- 19 Jul, 2016 9 commits
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Ursula Braun authored
[ Upstream commit 7831b4ff ] A qeth_card contains a napi_struct linked to the net_device during device probing. This struct must be deleted when removing the qeth device, otherwise Panic on oops can occur when qeth devices are repeatedly removed and added. Fixes: a1c3ed4c ("qeth: NAPI support for l2 and l3 discipline") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v2.6.37+ Signed-off-by:
Ursula Braun <ubraun@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Tested-by:
Alexander Klein <ALKL@de.ibm.com> Signed-off-by:
David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Signed-off-by:
Sasha Levin <alexander.levin@verizon.com>
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Colin Pitrat authored
[ Upstream commit 87041a58 ] This fixes the issue descirbe in bug 117531 (https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=117531). It's a regression introduced in linux 4.5 that causes a Oops at load of gpio_sch and prevents powering off the computer. The issue is that sch_gpio_reg_set is called in sch_gpio_probe before gpio_chip data is initialized with the pointer to the sch_gpio struct. As sch_gpio_reg_set calls gpiochip_get_data, it returns NULL which causes the Oops. The patch follows Mika's advice (https://lkml.org/lkml/2016/5/9/61) and consists in modifying sch_gpio_reg_get and sch_gpio_reg_set to take a sch_gpio struct directly instead of a gpio_chip, which avoids the call to gpiochip_get_data. Thanks Mika for your patience with me :-) Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by:
Colin Pitrat <colin.pitrat@gmail.com> Acked-by:
Alexandre Courbot <acourbot@nvidia.com> Acked-by:
Mika Westerberg <mika.westerberg@linux.intel.com> Signed-off-by:
Linus Walleij <linus.walleij@linaro.org> Signed-off-by:
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Takashi Iwai authored
[ Upstream commit 3fa6993f ] The user timer tu->qused counter may go to a negative value when multiple concurrent reads are performed since both the check and the decrement of tu->qused are done in two individual locked contexts. This results in bogus read outs, and the endless loop in the user-space side. The fix is to move the decrement of the tu->qused counter into the same spinlock context as the zero-check of the counter. Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> Signed-off-by:
Takashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.de> Signed-off-by:
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Omar Sandoval authored
[ Upstream commit 8ba86821 ] get_task_ioprio() accesses the task->io_context without holding the task lock and thus can race with exit_io_context(), leading to a use-after-free. The reproducer below hits this within a few seconds on my 4-core QEMU VM: #define _GNU_SOURCE #include <assert.h> #include <unistd.h> #include <sys/syscall.h> #include <sys/wait.h> int main(int argc, char **argv) { pid_t pid, child; long nproc, i; /* ioprio_set(IOPRIO_WHO_PROCESS, 0, IOPRIO_PRIO_VALUE(IOPRIO_CLASS_IDLE, 0)); */ syscall(SYS_ioprio_set, 1, 0, 0x6000); nproc = sysconf(_SC_NPROCESSORS_ONLN); for (i = 0; i < nproc; i++) { pid = fork(); assert(pid != -1); if (pid == 0) { for (;;) { pid = fork(); assert(pid != -1); if (pid == 0) { _exit(0); } else { child = wait(NULL); assert(child == pid); } } } pid = fork(); assert(pid != -1); if (pid == 0) { for (;;) { /* ioprio_get(IOPRIO_WHO_PGRP, 0); */ syscall(SYS_ioprio_get, 2, 0); } } } for (;;) { /* ioprio_get(IOPRIO_WHO_PGRP, 0); */ syscall(SYS_ioprio_get, 2, 0); } return 0; } This gets us KASAN dumps like this: [ 35.526914] ================================================================== [ 35.530009] BUG: KASAN: out-of-bounds in get_task_ioprio+0x7b/0x90 at addr ffff880066f34e6c [ 35.530009] Read of size 2 by task ioprio-gpf/363 [ 35.530009] ============================================================================= [ 35.530009] BUG blkdev_ioc (Not tainted): kasan: bad access detected [ 35.530009] ----------------------------------------------------------------------------- [ 35.530009] Disabling lock debugging due to kernel taint [ 35.530009] INFO: Allocated in create_task_io_context+0x2b/0x370 