The EXT_RGMII_OOB_CTRL register can be written from different
contexts. It is predominantly written from the adjust_link
handler which is synchronized by the phydev->lock, but can
also be written from a different context when configuring the
mii in bcmgenet_mii_config().

The chances of contention are quite low, but it is conceivable
that adjust_link could occur during resume when WoL is enabled
so use the phydev->lock synchronizer in bcmgenet_mii_config()
to be sure.

Fixes: afe3f907 ("net: bcmgenet: power on MII block for all MII modes")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Doug Berger <opendmb@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Florian Fainelli <florian.fainelli@broadcom.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>

Daniel Borkmann says:

====================
pull-request: bpf 2024-04-26

We've added 12 non-merge commits during the last 22 day(s) which contain
a total of 14 files changed, 168 insertions(+), 72 deletions(-).

The main changes are:

1) Fix BPF_PROBE_MEM in verifier and JIT to skip loads from vsyscall page,
   from Puranjay Mohan.

2) Fix a crash in XDP with devmap broadcast redirect when the latter map
   is in process of being torn down, from Toke Høiland-Jørgensen.

3) Fix arm64 and riscv64 BPF JITs to properly clear start time for BPF
   program runtime stats, from Xu Kuohai.

4) Fix a sockmap KCSAN-reported data race in sk_psock_skb_ingress_enqueue,
    from Jason Xing.

5) Fix BPF verifier error message in resolve_pseudo_ldimm64,
   from Anton Protopopov.

6) Fix missing DEBUG_INFO_BTF_MODULES Kconfig menu item,
   from Andrii Nakryiko.

* tag 'for-netdev' of https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/bpf/bpf:
  selftests/bpf: Test PROBE_MEM of VSYSCALL_ADDR on x86-64
  bpf, x86: Fix PROBE_MEM runtime load check
  bpf: verifier: prevent userspace memory access
  xdp: use flags field to disambiguate broadcast redirect
  arm32, bpf: Reimplement sign-extension mov instruction
  riscv, bpf: Fix incorrect runtime stats
  bpf, arm64: Fix incorrect runtime stats
  bpf: Fix a verifier verbose message
  bpf, skmsg: Fix NULL pointer dereference in sk_psock_skb_ingress_enqueue
  MAINTAINERS: bpf: Add Lehui and Puranjay as riscv64 reviewers
  MAINTAINERS: Update email address for Puranjay Mohan
  bpf, kconfig: Fix DEBUG_INFO_BTF_MODULES Kconfig definition
====================

Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240426224248.26197-1-daniel@iogearbox.netSigned-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>

Fix extract_user_to_sg() so that it will break out of the loop if
iov_iter_extract_pages() returns 0 rather than looping around forever.

[Note that I've included two fixes lines as the function got moved to a
different file and renamed]

Fixes: 85dd2c8f ("netfs: Add a function to extract a UBUF or IOVEC into a BVEC iterator")
Fixes: f5f82cd1 ("Move netfs_extract_iter_to_sg() to lib/scatterlist.c")
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
cc: Jeff Layton <jlayton@kernel.org>
cc: Steve French <sfrench@samba.org>
cc: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
cc: netfs@lists.linux.dev
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/1967121.1714034372@warthog.procyon.org.ukSigned-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>

Puranjay Mohan says:

====================
bpf: prevent userspace memory access

V5: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20240324185356.59111-1-puranjay12@gmail.com/
Changes in V6:
- Disable the verifier's instrumentation in x86-64 and update the JIT to
  take care of vsyscall page in addition to userspace addresses.
- Update bpf_testmod to test for vsyscall addresses.

V4: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20240321124640.8870-1-puranjay12@gmail.com/
Changes in V5:
- Use TASK_SIZE_MAX + PAGE_SIZE, VSYSCALL_ADDR as userspace boundary in
  x86-64 JIT.
- Added Acked-by: Ilya Leoshkevich <iii@linux.ibm.com>

V3: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20240321120842.78983-1-puranjay12@gmail.com/
Changes in V4:
- Disable this feature on architectures that don't define
  CONFIG_ARCH_HAS_NON_OVERLAPPING_ADDRESS_SPACE.
- By doing the above, we don't need anything explicitly for s390x.

V2: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20240321101058.68530-1-puranjay12@gmail.com/
Changes in V3:
- Return 0 from bpf_arch_uaddress_limit() in disabled case because it
  returns u64.
- Modify the check in verifier to no do instrumentation when uaddress_limit
  is 0.

V1: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20240320105436.4781-1-puranjay12@gmail.com/
Changes in V2:
- Disable this feature on s390x.

With BPF_PROBE_MEM, BPF allows de-referencing an untrusted pointer. To
thwart invalid memory accesses, the JITs add an exception table entry for
all such accesses. But in case the src_reg + offset is a userspace address,
the BPF program might read that memory if the user has mapped it.

x86-64 JIT already instruments the BPF_PROBE_MEM based loads with checks to
skip loads from userspace addresses, but is doesn't check for vsyscall page
because it falls in the kernel address space but is considered a userspace
page. The second patch in this series fixes the x86-64 JIT to also skip
loads from the vsyscall page. The last patch updates the bpf_testmod so
this address can be checked as part of the selftests.

Other architectures don't have the complexity of the vsyscall address and
just need to skip loads from the userspace. To make this more scalable and
robust, the verifier is updated in the first patch to instrument
BPF_PROBE_MEM to skip loads from the userspace addresses.
====================

Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240424100210.11982-1-puranjay@kernel.orgSigned-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>

The vsyscall is a legacy API for fast execution of system calls. It maps
a page at address VSYSCALL_ADDR into the userspace program. This address
is in the top 10MB of the address space:

ffffffffff600000 - ffffffffff600fff |    4 kB | legacy vsyscall ABI

The last commit fixes the x86-64 BPF JIT to skip accessing addresses in
this memory region. Add this address to bpf_testmod_return_ptr() so we
can make sure that it is fixed.

After this change and without the previous commit, subprogs_extable
selftest will crash the kernel.
Signed-off-by: Puranjay Mohan <puranjay@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240424100210.11982-4-puranjay@kernel.orgSigned-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>

When a load is marked PROBE_MEM - e.g. due to PTR_UNTRUSTED access - the
address being loaded from is not necessarily valid. The BPF jit sets up
exception handlers for each such load which catch page faults and 0 out
the destination register.

If the address for the load is outside kernel address space, the load
will escape the exception handling and crash the kernel. To prevent this
from happening, the emits some instruction to verify that addr is > end
of userspace addresses.

x86 has a legacy vsyscall ABI where a page at address 0xffffffffff600000
is mapped with user accessible permissions. The addresses in this page
are considered userspace addresses by the fault handler. Therefore, a
BPF program accessing this page will crash the kernel.

This patch fixes the runtime checks to also check that the PROBE_MEM
address is below VSYSCALL_ADDR.

Example BPF program:

 SEC("fentry/tcp_v4_connect")
 int BPF_PROG(fentry_tcp_v4_connect, struct sock *sk)
 {
	*(volatile unsigned long *)&sk->sk_tsq_flags;
	return 0;
 }

BPF Assembly:

 0: (79) r1 = *(u64 *)(r1 +0)
 1: (79) r1 = *(u64 *)(r1 +344)
 2: (b7) r0 = 0
 3: (95) exit

			       x86-64 JIT
			       ==========

            BEFORE                                    AFTER
	    ------                                    -----

 0:   nopl   0x0(%rax,%rax,1)             0:   nopl   0x0(%rax,%rax,1)
 5:   xchg   %ax,%ax                      5:   xchg   %ax,%ax
 7:   push   %rbp                         7:   push   %rbp
 8:   mov    %rsp,%rbp                    8:   mov    %rsp,%rbp
 b:   mov    0x0(%rdi),%rdi               b:   mov    0x0(%rdi),%rdi
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------
 f:   movabs $0x100000000000000,%r11      f:   movabs $0xffffffffff600000,%r10
19:   add    $0x2a0,%rdi                 19:   mov    %rdi,%r11
20:   cmp    %r11,%rdi                   1c:   add    $0x2a0,%r11
23:   jae    0x0000000000000029          23:   sub    %r10,%r11
25:   xor    %edi,%edi                   26:   movabs $0x100000000a00000,%r10
27:   jmp    0x000000000000002d          30:   cmp    %r10,%r11
29:   mov    0x0(%rdi),%rdi              33:   ja     0x0000000000000039
--------------------------------\        35:   xor    %edi,%edi
2d:   xor    %eax,%eax           \       37:   jmp    0x0000000000000040
2f:   leave                       \      39:   mov    0x2a0(%rdi),%rdi
30:   ret                          \--------------------------------------------
                                         40:   xor    %eax,%eax
                                         42:   leave
                                         43:   ret
Signed-off-by: Puranjay Mohan <puranjay@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240424100210.11982-3-puranjay@kernel.orgSigned-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>

With BPF_PROBE_MEM, BPF allows de-referencing an untrusted pointer. To
thwart invalid memory accesses, the JITs add an exception table entry
for all such accesses. But in case the src_reg + offset is a userspace
address, the BPF program might read that memory if the user has
mapped it.

Make the verifier add guard instructions around such memory accesses and
skip the load if the address falls into the userspace region.

The JITs need to implement bpf_arch_uaddress_limit() to define where
the userspace addresses end for that architecture or TASK_SIZE is taken
as default.

The implementation is as follows:

REG_AX =  SRC_REG
if(offset)
	REG_AX += offset;
REG_AX >>= 32;
if (REG_AX <= (uaddress_limit >> 32))
	DST_REG = 0;
else
	DST_REG = *(size *)(SRC_REG + offset);

Comparing just the upper 32 bits of the load address with the upper
32 bits of uaddress_limit implies that the values are being aligned down
to a 4GB boundary before comparison.

