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  1. 03 Jul, 2019 30 commits
  3. 25 Jun, 2019 10 commits
    • Greg Kroah-Hartman's avatar
      Linux 5.1.15 · f0fae702
      Greg Kroah-Hartman authored
      f0fae702
    • Michael Ellerman's avatar
      powerpc/mm/64s/hash: Reallocate context ids on fork · 1d7446de
      Michael Ellerman authored 
      commit ca72d883 upstream.

When using the Hash Page Table (HPT) MMU, userspace memory mappings
are managed at two levels. Firstly in the Linux page tables, much like
other architectures, and secondly in the SLB (Segment Lookaside
Buffer) and HPT. It's the SLB and HPT that are actually used by the
hardware to do translations.

As part of the series adding support for 4PB user virtual address
space using the hash MMU, we added support for allocating multiple
"context ids" per process, one for each 512TB chunk of address space.
These are tracked in an array called extended_id in the mm_context_t
of a process that has done a mapping above 512TB.

If such a process forks (ie. clone(2) without CLONE_VM set) it's mm is
copied, including the mm_context_t, and then init_new_context() is
called to reinitialise parts of the mm_context_t as appropriate to
separate the address spaces of the two processes.

The key step in ensuring the two processes have separate address
spaces is to allocate a new context id for the process, this is done
at the beginning of hash__init_new_context(). If we didn't allocate a
new context id then the two processes would share mappings as far as
the SLB and HPT are concerned, even though their Linux page tables
would be separate.

For mappings above 512TB, which use the extended_id array, we
neglected to allocate new context ids on fork, meaning the parent and
child use the same ids and therefore share those mappings even though
they're supposed to be separate. This can lead to the parent seeing
writes done by the child, which is essentially memory corruption.

There is an additional exposure which is that if the child process
exits, all its context ids are freed, including the context ids that
are still in use by the parent for mappings above 512TB. One or more
of those ids can then be reallocated to a third process, that process
can then read/write to the parent's mappings above 512TB. Additionally
if the freed id is used for the third process's primary context id,
then the parent is able to read/write to the third process's mappings
*below* 512TB.

All of these are fundamental failures to enforce separation between
processes. The only mitigating factor is that the bug only occurs if a
process creates mappings above 512TB, and most applications still do
not create such mappings.

Only machines using the hash page table MMU are affected, eg. PowerPC
970 (G5), PA6T, Power5/6/7/8/9. By default Power9 bare metal machines
(powernv) use the Radix MMU and are not affected, unless the machine
has been explicitly booted in HPT mode (using disable_radix on the
kernel command line). KVM guests on Power9 may be affected if the host
or guest is configured to use the HPT MMU. LPARs under PowerVM on
Power9 are affected as they always use the HPT MMU. Kernels built with
PAGE_SIZE=4K are not affected.

The fix is relatively simple, we need to reallocate context ids for
all extended mappings on fork.

Fixes: f384796c ("powerpc/mm: Add support for handling > 512TB address in SLB miss")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v4.17+
Signed-off-by: default avatarMichael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
Signed-off-by: default avatarGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
      1d7446de
    • James Morse's avatar
      x86/resctrl: Don't stop walking closids when a locksetup group is found · d0dcce78
      James Morse authored 
      commit 87d3aa28 upstream.

When a new control group is created __init_one_rdt_domain() walks all
the other closids to calculate the sets of used and unused bits.

If it discovers a pseudo_locksetup group, it breaks out of the loop.  This
means any later closid doesn't get its used bits added to used_b.  These
bits will then get set in unused_b, and added to the new control group's
configuration, even if they were marked as exclusive for a later closid.

When encountering a pseudo_locksetup group, we should continue. This is
because "a resource group enters 'pseudo-locked' mode after the schemata is
written while the resource group is in 'pseudo-locksetup' mode." When we
find a pseudo_locksetup group, its configuration is expected to be
overwritten, we can skip it.

Fixes: dfe9674b ("x86/intel_rdt: Enable entering of pseudo-locksetup mode")
Signed-off-by: default avatarJames Morse <james.morse@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: default avatarThomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Acked-by: default avatarReinette Chatre <reinette.chatre@intel.com>
Cc: Fenghua Yu <fenghua.yu@intel.com>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: H Peter Avin <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190603172531.178830-1-james.morse@arm.com
[Dropped comment due to lack of space]
Signed-off-by: default avatarJames Morse <james.morse@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: default avatarGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
      d0dcce78
    • Jouni Malinen's avatar
      mac80211: Do not use stack memory with scatterlist for GMAC · 7a663886
      Jouni Malinen authored 
      commit a71fd9da upstream.

ieee80211_aes_gmac() uses the mic argument directly in sg_set_buf() and
that does not allow use of stack memory (e.g., BUG_ON() is hit in
sg_set_buf() with CONFIG_DEBUG_SG). BIP GMAC TX side is fine for this
since it can use the skb data buffer, but the RX side was using a stack
variable for deriving the local MIC value to compare against the
received one.

Fix this by allocating heap memory for the mic buffer.

This was found with hwsim test case ap_cipher_bip_gmac_128 hitting that
BUG_ON() and kernel panic.

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: default avatarJouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
Signed-off-by: default avatarJohannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: default avatarGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
      7a663886
    • Andy Strohman's avatar
      nl80211: fix station_info pertid memory leak · 34e22e35
      Andy Strohman authored 
      commit f77bf486 upstream.

When dumping stations, memory allocated for station_info's
pertid member will leak if the nl80211 header cannot be added to
the sk_buff due to insufficient tail room.

