by: Wei Wang <wei.w.wang@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Wei Wang <wei.w.wang@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Like Xu <like.xu@linux.intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com>
Message-Id: <20210201051039.255478-7-like.xu@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>

When vcpu sets DEBUGCTLMSR_LBR in the MSR_IA32_DEBUGCTLMSR, the KVM handler
would create a guest LBR event which enables the callstack mode and none of
hardware counter is assigned. The host perf would schedule and enable this
event as usual but in an exclusive way.

The guest LBR event will be released when the vPMU is reset but soon,
the lazy release mechanism would be applied to this event like a vPMC.
Suggested-by: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com>
Co-developed-by: Wei Wang <wei.w.wang@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Wei Wang <wei.w.wang@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Like Xu <like.xu@linux.intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com>
Message-Id: <20210201051039.255478-6-like.xu@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>

Usespace could set the bits [0, 5] of the IA32_PERF_CAPABILITIES
MSR which tells about the record format stored in the LBR records.

The LBR will be enabled on the guest if host perf supports LBR
(checked via x86_perf_get_lbr()) and the vcpu model is compatible
with the host one.
Signed-off-by: Like Xu <like.xu@linux.intel.com>
Message-Id: <20210201051039.255478-4-like.xu@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>

Usespace could set the bits [0, 5] of the IA32_PERF_CAPABILITIES
MSR which tells about the record format stored in the LBR records.

The LBR will be enabled on the guest if host perf supports LBR
(checked via x86_perf_get_lbr()) and the vcpu model is compatible
with the host one.
Signed-off-by: Like Xu <like.xu@linux.intel.com>
Message-Id: <20210201051039.255478-4-like.xu@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>

Once MSR_IA32_PERF_CAPABILITIES is changed via vmx_set_msr(), the
value should not be changed by cpuid(). To ensure that the new value
is kept, the default initialization path is moved to intel_pmu_init().
The effective value of the MSR will be 0 if PDCM is clear, however.
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>

To make code responsibilities clear, we may resue and invoke the
vmx_set_intercept_for_msr() in other vmx-specific files (e.g. pmu_intel.c),
so expose it to passthrough LBR msrs later.
Signed-off-by: Like Xu <like.xu@linux.intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com>
Message-Id: <20210201051039.255478-2-like.xu@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>

SVM already has specific handlers of MSR_IA32_DEBUGCTLMSR in the
svm_get/set_msr, so the x86 common part can be safely moved to VMX.
This allows KVM to store the bits it supports in GUEST_IA32_DEBUGCTL.

Add vmx_supported_debugctl() to refactor the throwing logic of #GP.
Signed-off-by: Like Xu <like.xu@linux.intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com>
Message-Id: <20210108013704.134985-2-like.xu@linux.intel.com>
[Merge parts of Chenyi Qiang's "KVM: X86: Expose bus lock debug exception
 to guest". - Paolo]
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>

Use x2apic_mode instead of x2apic_enabled() when adjusting the
destination ID during Posted Interrupt updates.  This avoids the costly
RDMSR that is hidden behind x2apic_enabled().
Reported-by: luferry <luferry@163.com>
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Message-Id: <20210115220354.434807-3-seanjc@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>

Export x2apic_mode so that KVM can query whether x2APIC is active
without having to incur the RDMSR in x2apic_enabled().  When Posted
Interrupts are in use for a guest with an assigned device, KVM ends up
checking for x2APIC at least once every time a vCPU halts.  KVM could
obviously snapshot x2apic_enabled() to avoid the RDMSR, but that's
rather silly given that x2apic_mode holds the exact info needed by KVM.
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Message-Id: <20210115220354.434807-2-seanjc@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>

Introduce a new capability named KVM_CAP_X86_BUS_LOCK_EXIT, which is
used to handle bus locks detected in guest. It allows the userspace to
do custom throttling policies to mitigate the 'noisy neighbour' problem.
Signed-off-by: Chenyi Qiang <chenyi.qiang@intel.com>
Message-Id: <20201106090315.18606-5-chenyi.qiang@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>

Virtual Machine can exploit bus locks to degrade the performance of
system. Bus lock can be caused by split locked access to writeback(WB)
memory or by using locks on uncacheable(UC) memory. The bus lock is
typically >1000 cycles slower than an atomic operation within a cache
line. It also disrupts performance on other cores (which must wait for
the bus lock to be released before their memory operations can
complete).

