Commits · d9f411bacfa0c3d0d97580a66f88e70f92bcf58e · Kirill Smelkov / linux

15 Dec, 2020 40 commits

userfaultfd/selftests: hint the test runner on required privilege · d9f411ba

Peter Xu authored Dec 14, 2020

Now userfaultfd test program requires either root or ptrace privilege due
to the signal/event tests.  When UFFDIO_API failed, hint the test runner
about this fact verbosely.

Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20201208024709.7701-4-peterx@redhat.comSigned-off-by: Peter Xu <peterx@redhat.com>
Cc: Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com>
Cc: Mike Rapoport <rppt@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>

d9f411ba

userfaultfd/selftests: fix retval check for userfaultfd_open() · 1e17a24e

Peter Xu authored Dec 14, 2020

userfaultfd_open() returns 1 for errors rather than negatives. Fix it on
all the callers so when UFFDIO_API failed the test will bail out.

Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20201208024709.7701-3-peterx@redhat.comSigned-off-by: Peter Xu <peterx@redhat.com>
Cc: Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com>
Cc: Mike Rapoport <rppt@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>

1e17a24e

userfaultfd/selftests: always dump something in modes · 164c50be

Peter Xu authored Dec 14, 2020

Patch series "userfaultfd: selftests: Small fixes".

Some very trivial fixes that I kept locally to userfaultfd selftest
program.

This patch (of 3):

BOUNCE_POLL is a special bit that if cleared it means "READ" instead.
Dump that too otherwise we'll see tests with empty modes.

Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20201208024709.7701-1-peterx@redhat.com
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20201208024709.7701-2-peterx@redhat.comSigned-off-by: Peter Xu <peterx@redhat.com>
Cc: Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com>
Cc: Mike Rapoport <rppt@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>

164c50be

userfaultfd: selftests: make __{s,u}64 format specifiers portable · 77f962e7

Axel Rasmussen authored Dec 14, 2020

On certain platforms (powerpcle is the one on which I ran into this),
"%Ld" and "%Lu" are unsuitable for printing __s64 and __u64, respectively,
resulting in build warnings.  Cast to {u,}int64_t, and use the PRI{d,u}64
macros defined in inttypes.h to print them.  This ought to be portable to
all platforms.

Splitting this off into a separate macro lets us remove some lines, and
get rid of some (I would argue) stylistically odd cases where we joined
printf() and exit() into a single statement with a ,.

Finally, this also fixes a "missing braces around initializer" warning
when we initialize prms in wp_range().

[axelrasmussen@google.com: v2]
  Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20201203180244.1811601-1-axelrasmussen@google.com

Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20201202211542.1121189-1-axelrasmussen@google.comSigned-off-by: Axel Rasmussen <axelrasmussen@google.com>
Acked-by: Peter Xu <peterx@redhat.com>
Cc: Shuah Khan <shuah@kernel.org>
Cc: Joe Perches <joe@perches.com>
Cc: Mike Rapoport <rppt@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Cc: Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com>
Cc: David Alan Gilbert <dgilbert@redhat.com>
Cc: Greg Thelen <gthelen@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>

77f962e7

userfaultfd: add user-mode only option to unprivileged_userfaultfd sysctl knob · d0d4730a

Lokesh Gidra authored Dec 14, 2020

With this change, when the knob is set to 0, it allows unprivileged users
to call userfaultfd, like when it is set to 1, but with the restriction
that page faults from only user-mode can be handled.  In this mode, an
unprivileged user (without SYS_CAP_PTRACE capability) must pass
UFFD_USER_MODE_ONLY to userfaultd or the API will fail with EPERM.

This enables administrators to reduce the likelihood that an attacker with
access to userfaultfd can delay faulting kernel code to widen timing
windows for other exploits.

The default value of this knob is changed to 0.  This is required for
correct functioning of pipe mutex.  However, this will fail postcopy live
migration, which will be unnoticeable to the VM guests.  To avoid this,
set 'vm.userfault = 1' in /sys/sysctl.conf.

The main reason this change is desirable as in the short term is that the
Android userland will behave as with the sysctl set to zero.  So without
this commit, any Linux binary using userfaultfd to manage its memory would
behave differently if run within the Android userland.  For more details,
refer to Andrea's reply [1].