The above means that all loads with address <= uaddress_limit + 4GB are
skipped. This is acceptable because there is a large hole (much larger
than 4GB) between userspace and kernel space memory, therefore a
correctly functioning BPF program should not access this 4GB memory
above the userspace.

Let's analyze what this patch does to the following fentry program
dereferencing an untrusted pointer:

  SEC("fentry/tcp_v4_connect")
  int BPF_PROG(fentry_tcp_v4_connect, struct sock *sk)
  {
                *(volatile long *)sk;
                return 0;
  }

    BPF Program before              |           BPF Program after
    ------------------              |           -----------------

  0: (79) r1 = *(u64 *)(r1 +0)          0: (79) r1 = *(u64 *)(r1 +0)
  -----------------------------------------------------------------------
  1: (79) r1 = *(u64 *)(r1 +0) --\      1: (bf) r11 = r1
  ----------------------------\   \     2: (77) r11 >>= 32
  2: (b7) r0 = 0               \   \    3: (b5) if r11 <= 0x8000 goto pc+2
  3: (95) exit                  \   \-> 4: (79) r1 = *(u64 *)(r1 +0)
                                 \      5: (05) goto pc+1
                                  \     6: (b7) r1 = 0
                                   \--------------------------------------
                                        7: (b7) r0 = 0
                                        8: (95) exit

As you can see from above, in the best case (off=0), 5 extra instructions
are emitted.

Now, we analyze the same program after it has gone through the JITs of
ARM64 and RISC-V architectures. We follow the single load instruction
that has the untrusted pointer and see what instrumentation has been
added around it.

                                x86-64 JIT
                                ==========
     JIT's Instrumentation
          (upstream)
     ---------------------

   0:   nopl   0x0(%rax,%rax,1)
   5:   xchg   %ax,%ax
   7:   push   %rbp
   8:   mov    %rsp,%rbp
   b:   mov    0x0(%rdi),%rdi
  ---------------------------------
   f:   movabs $0x800000000000,%r11
  19:   cmp    %r11,%rdi
  1c:   jb     0x000000000000002a
  1e:   mov    %rdi,%r11
  21:   add    $0x0,%r11
  28:   jae    0x000000000000002e
  2a:   xor    %edi,%edi
  2c:   jmp    0x0000000000000032
  2e:   mov    0x0(%rdi),%rdi
  ---------------------------------
  32:   xor    %eax,%eax
  34:   leave
  35:   ret

The x86-64 JIT already emits some instructions to protect against user
memory access. This patch doesn't make any changes for the x86-64 JIT.

                                  ARM64 JIT
                                  =========

        No Intrumentation                       Verifier's Instrumentation
           (upstream)                                  (This patch)
        -----------------                       --------------------------

   0:   add     x9, x30, #0x0                0:   add     x9, x30, #0x0
   4:   nop                                  4:   nop
   8:   paciasp                              8:   paciasp
   c:   stp     x29, x30, [sp, #-16]!        c:   stp     x29, x30, [sp, #-16]!
  10:   mov     x29, sp                     10:   mov     x29, sp
  14:   stp     x19, x20, [sp, #-16]!       14:   stp     x19, x20, [sp, #-16]!
  18:   stp     x21, x22, [sp, #-16]!       18:   stp     x21, x22, [sp, #-16]!
  1c:   stp     x25, x26, [sp, #-16]!       1c:   stp     x25, x26, [sp, #-16]!
  20:   stp     x27, x28, [sp, #-16]!       20:   stp     x27, x28, [sp, #-16]!
  24:   mov     x25, sp                     24:   mov     x25, sp
  28:   mov     x26, #0x0                   28:   mov     x26, #0x0
  2c:   sub     x27, x25, #0x0              2c:   sub     x27, x25, #0x0
  30:   sub     sp, sp, #0x0                30:   sub     sp, sp, #0x0
  34:   ldr     x0, [x0]                    34:   ldr     x0, [x0]
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
  38:   ldr     x0, [x0] ----------\        38:   add     x9, x0, #0x0
-----------------------------------\\       3c:   lsr     x9, x9, #32
  3c:   mov     x7, #0x0            \\      40:   cmp     x9, #0x10, lsl #12
  40:   mov     sp, sp               \\     44:   b.ls    0x0000000000000050
  44:   ldp     x27, x28, [sp], #16   \\--> 48:   ldr     x0, [x0]
  48:   ldp     x25, x26, [sp], #16    \    4c:   b       0x0000000000000054
  4c:   ldp     x21, x22, [sp], #16     \   50:   mov     x0, #0x0
  50:   ldp     x19, x20, [sp], #16      \---------------------------------------
  54:   ldp     x29, x30, [sp], #16         54:   mov     x7, #0x0
  58:   add     x0, x7, #0x0                58:   mov     sp, sp
  5c:   autiasp                             5c:   ldp     x27, x28, [sp], #16
  60:   ret                                 60:   ldp     x25, x26, [sp], #16
  64:   nop                                 64:   ldp     x21, x22, [sp], #16
  68:   ldr     x10, 0x0000000000000070     68:   ldp     x19, x20, [sp], #16
  6c:   br      x10                         6c:   ldp     x29, x30, [sp], #16
                                            70:   add     x0, x7, #0x0
                                            74:   autiasp
                                            78:   ret
                                            7c:   nop
                                            80:   ldr     x10, 0x0000000000000088
                                            84:   br      x10

There are 6 extra instructions added in ARM64 in the best case. This will
become 7 in the worst case (off != 0).

                           RISC-V JIT (RISCV_ISA_C Disabled)
                           ==========

        No Intrumentation           Verifier's Instrumentation
           (upstream)                      (This patch)
        -----------------           --------------------------

   0:   nop                            0:   nop
   4:   nop                            4:   nop
   8:   li      a6, 33                 8:   li      a6, 33
   c:   addi    sp, sp, -16            c:   addi    sp, sp, -16
  10:   sd      s0, 8(sp)             10:   sd      s0, 8(sp)
  14:   addi    s0, sp, 16            14:   addi    s0, sp, 16
  18:   ld      a0, 0(a0)             18:   ld      a0, 0(a0)
---------------------------------------------------------------
  1c:   ld      a0, 0(a0) --\         1c:   mv      t0, a0
--------------------------\  \        20:   srli    t0, t0, 32
  20:   li      a5, 0      \  \       24:   lui     t1, 4096
  24:   ld      s0, 8(sp)   \  \      28:   sext.w  t1, t1
  28:   addi    sp, sp, 16   \  \     2c:   bgeu    t1, t0, 12
  2c:   sext.w  a0, a5        \  \--> 30:   ld      a0, 0(a0)
  30:   ret                    \      34:   j       8
                                \     38:   li      a0, 0
                                 \------------------------------
                                      3c:   li      a5, 0
                                      40:   ld      s0, 8(sp)
                                      44:   addi    sp, sp, 16
                                      48:   sext.w  a0, a5
                                      4c:   ret

There are 7 extra instructions added in RISC-V.

Fixes: 80083428 ("bpf, arm64: Add BPF exception tables")
Reported-by: Breno Leitao <leitao@debian.org>
Suggested-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Ilya Leoshkevich <iii@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Puranjay Mohan <puranjay12@gmail.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240424100210.11982-2-puranjay@kernel.orgSigned-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>

Drop the flow-hash of the skb when forwarding to the L2TP netdev.

This avoids the L2TP qdisc from using the flow-hash from the outer
packet, which is identical for every flow within the tunnel.

This does not affect every platform but is specific for the ethernet
driver. It depends on the platform including L4 information in the
flow-hash.

One such example is the Mediatek Filogic MT798x family of networking
processors.

Fixes: d9e31d17 ("l2tp: Add L2TP ethernet pseudowire support")
Acked-by: James Chapman <jchapman@katalix.com>
Signed-off-by: David Bauer <mail@david-bauer.net>
Reviewed-by: Simon Horman <horms@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240424171110.13701-1-mail@david-bauer.netSigned-off-by: Paolo Abeni <pabeni@redhat.com>

syzbot triggered various splats (see [0] and links) by a crafted GSO
packet of VIRTIO_NET_HDR_GSO_UDP layering the following protocols:

  ETH_P_8021AD + ETH_P_NSH + ETH_P_IPV6 + IPPROTO_UDP

NSH can encapsulate IPv4, IPv6, Ethernet, NSH, and MPLS.  As the inner
protocol can be Ethernet, NSH GSO handler, nsh_gso_segment(), calls
skb_mac_gso_segment() to invoke inner protocol GSO handlers.

nsh_gso_segment() does the following for the original skb before
calling skb_mac_gso_segment()

  1. reset skb->network_header
  2. save the original skb->{mac_heaeder,mac_len} in a local variable
  3. pull the NSH header
  4. resets skb->mac_header
  5. set up skb->mac_len and skb->protocol for the inner protocol.

and does the following for the segmented skb

  6. set ntohs(ETH_P_NSH) to skb->protocol
  7. push the NSH header
  8. restore skb->mac_header
  9. set skb->mac_header + mac_len to skb->network_header
 10. restore skb->mac_len

There are two problems in 6-7 and 8-9.

  (a)
  After 6 & 7, skb->data points to the NSH header, so the outer header
  (ETH_P_8021AD in this case) is stripped when skb is sent out of netdev.

  Also, if NSH is encapsulated by NSH + Ethernet (so NSH-Ethernet-NSH),
  skb_pull() in the first nsh_gso_segment() will make skb->data point
  to the middle of the outer NSH or Ethernet header because the Ethernet
  header is not pulled by the second nsh_gso_segment().

  (b)
  While restoring skb->{mac_header,network_header} in 8 & 9,
  nsh_gso_segment() does not assume that the data in the linear
  buffer is shifted.

  However, udp6_ufo_fragment() could shift the data and change
  skb->mac_header accordingly as demonstrated by syzbot.

  If this happens, even the restored skb->mac_header points to
  the middle of the outer header.