To address the threat, bus lock VM exit is introduced to notify the VMM
when a bus lock was acquired, allowing it to enforce throttling or other
policy based mitigations.

A VMM can enable VM exit due to bus locks by setting a new "Bus Lock
Detection" VM-execution control(bit 30 of Secondary Processor-based VM
execution controls). If delivery of this VM exit was preempted by a
higher priority VM exit (e.g. EPT misconfiguration, EPT violation, APIC
access VM exit, APIC write VM exit, exception bitmap exiting), bit 26 of
exit reason in vmcs field is set to 1.

In current implementation, the KVM exposes this capability through
KVM_CAP_X86_BUS_LOCK_EXIT. The user can get the supported mode bitmap
(i.e. off and exit) and enable it explicitly (disabled by default). If
bus locks in guest are detected by KVM, exit to user space even when
current exit reason is handled by KVM internally. Set a new field
KVM_RUN_BUS_LOCK in vcpu->run->flags to inform the user space that there
is a bus lock detected in guest.

Document for Bus Lock VM exit is now available at the latest "Intel
Architecture Instruction Set Extensions Programming Reference".

Document Link:
https://software.intel.com/content/www/us/en/develop/download/intel-architecture-instruction-set-extensions-programming-reference.htmlCo-developed-by: Xiaoyao Li <xiaoyao.li@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Xiaoyao Li <xiaoyao.li@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Chenyi Qiang <chenyi.qiang@intel.com>
Message-Id: <20201106090315.18606-4-chenyi.qiang@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>

Reset the vcpu->run->flags at the beginning of kvm_arch_vcpu_ioctl_run.
It can avoid every thunk of code that needs to set the flag clear it,
which increases the odds of missing a case and ending up with a flag in
an undefined state.
Signed-off-by: Chenyi Qiang <chenyi.qiang@intel.com>
Message-Id: <20201106090315.18606-3-chenyi.qiang@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>

Convert vcpu_vmx.exit_reason from a u32 to a union (of size u32).  The
full VM_EXIT_REASON field is comprised of a 16-bit basic exit reason in
bits 15:0, and single-bit modifiers in bits 31:16.

Historically, KVM has only had to worry about handling the "failed
VM-Entry" modifier, which could only be set in very specific flows and
required dedicated handling.  I.e. manually stripping the FAILED_VMENTRY
bit was a somewhat viable approach.  But even with only a single bit to
worry about, KVM has had several bugs related to comparing a basic exit
reason against the full exit reason store in vcpu_vmx.

Upcoming Intel features, e.g. SGX, will add new modifier bits that can
be set on more or less any VM-Exit, as opposed to the significantly more
restricted FAILED_VMENTRY, i.e. correctly handling everything in one-off
flows isn't scalable.  Tracking exit reason in a union forces code to
explicitly choose between consuming the full exit reason and the basic
exit, and is a convenient way to document and access the modifiers.

No functional change intended.

Cc: Xiaoyao Li <xiaoyao.li@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Chenyi Qiang <chenyi.qiang@intel.com>
Message-Id: <20201106090315.18606-2-chenyi.qiang@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>

The SEV FW version >= 0.23 added a new command that can be used to query
the attestation report containing the SHA-256 digest of the guest memory
encrypted through the KVM_SEV_LAUNCH_UPDATE_{DATA, VMSA} commands and
sign the report with the Platform Endorsement Key (PEK).

See the SEV FW API spec section 6.8 for more details.

Note there already exist a command (KVM_SEV_LAUNCH_MEASURE) that can be
used to get the SHA-256 digest. The main difference between the
KVM_SEV_LAUNCH_MEASURE and KVM_SEV_ATTESTATION_REPORT is that the latter
can be called while the guest is running and the measurement value is
signed with PEK.

Cc: James Bottomley <jejb@linux.ibm.com>
Cc: Tom Lendacky <Thomas.Lendacky@amd.com>
Cc: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com>
Cc: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Cc: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: John Allen <john.allen@amd.com>
Cc: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Cc: linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org
Reviewed-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Acked-by: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com>
Tested-by: James Bottomley <jejb@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com>
Message-Id: <20210104151749.30248-1-brijesh.singh@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>

Disabling dirty logging is much more intestesting from a testing
perspective if the vCPUs are still running. This also excercises the
code-path in which collapsible SPTEs must be faulted back in at a higher
level after disabling dirty logging.