[1] https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20200904033438.GI9411@redhat.com/

Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20201120030411.2690816-3-lokeshgidra@google.comSigned-off-by: Lokesh Gidra <lokeshgidra@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>
Cc: Peter Xu <peterx@redhat.com>
Cc: Sebastian Andrzej Siewior <bigeasy@linutronix.de>
Cc: Alexander Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: Stephen Smalley <stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com>
Cc: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@kernel.org>
Cc: Daniel Colascione <dancol@dancol.org>
Cc: "Joel Fernandes (Google)" <joel@joelfernandes.org>
Cc: Kalesh Singh <kaleshsingh@google.com>
Cc: Suren Baghdasaryan <surenb@google.com>
Cc: Jeff Vander Stoep <jeffv@google.com>
Cc: <calin@google.com>
Cc: Mike Rapoport <rppt@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Cc: Shaohua Li <shli@fb.com>
Cc: Jerome Glisse <jglisse@redhat.com>
Cc: Mauro Carvalho Chehab <mchehab+huawei@kernel.org>
Cc: Johannes Weiner <hannes@cmpxchg.org>
Cc: Mel Gorman <mgorman@techsingularity.net>
Cc: Nitin Gupta <nigupta@nvidia.com>
Cc: Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@suse.cz>
Cc: Iurii Zaikin <yzaikin@google.com>
Cc: Luis Chamberlain <mcgrof@kernel.org>
Cc: Daniel Colascione <dancol@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>

d0d4730a

userfaultfd: add UFFD_USER_MODE_ONLY · 37cd0575

Lokesh Gidra authored Dec 14, 2020

Patch series "Control over userfaultfd kernel-fault handling", v6.

This patch series is split from [1].  The other series enables SELinux
support for userfaultfd file descriptors so that its creation and movement
can be controlled.

It has been demonstrated on various occasions that suspending kernel code
execution for an arbitrary amount of time at any access to userspace
memory (copy_from_user()/copy_to_user()/...) can be exploited to change
the intended behavior of the kernel.  For instance, handling page faults
in kernel-mode using userfaultfd has been exploited in [2, 3].  Likewise,
FUSE, which is similar to userfaultfd in this respect, has been exploited
in [4, 5] for similar outcome.

This small patch series adds a new flag to userfaultfd(2) that allows
callers to give up the ability to handle kernel-mode faults with the
resulting UFFD file object.  It then adds a 'user-mode only' option to the
unprivileged_userfaultfd sysctl knob to require unprivileged callers to
use this new flag.

The purpose of this new interface is to decrease the chance of an
unprivileged userfaultfd user taking advantage of userfaultfd to enhance
security vulnerabilities by lengthening the race window in kernel code.

[1] https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20200211225547.235083-1-dancol@google.com/
[2] https://duasynt.com/blog/linux-kernel-heap-spray
[3] https://duasynt.com/blog/cve-2016-6187-heap-off-by-one-exploit
[4] https://googleprojectzero.blogspot.com/2016/06/exploiting-recursion-in-linux-kernel_20.html
[5] https://bugs.chromium.org/p/project-zero/issues/detail?id=808

This patch (of 2):

userfaultfd handles page faults from both user and kernel code.  Add a new
UFFD_USER_MODE_ONLY flag for userfaultfd(2) that makes the resulting
userfaultfd object refuse to handle faults from kernel mode, treating
these faults as if SIGBUS were always raised, causing the kernel code to
fail with EFAULT.

A future patch adds a knob allowing administrators to give some processes
the ability to create userfaultfd file objects only if they pass
UFFD_USER_MODE_ONLY, reducing the likelihood that these processes will
exploit userfaultfd's ability to delay kernel page faults to open timing
windows for future exploits.

Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20201120030411.2690816-1-lokeshgidra@google.com
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20201120030411.2690816-2-lokeshgidra@google.comSigned-off-by: Daniel Colascione <dancol@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Lokesh Gidra <lokeshgidra@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com>
Cc: Alexander Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: <calin@google.com>
Cc: Daniel Colascione <dancol@dancol.org>
Cc: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@kernel.org>
Cc: Iurii Zaikin <yzaikin@google.com>
Cc: Jeff Vander Stoep <jeffv@google.com>
Cc: Jerome Glisse <jglisse@redhat.com>
Cc: "Joel Fernandes (Google)" <joel@joelfernandes.org>
Cc: Johannes Weiner <hannes@cmpxchg.org>
Cc: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>
Cc: Kalesh Singh <kaleshsingh@google.com>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: Luis Chamberlain <mcgrof@kernel.org>
Cc: Mauro Carvalho Chehab <mchehab+huawei@kernel.org>
Cc: Mel Gorman <mgorman@techsingularity.net>
Cc: Mike Rapoport <rppt@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Cc: Nitin Gupta <nigupta@nvidia.com>
Cc: Peter Xu <peterx@redhat.com>
Cc: Sebastian Andrzej Siewior <bigeasy@linutronix.de>
Cc: Shaohua Li <shli@fb.com>
Cc: Stephen Smalley <stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com>
Cc: Suren Baghdasaryan <surenb@google.com>
Cc: Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@suse.cz>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>

37cd0575

mm, page_poison: remove CONFIG_PAGE_POISONING_ZERO · f289041e

Vlastimil Babka authored Dec 14, 2020

CONFIG_PAGE_POISONING_ZERO uses the zero pattern instead of 0xAA.  It was
introduced by commit 1414c7f4 ("mm/page_poisoning.c: allow for zero
poisoning"), noting that using zeroes retains the benefit of sanitizing
content of freed pages, with the benefit of not having to zero them again
on alloc, and the downside of making some forms of corruption (stray
writes of NULLs) harder to detect than with the 0xAA pattern.  Together
with CONFIG_PAGE_POISONING_NO_SANITY it made possible to sanitize the
contents on free without checking it back on alloc.

These days we have the init_on_free() option to achieve sanitization with
zeroes and to save clearing on alloc (and without checking on alloc).
Arguably if someone does choose to check the poison for corruption on
alloc, the savings of not clearing the page are secondary, and it makes
sense to always use the 0xAA poison pattern.  Thus, remove the
CONFIG_PAGE_POISONING_ZERO option for being redundant.

Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20201113104033.22907-6-vbabka@suse.czSigned-off-by: Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@suse.cz>
Acked-by: David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com>
Cc: Mike Rapoport <rppt@linux.ibm.com>
Cc: Rafael J. Wysocki <rafael.j.wysocki@intel.com>
Cc: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: Laura Abbott <labbott@kernel.org>
Cc: Mateusz Nosek <mateusznosek0@gmail.com>
Cc: Michal Hocko <mhocko@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>

f289041e

mm, page_poison: remove CONFIG_PAGE_POISONING_NO_SANITY · 8f424750

Vlastimil Babka authored Dec 14, 2020

CONFIG_PAGE_POISONING_NO_SANITY skips the check on page alloc whether the
poison pattern was corrupted, suggesting a use-after-free.  The motivation
to introduce it in commit 8823b1db ("mm/page_poison.c: enable
PAGE_POISONING as a separate option") was to simply sanitize freed pages,
optimally together with CONFIG_PAGE_POISONING_ZERO.

These days we have an init_on_free=1 boot option, which makes this use
case of page poisoning redundant.  For sanitizing, writing zeroes is
sufficient, there is pretty much no benefit from writing the 0xAA poison
pattern to freed pages, without checking it back on alloc.  Thus, remove
this option and suggest init_on_free instead in the main config's help.

Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20201113104033.22907-5-vbabka@suse.czSigned-off-by: Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@suse.cz>
Acked-by: David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com>
Cc: Mike Rapoport <rppt@linux.ibm.com>
Cc: Rafael J. Wysocki <rafael.j.wysocki@intel.com>
Cc: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: Laura Abbott <labbott@kernel.org>
Cc: Mateusz Nosek <mateusznosek0@gmail.com>
Cc: Michal Hocko <mhocko@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>

8f424750

kernel/power: allow hibernation with page_poison sanity checking · 03b6c9a3

Vlastimil Babka authored Dec 14, 2020

Page poisoning used to be incompatible with hibernation, as the state of
poisoned pages was lost after resume, thus enabling CONFIG_HIBERNATION
forces CONFIG_PAGE_POISONING_NO_SANITY.  For the same reason, the
poisoning with zeroes variant CONFIG_PAGE_POISONING_ZERO used to disable
hibernation.  The latter restriction was removed by commit 1ad1410f
("PM / Hibernate: allow hibernation with PAGE_POISONING_ZERO") and
similarly for init_on_free by commit 18451f9f ("PM: hibernate: fix
crashes with init_on_free=1") by making sure free pages are cleared after
resume.

We can use the same mechanism to instead poison free pages with
PAGE_POISON after resume.  This covers both zero and 0xAA patterns.  Thus
we can remove the Kconfig restriction that disables page poison sanity
checking when hibernation is enabled.

Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20201113104033.22907-4-vbabka@suse.czSigned-off-by: Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@suse.cz>
Acked-by: Rafael J. Wysocki <rafael.j.wysocki@intel.com>	[hibernation]
Reviewed-by: David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com>
Cc: Mike Rapoport <rppt@linux.ibm.com>
Cc: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: Laura Abbott <labbott@kernel.org>
Cc: Mateusz Nosek <mateusznosek0@gmail.com>
Cc: Michal Hocko <mhocko@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>

03b6c9a3

mm, page_poison: use static key more efficiently · 8db26a3d

Vlastimil Babka authored Dec 14, 2020

Commit 11c9c7ed ("mm/page_poison.c: replace bool variable with static
key") changed page_poisoning_enabled() to a static key check.  However,
the function is not inlined, so each check still involves a function call
with overhead not eliminated when page poisoning is disabled.

Analogically to how debug_pagealloc is handled, this patch converts
page_poisoning_enabled() back to boolean check, and introduces
page_poisoning_enabled_static() for fast paths.  Both functions are
inlined.

The function kernel_poison_pages() is also called unconditionally and does
the static key check inside.  Remove it from there and put it to callers.
Also split it to two functions kernel_poison_pages() and
kernel_unpoison_pages() instead of the confusing bool parameter.

Also optimize the check that enables page poisoning instead of
debug_pagealloc for architectures without proper debug_pagealloc support.
Move the check to init_mem_debugging_and_hardening() to enable a single
static key instead of having two static branches in
page_poisoning_enabled_static().

Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20201113104033.22907-3-vbabka@suse.czSigned-off-by: Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@suse.cz>
Reviewed-by: David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com>
Cc: Mike Rapoport <rppt@linux.ibm.com>
Cc: Rafael J. Wysocki <rafael.j.wysocki@intel.com>
Cc: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: Laura Abbott <labbott@kernel.org>
Cc: Mateusz Nosek <mateusznosek0@gmail.com>
Cc: Michal Hocko <mhocko@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>

8db26a3d

mm, page_alloc: do not rely on the order of page_poison and init_on_alloc/free parameters · 04013513

Vlastimil Babka authored Dec 14, 2020

Patch series "cleanup page poisoning", v3.

I have identified a number of issues and opportunities for cleanup with
CONFIG_PAGE_POISON and friends:

 - interaction with init_on_alloc and init_on_free parameters depends on
   the order of parameters (Patch 1)

 - the boot time enabling uses static key, but inefficienty (Patch 2)

 - sanity checking is incompatible with hibernation (Patch 3)

 - CONFIG_PAGE_POISONING_NO_SANITY can be removed now that we have
   init_on_free (Patch 4)

 - CONFIG_PAGE_POISONING_ZERO can be most likely removed now that we
   have init_on_free (Patch 5)

This patch (of 5):

Enabling page_poison=1 together with init_on_alloc=1 or init_on_free=1
produces a warning in dmesg that page_poison takes precedence.  However,
as these warnings are printed in early_param handlers for
init_on_alloc/free, they are not printed if page_poison is enabled later
on the command line (handlers are called in the order of their
parameters), or when init_on_alloc/free is always enabled by the
respective config option - before the page_poison early param handler is
called, it is not considered to be enabled.  This is inconsistent.