It seems nsh_gso_segment() has never worked with outer headers so far.

At the end of nsh_gso_segment(), the outer header must be restored for
the segmented skb, instead of the NSH header.

To do that, let's calculate the outer header position relatively from
the inner header and set skb->{data,mac_header,protocol} properly.

[0]:
BUG: KMSAN: uninit-value in ipvlan_process_outbound drivers/net/ipvlan/ipvlan_core.c:524 [inline]
BUG: KMSAN: uninit-value in ipvlan_xmit_mode_l3 drivers/net/ipvlan/ipvlan_core.c:602 [inline]
BUG: KMSAN: uninit-value in ipvlan_queue_xmit+0xf44/0x16b0 drivers/net/ipvlan/ipvlan_core.c:668
 ipvlan_process_outbound drivers/net/ipvlan/ipvlan_core.c:524 [inline]
 ipvlan_xmit_mode_l3 drivers/net/ipvlan/ipvlan_core.c:602 [inline]
 ipvlan_queue_xmit+0xf44/0x16b0 drivers/net/ipvlan/ipvlan_core.c:668
 ipvlan_start_xmit+0x5c/0x1a0 drivers/net/ipvlan/ipvlan_main.c:222
 __netdev_start_xmit include/linux/netdevice.h:4989 [inline]
 netdev_start_xmit include/linux/netdevice.h:5003 [inline]
 xmit_one net/core/dev.c:3547 [inline]
 dev_hard_start_xmit+0x244/0xa10 net/core/dev.c:3563
 __dev_queue_xmit+0x33ed/0x51c0 net/core/dev.c:4351
 dev_queue_xmit include/linux/netdevice.h:3171 [inline]
 packet_xmit+0x9c/0x6b0 net/packet/af_packet.c:276
 packet_snd net/packet/af_packet.c:3081 [inline]
 packet_sendmsg+0x8aef/0x9f10 net/packet/af_packet.c:3113
 sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:730 [inline]
 __sock_sendmsg net/socket.c:745 [inline]
 __sys_sendto+0x735/0xa10 net/socket.c:2191
 __do_sys_sendto net/socket.c:2203 [inline]
 __se_sys_sendto net/socket.c:2199 [inline]
 __x64_sys_sendto+0x125/0x1c0 net/socket.c:2199
 do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:52 [inline]
 do_syscall_64+0xcf/0x1e0 arch/x86/entry/common.c:83
 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x63/0x6b

Uninit was created at:
 slab_post_alloc_hook mm/slub.c:3819 [inline]
 slab_alloc_node mm/slub.c:3860 [inline]
 __do_kmalloc_node mm/slub.c:3980 [inline]
 __kmalloc_node_track_caller+0x705/0x1000 mm/slub.c:4001
 kmalloc_reserve+0x249/0x4a0 net/core/skbuff.c:582
 __alloc_skb+0x352/0x790 net/core/skbuff.c:651
 skb_segment+0x20aa/0x7080 net/core/skbuff.c:4647
 udp6_ufo_fragment+0xcab/0x1150 net/ipv6/udp_offload.c:109
 ipv6_gso_segment+0x14be/0x2ca0 net/ipv6/ip6_offload.c:152
 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3e8/0x760 net/core/gso.c:53
 nsh_gso_segment+0x6f4/0xf70 net/nsh/nsh.c:108
 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3e8/0x760 net/core/gso.c:53
 __skb_gso_segment+0x4b0/0x730 net/core/gso.c:124
 skb_gso_segment include/net/gso.h:83 [inline]
 validate_xmit_skb+0x107f/0x1930 net/core/dev.c:3628
 __dev_queue_xmit+0x1f28/0x51c0 net/core/dev.c:4343
 dev_queue_xmit include/linux/netdevice.h:3171 [inline]
 packet_xmit+0x9c/0x6b0 net/packet/af_packet.c:276
 packet_snd net/packet/af_packet.c:3081 [inline]
 packet_sendmsg+0x8aef/0x9f10 net/packet/af_packet.c:3113
 sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:730 [inline]
 __sock_sendmsg net/socket.c:745 [inline]
 __sys_sendto+0x735/0xa10 net/socket.c:2191
 __do_sys_sendto net/socket.c:2203 [inline]
 __se_sys_sendto net/socket.c:2199 [inline]
 __x64_sys_sendto+0x125/0x1c0 net/socket.c:2199
 do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:52 [inline]
 do_syscall_64+0xcf/0x1e0 arch/x86/entry/common.c:83
 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x63/0x6b

CPU: 1 PID: 5101 Comm: syz-executor421 Not tainted 6.8.0-rc5-syzkaller-00297-gf2e367d6 #0
Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 01/25/2024

Fixes: c411ed85 ("nsh: add GSO support")
Reported-and-tested-by: syzbot+42a0dc856239de4de60e@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Closes: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?extid=42a0dc856239de4de60e
Reported-and-tested-by: syzbot+c298c9f0e46a3c86332b@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Closes: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?extid=c298c9f0e46a3c86332b
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/netdev/20240415222041.18537-1-kuniyu@amazon.com/Signed-off-by: Kuniyuki Iwashima <kuniyu@amazon.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240424023549.21862-1-kuniyu@amazon.comSigned-off-by: Paolo Abeni <pabeni@redhat.com>

Bui Quang Minh says:

====================
Ensure the copied buf is NUL terminated (part)

I found that some drivers contains an out-of-bound read pattern like this

	kern_buf = memdup_user(user_buf, count);
	...
	sscanf(kern_buf, ...);

The sscanf can be replaced by some other string-related functions. This
pattern can lead to out-of-bound read of kern_buf in string-related
functions.

This series fix the above issue by replacing memdup_user with
memdup_user_nul.

v1: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240422-fix-oob-read-v1-0-e02854c30174@gmail.com
====================

Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240424-fix-oob-read-v2-0-f1f1b53a10f4@gmail.comSigned-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>

We try to access count + 1 byte from userspace with memdup_user(buffer,
count + 1). However, the userspace only provides buffer of count bytes and
only these count bytes are verified to be okay to access. To ensure the
copied buffer is NUL terminated, we use memdup_user_nul instead.

Fixes: 3a2eb515 ("octeontx2-af: Fix an off by one in rvu_dbg_qsize_write()")
Signed-off-by: Bui Quang Minh <minhquangbui99@gmail.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240424-fix-oob-read-v2-6-f1f1b53a10f4@gmail.comSigned-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>

Currently, we allocate a nbytes-sized kernel buffer and copy nbytes from
userspace to that buffer. Later, we use sscanf on this buffer but we don't
ensure that the string is terminated inside the buffer, this can lead to
OOB read when using sscanf. Fix this issue by using memdup_user_nul
instead of memdup_user.

Fixes: 7afc5dbd ("bna: Add debugfs interface.")
Signed-off-by: Bui Quang Minh <minhquangbui99@gmail.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240424-fix-oob-read-v2-2-f1f1b53a10f4@gmail.comSigned-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>

Currently, we allocate a count-sized kernel buffer and copy count bytes
from userspace to that buffer. Later, we use sscanf on this buffer but we
don't ensure that the string is terminated inside the buffer, this can lead
to OOB read when using sscanf. Fix this issue by using memdup_user_nul
instead of memdup_user.

Fixes: 96a9a934 ("ice: configure FW logging")
Fixes: 73671c31 ("ice: enable FW logging")
Reviewed-by: Przemek Kitszel <przemyslaw.kitszel@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Bui Quang Minh <minhquangbui99@gmail.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240424-fix-oob-read-v2-1-f1f1b53a10f4@gmail.comSigned-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>

Pull networking fixes from Jakub Kicinski:
 "Including fixes from netfilter, wireless and bluetooth.

  Nothing major, regression fixes are mostly in drivers, two more of
  those are flowing towards us thru various trees. I wish some of the
  changes went into -rc5, we'll try to keep an eye on frequency of PRs
  from sub-trees.

  Also disproportional number of fixes for bugs added in v6.4, strange
  coincidence.

  Current release - regressions:

   - igc: fix LED-related deadlock on driver unbind

   - wifi: mac80211: small fixes to recent clean up of the connection
     process

   - Revert "wifi: iwlwifi: bump FW API to 90 for BZ/SC devices", kernel
     doesn't have all the code to deal with that version, yet

   - Bluetooth:
       - set power_ctrl_enabled on NULL returned by gpiod_get_optional()
       - qca: fix invalid device address check, again

   - eth: ravb: fix registered interrupt names

  Current release - new code bugs:

   - wifi: mac80211: check EHT/TTLM action frame length

  Previous releases - regressions:

   - fix sk_memory_allocated_{add|sub} for architectures where
     __this_cpu_{add|sub}* are not IRQ-safe

   - dsa: mv88e6xx: fix link setup for 88E6250

  Previous releases - always broken:

   - ip: validate dev returned from __in_dev_get_rcu(), prevent possible
     null-derefs in a few places

   - switch number of for_each_rcu() loops using call_rcu() on the
     iterator to for_each_safe()

   - macsec: fix isolation of broadcast traffic in presence of offload

   - vxlan: drop packets from invalid source address

   - eth: mlxsw: trap and ACL programming fixes

   - eth: bnxt: PCIe error recovery fixes, fix counting dropped packets

   - Bluetooth:
       - lots of fixes for the command submission rework from v6.4
       - qca: fix NULL-deref on non-serdev suspend

  Misc:

   - tools: ynl: don't ignore errors in NLMSG_DONE messages"

* tag 'net-6.9-rc6' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/netdev/net: (88 commits)
  af_unix: Suppress false-positive lockdep splat for spin_lock() in __unix_gc().
  net: b44: set pause params only when interface is up
  tls: fix lockless read of strp->msg_ready in ->poll
  dpll: fix dpll_pin_on_pin_register() for multiple parent pins
  net: ravb: Fix registered interrupt names
  octeontx2-af: fix the double free in rvu_npc_freemem()
  net: ethernet: ti: am65-cpts: Fix PTPv1 message type on TX packets
  ice: fix LAG and VF lock dependency in ice_reset_vf()
  iavf: Fix TC config comparison with existing adapter TC config
  i40e: Report MFS in decimal base instead of hex
  i40e: Do not use WQ_MEM_RECLAIM flag for workqueue
  net: ti: icssg-prueth: Fix signedness bug in prueth_init_rx_chns()
  net/mlx5e: Advertise mlx5 ethernet driver updates sk_buff md_dst for MACsec
  macsec: Detect if Rx skb is macsec-related for offloading devices that update md_dst
  ethernet: Add helper for assigning packet type when dest address does not match device address
  macsec: Enable devices to advertise whether they update sk_buff md_dst during offloads
  net: phy: dp83869: Fix MII mode failure
  netfilter: nf_tables: honor table dormant flag from netdev release event path
  eth: bnxt: fix counting packets discarded due to OOM and netpoll
  igc: Fix LED-related deadlock on driver unbind
  ...