To: linux-kselftest@vger.kernel.org
CC: Peter Xu <peterx@redhat.com>
CC: Andrew Jones <drjones@redhat.com>
CC: Thomas Huth <thuth@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Ben Gardon <bgardon@google.com>
Message-Id: <20210202185734.1680553-29-bgardon@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>

Add a parameter to control the backing memory type for
dirty_log_perf_test so that the test can be run with hugepages.

To: linux-kselftest@vger.kernel.org
CC: Peter Xu <peterx@redhat.com>
CC: Andrew Jones <drjones@redhat.com>
CC: Thomas Huth <thuth@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Ben Gardon <bgardon@google.com>
Message-Id: <20210202185734.1680553-28-bgardon@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>

Add a memslot modification stress test in which a memslot is repeatedly
created and removed while vCPUs access memory in another memslot. Most
userspaces do not create or remove memslots on running VMs which makes
it hard to test races in adding and removing memslots without a
dedicated test. Adding and removing a memslot also has the effect of
tearing down the entire paging structure, which leads to more page
faults and pressure on the page fault handling path than a one-and-done
memory population test.
Reviewed-by: Jacob Xu <jacobhxu@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Ben Gardon <bgardon@google.com>
Message-Id: <20210112214253.463999-7-bgardon@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>

Add an option to overlap the ranges of memory each vCPU accesses instead
of partitioning them. This option will increase the probability of
multiple vCPUs faulting on the same page at the same time, and causing
interesting races, if there are bugs in the page fault handler or
elsewhere in the kernel.
Reviewed-by: Jacob Xu <jacobhxu@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Makarand Sonare <makarandsonare@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Ben Gardon <bgardon@google.com>
Message-Id: <20210112214253.463999-6-bgardon@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>

Currently the population stage in the dirty_log_perf_test does nothing
as the per-vCPU iteration counters are not initialized and the loop does
not wait for each vCPU. Remedy those errors.
Reviewed-by: Jacob Xu <jacobhxu@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Makarand Sonare <makarandsonare@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Ben Gardon <bgardon@google.com>
Message-Id: <20210112214253.463999-5-bgardon@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>

In order to add an iteration -1 to indicate that the memory population
phase has not yet completed, convert the interations counters to ints.

No functional change intended.
Reviewed-by: Jacob Xu <jacobhxu@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Ben Gardon <bgardon@google.com>
Message-Id: <20210112214253.463999-4-bgardon@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>

Peter Xu pointed out that a log message printed while waiting for the
memory population phase of the dirty_log_perf_test will flood the debug
logs as there is no delay after printing the message. Since the message
does not provide much value anyway, remove it.
Reviewed-by: Jacob Xu <jacobhxu@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Ben Gardon <bgardon@google.com>
Message-Id: <20210112214253.463999-3-bgardon@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>

In response to some earlier comments from Peter Xu, rename
timespec_diff_now to the much more sensible timespec_elapsed.

No functional change intended.
Reviewed-by: Jacob Xu <jacobhxu@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Makarand Sonare <makarandsonare@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Ben Gardon <bgardon@google.com>
Message-Id: <20210112214253.463999-2-bgardon@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>

Remove the update_pte() shadow paging logic, which was obsoleted by
commit 4731d4c7 ("KVM: MMU: out of sync shadow core"), but never
removed.  As pointed out by Yu, KVM never write protects leaf page
tables for the purposes of shadow paging, and instead marks their
associated shadow page as unsync so that the guest can write PTEs at
will.

The update_pte() path, which predates the unsync logic, optimizes COW
scenarios by refreshing leaf SPTEs when they are written, as opposed to
zapping the SPTE, restarting the guest, and installing the new SPTE on
the subsequent fault.  Since KVM no longer write-protects leaf page
tables, update_pte() is unreachable and can be dropped.
Reported-by: Yu Zhang <yu.c.zhang@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Message-Id: <20210115004051.4099250-1-seanjc@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>

When a guest is using xAPIC KVM allocates a backing page for the required
EPT entry for the APIC access address set in the VMCS. If mm decides to
move that page the KVM mmu notifier will update the VMCS with the new
HPA. This test induces a page move to test that APIC access continues to
work correctly. It is a directed test for
commit e649b3f0 "KVM: x86: Fix APIC page invalidation race".