We can remove the dependency on order by making the init_on_* parameters
only set a boolean variable, and postponing the evaluation after all early
params have been processed.  Introduce a new
init_mem_debugging_and_hardening() function for that, and move the related
debug_pagealloc processing there as well.

As a result init_mem_debugging_and_hardening() knows always accurately if
init_on_* and/or page_poison options were enabled.  Thus we can also
optimize want_init_on_alloc() and want_init_on_free().  We don't need to
check page_poisoning_enabled() there, we can instead not enable the
init_on_* static keys at all, if page poisoning is enabled.  This results
in a simpler and more effective code.

Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20201113104033.22907-1-vbabka@suse.cz
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20201113104033.22907-2-vbabka@suse.czSigned-off-by: Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@suse.cz>
Reviewed-by: David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Mike Rapoport <rppt@linux.ibm.com>
Cc: Rafael J. Wysocki <rafael.j.wysocki@intel.com>
Cc: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: Michal Hocko <mhocko@kernel.org>
Cc: Mateusz Nosek <mateusznosek0@gmail.com>
Cc: Laura Abbott <labbott@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>

04013513

mm: cma: improve pr_debug log in cma_release() · b8ca396f

Charan Teja Reddy authored Dec 14, 2020

It is required to print 'count' of pages, along with the pages, passed to
cma_release to debug the cases of mismatched count value passed between
cma_alloc() and cma_release() from a code path.

As an example, consider the below scenario:

1) CMA pool size is 4MB and

2) User doing the erroneous step of allocating 2 pages but freeing 1
   page in a loop from this CMA pool.  The step 2 causes cma_alloc() to
   return NULL at one point of time because of -ENOMEM condition.

And the current pr_debug logs is not giving the info about these types of
allocation patterns because of count value not being printed in
cma_release().

We are printing the count value in the trace logs, just extend the same to
pr_debug logs too.

[akpm@linux-foundation.org: fix printk warning]

Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/1606318341-29521-1-git-send-email-charante@codeaurora.orgSigned-off-by: Charan Teja Reddy <charante@codeaurora.org>
Reviewed-by: Souptick Joarder <jrdr.linux@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@suse.cz>
Cc: Vinayak Menon <vinmenon@codeaurora.org>
Cc: Joonsoo Kim <iamjoonsoo.kim@lge.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>

b8ca396f

mm/cma.c: remove redundant cma_mutex lock · a4efc174

Lecopzer Chen authored Dec 14, 2020

The cma_mutex which protects alloc_contig_range() was first appeared in
commit 7ee793a6 ("cma: Remove potential deadlock situation"), at that
time, there is no guarantee the behavior of concurrency inside
alloc_contig_range().

After commit 2c7452a0 ("mm/page_isolation.c: make
start_isolate_page_range() fail if already isolated")

  > However, two subsystems (CMA and gigantic
  > huge pages for example) could attempt operations on the same range.  If
  > this happens, one thread may 'undo' the work another thread is doing.
  > This can result in pageblocks being incorrectly left marked as
  > MIGRATE_ISOLATE and therefore not available for page allocation.

The concurrency inside alloc_contig_range() was clarified.

Now we can find that hugepage and virtio call alloc_contig_range() without
any lock, thus cma_mutex is "redundant" in cma_alloc() now.

Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20201020102241.3729-1-lecopzer.chen@mediatek.comSigned-off-by: Lecopzer Chen <lecopzer.chen@mediatek.com>
Acked-by: David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@suse.cz>
Cc: Matthias Brugger <matthias.bgg@gmail.com>
Cc: YJ Chiang <yj.chiang@mediatek.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>

a4efc174

mm: migrate: remove unused parameter in migrate_vma_insert_page() · d85c6db4

Stephen Zhang authored Dec 14, 2020

"dst" parameter to migrate_vma_insert_page() is not used anymore.

Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/CANubcdUwCAMuUyamG2dkWP=cqSR9MAS=tHLDc95kQkqU-rEnAg@mail.gmail.comSigned-off-by: Stephen Zhang <starzhangzsd@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>