- 06 Feb, 2018 35 commits
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Marc Zyngier authored
Function identifiers are a 32bit, unsigned quantity. But we never tell so to the compiler, resulting in the following: 4ac: b26187e0 mov x0, #0xffffffff80000001 We thus rely on the firmware narrowing it for us, which is not always a reasonable expectation. Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Reported-by:
Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org> Acked-by:
Robin Murphy <robin.murphy@arm.com> Tested-by:
Marc Zyngier <marc.zyngier@arm.com> Signed-off-by:
Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
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Marc Zyngier authored
Since PSCI 1.0 allows the SMCCC version to be (indirectly) probed, let's do that at boot time, and expose the version of the calling convention as part of the psci_ops structure. Acked-by:
Lorenzo Pieralisi <lorenzo.pieralisi@arm.com> Reviewed-by:
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Marc Zyngier authored
In order to call into the firmware to apply workarounds, it is useful to find out whether we're using HVC or SMC. Let's expose this through the psci_ops. Acked-by:
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Marc Zyngier authored
We want SMCCC_ARCH_WORKAROUND_1 to be fast. As fast as possible. So let's intercept it as early as we can by testing for the function call number as soon as we've identified a HVC call coming from the guest. Tested-by:
Christoffer Dall <christoffer.dall@linaro.org> Signed-off-by:
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Marc Zyngier authored
A new feature of SMCCC 1.1 is that it offers firmware-based CPU workarounds. In particular, SMCCC_ARCH_WORKAROUND_1 provides BP hardening for CVE-2017-5715. If the host has some mitigation for this issue, report that we deal with it using SMCCC_ARCH_WORKAROUND_1, as we apply the host workaround on every guest exit. Tested-by:
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Marc Zyngier authored
We're about to need kvm_psci_version in HYP too. So let's turn it into a static inline, and pass the kvm structure as a second parameter (so that HYP can do a kern_hyp_va on it). Tested-by:
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Marc Zyngier authored
The new SMC Calling Convention (v1.1) allows for a reduced overhead when calling into the firmware, and provides a new feature discovery mechanism. Make it visible to KVM guests. Tested-by:
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Marc Zyngier authored
PSCI 1.0 can be trivially implemented by providing the FEATURES call on top of PSCI 0.2 and returning 1.0 as the PSCI version. We happily ignore everything else, as they are either optional or are clarifications that do not require any additional change. PSCI 1.0 is now the default until we decide to add a userspace selection API. Reviewed-by:
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Marc Zyngier authored
Instead of open coding the accesses to the various registers, let's add explicit SMCCC accessors. Reviewed-by:
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Marc Zyngier authored
As we're about to trigger a PSCI version explosion, it doesn't hurt to introduce a PSCI_VERSION helper that is going to be used everywhere. Reviewed-by:
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Marc Zyngier authored
As we're about to update the PSCI support, and because I'm lazy, let's move the PSCI include file to include/kvm so that both ARM architectures can find it. Acked-by:
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Marc Zyngier authored
When handling an SMC trap, the "preferred return address" is set to that of the SMC, and not the next PC (which is a departure from the behaviour of an SMC that isn't trapped). Increment PC in the handler, as the guest is otherwise forever stuck... Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Fixes: acfb3b88 ("arm64: KVM: Fix SMCCC handling of unimplemented SMC/HVC calls") Reviewed-by:
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Marc Zyngier authored
KVM doesn't follow the SMCCC when it comes to unimplemented calls, and inject an UNDEF instead of returning an error. Since firmware calls are now used for security mitigation, they are becoming more common, and the undef is counter productive. Instead, let's follow the SMCCC which states that -1 must be returned to the caller when getting an unknown function number. Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> Tested-by:
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Marc Zyngier authored
KVM doesn't follow the SMCCC when it comes to unimplemented calls, and inject an UNDEF instead of returning an error. Since firmware calls are now used for security mitigation, they are becoming more common, and the undef is counter productive. Instead, let's follow the SMCCC which states that -1 must be returned to the caller when getting an unknown function number. Signed-off-by:
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Will Deacon authored
It is possible to take an IRQ from EL0 following a branch to a kernel address in such a way that the IRQ is prioritised over the instruction abort. Whilst an attacker would need to get the stars to align here, it might be sufficient with enough calibration so perform BP hardening in the rare case that we see a kernel address in the ELR when handling an IRQ from EL0. Reported-by:
Dan Hettena <dhettena@nvidia.com> Reviewed-by:
Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com> Signed-off-by:
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Will Deacon authored
Software-step and PC alignment fault exceptions have higher priority than instruction abort exceptions, so apply the BP hardening hooks there too if the user PC appears to reside in kernel space. Reported-by:
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Will Deacon authored