Tested: ran for 1 hour on a skylake, migrating backing page every 1ms

Depends on patch "selftests: kvm: Add exception handling to selftests"
from aaronlewis@google.com that has not yet been queued.
Signed-off-by: Peter Shier <pshier@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Jim Mattson <jmattson@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Ricardo Koller <ricarkol@google.com>
Message-Id: <20201105223823.850068-1-pshier@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>

Expose AVX (VEX-encoded) versions of the Vector Neural Network
Instructions to guest.

The bit definition:
CPUID.(EAX=7,ECX=1):EAX[bit 4] AVX_VNNI

The following instructions are available when this feature is
present in the guest.
  1. VPDPBUS: Multiply and Add Unsigned and Signed Bytes
  2. VPDPBUSDS: Multiply and Add Unsigned and Signed Bytes with Saturation
  3. VPDPWSSD: Multiply and Add Signed Word Integers
  4. VPDPWSSDS: Multiply and Add Signed Integers with Saturation

This instruction is currently documented in the latest "extensions"
manual (ISE). It will appear in the "main" manual (SDM) in the future.
Signed-off-by: Yang Zhong <yang.zhong@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Tony Luck <tony.luck@intel.com>
Message-Id: <20210105004909.42000-3-yang.zhong@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>

Add AVX version of the Vector Neural Network (VNNI) Instructions.

A processor supports AVX VNNI instructions if CPUID.0x07.0x1:EAX[4] is
present. The following instructions are available when this feature is
present.
  1. VPDPBUS: Multiply and Add Unsigned and Signed Bytes
  2. VPDPBUSDS: Multiply and Add Unsigned and Signed Bytes with Saturation
  3. VPDPWSSD: Multiply and Add Signed Word Integers
  4. VPDPWSSDS: Multiply and Add Signed Integers with Saturation

The only in-kernel usage of this is kvm passthrough. The CPU feature
flag is shown as "avx_vnni" in /proc/cpuinfo.

This instruction is currently documented in the latest "extensions"
manual (ISE). It will appear in the "main" manual (SDM) in the future.
Signed-off-by: Kyung Min Park <kyung.min.park@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Yang Zhong <yang.zhong@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Tony Luck <tony.luck@intel.com>
Message-Id: <20210105004909.42000-2-yang.zhong@intel.com>
Acked-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>

Fix the following coccicheck warning:
./arch/x86/kvm/x86.c:8012:5-48: WARNING: Comparison to bool
Signed-off-by: YANG LI <abaci-bugfix@linux.alibaba.com>
Reported-by: Abaci Robot <abaci@linux.alibaba.com>
Message-Id: <1610357578-66081-1-git-send-email-abaci-bugfix@linux.alibaba.com>
Reviewed-by: Vitaly Kuznetsov <vkuznets@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>

Walk the list of MMU pages in reverse in kvm_mmu_zap_oldest_mmu_pages().
The list is FIFO, meaning new pages are inserted at the head and thus
the oldest pages are at the tail.  Using a "forward" iterator causes KVM
to zap MMU pages that were just added, which obliterates guest
performance once the max number of shadow MMU pages is reached.

Fixes: 6b82ef2c ("KVM: x86/mmu: Batch zap MMU pages when recycling oldest pages")
Reported-by: Zdenek Kaspar <zkaspar82@gmail.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Message-Id: <20210113205030.3481307-1-seanjc@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>

Return a 'bool' instead of an 'int' for various PTE accessors that are
boolean in nature, e.g. is_shadow_present_pte().  Returning an int is
goofy and potentially dangerous, e.g. if a flag being checked is moved
into the upper 32 bits of a SPTE, then the compiler may silently squash
the entire check since casting to an int is guaranteed to yield a
return value of '0'.

Opportunistically refactor is_last_spte() so that it naturally returns
a bool value instead of letting it implicitly cast 0/1 to false/true.