Pull nfsd fixes from Chuck Lever:

 - Revert some backchannel fixes that went into v6.9-rc

* tag 'nfsd-6.9-5' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/cel/linux:
  Revert "NFSD: Convert the callback workqueue to use delayed_work"
  Revert "NFSD: Reschedule CB operations when backchannel rpc_clnt is shut down"

Pull HID fixes from Benjamin Tissoires:

 - A couple of i2c-hid fixes (Kenny Levinsen & Nam Cao)

 - A config issue with mcp-2221 when CONFIG_IIO is not enabled
   (Abdelrahman Morsy)

 - A dev_err fix in intel-ish-hid (Zhang Lixu)

 - A couple of mouse fixes for both nintendo and Logitech-dj (Nuno
   Pereira and Yaraslau Furman)

 - I'm changing my main kernel email address as it's way simpler for me
   than the Red Hat one (Benjamin Tissoires)

* tag 'for-linus-2024042501' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/hid/hid:
  HID: mcp-2221: cancel delayed_work only when CONFIG_IIO is enabled
  HID: logitech-dj: allow mice to use all types of reports
  HID: i2c-hid: Revert to await reset ACK before reading report descriptor
  HID: nintendo: Fix N64 controller being identified as mouse
  MAINTAINERS: update Benjamin's email address
  HID: intel-ish-hid: ipc: Fix dev_err usage with uninitialized dev->devc
  HID: i2c-hid: remove I2C_HID_READ_PENDING flag to prevent lock-up

Pablo Neira Ayuso says:

====================
Netfilter/IPVS fixes for net

The following patchset contains two Netfilter/IPVS fixes for net:

Patch #1 fixes SCTP checksumming for IPVS with gso packets,
	 from Ismael Luceno.

Patch #2 honor dormant flag from netdev event path to fix a possible
	 double hook unregistration.

* tag 'nf-24-04-25' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/netfilter/nf:
  netfilter: nf_tables: honor table dormant flag from netdev release event path
  ipvs: Fix checksumming on GSO of SCTP packets
====================

Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240425090149.1359547-1-pablo@netfilter.orgSigned-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>

syzbot reported a lockdep splat regarding unix_gc_lock and
unix_state_lock().

One is called from recvmsg() for a connected socket, and another
is called from GC for TCP_LISTEN socket.

So, the splat is false-positive.

Let's add a dedicated lock class for the latter to suppress the splat.

Note that this change is not necessary for net-next.git as the issue
is only applied to the old GC impl.

[0]:
WARNING: possible circular locking dependency detected
6.9.0-rc5-syzkaller-00007-g4d200843 #0 Not tainted
 -----------------------------------------------------
kworker/u8:1/11 is trying to acquire lock:
ffff88807cea4e70 (&u->lock){+.+.}-{2:2}, at: spin_lock include/linux/spinlock.h:351 [inline]
ffff88807cea4e70 (&u->lock){+.+.}-{2:2}, at: __unix_gc+0x40e/0xf70 net/unix/garbage.c:302

but task is already holding lock:
ffffffff8f6ab638 (unix_gc_lock){+.+.}-{2:2}, at: spin_lock include/linux/spinlock.h:351 [inline]
ffffffff8f6ab638 (unix_gc_lock){+.+.}-{2:2}, at: __unix_gc+0x117/0xf70 net/unix/garbage.c:261

which lock already depends on the new lock.

the existing dependency chain (in reverse order) is:

 -> #1 (unix_gc_lock){+.+.}-{2:2}:
       lock_acquire+0x1ed/0x550 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5754
       __raw_spin_lock include/linux/spinlock_api_smp.h:133 [inline]
       _raw_spin_lock+0x2e/0x40 kernel/locking/spinlock.c:154
       spin_lock include/linux/spinlock.h:351 [inline]
       unix_notinflight+0x13d/0x390 net/unix/garbage.c:140
       unix_detach_fds net/unix/af_unix.c:1819 [inline]
       unix_destruct_scm+0x221/0x350 net/unix/af_unix.c:1876
       skb_release_head_state+0x100/0x250 net/core/skbuff.c:1188
       skb_release_all net/core/skbuff.c:1200 [inline]
       __kfree_skb net/core/skbuff.c:1216 [inline]
       kfree_skb_reason+0x16d/0x3b0 net/core/skbuff.c:1252
       kfree_skb include/linux/skbuff.h:1262 [inline]
       manage_oob net/unix/af_unix.c:2672 [inline]
       unix_stream_read_generic+0x1125/0x2700 net/unix/af_unix.c:2749
       unix_stream_splice_read+0x239/0x320 net/unix/af_unix.c:2981
       do_splice_read fs/splice.c:985 [inline]
       splice_file_to_pipe+0x299/0x500 fs/splice.c:1295
       do_splice+0xf2d/0x1880 fs/splice.c:1379
       __do_splice fs/splice.c:1436 [inline]
       __do_sys_splice fs/splice.c:1652 [inline]
       __se_sys_splice+0x331/0x4a0 fs/splice.c:1634
       do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:52 [inline]
       do_syscall_64+0xf5/0x240 arch/x86/entry/common.c:83
       entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f

 -> #0 (&u->lock){+.+.}-{2:2}:
       check_prev_add kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3134 [inline]
       check_prevs_add kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3253 [inline]
       validate_chain+0x18cb/0x58e0 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3869
       __lock_acquire+0x1346/0x1fd0 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5137
       lock_acquire+0x1ed/0x550 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5754
       __raw_spin_lock include/linux/spinlock_api_smp.h:133 [inline]
       _raw_spin_lock+0x2e/0x40 kernel/locking/spinlock.c:154
       spin_lock include/linux/spinlock.h:351 [inline]
       __unix_gc+0x40e/0xf70 net/unix/garbage.c:302
       process_one_work kernel/workqueue.c:3254 [inline]
       process_scheduled_works+0xa10/0x17c0 kernel/workqueue.c:3335
       worker_thread+0x86d/0xd70 kernel/workqueue.c:3416
       kthread+0x2f0/0x390 kernel/kthread.c:388
       ret_from_fork+0x4b/0x80 arch/x86/kernel/process.c:147
       ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30 arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:244

other info that might help us debug this:

 Possible unsafe locking scenario:

       CPU0                    CPU1
       ----                    ----
  lock(unix_gc_lock);
                               lock(&u->lock);
                               lock(unix_gc_lock);
  lock(&u->lock);

 *** DEADLOCK ***

3 locks held by kworker/u8:1/11:
 #0: ffff888015089148 ((wq_completion)events_unbound){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: process_one_work kernel/workqueue.c:3229 [inline]
 #0: ffff888015089148 ((wq_completion)events_unbound){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: process_scheduled_works+0x8e0/0x17c0 kernel/workqueue.c:3335
 #1: ffffc90000107d00 (unix_gc_work){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: process_one_work kernel/workqueue.c:3230 [inline]
 #1: ffffc90000107d00 (unix_gc_work){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: process_scheduled_works+0x91b/0x17c0 kernel/workqueue.c:3335
 #2: ffffffff8f6ab638 (unix_gc_lock){+.+.}-{2:2}, at: spin_lock include/linux/spinlock.h:351 [inline]
 #2: ffffffff8f6ab638 (unix_gc_lock){+.+.}-{2:2}, at: __unix_gc+0x117/0xf70 net/unix/garbage.c:261

stack backtrace:
CPU: 0 PID: 11 Comm: kworker/u8:1 Not tainted 6.9.0-rc5-syzkaller-00007-g4d200843 #0
Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 03/27/2024
Workqueue: events_unbound __unix_gc
Call Trace:
 <TASK>
 __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:88 [inline]
 dump_stack_lvl+0x241/0x360 lib/dump_stack.c:114
 check_noncircular+0x36a/0x4a0 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:2187
 check_prev_add kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3134 [inline]
 check_prevs_add kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3253 [inline]
 validate_chain+0x18cb/0x58e0 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3869
 __lock_acquire+0x1346/0x1fd0 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5137
 lock_acquire+0x1ed/0x550 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5754
 __raw_spin_lock include/linux/spinlock_api_smp.h:133 [inline]
 _raw_spin_lock+0x2e/0x40 kernel/locking/spinlock.c:154
 spin_lock include/linux/spinlock.h:351 [inline]
 __unix_gc+0x40e/0xf70 net/unix/garbage.c:302
 process_one_work kernel/workqueue.c:3254 [inline]
 process_scheduled_works+0xa10/0x17c0 kernel/workqueue.c:3335
 worker_thread+0x86d/0xd70 kernel/workqueue.c:3416
 kthread+0x2f0/0x390 kernel/kthread.c:388
 ret_from_fork+0x4b/0x80 arch/x86/kernel/process.c:147
 ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30 arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:244
 </TASK>

Fixes: 47d8ac01 ("af_unix: Fix garbage collector racing against connect()")
Reported-and-tested-by: syzbot+fa379358c28cc87cc307@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Closes: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?extid=fa379358c28cc87cc307Signed-off-by: Kuniyuki Iwashima <kuniyu@amazon.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240424170443.9832-1-kuniyu@amazon.comSigned-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>

b44_free_rings() accesses b44::rx_buffers (and ::tx_buffers)
unconditionally, but b44::rx_buffers is only valid when the
device is up (they get allocated in b44_open(), and deallocated
again in b44_close()), any other time these are just a NULL pointers.