The arm64 futex code has some explicit dereferencing of user pointers where performing atomic operations in response to a futex command. This patch uses masking to limit any speculative futex operations to within the user address space. Signed-off-by:
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Will Deacon authored
Like we've done for get_user and put_user, ensure that user pointers are masked before invoking the underlying __arch_{clear,copy_*}_user operations. Signed-off-by: -
Will Deacon authored
access_ok isn't an expensive operation once the addr_limit for the current thread has been loaded into the cache. Given that the initial access_ok check preceding a sequence of __{get,put}_user operations will take the brunt of the miss, we can make the __* variants identical to the full-fat versions, which brings with it the benefits of address masking. The likely cost in these sequences will be from toggling PAN/UAO, which we can address later by implementing the *_unsafe versions. Reviewed-by: -
Will Deacon authored
A mispredicted conditional call to set_fs could result in the wrong addr_limit being forwarded under speculation to a subsequent access_ok check, potentially forming part of a spectre-v1 attack using uaccess routines. This patch prevents this forwarding from taking place, but putting heavy barriers in set_fs after writing the addr_limit. Reviewed-by:
Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com> Signed-off-by:
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Will Deacon authored
In a similar manner to array_index_mask_nospec, this patch introduces an assembly macro (mask_nospec64) which can be used to bound a value under speculation. This macro is then used to ensure that the indirect branch through the syscall table is bounded under speculation, with out-of-range addresses speculating as calls to sys_io_setup (0). Reviewed-by:
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Robin Murphy authored
Similarly to x86, mitigate speculation past an access_ok() check by masking the pointer against the address limit before use. Even if we don't expect speculative writes per se, it is plausible that a CPU may still speculate at least as far as fetching a cache line for writing, hence we also harden put_user() and clear_user() for peace of mind. Signed-off-by:
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Robin Murphy authored
Currently, USER_DS represents an exclusive limit while KERNEL_DS is inclusive. In order to do some clever trickery for speculation-safe masking, we need them both to behave equivalently - there aren't enough bits to make KERNEL_DS exclusive, so we have precisely one option. This also happens to correct a longstanding false negative for a range ending on the very top byte of kernel memory. Mark Rutland points out that we've actually got the semantics of addresses vs. segments muddled up in most of the places we need to amend, so shuffle the {USER,KERNEL}_DS definitions around such that we can correct those properly instead of just pasting "-1"s everywhere. Signed-off-by: -
Robin Murphy authored
Provide an optimised, assembly implementation of array_index_mask_nospec() for arm64 so that the compiler is not in a position to transform the code in ways which affect its ability to inhibit speculation (e.g. by introducing conditional branches). This is similar to the sequence used by x86, modulo architectural differences in the carry/borrow flags. Reviewed-by:
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Will Deacon authored
For CPUs capable of data value prediction, CSDB waits for any outstanding predictions to architecturally resolve before allowing speculative execution to continue. Provide macros to expose it to the arch code. Reviewed-by:
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Will Deacon authored
The identity map is mapped as both writeable and executable by the SWAPPER_MM_MMUFLAGS and this is relied upon by the kpti code to manage a synchronisation flag. Update the .pushsection flags to reflect the actual mapping attributes. Reported-by:
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Will Deacon authored
pte_to_phys lives in assembler.h and takes its destination register as the first argument. Move phys_to_pte out of head.S to sit with its counterpart and rejig it to follow the same calling convention. Signed-off-by:
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Will Deacon authored
We don't fully understand the Cavium ThunderX erratum, but it appears that mapping the kernel as nG can lead to horrible consequences such as attempting to execute userspace from kernel context. Since kpti isn't enabled for these CPUs anyway, simplify the comment justifying the lack of post_ttbr_update_workaround in the exception trampoline. Signed-off-by:
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Will Deacon authored
Since AArch64 assembly instructions take the destination register as their first operand, do the same thing for the phys_to_ttbr macro. Acked-by:
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Marc Zyngier authored
Cavium ThunderX's erratum 27456 results in a corruption of icache entries that are loaded from memory that is mapped as non-global (i.e. ASID-tagged). As KPTI is based on memory being mapped non-global, let's prevent it from kicking in if this erratum is detected. Signed-off-by:
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Will Deacon authored
Defaulting to global mappings for kernel space is generally good for performance and appears to be necessary for Cavium ThunderX. If we subsequently decide that we need to enable kpti, then we need to rewrite our existing page table entries to be non-global. This is fiddly, and made worse by the possible use of contiguous mappings, which require a strict break-before-make sequence. Since the enable callback runs on each online CPU from stop_machine context, we can have all CPUs enter the idmap, where secondaries can wait for the primary CPU to rewrite swapper with its MMU off. It's all fairly horrible, but at least it only runs once. Tested-by:
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Will Deacon authored