No functional change intended.
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Message-Id: <20210123003003.3137525-1-seanjc@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>

fixed the following warning：
/virt/kvm/dirty_ring.c:70:20-27: WARNING: vzalloc should be used for
ring -> dirty_gfns, instead of vmalloc/memset.
Signed-off-by: Tian Tao <tiantao6@hisilicon.com>
Message-Id: <1611547045-13669-1-git-send-email-tiantao6@hisilicon.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>

Enter a SRCU critical section for a memslots lookup during steal time
update if and only if a steal time update is actually needed.  Taking
the lock can be avoided if steal time is disabled by the guest, or if
KVM knows it has already flagged the vCPU as being preempted.

Reword the comment to be more precise as to exactly why memslots will
be queried.
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Message-Id: <20210123000334.3123628-3-seanjc@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>

Remove the disabling of page faults across kvm_steal_time_set_preempted()
as KVM now accesses the steal time struct (shared with the guest) via a
cached mapping (see commit b0431382, "x86/KVM: Make sure
KVM_VCPU_FLUSH_TLB flag is not missed".)  The cache lookup is flagged as
atomic, thus it would be a bug if KVM tried to resolve a new pfn, i.e.
we want the splat that would be reached via might_fault().
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Message-Id: <20210123000334.3123628-2-seanjc@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>

In order to convert an HVA to a PFN, KVM usually tries to use
the get_user_pages family of functinso.  This however is not
possible for VM_IO vmas; in that case, KVM instead uses follow_pfn.

In doing this however KVM loses the information on whether the
PFN is writable.  That is usually not a problem because the main
use of VM_IO vmas with KVM is for BARs in PCI device assignment,
however it is a bug.  To fix it, use follow_pte and check pte_write
while under the protection of the PTE lock.  The information can
be used to fail hva_to_pfn_remapped or passed back to the
caller via *writable.

Usage of follow_pfn was introduced in commit add6a0cd ("KVM: MMU: try to fix
up page faults before giving up", 2016-07-05); however, even older version
have the same issue, all the way back to commit 2e2e3738 ("KVM:
Handle vma regions with no backing page", 2008-07-20), as they also did
not check whether the PFN was writable.

Fixes: 2e2e3738 ("KVM: Handle vma regions with no backing page")
Reported-by: David Stevens <stevensd@google.com>
Cc: 3pvd@google.com
Cc: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
Cc: Jason Gunthorpe <jgg@ziepe.ca>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>

There is a bug in the TDP MMU function to zap SPTEs which could be
replaced with a larger mapping which prevents the function from doing
anything. Fix this by correctly zapping the last level SPTEs.

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: 14881998 ("kvm: x86/mmu: Support disabling dirty logging for the tdp MMU")
Signed-off-by: Ben Gardon <bgardon@google.com>
Message-Id: <20210202185734.1680553-11-bgardon@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>

If not in long mode, the low bits of CR3 are reserved but not enforced to
be zero, so remove those checks.  If in long mode, however, the MBZ bits
extend down to the highest physical address bit of the guest, excluding
the encryption bit.

Make the checks consistent with the above, and match them between
nested_vmcb_checks and KVM_SET_SREGS.

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: 761e4169 ("KVM: nSVM: Check that MBZ bits in CR3 and CR4 are not set on vmrun of nested guests")
Fixes: a780a3ea ("KVM: X86: Fix reserved bits check for MOV to CR3")
Reviewed-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>

Don't let KVM load when running as an SEV guest, regardless of what
CPUID says.  Memory is encrypted with a key that is not accessible to
the host (L0), thus it's impossible for L0 to emulate SVM, e.g. it'll
see garbage when reading the VMCB.

Technically, KVM could decrypt all memory that needs to be accessible to
the L0 and use shadow paging so that L0 does not need to shadow NPT, but
exposing such information to L0 largely defeats the purpose of running as
an SEV guest.  This can always be revisited if someone comes up with a
use case for running VMs inside SEV guests.

Note, VMLOAD, VMRUN, etc... will also #GP on GPAs with C-bit set, i.e. KVM
is doomed even if the SEV guest is debuggable and the hypervisor is willing
to decrypt the VMCB.  This may or may not be fixed on CPUs that have the
SVME_ADDR_CHK fix.

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Message-Id: <20210202212017.2486595-1-seanjc@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>