So if you try to change the pause params while the network interface
is disabled/administratively down, everything explodes (which likely
netifd tries to do).

Link: https://github.com/openwrt/openwrt/issues/13789
Fixes: 1da177e4 (Linux-2.6.12-rc2)
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Reported-by: Peter Münster <pm@a16n.net>
Suggested-by: Jonas Gorski <jonas.gorski@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Vaclav Svoboda <svoboda@neng.cz>
Tested-by: Peter Münster <pm@a16n.net>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Lunn <andrew@lunn.ch>
Signed-off-by: Peter Münster <pm@a16n.net>
Reviewed-by: Michael Chan <michael.chan@broadcom.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/87y192oolj.fsf@a16n.netSigned-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>

tls_sk_poll is called without locking the socket, and needs to read
strp->msg_ready (via tls_strp_msg_ready). Convert msg_ready to a bool
and use READ_ONCE/WRITE_ONCE where needed. The remaining reads are
only performed when the socket is locked.

Fixes: 121dca78 ("tls: suppress wakeups unless we have a full record")
Signed-off-by: Sabrina Dubroca <sd@queasysnail.net>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/0b7ee062319037cf86af6b317b3d72f7bfcd2e97.1713797701.git.sd@queasysnail.netSigned-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>

In scenario where pin is registered with multiple parent pins via
dpll_pin_on_pin_register(..), all belonging to the same dpll device.
A second call to dpll_pin_on_pin_unregister(..) would cause a call trace,
as it tries to use already released registration resources (due to fix
introduced in b446631f). In this scenario pin was registered twice,
so resources are not yet expected to be release until each registered
pin/pin pair is unregistered.

Currently, the following crash/call trace is produced when ice driver is
removed on the system with installed E810T NIC which includes dpll device:

WARNING: CPU: 51 PID: 9155 at drivers/dpll/dpll_core.c:809 dpll_pin_ops+0x20/0x30
RIP: 0010:dpll_pin_ops+0x20/0x30
Call Trace:
 ? __warn+0x7f/0x130
 ? dpll_pin_ops+0x20/0x30
 dpll_msg_add_pin_freq+0x37/0x1d0
 dpll_cmd_pin_get_one+0x1c0/0x400
 ? __nlmsg_put+0x63/0x80
 dpll_pin_event_send+0x93/0x140
 dpll_pin_on_pin_unregister+0x3f/0x100
 ice_dpll_deinit_pins+0xa1/0x230 [ice]
 ice_remove+0xf1/0x210 [ice]

Fix by adding a parent pointer as a cookie when creating a registration,
also when searching for it. For the regular pins pass NULL, this allows to
create separated registration for each parent the pin is registered with.

Fixes: b446631f ("dpll: fix dpll_xa_ref_*_del() for multiple registrations")
Signed-off-by: Arkadiusz Kubalewski <arkadiusz.kubalewski@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Jiri Pirko <jiri@nvidia.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240424101636.1491424-1-arkadiusz.kubalewski@intel.comSigned-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>

As interrupts are now requested from ravb_probe(), before calling
register_netdev(), ndev->name still contains the template "eth%d",
leading to funny names in /proc/interrupts.  E.g. on R-Car E3:

	89:  0      0  GICv2  93 Level  eth%d:ch22:multi
	90:  0      3  GICv2  95 Level  eth%d:ch24:emac
	91:  0  23484  GICv2  71 Level  eth%d:ch0:rx_be
	92:  0      0  GICv2  72 Level  eth%d:ch1:rx_nc
	93:  0  13735  GICv2  89 Level  eth%d:ch18:tx_be
	94:  0      0  GICv2  90 Level  eth%d:ch19:tx_nc

Worse, on platforms with multiple RAVB instances (e.g. R-Car V4H), all
interrupts have similar names.

Fix this by using the device name instead, like is done in several other
drivers:

	89:  0      0  GICv2  93 Level  e6800000.ethernet:ch22:multi
	90:  0      1  GICv2  95 Level  e6800000.ethernet:ch24:emac
	91:  0  28578  GICv2  71 Level  e6800000.ethernet:ch0:rx_be
	92:  0      0  GICv2  72 Level  e6800000.ethernet:ch1:rx_nc
	93:  0  14044  GICv2  89 Level  e6800000.ethernet:ch18:tx_be
	94:  0      0  GICv2  90 Level  e6800000.ethernet:ch19:tx_nc

Rename the local variable dev_name, as it shadows the dev_name()
function, and pre-initialize it, to simplify the code.

Fixes: 32f012b8 ("net: ravb: Move getting/requesting IRQs in the probe() method")
Signed-off-by: Geert Uytterhoeven <geert+renesas@glider.be>
Reviewed-by: Niklas Söderlund <niklas.soderlund+renesas@ragnatech.se>
Reviewed-by: Sergey Shtylyov <s.shtylyov@omp.ru>
Reviewed-by: Claudiu Beznea <claudiu.beznea.uj@bp.renesas.com>
Tested-by: Claudiu Beznea <claudiu.beznea.uj@bp.renesas.com> # on RZ/G3S
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/cde67b68adf115b3cf0b44c32334ae00b2fbb321.1713944647.git.geert+renesas@glider.beSigned-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>

Clang static checker(scan-build) warning：
drivers/net/ethernet/marvell/octeontx2/af/rvu_npc.c:line 2184, column 2
Attempt to free released memory.

npc_mcam_rsrcs_deinit() has released 'mcam->counters.bmap'. Deleted this
redundant kfree() to fix this double free problem.

Fixes: dd784287 ("octeontx2-af: Add new devlink param to configure maximum usable NIX block LFs")
Signed-off-by: Su Hui <suhui@nfschina.com>
Reviewed-by: Geetha sowjanya <gakula@marvell.com>
Reviewed-by: Kalesh AP <kalesh-anakkur.purayil@broadcom.com>
Reviewed-by: Hariprasad Kelam <hkelam@marvell.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240424022724.144587-1-suhui@nfschina.comSigned-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>

The CPTS, by design, captures the messageType (Sync, Delay_Req, etc.)
field from the second nibble of the PTP header which is defined in the
PTPv2 (1588-2008) specification. In the PTPv1 (1588-2002) specification
the first two bytes of the PTP header are defined as the versionType
which is always 0x0001. This means that any PTPv1 packets that are
tagged for TX timestamping by the CPTS will have their messageType set
to 0x0 which corresponds to a Sync message type. This causes issues
when a PTPv1 stack is expecting a Delay_Req (messageType: 0x1)
timestamp that never appears.

Fix this by checking if the ptp_class of the timestamped TX packet is
PTP_CLASS_V1 and then matching the PTP sequence ID to the stored
sequence ID in the skb->cb data structure. If the sequence IDs match
and the packet is of type PTPv1 then there is a chance that the
messageType has been incorrectly stored by the CPTS so overwrite the
messageType stored by the CPTS with the messageType from the skb->cb
data structure. This allows the PTPv1 stack to receive TX timestamps
for Delay_Req packets which are necessary to lock onto a PTP Leader.
Signed-off-by: Jason Reeder <jreeder@ti.com>
Signed-off-by: Ravi Gunasekaran <r-gunasekaran@ti.com>
Tested-by: Ed Trexel <ed.trexel@hp.com>
Fixes: f6bd5952 ("net: ethernet: ti: introduce am654 common platform time sync driver")
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240424071626.32558-1-r-gunasekaran@ti.comSigned-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>

Tony Nguyen says:

====================
Intel Wired LAN Driver Updates 2024-04-23 (i40e, iavf, ice)

This series contains updates to i40e, iavf, and ice drivers.

Sindhu removes WQ_MEM_RECLAIM flag from workqueue for i40e.

Erwan Velu adjusts message to avoid confusion on base being reported on
i40e.

Sudheer corrects insufficient check for TC equality on iavf.

Jake corrects ordering of locks to avoid possible deadlock on ice.
====================

Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240423182723.740401-1-anthony.l.nguyen@intel.comSigned-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>

Rahul Rameshbabu says:

====================
Fix isolation of broadcast traffic and unmatched unicast traffic with MACsec offload

Some device drivers support devices that enable them to annotate whether a
Rx skb refers to a packet that was processed by the MACsec offloading
functionality of the device. Logic in the Rx handling for MACsec offload
does not utilize this information to preemptively avoid forwarding to the
macsec netdev currently. Because of this, things like multicast messages or
unicast messages with an unmatched destination address such as ARP requests
are forwarded to the macsec netdev whether the message received was MACsec
encrypted or not. The goal of this patch series is to improve the Rx
handling for MACsec offload for devices capable of annotating skbs received
that were decrypted by the NIC offload for MACsec.

Here is a summary of the issue that occurs with the existing logic today.

    * The current design of the MACsec offload handling path tries to use
      "best guess" mechanisms for determining whether a packet associated
      with the currently handled skb in the datapath was processed via HW
      offload
    * The best guess mechanism uses the following heuristic logic (in order of
      precedence)
      - Check if header destination MAC address matches MACsec netdev MAC
        address -> forward to MACsec port
      - Check if packet is multicast traffic -> forward to MACsec port
      - MACsec security channel was able to be looked up from skb offload
        context (mlx5 only) -> forward to MACsec port
    * Problem: plaintext traffic can potentially solicit a MACsec encrypted
      response from the offload device
      - Core aspect of MACsec is that it identifies unauthorized LAN connections
        and excludes them from communication
        + This behavior can be seen when not enabling offload for MACsec
      - The offload behavior violates this principle in MACsec

I believe this behavior is a security bug since applications utilizing
MACsec could be exploited using this behavior, and the correct way to
resolve this is by having the hardware correctly indicate whether MACsec
offload occurred for the packet or not. In the patches in this series, I
leave a warning for when the problematic path occurs because I cannot
figure out a secure way to fix the security issue that applies to the core
MACsec offload handling in the Rx path without breaking MACsec offload for
other vendors.