age=0 cpu=0 pid=360 [ 35.530009] ___slab_alloc+0x55d/0x5a0 [ 35.530009] __slab_alloc.isra.20+0x2b/0x40 [ 35.530009] kmem_cache_alloc_node+0x84/0x200 [ 35.530009] create_task_io_context+0x2b/0x370 [ 35.530009] get_task_io_context+0x92/0xb0 [ 35.530009] copy_process.part.8+0x5029/0x5660 [ 35.530009] _do_fork+0x155/0x7e0 [ 35.530009] SyS_clone+0x19/0x20 [ 35.530009] do_syscall_64+0x195/0x3a0 [ 35.530009] return_from_SYSCALL_64+0x0/0x6a [ 35.530009] INFO: Freed in put_io_context+0xe7/0x120 age=0 cpu=0 pid=1060 [ 35.530009] __slab_free+0x27b/0x3d0 [ 35.530009] kmem_cache_free+0x1fb/0x220 [ 35.530009] put_io_context+0xe7/0x120 [ 35.530009] put_io_context_active+0x238/0x380 [ 35.530009] exit_io_context+0x66/0x80 [ 35.530009] do_exit+0x158e/0x2b90 [ 35.530009] do_group_exit+0xe5/0x2b0 [ 35.530009] SyS_exit_group+0x1d/0x20 [ 35.530009] entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x1a/0xa4 [ 35.530009] INFO: Slab 0xffffea00019bcd00 objects=20 used=4 fp=0xffff880066f34ff0 flags=0x1fffe0000004080 [ 35.530009] INFO: Object 0xffff880066f34e58 @offset=3672 fp=0x0000000000000001 [ 35.530009] ================================================================== Fix it by grabbing the task lock while we poke at the io_context. Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Reported-by:
Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com> Signed-off-by:
Omar Sandoval <osandov@fb.com> Signed-off-by:
Jens Axboe <axboe@fb.com> Signed-off-by:
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Borislav Petkov authored
[ Upstream commit 1ead852d ] Fix boot crash that triggers if this driver is built into a kernel and run on non-AMD systems. AMD northbridges users call amd_cache_northbridges() and it returns a negative value to signal that we weren't able to cache/detect any northbridges on the system. At least, it should do so as all its callers expect it to do so. But it does return a negative value only when kmalloc() fails. Fix it to return -ENODEV if there are no NBs cached as otherwise, amd_nb users like amd64_edac, for example, which relies on it to know whether it should load or not, gets loaded on systems like Intel Xeons where it shouldn't. Reported-and-tested-by:
Tony Battersby <tonyb@cybernetics.com> Signed-off-by:
Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1466097230-5333-2-git-send-email-bp@alien8.de Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/5761BEB0.9000807@cybernetics.comSigned-off-by:
Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org> Signed-off-by:
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Takashi Iwai authored
[ Upstream commit 62db7152 ] vortex_wtdma_bufshift() function does calculate the page index wrongly, first masking then shift, which always results in zero. The proper computation is to first shift, then mask. Reported-by:
Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@oracle.com> Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> Signed-off-by:
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Brian King authored
[ Upstream commit 54e430bb ] If we fall back to using LSI on the Croc or Crocodile chip we need to clear the interrupt so we don't hang the system. Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> Tested-by:
Benjamin Herrenschmidt <benh@kernel.crashing.org> Signed-off-by:
Brian King <brking@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Signed-off-by:
Martin K. Petersen <martin.petersen@oracle.com> Signed-off-by:
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Christophe JAILLET authored
[ Upstream commit 9c6795a9 ] 'commpage_bak' is allocated with 'sizeof(struct echoaudio)' bytes. We then copy 'sizeof(struct comm_page)' bytes in it. On my system, smatch complains because one is 2960 and the other is 3072. This would result in memory corruption or a oops. Signed-off-by:
Christophe JAILLET <christophe.jaillet@wanadoo.fr> Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> Signed-off-by:
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Bob Copeland authored