I noticed this leak in the kmalloc-2048 cache.

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: 8689c051 ("cfg80211: dynamically allocate per-tid stats for station info")
Signed-off-by: default avatarAndy Strohman <andy@uplevelsystems.com>
Signed-off-by: default avatarJohannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: default avatarGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
      34e22e35
    • Yu Wang's avatar
      mac80211: handle deauthentication/disassociation from TDLS peer · b8caf5aa
      Yu Wang authored 
      commit 79c92ca4 upstream.

When receiving a deauthentication/disassociation frame from a TDLS
peer, a station should not disconnect the current AP, but only
disable the current TDLS link if it's enabled.

Without this change, a TDLS issue can be reproduced by following the
steps as below:

1. STA-1 and STA-2 are connected to AP, bidirection traffic is running
   between STA-1 and STA-2.
2. Set up TDLS link between STA-1 and STA-2, stay for a while, then
   teardown TDLS link.
3. Repeat step #2 and monitor the connection between STA and AP.

During the test, one STA may send a deauthentication/disassociation
frame to another, after TDLS teardown, with reason code 6/7, which
means: Class 2/3 frame received from nonassociated STA.

On receive this frame, the receiver STA will disconnect the current
AP and then reconnect. It's not a expected behavior, purpose of this
frame should be disabling the TDLS link, not the link with AP.

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: default avatarYu Wang <yyuwang@codeaurora.org>
Signed-off-by: default avatarJohannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: default avatarGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
      b8caf5aa
    • Manikanta Pubbisetty's avatar
      {nl,mac}80211: allow 4addr AP operation on crypto controlled devices · 0dd7d335
      Manikanta Pubbisetty authored 
      commit 33d915d9 upstream.

As per the current design, in the case of sw crypto controlled devices,
it is the device which advertises the support for AP/VLAN iftype based
on it's ability to tranmsit packets encrypted in software
(In VLAN functionality, group traffic generated for a specific
VLAN group is always encrypted in software). Commit db3bdcb9
("mac80211: allow AP_VLAN operation on crypto controlled devices")
has introduced this change.

Since 4addr AP operation also uses AP/VLAN iftype, this conditional
way of advertising AP/VLAN support has broken 4addr AP mode operation on
crypto controlled devices which do not support VLAN functionality.

In the case of ath10k driver, not all firmwares have support for VLAN
functionality but all can support 4addr AP operation. Because AP/VLAN
support is not advertised for these devices, 4addr AP operations are
also blocked.

Fix this by allowing 4addr operation on devices which do not support
AP/VLAN iftype but can support 4addr AP operation (decision is based on
the wiphy flag WIPHY_FLAG_4ADDR_AP).

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: db3bdcb9 ("mac80211: allow AP_VLAN operation on crypto controlled devices")
Signed-off-by: default avatarManikanta Pubbisetty <mpubbise@codeaurora.org>
Signed-off-by: default avatarJohannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: default avatarGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
      0dd7d335
    • Johannes Berg's avatar
      mac80211: drop robust management frames from unknown TA · 61113ed9
      Johannes Berg authored 
      commit 588f7d39 upstream.

When receiving a robust management frame, drop it if we don't have
rx->sta since then we don't have a security association and thus
couldn't possibly validate the frame.

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: default avatarJohannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: default avatarGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
      61113ed9
    • Eric Biggers's avatar
      cfg80211: fix memory leak of wiphy device name · 4a6d3e2f
      Eric Biggers authored 
      commit 4f488fbc upstream.

In wiphy_new_nm(), if an error occurs after dev_set_name() and
device_initialize() have already been called, it's necessary to call
put_device() (via wiphy_free()) to avoid a memory leak.

Reported-by: syzbot+7fddca22578bc67c3fe4@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Fixes: 1f87f7d3 ("cfg80211: add rfkill support")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: default avatarEric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: default avatarJohannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: default avatarGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
      4a6d3e2f
    • Christian Brauner's avatar
      fs/namespace: fix unprivileged mount propagation · 4bb1bedc
      Christian Brauner authored 
      commit d728cf79 upstream.

When propagating mounts across mount namespaces owned by different user
namespaces it is not possible anymore to move or umount the mount in the
less privileged mount namespace.

Here is a reproducer:

  sudo mount -t tmpfs tmpfs /mnt
  sudo --make-rshared /mnt

  # create unprivileged user + mount namespace and preserve propagation
  unshare -U -m --map-root --propagation=unchanged

  # now change back to the original mount namespace in another terminal:
  sudo mkdir /mnt/aaa
  sudo mount -t tmpfs tmpfs /mnt/aaa

  # now in the unprivileged user + mount namespace
  mount --move /mnt/aaa /opt

Unfortunately, this is a pretty big deal for userspace since this is
e.g. used to inject mounts into running unprivileged containers.
So this regression really needs to go away rather quickly.

The problem is that a recent change falsely locked the root of the newly
added mounts by setting MNT_LOCKED. Fix this by only locking the mounts
on copy_mnt_ns() and not when adding a new mount.

Fixes: 3bd045cc ("separate copying and locking mount tree on cross-userns copies")
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Tested-by: default avatarChristian Brauner <christian@brauner.io>
Acked-by: default avatarChristian Brauner <christian@brauner.io>
Signed-off-by: default avatar"Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Signed-off-by: default avatarChristian Brauner <christian@brauner.io>
Signed-off-by: default avatarAl Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: default avatarGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
      4bb1bedc
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