Break-before-make is not needed when transitioning from Global to Non-Global mappings, provided that the contiguous hint is not being used. Signed-off-by:
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Will Deacon authored
To allow systems which do not require kpti to continue running with global kernel mappings (which appears to be a requirement for Cavium ThunderX due to a CPU erratum), make the use of nG in the kernel page tables dependent on arm64_kernel_unmapped_at_el0(), which is resolved at runtime. Signed-off-by:
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Shanker Donthineni authored
The ARM architecture defines the memory locations that are permitted to be accessed as the result of a speculative instruction fetch from an exception level for which all stages of translation are disabled. Specifically, the core is permitted to speculatively fetch from the 4KB region containing the current program counter 4K and next 4K. When translation is changed from enabled to disabled for the running exception level (SCTLR_ELn[M] changed from a value of 1 to 0), the Falkor core may errantly speculatively access memory locations outside of the 4KB region permitted by the architecture. The errant memory access may lead to one of the following unexpected behaviors. 1) A System Error Interrupt (SEI) being raised by the Falkor core due to the errant memory access attempting to access a region of memory that is protected by a slave-side memory protection unit. 2) Unpredictable device behavior due to a speculative read from device memory. This behavior may only occur if the instruction cache is disabled prior to or coincident with translation being changed from enabled to disabled. The conditions leading to this erratum will not occur when either of the following occur: 1) A higher exception level disables translation of a lower exception level (e.g. EL2 changing SCTLR_EL1[M] from a value of 1 to 0). 2) An exception level disabling its stage-1 translation if its stage-2 translation is enabled (e.g. EL1 changing SCTLR_EL1[M] from a value of 1 to 0 when HCR_EL2[VM] has a value of 1). To avoid the errant behavior, software must execute an ISB immediately prior to executing the MSR that will change SCTLR_ELn[M] from 1 to 0. Signed-off-by:Shanker Donthineni <shankerd@codeaurora.org> Signed-off-by:
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Will Deacon authored
If the spinlock "next" ticket wraps around between the initial LDR and the cmpxchg in the LSE version of spin_trylock, then we can erroneously think that we have successfuly acquired the lock because we only check whether the next ticket return by the cmpxchg is equal to the owner ticket in our updated lock word. This patch fixes the issue by performing a full 32-bit check of the lock word when trying to determine whether or not the CASA instruction updated memory. Reported-by:
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- 26 Jan, 2018 1 commit
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Steve Capper authored
In cpu_do_switch_mm(.) with ARM64_SW_TTBR0_PAN=y we apply phys_to_ttbr to a value that already has an ASID inserted into the upper bits. For 52-bit PA configurations this then can give us TTBR0_EL1 registers that cause translation table walks to attempt to access non-zero PA[51:48] spuriously. Ultimately leading to a Synchronous External Abort on level 1 translation. This patch re-arranges the logic in cpu_do_switch_mm(.) such that phys_to_ttbr is called before the ASID is inserted into the TTBR0 value. Fixes: 6b88a32c ("arm64: kpti: Fix the interaction between ASID switching and software PAN") Acked-by:
Suzuki K Poulose <suzuki.poulose@arm.com> Tested-by:
Kristina Martsenko <kristina.martsenko@arm.com> Reviewed-by:
Steve Capper <steve.capper@arm.com> Signed-off-by:
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- 23 Jan, 2018 4 commits
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Jayachandran C authored
Whitelist Broadcom Vulcan/Cavium ThunderX2 processors in unmap_kernel_at_el0(). These CPUs are not vulnerable to CVE-2017-5754 and do not need KPTI when KASLR is off. Acked-by:
Jayachandran C <jnair@caviumnetworks.com> Signed-off-by:
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Jayachandran C authored
Use PSCI based mitigation for speculative execution attacks targeting the branch predictor. We use the same mechanism as the one used for Cortex-A CPUs, we expect the PSCI version call to have a side effect of clearing the BTBs. Acked-by:
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Suzuki K Poulose authored
When a CPU is brought up after we have finalised the system wide capabilities (i.e, features and errata), we make sure the new CPU doesn't need a new errata work around which has not been detected already. However we don't run enable() method on the new CPU for the errata work arounds already detected. This could cause the new CPU running without potential work arounds. It is upto the "enable()" method to decide if this CPU should do something about the errata. Fixes: commit 6a6efbb4 ("arm64: Verify CPU errata work arounds on hotplugged CPU") Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com> Cc: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com> Cc: Andre Przywara <andre.przywara@arm.com> Cc: Dave Martin <dave.martin@arm.com> Signed-off-by:
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Marc Zyngier authored
We call arm64_apply_bp_hardening() from post_ttbr_update_workaround, which has the unexpected consequence of being triggered on every exception return to userspace when ARM64_SW_TTBR0_PAN is selected, even if no context switch actually occured. This is a bit suboptimal, and it would be more logical to only invalidate the branch predictor when we actually switch to a different mm. In order to solve this, move the call to arm64_apply_bp_hardening() into check_and_switch_context(), where we're guaranteed to pick a different mm context. Acked-by:
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