Shown at the bottom is an example use case where plaintext traffic sent to
a physical port of a NIC configured for MACsec offload is unable to be
handled correctly by the software stack when the NIC provides awareness to
the kernel about whether the received packet is MACsec traffic or not. In
this specific example, plaintext ARP requests are being responded with
MACsec encrypted ARP replies (which leads to routing information being
unable to be built for the requester).

    Side 1

      ip link del macsec0
      ip address flush mlx5_1
      ip address add 1.1.1.1/24 dev mlx5_1
      ip link set dev mlx5_1 up
      ip link add link mlx5_1 macsec0 type macsec sci 1 encrypt on
      ip link set dev macsec0 address 00:11:22:33:44:66
      ip macsec offload macsec0 mac
      ip macsec add macsec0 tx sa 0 pn 1 on key 00 dffafc8d7b9a43d5b9a3dfbbf6a30c16
      ip macsec add macsec0 rx sci 2 on
      ip macsec add macsec0 rx sci 2 sa 0 pn 1 on key 00 ead3664f508eb06c40ac7104cdae4ce5
      ip address flush macsec0
      ip address add 2.2.2.1/24 dev macsec0
      ip link set dev macsec0 up

      # macsec0 enters promiscuous mode.
      # This enables all traffic received on macsec_vlan to be processed by
      # the macsec offload rx datapath. This however means that traffic
      # meant to be received by mlx5_1 will be incorrectly steered to
      # macsec0 as well.

      ip link add link macsec0 name macsec_vlan type vlan id 1
      ip link set dev macsec_vlan address 00:11:22:33:44:88
      ip address flush macsec_vlan
      ip address add 3.3.3.1/24 dev macsec_vlan
      ip link set dev macsec_vlan up

    Side 2

      ip link del macsec0
      ip address flush mlx5_1
      ip address add 1.1.1.2/24 dev mlx5_1
      ip link set dev mlx5_1 up
      ip link add link mlx5_1 macsec0 type macsec sci 2 encrypt on
      ip link set dev macsec0 address 00:11:22:33:44:77
      ip macsec offload macsec0 mac
      ip macsec add macsec0 tx sa 0 pn 1 on key 00 ead3664f508eb06c40ac7104cdae4ce5
      ip macsec add macsec0 rx sci 1 on
      ip macsec add macsec0 rx sci 1 sa 0 pn 1 on key 00 dffafc8d7b9a43d5b9a3dfbbf6a30c16
      ip address flush macsec0
      ip address add 2.2.2.2/24 dev macsec0
      ip link set dev macsec0 up

      # macsec0 enters promiscuous mode.
      # This enables all traffic received on macsec_vlan to be processed by
      # the macsec offload rx datapath. This however means that traffic
      # meant to be received by mlx5_1 will be incorrectly steered to
      # macsec0 as well.

      ip link add link macsec0 name macsec_vlan type vlan id 1
      ip link set dev macsec_vlan address 00:11:22:33:44:99
      ip address flush macsec_vlan
      ip address add 3.3.3.2/24 dev macsec_vlan
      ip link set dev macsec_vlan up

    Side 1

      ping -I mlx5_1 1.1.1.2
      PING 1.1.1.2 (1.1.1.2) from 1.1.1.1 mlx5_1: 56(84) bytes of data.
      From 1.1.1.1 icmp_seq=1 Destination Host Unreachable
      ping: sendmsg: No route to host
      From 1.1.1.1 icmp_seq=2 Destination Host Unreachable
      From 1.1.1.1 icmp_seq=3 Destination Host Unreachable

Changes:

  v2->v3:
    * Made dev paramater const for eth_skb_pkt_type helper as suggested by Sabrina
      Dubroca <sd@queasysnail.net>
  v1->v2:
    * Fixed series subject to detail the issue being fixed
    * Removed strange characters from cover letter
    * Added comment in example that illustrates the impact involving
      promiscuous mode
    * Added patch for generalizing packet type detection
    * Added Fixes: tags and targeting net
    * Removed pointless warning in the heuristic Rx path for macsec offload
    * Applied small refactor in Rx path offload to minimize scope of rx_sc
      local variable

Link: https://github.com/Binary-Eater/macsec-rx-offload/blob/trunk/MACsec_violation_in_core_stack_offload_rx_handling.pdf
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/netdev/20240419213033.400467-5-rrameshbabu@nvidia.com/
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/netdev/20240419011740.333714-1-rrameshbabu@nvidia.com/
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/netdev/87r0l25y1c.fsf@nvidia.com/
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/netdev/20231116182900.46052-1-rrameshbabu@nvidia.com/
====================

Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240423181319.115860-1-rrameshbabu@nvidia.comSigned-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>

9f74a3df ("ice: Fix VF Reset paths when interface in a failed over
aggregate"), the ice driver has acquired the LAG mutex in ice_reset_vf().
The commit placed this lock acquisition just prior to the acquisition of
the VF configuration lock.

If ice_reset_vf() acquires the configuration lock via the ICE_VF_RESET_LOCK
flag, this could deadlock with ice_vc_cfg_qs_msg() because it always
acquires the locks in the order of the VF configuration lock and then the
LAG mutex.

Lockdep reports this violation almost immediately on creating and then
removing 2 VF:

======================================================
WARNING: possible circular locking dependency detected
6.8.0-rc6 #54 Tainted: G        W  O
------------------------------------------------------
kworker/60:3/6771 is trying to acquire lock:
ff40d43e099380a0 (&vf->cfg_lock){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: ice_reset_vf+0x22f/0x4d0 [ice]

but task is already holding lock:
ff40d43ea1961210 (&pf->lag_mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: ice_reset_vf+0xb7/0x4d0 [ice]

which lock already depends on the new lock.

the existing dependency chain (in reverse order) is:

-> #1 (&pf->lag_mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}:
       __lock_acquire+0x4f8/0xb40
       lock_acquire+0xd4/0x2d0
       __mutex_lock+0x9b/0xbf0
       ice_vc_cfg_qs_msg+0x45/0x690 [ice]
       ice_vc_process_vf_msg+0x4f5/0x870 [ice]
       __ice_clean_ctrlq+0x2b5/0x600 [ice]
       ice_service_task+0x2c9/0x480 [ice]
       process_one_work+0x1e9/0x4d0
       worker_thread+0x1e1/0x3d0
       kthread+0x104/0x140
       ret_from_fork+0x31/0x50
       ret_from_fork_asm+0x1b/0x30

-> #0 (&vf->cfg_lock){+.+.}-{3:3}:
       check_prev_add+0xe2/0xc50
       validate_chain+0x558/0x800
       __lock_acquire+0x4f8/0xb40
       lock_acquire+0xd4/0x2d0
       __mutex_lock+0x9b/0xbf0
       ice_reset_vf+0x22f/0x4d0 [ice]
       ice_process_vflr_event+0x98/0xd0 [ice]
       ice_service_task+0x1cc/0x480 [ice]
       process_one_work+0x1e9/0x4d0
       worker_thread+0x1e1/0x3d0
       kthread+0x104/0x140
       ret_from_fork+0x31/0x50
       ret_from_fork_asm+0x1b/0x30

other info that might help us debug this:
 Possible unsafe locking scenario:
       CPU0                    CPU1
       ----                    ----
  lock(&pf->lag_mutex);
                               lock(&vf->cfg_lock);
                               lock(&pf->lag_mutex);
  lock(&vf->cfg_lock);

 *** DEADLOCK ***
4 locks held by kworker/60:3/6771:
 #0: ff40d43e05428b38 ((wq_completion)ice){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: process_one_work+0x176/0x4d0
 #1: ff50d06e05197e58 ((work_completion)(&pf->serv_task)){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: process_one_work+0x176/0x4d0
 #2: ff40d43ea1960e50 (&pf->vfs.table_lock){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: ice_process_vflr_event+0x48/0xd0 [ice]
 #3: ff40d43ea1961210 (&pf->lag_mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: ice_reset_vf+0xb7/0x4d0 [ice]

stack backtrace:
CPU: 60 PID: 6771 Comm: kworker/60:3 Tainted: G        W  O       6.8.0-rc6 #54
Hardware name:
Workqueue: ice ice_service_task [ice]
Call Trace:
 <TASK>
 dump_stack_lvl+0x4a/0x80
 check_noncircular+0x12d/0x150
 check_prev_add+0xe2/0xc50
 ? save_trace+0x59/0x230
 ? add_chain_cache+0x109/0x450
 validate_chain+0x558/0x800
 __lock_acquire+0x4f8/0xb40
 ? lockdep_hardirqs_on+0x7d/0x100
 lock_acquire+0xd4/0x2d0
 ? ice_reset_vf+0x22f/0x4d0 [ice]
 ? lock_is_held_type+0xc7/0x120
 __mutex_lock+0x9b/0xbf0
 ? ice_reset_vf+0x22f/0x4d0 [ice]
 ? ice_reset_vf+0x22f/0x4d0 [ice]
 ? rcu_is_watching+0x11/0x50
 ? ice_reset_vf+0x22f/0x4d0 [ice]
 ice_reset_vf+0x22f/0x4d0 [ice]
 ? process_one_work+0x176/0x4d0
 ice_process_vflr_event+0x98/0xd0 [ice]
 ice_service_task+0x1cc/0x480 [ice]
 process_one_work+0x1e9/0x4d0
 worker_thread+0x1e1/0x3d0
 ? __pfx_worker_thread+0x10/0x10
 kthread+0x104/0x140
 ? __pfx_kthread+0x10/0x10
 ret_from_fork+0x31/0x50
 ? __pfx_kthread+0x10/0x10
 ret_from_fork_asm+0x1b/0x30
 </TASK>

To avoid deadlock, we must acquire the LAG mutex only after acquiring the
VF configuration lock. Fix the ice_reset_vf() to acquire the LAG mutex only
after we either acquire or check that the VF configuration lock is held.

Fixes: 9f74a3df ("ice: Fix VF Reset paths when interface in a failed over aggregate")
Signed-off-by: Jacob Keller <jacob.e.keller@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Dave Ertman <david.m.ertman@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Mateusz Polchlopek <mateusz.polchlopek@intel.com>
Tested-by: Przemek Kitszel <przemyslaw.kitszel@intel.com>
Tested-by: Rafal Romanowski <rafal.romanowski@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Tony Nguyen <anthony.l.nguyen@intel.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240423182723.740401-5-anthony.l.nguyen@intel.comSigned-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>

Same number of TCs doesn't imply that underlying TC configs are
same. The config could be different due to difference in number
of queues in each TC. Add utility function to determine if TC
configs are same.

Fixes: d5b33d02 ("i40evf: add ndo_setup_tc callback to i40evf")
Signed-off-by: Sudheer Mogilappagari <sudheer.mogilappagari@intel.com>
Tested-by: Mineri Bhange <minerix.bhange@intel.com> (A Contingent Worker at Intel)
Signed-off-by: Tony Nguyen <anthony.l.nguyen@intel.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240423182723.740401-4-anthony.l.nguyen@intel.comSigned-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>

If the MFS is set below the default (0x2600), a warning message is
reported like the following :

	MFS for port 1 has been set below the default: 600

This message is a bit confusing as the number shown here (600) is in
fact an hexa number: 0x600 = 1536

Without any explicit "0x" prefix, this message is read like the MFS is
set to 600 bytes.

MFS, as per MTUs, are usually expressed in decimal base.

This commit reports both current and default MFS values in decimal
so it's less confusing for end-users.

A typical warning message looks like the following :

	MFS for port 1 (1536) has been set below the default (9728)
Signed-off-by: Erwan Velu <e.velu@criteo.com>
Reviewed-by: Simon Horman <horms@kernel.org>
Tested-by: Tony Brelinski <tony.brelinski@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Tony Nguyen <anthony.l.nguyen@intel.com>
Fixes: 3a2c6ced ("i40e: Add a check to see if MFS is set")
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240423182723.740401-3-anthony.l.nguyen@intel.comSigned-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>

Issue reported by customer during SRIOV testing, call trace:
When both i40e and the i40iw driver are loaded, a warning
in check_flush_dependency is being triggered. This seems
to be because of the i40e driver workqueue is allocated with
the WQ_MEM_RECLAIM flag, and the i40iw one is not.

Similar error was encountered on ice too and it was fixed by
removing the flag. Do the same for i40e too.

[Feb 9 09:08] ------------[ cut here ]------------
[  +0.000004] workqueue: WQ_MEM_RECLAIM i40e:i40e_service_task [i40e] is
flushing !WQ_MEM_RECLAIM infiniband:0x0
[  +0.000060] WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 937 at kernel/workqueue.c:2966
check_flush_dependency+0x10b/0x120
[  +0.000007] Modules linked in: snd_seq_dummy snd_hrtimer snd_seq
snd_timer snd_seq_device snd soundcore nls_utf8 cifs cifs_arc4
nls_ucs2_utils rdma_cm iw_cm ib_cm cifs_md4 dns_resolver netfs qrtr
rfkill sunrpc vfat fat intel_rapl_msr intel_rapl_common irdma
intel_uncore_frequency intel_uncore_frequency_common ice ipmi_ssif
isst_if_common skx_edac nfit libnvdimm x86_pkg_temp_thermal
intel_powerclamp gnss coretemp ib_uverbs rapl intel_cstate ib_core
iTCO_wdt iTCO_vendor_support acpi_ipmi mei_me ipmi_si intel_uncore
ioatdma i2c_i801 joydev pcspkr mei ipmi_devintf lpc_ich
intel_pch_thermal i2c_smbus ipmi_msghandler acpi_power_meter acpi_pad
xfs libcrc32c ast sd_mod drm_shmem_helper t10_pi drm_kms_helper sg ixgbe
drm i40e ahci crct10dif_pclmul libahci crc32_pclmul igb crc32c_intel
libata ghash_clmulni_intel i2c_algo_bit mdio dca wmi dm_mirror
dm_region_hash dm_log dm_mod fuse
[  +0.000050] CPU: 0 PID: 937 Comm: kworker/0:3 Kdump: loaded Not
tainted 6.8.0-rc2-Feb-net_dev-Qiueue-00279-gbd43c5687e05 #1
[  +0.000003] Hardware name: Intel Corporation S2600BPB/S2600BPB, BIOS
SE5C620.86B.02.01.0013.121520200651 12/15/2020
[  +0.000001] Workqueue: i40e i40e_service_task [i40e]
[  +0.000024] RIP: 0010:check_flush_dependency+0x10b/0x120
[  +0.000003] Code: ff 49 8b 54 24 18 48 8d 8b b0 00 00 00 49 89 e8 48
81 c6 b0 00 00 00 48 c7 c7 b0 97 fa 9f c6 05 8a cc 1f 02 01 e8 35 b3 fd
ff <0f> 0b e9 10 ff ff ff 80 3d 78 cc 1f 02 00 75 94 e9 46 ff ff ff 90
[  +0.000002] RSP: 0018:ffffbd294976bcf8 EFLAGS: 00010282
[  +0.000002] RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffff94d4c483c000 RCX:
0000000000000027
[  +0.000001] RDX: ffff94d47f620bc8 RSI: 0000000000000001 RDI:
ffff94d47f620bc0
[  +0.000001] RBP: 0000000000000000 R08: 0000000000000000 R09:
00000000ffff7fff
[  +0.000001] R10: ffffbd294976bb98 R11: ffffffffa0be65e8 R12:
ffff94c5451ea180
[  +0.000001] R13: ffff94c5ab5e8000 R14: ffff94c5c20b6e05 R15:
ffff94c5f1330ab0
[  +0.000001] FS:  0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff94d47f600000(0000)
knlGS:0000000000000000
[  +0.000002] CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
[  +0.000001] CR2: 00007f9e6f1fca70 CR3: 0000000038e20004 CR4:
00000000007706f0
[  +0.000000] DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2:
0000000000000000
[  +0.000001] DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7:
0000000000000400
[  +0.000001] PKRU: 55555554
[  +0.000001] Call Trace:
[  +0.000001]  <TASK>
[  +0.000002]  ? __warn+0x80/0x130
[  +0.000003]  ? check_flush_dependency+0x10b/0x120
[  +0.000002]  ? report_bug+0x195/0x1a0
[  +0.000005]  ? handle_bug+0x3c/0x70
[  +0.000003]  ? exc_invalid_op+0x14/0x70
[  +0.000002]  ? asm_exc_invalid_op+0x16/0x20
[  +0.000006]  ? check_flush_dependency+0x10b/0x120
[  +0.000002]  ? check_flush_dependency+0x10b/0x120
[  +0.000002]  __flush_workqueue+0x126/0x3f0
[  +0.000015]  ib_cache_cleanup_one+0x1c/0xe0 [ib_core]
[  +0.000056]  __ib_unregister_device+0x6a/0xb0 [ib_core]
[  +0.000023]  ib_unregister_device_and_put+0x34/0x50 [ib_core]
[  +0.000020]  i40iw_close+0x4b/0x90 [irdma]
[  +0.000022]  i40e_notify_client_of_netdev_close+0x54/0xc0 [i40e]
[  +0.000035]  i40e_service_task+0x126/0x190 [i40e]
[  +0.000024]  process_one_work+0x174/0x340
[  +0.000003]  worker_thread+0x27e/0x390
[  +0.000001]  ? __pfx_worker_thread+0x10/0x10
[  +0.000002]  kthread+0xdf/0x110
[  +0.000002]  ? __pfx_kthread+0x10/0x10
[  +0.000002]  ret_from_fork+0x2d/0x50
[  +0.000003]  ? __pfx_kthread+0x10/0x10
[  +0.000001]  ret_from_fork_asm+0x1b/0x30
[  +0.000004]  </TASK>
[  +0.000001] ---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]---

Fixes: 4d5957cb ("i40e: remove WQ_UNBOUND and the task limit of our workqueue")
Signed-off-by: Sindhu Devale <sindhu.devale@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Arkadiusz Kubalewski <arkadiusz.kubalewski@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Mateusz Polchlopek <mateusz.polchlopek@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Aleksandr Loktionov <aleksandr.loktionov@intel.com>
Tested-by: Robert Ganzynkowicz <robert.ganzynkowicz@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Tony Nguyen <anthony.l.nguyen@intel.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240423182723.740401-2-anthony.l.nguyen@intel.comSigned-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>

The rx_chn->irq[] array is unsigned int but it should be signed for the
error handling to work.  Also if k3_udma_glue_rx_get_irq() returns zero
then we should return -ENXIO instead of success.

Fixes: 128d5874 ("net: ti: icssg-prueth: Add ICSSG ethernet driver")
Signed-off-by: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@linaro.org>
Reviewed-by: Roger Quadros <rogerq@kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: MD Danish Anwar <danishanwar@ti.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/05282415-e7f4-42f3-99f8-32fde8f30936@moroto.mountainSigned-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>

mlx5 Rx flow steering and CQE handling enable the driver to be able to
update an skb's md_dst attribute as MACsec when MACsec traffic arrives when
a device is configured for offloading. Advertise this to the core stack to
take advantage of this capability.

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: b7c9400c ("net/mlx5e: Implement MACsec Rx data path using MACsec skb_metadata_dst")
Signed-off-by: Rahul Rameshbabu <rrameshbabu@nvidia.com>
Reviewed-by: Benjamin Poirier <bpoirier@nvidia.com>
Reviewed-by: Cosmin Ratiu <cratiu@nvidia.com>
Reviewed-by: Sabrina Dubroca <sd@queasysnail.net>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240423181319.115860-5-rrameshbabu@nvidia.comSigned-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>

Can now correctly identify where the packets should be delivered by using
md_dst or its absence on devices that provide it.

This detection is not possible without device drivers that update md_dst. A
fallback pattern should be used for supporting such device drivers. This
fallback mode causes multicast messages to be cloned to both the non-macsec
and macsec ports, independent of whether the multicast message received was
encrypted over MACsec or not. Other non-macsec traffic may also fail to be
handled correctly for devices in promiscuous mode.

Link: https://lore.kernel.org/netdev/ZULRxX9eIbFiVi7v@hog/
Cc: Sabrina Dubroca <sd@queasysnail.net>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: 860ead89 ("net/macsec: Add MACsec skb_metadata_dst Rx Data path support")
Signed-off-by: Rahul Rameshbabu <rrameshbabu@nvidia.com>
Reviewed-by: Benjamin Poirier <bpoirier@nvidia.com>
Reviewed-by: Cosmin Ratiu <cratiu@nvidia.com>
Reviewed-by: Sabrina Dubroca <sd@queasysnail.net>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240423181319.115860-4-rrameshbabu@nvidia.comSigned-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>

Enable reuse of logic in eth_type_trans for determining packet type.
Suggested-by: Sabrina Dubroca <sd@queasysnail.net>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Rahul Rameshbabu <rrameshbabu@nvidia.com>
Reviewed-by: Sabrina Dubroca <sd@queasysnail.net>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240423181319.115860-3-rrameshbabu@nvidia.comSigned-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>

Cannot know whether a Rx skb missing md_dst is intended for MACsec or not
without knowing whether the device is able to update this field during an
offload. Assume that an offload to a MACsec device cannot support updating
md_dst by default. Capable devices can advertise that they do indicate that
an skb is related to a MACsec offloaded packet using the md_dst.

Cc: Sabrina Dubroca <sd@queasysnail.net>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: 860ead89 ("net/macsec: Add MACsec skb_metadata_dst Rx Data path support")
Signed-off-by: Rahul Rameshbabu <rrameshbabu@nvidia.com>
Reviewed-by: Benjamin Poirier <bpoirier@nvidia.com>
Reviewed-by: Cosmin Ratiu <cratiu@nvidia.com>
Reviewed-by: Sabrina Dubroca <sd@queasysnail.net>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240423181319.115860-2-rrameshbabu@nvidia.comSigned-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>

Johannes berg says:

====================
Fixes for the current cycle:
 * ath11k: convert to correct RCU iteration of IPv6 addresses
 * iwlwifi: link ID, FW API version, scanning and PASN fixes
 * cfg80211: NULL-deref and tracing fixes
 * mac80211: connection mode, mesh fast-TX, multi-link and
             various other small fixes
====================
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>

The DP83869 driver sets the MII bit (needed for PHY to work in MII mode)
only if the op-mode is either DP83869_100M_MEDIA_CONVERT or
DP83869_RGMII_100_BASE.

Some drivers i.e. ICSSG support MII mode with op-mode as
DP83869_RGMII_COPPER_ETHERNET for which the MII bit is not set in dp83869
driver. As a result MII mode on ICSSG doesn't work and below log is seen.

TI DP83869 300b2400.mdio:0f: selected op-mode is not valid with MII mode
icssg-prueth icssg1-eth: couldn't connect to phy ethernet-phy@0
icssg-prueth icssg1-eth: can't phy connect port MII0

Fix this by setting MII bit for DP83869_RGMII_COPPER_ETHERNET op-mode as
well.

Fixes: 94e86ef1 ("net: phy: dp83869: support mii mode when rgmii strap cfg is used")
Signed-off-by: MD Danish Anwar <danishanwar@ti.com>
Reviewed-by: Ravi Gunasekaran <r-gunasekaran@ti.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>

Check for table dormant flag otherwise netdev release event path tries
to unregister an already unregistered hook.

[524854.857999] ------------[ cut here ]------------
[524854.858010] WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 3386599 at net/netfilter/core.c:501 __nf_unregister_net_hook+0x21a/0x260
[...]
[524854.858848] CPU: 0 PID: 3386599 Comm: kworker/u32:2 Not tainted 6.9.0-rc3+ #365
[524854.858869] Workqueue: netns cleanup_net
[524854.858886] RIP: 0010:__nf_unregister_net_hook+0x21a/0x260
[524854.858903] Code: 24 e8 aa 73 83 ff 48 63 43 1c 83 f8 01 0f 85 3d ff ff ff e8 98 d1 f0 ff 48 8b 3c 24 e8 8f 73 83 ff 48 63 43 1c e9 26 ff ff ff <0f> 0b 48 83 c4 18 48 c7 c7 00 68 e9 82 5b 5d 41 5c 41 5d 41 5e 41
[524854.858914] RSP: 0018:ffff8881e36d79e0 EFLAGS: 00010246
[524854.858926] RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffff8881339ae790 RCX: ffffffff81ba524a
[524854.858936] RDX: dffffc0000000000 RSI: 0000000000000008 RDI: ffff8881c8a16438
[524854.858945] RBP: ffff8881c8a16438 R08: 0000000000000001 R09: ffffed103c6daf34
[524854.858954] R10: ffff8881e36d79a7 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: 0000000000000005
[524854.858962] R13: ffff8881c8a16000 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: ffff8881351b5a00
[524854.858971] FS:  0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff888390800000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
[524854.858982] CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
[524854.858991] CR2: 00007fc9be0f16f4 CR3: 00000001437cc004 CR4: 00000000001706f0
[524854.859000] Call Trace:
[524854.859006]  <TASK>
[524854.859013]  ? __warn+0x9f/0x1a0
[524854.859027]  ? __nf_unregister_net_hook+0x21a/0x260
[524854.859044]  ? report_bug+0x1b1/0x1e0
[524854.859060]  ? handle_bug+0x3c/0x70
[524854.859071]  ? exc_invalid_op+0x17/0x40
[524854.859083]  ? asm_exc_invalid_op+0x1a/0x20
[524854.859100]  ? __nf_unregister_net_hook+0x6a/0x260
[524854.859116]  ? __nf_unregister_net_hook+0x21a/0x260
[524854.859135]  nf_tables_netdev_event+0x337/0x390 [nf_tables]
[524854.859304]  ? __pfx_nf_tables_netdev_event+0x10/0x10 [nf_tables]
[524854.859461]  ? packet_notifier+0xb3/0x360
[524854.859476]  ? _raw_spin_unlock_irqrestore+0x11/0x40
[524854.859489]  ? dcbnl_netdevice_event+0x35/0x140
[524854.859507]  ? __pfx_nf_tables_netdev_event+0x10/0x10 [nf_tables]
[524854.859661]  notifier_call_chain+0x7d/0x140
[524854.859677]  unregister_netdevice_many_notify+0x5e1/0xae0

Fixes: d54725cd ("netfilter: nf_tables: support for multiple devices per netdev hook")
Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org>

Luiz Augusto von Dentz says:

====================
bluetooth pull request for net:

 - qca: set power_ctrl_enabled on NULL returned by gpiod_get_optional()
 - hci_sync: Using hci_cmd_sync_submit when removing Adv Monitor
 - qca: fix invalid device address check
 - hci_sync: Use advertised PHYs on hci_le_ext_create_conn_sync
 - Fix type of len in {l2cap,sco}_sock_getsockopt_old()
 - btusb: mediatek: Fix double free of skb in coredump
 - btusb: Add Realtek RTL8852BE support ID 0x0bda:0x4853
 - btusb: Fix triggering coredump implementation for QCA

* tag 'for-net-2024-04-24' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/bluetooth/bluetooth:
  Bluetooth: qca: set power_ctrl_enabled on NULL returned by gpiod_get_optional()
  Bluetooth: hci_sync: Using hci_cmd_sync_submit when removing Adv Monitor
  Bluetooth: qca: fix NULL-deref on non-serdev setup
  Bluetooth: qca: fix NULL-deref on non-serdev suspend
  Bluetooth: btusb: mediatek: Fix double free of skb in coredump
  Bluetooth: MGMT: Fix failing to MGMT_OP_ADD_UUID/MGMT_OP_REMOVE_UUID
  Bluetooth: qca: fix invalid device address check
  Bluetooth: hci_event: Fix sending HCI_OP_READ_ENC_KEY_SIZE
  Bluetooth: btusb: Fix triggering coredump implementation for QCA
  Bluetooth: btusb: Add Realtek RTL8852BE support ID 0x0bda:0x4853
  Bluetooth: hci_sync: Use advertised PHYs on hci_le_ext_create_conn_sync
  Bluetooth: Fix type of len in {l2cap,sco}_sock_getsockopt_old()
====================

Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240424204102.2319483-1-luiz.dentz@gmail.comSigned-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>

I added OOM and netpoll discard counters, naively assuming that
the cpr pointer is pointing to a common completion ring.
Turns out that is usually *a* completion ring but not *the*
completion ring which bnapi->cp_ring points to. bnapi->cp_ring
is where the stats are read from, so we end up reporting 0
thru ethtool -S and qstat even though the drop events have happened.
Make 100% sure we're recording statistics in the correct structure.

Fixes: 907fd4a2 ("bnxt: count discards due to memory allocation errors")
Reviewed-by: Michael Chan <michael.chan@broadcom.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240424002148.3937059-1-kuba@kernel.orgSigned-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>