[ Upstream commit 81e43960 ] UBSAN reports the following warning from accessing path->path[-1] in set_path_power(): [ 16.078040] ================================================================================ [ 16.078124] UBSAN: Undefined behaviour in sound/pci/hda/hda_generic.c:3981:17 [ 16.078198] index -1 is out of range for type 'hda_nid_t [10]' [ 16.078270] CPU: 2 PID: 1738 Comm: modprobe Not tainted 4.7.0-rc1-wt+ #47 [ 16.078274] Hardware name: LENOVO 3443CTO/3443CTO, BIOS G6ET23WW (1.02 ) 08/14/2012 [ 16.078278] ffff8800cb246000 ffff8800cb3638b8 ffffffff815c4fe3 0000000000000032 [ 16.078286] ffff8800cb3638e0 ffffffffffffffff ffff8800cb3638d0 ffffffff8162443d [ 16.078294] ffffffffa0894200 ffff8800cb363920 ffffffff81624af7 0000000000000292 [ 16.078302] Call Trace: [ 16.078311] [<ffffffff815c4fe3>] dump_stack+0x86/0xd3 [ 16.078317] [<ffffffff8162443d>] ubsan_epilogue+0xd/0x40 [ 16.078324] [<ffffffff81624af7>] __ubsan_handle_out_of_bounds+0x67/0x70 [ 16.078335] [<ffffffffa087665f>] set_path_power+0x1bf/0x230 [snd_hda_codec_generic] [ 16.078344] [<ffffffffa087880d>] add_pin_power_ctls+0x8d/0xc0 [snd_hda_codec_generic] [ 16.078352] [<ffffffffa087f190>] ? pin_power_down_callback+0x20/0x20 [snd_hda_codec_generic] [ 16.078360] [<ffffffffa0878947>] add_all_pin_power_ctls+0x107/0x150 [snd_hda_codec_generic] [ 16.078370] [<ffffffffa08842b3>] snd_hda_gen_parse_auto_config+0x2d73/0x49e0 [snd_hda_codec_generic] [ 16.078376] [<ffffffff81173360>] ? trace_hardirqs_on_caller+0x1b0/0x2c0 [ 16.078390] [<ffffffffa089df27>] alc_parse_auto_config+0x147/0x310 [snd_hda_codec_realtek] [ 16.078402] [<ffffffffa08a332a>] patch_alc269+0x23a/0x560 [snd_hda_codec_realtek] [ 16.078417] [<ffffffffa0838644>] hda_codec_driver_probe+0xa4/0x1a0 [snd_hda_codec] [ 16.078424] [<ffffffff817bbac1>] driver_probe_device+0x101/0x380 [ 16.078430] [<ffffffff817bbdf9>] __driver_attach+0xb9/0x100 [ 16.078438] [<ffffffff817bbd40>] ? driver_probe_device+0x380/0x380 [ 16.078444] [<ffffffff817b8d20>] bus_for_each_dev+0x70/0xc0 [ 16.078449] [<ffffffff817bb087>] driver_attach+0x27/0x50 [ 16.078454] [<ffffffff817ba956>] bus_add_driver+0x166/0x2c0 [ 16.078460] [<ffffffffa0369000>] ? 0xffffffffa0369000 [ 16.078465] [<ffffffff817bd13d>] driver_register+0x7d/0x130 [ 16.078477] [<ffffffffa083816f>] __hda_codec_driver_register+0x6f/0x90 [snd_hda_codec] [ 16.078488] [<ffffffffa036901e>] realtek_driver_init+0x1e/0x1000 [snd_hda_codec_realtek] [ 16.078493] [<ffffffff8100215e>] do_one_initcall+0x4e/0x1d0 [ 16.078499] [<ffffffff8119f54d>] ? rcu_read_lock_sched_held+0x6d/0x80 [ 16.078504] [<ffffffff813701b1>] ? kmem_cache_alloc_trace+0x391/0x560 [ 16.078510] [<ffffffff812bb314>] ? do_init_module+0x28/0x273 [ 16.078515] [<ffffffff812bb387>] do_init_module+0x9b/0x273 [ 16.078522] [<ffffffff811e3782>] load_module+0x20b2/0x3410 [ 16.078527] [<ffffffff811df140>] ? m_show+0x210/0x210 [ 16.078533] [<ffffffff813b2b26>] ? kernel_read+0x66/0xe0 [ 16.078541] [<ffffffff811e4cfa>] SYSC_finit_module+0xba/0xc0 [ 16.078547] [<ffffffff811e4d1e>] SyS_finit_module+0xe/0x10 [ 16.078552] [<ffffffff81a860fc>] entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x1f/0xbd [ 16.078556] ================================================================================ Fix by checking path->depth before use. Signed-off-by:
Bob Copeland <me@bobcopeland.com> Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> Signed-off-by:
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- 13 Jul, 2016 1 commit
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Sasha Levin authored
Signed-off-by:Sasha Levin <sasha.levin@oracle.com>
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- 12 Jul, 2016 1 commit
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Hugh Dickins authored
[ Upstream commit 7f556567 ] The well-spotted fallocate undo fix is good in most cases, but not when fallocate failed on the very first page. index 0 then passes lend -1 to shmem_undo_range(), and that has two bad effects: (a) that it will undo every fallocation throughout the file, unrestricted by the current range; but more importantly (b) it can cause the undo to hang, because lend -1 is treated as truncation, which makes it keep on retrying until every page has gone, but those already fully instantiated will never go away. Big thank you to xfstests generic/269 which demonstrates this. Fixes: b9b4bb26 ("tmpfs: don't undo fallocate past its last page") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by:
Hugh Dickins <hughd@google.com> Signed-off-by:
Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by:
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- 11 Jul, 2016 29 commits
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Florian Westphal authored
[ Upstream commit d7591f0c ] The three variants use same copy&pasted code, condense this into a helper and use that. Make sure info.name is 0-terminated. Signed-off-by:
Florian Westphal <fw@strlen.de> Signed-off-by:
Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org> Signed-off-by:
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Florian Westphal authored
[ Upstream commit 09d96860 ] This looks like refactoring, but its also a bug fix. Problem is that the compat path (32bit iptables, 64bit kernel) lacks a few sanity tests that are done in the normal path. For example, we do not check for underflows and the base chain policies. While its possible to also add such checks to the compat path, its more copy&pastry, for instance we cannot reuse check_underflow() helper as e->target_offset differs in the compat case. Other problem is that it makes auditing for validation errors harder; two places need to be checked and kept in sync. At a high level 32 bit compat works like this: 1- initial pass over blob: validate match/entry offsets, bounds checking lookup all matches and targets do bookkeeping wrt. size delta of 32/64bit structures assign match/target.u.kernel pointer (points at kernel implementation, needed to access ->compatsize etc.) 2- allocate memory according to the total bookkeeping size to contain the translated ruleset 3- second pass over original blob: for each entry, copy the 32bit representation to the newly allocated memory. This also does any special match translations (e.g. adjust 32bit to 64bit longs, etc). 4- check if ruleset is free of loops (chase all jumps) 5-first pass over translated blob: call the checkentry function of all matches and targets. The alternative implemented by this patch is to drop steps 3&4 from the compat process, the translation is changed into an intermediate step rather than a full 1:1 translate_table replacement. In the 2nd pass (step #3), change the 64bit ruleset back to a kernel representation, i.e. put() the kernel pointer and restore ->u.user.name . This gets us a 64bit ruleset that is in the format generated by a 64bit iptables userspace -- we can then use translate_table() to get the 'native' sanity checks. This has two drawbacks: 1. we re-validate all the match and target entry structure sizes even though compat translation is supposed to never generate bogus offsets. 2. we put and then re-lookup each match and target. THe upside is that we get all sanity tests and ruleset validations provided by the normal path and can remove some duplicated compat code. iptables-restore time of autogenerated ruleset with 300k chains of form -A CHAIN0001 -m limit --limit 1/s -j CHAIN0002 -A CHAIN0002 -m limit --limit 1/s -j CHAIN0003 shows no noticeable differences in restore times: old: 0m30.796s new: 0m31.521s 64bit: 0m25.674s Signed-off-by:
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Florian Westphal authored
[ Upstream commit 0188346f ] Always returned 0. Signed-off-by:
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Florian Westphal authored
[ Upstream commit 329a0807 ] Signed-off-by:
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Florian Westphal authored
[ Upstream commit 7d3f843e ] Signed-off-by:
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Florian Westphal authored
[ Upstream commit 8dddd327 ] Signed-off-by:
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Florian Westphal authored
[ Upstream commit 7b7eba0f ] Quoting John Stultz: In updating a 32bit arm device from 4.6 to Linus' current HEAD, I noticed I was having some trouble with networking, and realized that /proc/net/ip_tables_names was suddenly empty. Digging through the registration process, it seems we're catching on the: if (strcmp(t->u.user.name, XT_STANDARD_TARGET) == 0 && target_offset + sizeof(struct xt_standard_target) != next_offset) return -EINVAL; Where next_offset seems to be 4 bytes larger then the offset + standard_target struct size. next_offset needs to be aligned via XT_ALIGN (so we can access all members of ip(6)t_entry struct). This problem didn't show up on i686 as it only needs 4-byte alignment for u64, but iptables userspace on other 32bit arches does insert extra padding. Reported-by:
John Stultz <john.stultz@linaro.org> Tested-by:
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Florian Westphal authored
[ Upstream commit 13631bfc ] Validate that all matches (if any) add up to the beginning of the target and that each match covers at least the base structure size. The compat path should be able to safely re-use the function as the structures only differ in alignment; added a BUILD_BUG_ON just in case we have an arch that adds padding as well. Signed-off-by:
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Florian Westphal authored
[ Upstream commit ce683e5f ] We're currently asserting that targetoff + targetsize <= nextoff. Extend it to also check that targetoff is >= sizeof(xt_entry). Since this is generic code, add an argument pointing to the start of the match/target, we can then derive the base structure size from the delta. We also need the e->elems pointer in a followup change to validate matches. Signed-off-by:
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Florian Westphal authored
[ Upstream commit 7ed2abdd ] We have targets and standard targets -- the latter carries a verdict. The ip/ip6tables validation functions will access t->verdict for the standard targets to fetch the jump offset or verdict for chainloop detection, but this happens before the targets get checked/validated. Thus we also need to check for verdict presence here, else t->verdict can point right after a blob. Spotted with UBSAN while testing malformed blobs. Signed-off-by:
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Florian Westphal authored
[ Upstream commit fc1221b3 ] 32bit rulesets have different layout and alignment requirements, so once more integrity checks get added to xt_check_entry_offsets it will reject well-formed 32bit rulesets. Signed-off-by:
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Florian Westphal authored
[ Upstream commit a08e4e19 ] The target size includes the size of the xt_entry_target struct. Signed-off-by:
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Florian Westphal authored
[ Upstream commit aa412ba2 ] Once we add more sanity testing to xt_check_entry_offsets it becomes relvant if we're expecting a 32bit 'config_compat' blob or a normal one. Since we already have a lot of similar-named functions (check_entry, compat_check_entry, find_and_check_entry, etc.) and the current incarnation is short just fold its contents into the callers. Signed-off-by:
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Florian Westphal authored
[ Upstream commit 7d35812c ] Currently arp/ip and ip6tables each implement a short helper to check that the target offset is large enough to hold one xt_entry_target struct and that t->u.target_size fits within the current rule. Unfortunately these checks are not sufficient. To avoid adding new tests to all of ip/ip6/arptables move the current checks into a helper, then extend this helper in followup patches. Signed-off-by:
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Florian Westphal authored
[ Upstream commit 36472341 ] When we see a jump also check that the offset gets us to beginning of a rule (an ipt_entry). The extra overhead is negible, even with absurd cases. 300k custom rules, 300k jumps to 'next' user chain: [ plus one jump from INPUT to first userchain ]: Before: real 0m24.874s user 0m7.532s sys 0m16.076s After: real 0m27.464s user 0m7.436s sys 0m18.840s Signed-off-by:
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Florian Westphal authored
[ Upstream commit f24e230d ] Ben Hawkes says: In the mark_source_chains function (net/ipv4/netfilter/ip_tables.c) it is possible for a user-supplied ipt_entry structure to have a large next_offset field. This field is not bounds checked prior to writing a counter value at the supplied offset. Base chains enforce absolute verdict. User defined chains are supposed to end with an unconditional return, xtables userspace adds them automatically. But if such return is missing we will move to non-existent next rule. Reported-by:
Ben Hawkes <hawkes@google.com> Signed-off-by:
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Florian Westphal authored
[ Upstream commit 54d83fc7 ] Ben Hawkes says: In the mark_source_chains function (net/ipv4/netfilter/ip_tables.c) it is possible for a user-supplied ipt_entry structure to have a large next_offset field. This field is not bounds checked prior to writing a counter value at the supplied offset. Problem is that mark_source_chains should not have been called -- the rule doesn't have a next entry, so its supposed to return an absolute verdict of either ACCEPT or DROP. However, the function conditional() doesn't work as the name implies. It only checks that the rule is using wildcard address matching. However, an unconditional rule must also not be using any matches (no -m args). The underflow validator only checked the addresses, therefore passing the 'unconditional absolute verdict' test, while mark_source_chains also tested for presence of matches, and thus proceeeded to the next (not-existent) rule. Unify this so that all the callers have same idea of 'unconditional rule'. Reported-by:
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Florian Westphal authored
[ Upstream commit 6e94e0cf ] Otherwise this function may read data beyond the ruleset blob. Signed-off-by:
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Florian Westphal authored
[ Upstream commit bdf533de ] We should check that e->target_offset is sane before mark_source_chains gets called since it will fetch the target entry for loop detection. Signed-off-by:
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Ralf Baechle authored
[ Upstream commit d7de4134 ] TASK_SIZE was defined as 0x7fff8000UL which for 64k pages is not a multiple of the page size. Somewhere further down the math fails such that executing an ELF binary fails. Signed-off-by:
Ralf Baechle <ralf@linux-mips.org> Tested-by:
Joshua Henderson <joshua.henderson@microchip.com> Signed-off-by:
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David S. Miller authored
[ Upstream commit 7cafc0b8 ] We must handle data access exception as well as memory address unaligned exceptions from return from trap window fill faults, not just normal TLB misses. Otherwise we can get an OOPS that looks like this: ld-linux.so.2(36808): Kernel bad sw trap 5 [#1] CPU: 1 PID: 36808 Comm: ld-linux.so.2 Not tainted 4.6.0 #34 task: fff8000303be5c60 ti: fff8000301344000 task.ti: fff8000301344000 TSTATE: 0000004410001601 TPC: 0000000000a1a784 TNPC: 0000000000a1a788 Y: 00000002 Not tainted TPC: <do_sparc64_fault+0x5c4/0x700> g0: fff8000024fc8248 g1: 0000000000db04dc g2: 0000000000000000 g3: 0000000000000001 g4: fff8000303be5c60 g5: fff800030e672000 g6: fff8000301344000 g7: 0000000000000001 o0: 0000000000b95ee8 o1: 000000000000012b o2: 0000000000000000 o3: 0000000200b9b358 o4: 0000000000000000 o5: fff8000301344040 sp: fff80003013475c1 ret_pc: 0000000000a1a77c RPC: <do_sparc64_fault+0x5bc/0x700> l0: 00000000000007ff l1: 0000000000000000 l2: 000000000000005f l3: 0000000000000000 l4: fff8000301347e98 l5: fff8000024ff3060 l6: 0000000000000000 l7: 0000000000000000 i0: fff8000301347f60 i1: 0000000000102400 i2: 0000000000000000 i3: 0000000000000000 i4: 0000000000000000 i5: 0000000000000000 i6: fff80003013476a1 i7: 0000000000404d4c I7: <user_rtt_fill_fixup+0x6c/0x7c> Call Trace: [0000000000404d4c] user_rtt_fill_fixup+0x6c/0x7c The window trap handlers are slightly clever, the trap table entries for them are composed of two pieces of code. First comes the code that actually performs the window fill or spill trap handling, and then there are three instructions at the end which are for exception processing. The userland register window fill handler is: add %sp, STACK_BIAS + 0x00, %g1; \ ldxa [%g1 + %g0] ASI, %l0; \ mov 0x08, %g2; \ mov 0x10, %g3; \ ldxa [%g1 + %g2] ASI, %l1; \ mov 0x18, %g5; \ ldxa [%g1 + %g3] ASI, %l2; \ ldxa [%g1 + %g5] ASI, %l3; \ add %g1, 0x20, %g1; \ ldxa [%g1 + %g0] ASI, %l4; \ ldxa [%g1 + %g2] ASI, %l5; \ ldxa [%g1 + %g3] ASI, %l6; \ ldxa [%g1 + %g5] ASI, %l7; \ add %g1, 0x20, %g1; \ ldxa [%g1 + %g0] ASI, %i0; \ ldxa [%g1 + %g2] ASI, %i1; \ ldxa [%g1 + %g3] ASI, %i2; \ ldxa [%g1 + %g5] ASI, %i3; \ add %g1, 0x20, %g1; \ ldxa [%g1 + %g0] ASI, %i4; \ ldxa [%g1 + %g2] ASI, %i5; \ ldxa [%g1 + %g3] ASI, %i6; \ ldxa [%g1 + %g5] ASI, %i7; \ restored; \ retry; nop; nop; nop; nop; \ b,a,pt %xcc, fill_fixup_dax; \ b,a,pt %xcc, fill_fixup_mna; \ b,a,pt %xcc, fill_fixup; And the way this works is that if any of those memory accesses generate an exception, the exception handler can revector to one of those final three branch instructions depending upon which kind of exception the memory access took. In this way, the fault handler doesn't have to know if it was a spill or a fill that it's handling the fault for. It just always branches to the last instruction in the parent trap's handler. For example, for a regular fault, the code goes: winfix_trampoline: rdpr %tpc, %g3 or %g3, 0x7c, %g3 wrpr %g3, %tnpc done All window trap handlers are 0x80 aligned, so if we "or" 0x7c into the trap time program counter, we'll get that final instruction in the trap handler. On return from trap, we have to pull the register window in but we do this by hand instead of just executing a "restore" instruction for several reasons. The largest being that from Niagara and onward we simply don't have enough levels in the trap stack to fully resolve all possible exception cases of a window fault when we are already at trap level 1 (which we enter to get ready to return from the original trap). This is executed inline via the FILL_*_RTRAP handlers. rtrap_64.S's code branches directly to these to do the window fill by hand if necessary. Now if you look at them, we'll see at the end: ba,a,pt %xcc, user_rtt_fill_fixup; ba,a,pt %xcc, user_rtt_fill_fixup; ba,a,pt %xcc, user_rtt_fill_fixup; And oops, all three cases are handled like a fault. This doesn't work because each of these trap types (data access exception, memory address unaligned, and faults) store their auxiliary info in different registers to pass on to the C handler which does the real work. So in the case where the stack was unaligned, the unaligned trap handler sets up the arg registers one way, and then we branched to the fault handler which expects them setup another way. So the FAULT_TYPE_* value ends up basically being garbage, and randomly would generate the backtrace seen above. Reported-by:
Nick Alcock <nix@esperi.org.uk> Signed-off-by:
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David S. Miller authored
[ Upstream commit d11c2a0d ] All signal frames must be at least 16-byte aligned, because that is the alignment we explicitly create when we build signal return stack frames. All stack pointers must be at least 8-byte aligned. Signed-off-by:
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David S. Miller authored
[ Upstream commit 9ea46abe ] On cheetahplus chips we take the ctx_alloc_lock in order to modify the TLB lookup parameters for the indexed TLBs, which are stored in the context register. This is called with interrupts disabled, however ctx_alloc_lock is an IRQ safe lock, therefore we must take acquire/release it properly with spin_{lock,unlock}_irq(). Reported-by:
Meelis Roos <mroos@linux.ee> Tested-by:
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Babu Moger authored
[ Upstream commit d0c31e02 ] We noticed this panic while enabling SR-IOV in sparc. mlx4_core: Mellanox ConnectX core driver v2.2-1 (Jan 1 2015) mlx4_core: Initializing 0007:01:00.0 mlx4_core 0007:01:00.0: Enabling SR-IOV with 5 VFs mlx4_core: Initializing 0007:01:00.1 Unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference insmod(10010): Oops [#1] CPU: 391 PID: 10010 Comm: insmod Not tainted 4.1.12-32.el6uek.kdump2.sparc64 #1 TPC: <dma_supported+0x20/0x80> I7: <__mlx4_init_one+0x324/0x500 [mlx4_core]> Call Trace: [00000000104c5ea4] __mlx4_init_one+0x324/0x500 [mlx4_core] [00000000104c613c] mlx4_init_one+0xbc/0x120 [mlx4_core] [0000000000725f14] local_pci_probe+0x34/0xa0 [0000000000726028] pci_call_probe+0xa8/0xe0 [0000000000726310] pci_device_probe+0x50/0x80 [000000000079f700] really_probe+0x140/0x420 [000000000079fa24] driver_probe_device+0x44/0xa0 [000000000079fb5c] __device_attach+0x3c/0x60 [000000000079d85c] bus_for_each_drv+0x5c/0xa0 [000000000079f588] device_attach+0x88/0xc0 [000000000071acd0] pci_bus_add_device+0x30/0x80 [0000000000736090] virtfn_add.clone.1+0x210/0x360 [00000000007364a4] sriov_enable+0x2c4/0x520 [000000000073672c] pci_enable_sriov+0x2c/0x40 [00000000104c2d58] mlx4_enable_sriov+0xf8/0x180 [mlx4_core] [00000000104c49ac] mlx4_load_one+0x42c/0xd40 [mlx4_core] Disabling lock debugging due to kernel taint Caller[00000000104c5ea4]: __mlx4_init_one+0x324/0x500 [mlx4_core] Caller[00000000104c613c]: mlx4_init_one+0xbc/0x120 [mlx4_core] Caller[0000000000725f14]: local_pci_probe+0x34/0xa0 Caller[0000000000726028]: pci_call_probe+0xa8/0xe0 Caller[0000000000726310]: pci_device_probe+0x50/0x80 Caller[000000000079f700]: really_probe+0x140/0x420 Caller[000000000079fa24]: driver_probe_device+0x44/0xa0 Caller[000000000079fb5c]: __device_attach+0x3c/0x60 Caller[000000000079d85c]: bus_for_each_drv+0x5c/0xa0 Caller[000000000079f588]: device_attach+0x88/0xc0 Caller[000000000071acd0]: pci_bus_add_device+0x30/0x80 Caller[0000000000736090]: virtfn_add.clone.1+0x210/0x360 Caller[00000000007364a4]: sriov_enable+0x2c4/0x520 Caller[000000000073672c]: pci_enable_sriov+0x2c/0x40 Caller[00000000104c2d58]: mlx4_enable_sriov+0xf8/0x180 [mlx4_core] Caller[00000000104c49ac]: mlx4_load_one+0x42c/0xd40 [mlx4_core] Caller[00000000104c5f90]: __mlx4_init_one+0x410/0x500 [mlx4_core] Caller[00000000104c613c]: mlx4_init_one+0xbc/0x120 [mlx4_core] Caller[0000000000725f14]: local_pci_probe+0x34/0xa0 Caller[0000000000726028]: pci_call_probe+0xa8/0xe0 Caller[0000000000726310]: pci_device_probe+0x50/0x80 Caller[000000000079f700]: really_probe+0x140/0x420 Caller[000000000079fa24]: driver_probe_device+0x44/0xa0 Caller[000000000079fb08]: __driver_attach+0x88/0xa0 Caller[000000000079d90c]: bus_for_each_dev+0x6c/0xa0 Caller[000000000079f29c]: driver_attach+0x1c/0x40 Caller[000000000079e35c]: bus_add_driver+0x17c/0x220 Caller[00000000007a02d4]: driver_register+0x74/0x120 Caller[00000000007263fc]: __pci_register_driver+0x3c/0x60 Caller[00000000104f62bc]: mlx4_init+0x60/0xcc [mlx4_core] Kernel panic - not syncing: Fatal exception Press Stop-A (L1-A) to return to the boot prom ---[ end Kernel panic - not syncing: Fatal exception Details: Here is the call sequence virtfn_add->__mlx4_init_one->dma_set_mask->dma_supported The panic happened at line 760(file arch/sparc/kernel/iommu.c) 758 int dma_supported(struct device *dev, u64 device_mask) 759 { 760 struct iommu *iommu = dev->archdata.iommu; 761 u64 dma_addr_mask = iommu->dma_addr_mask; 762 763 if (device_mask >= (1UL << 32UL)) 764 return 0; 765 766 if ((device_mask & dma_addr_mask) == dma_addr_mask) 767 return 1; 768 769 #ifdef CONFIG_PCI 770 if (dev_is_pci(dev)) 771 return pci64_dma_supported(to_pci_dev(dev), device_mask); 772 #endif 773 774 return 0; 775 } 776 EXPORT_SYMBOL(dma_supported); Same panic happened with Intel ixgbe driver also. SR-IOV code looks for arch specific data while enabling VFs. When VF device is added, driver probe function makes set of calls to initialize the pci device. Because the VF device is added different way than the normal PF device(which happens via of_create_pci_dev for sparc), some of the arch specific initialization does not happen for VF device. That causes panic when archdata is accessed. To fix this, I have used already defined weak function pcibios_setup_device to copy archdata from PF to VF. Also verified the fix. Signed-off-by:
Babu Moger <babu.moger@oracle.com> Signed-off-by:
Sowmini Varadhan <sowmini.varadhan@oracle.com> Reviewed-by:
Ethan Zhao <ethan.zhao@oracle.com> Signed-off-by:
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David S. Miller authored
[ Upstream commit 397d1533 ] Like a signal return, we should use synchronize_user_stack() rather than flush_user_windows(). Reported-by:
Ilya Malakhov <ilmalakhovthefirst@gmail.com> Signed-off-by:
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Nitin Gupta authored
[ Upstream commit 36beca65 ] Orabug: 22495713 Currently, NUMA node distance matrix is initialized only when a machine descriptor (MD) exists. However, sun4u machines (e.g. Sun Blade 2500) do not have an MD and thus distance values were left uninitialized. The initialization is now moved such that it happens on both sun4u and sun4v. Signed-off-by:
Nitin Gupta <nitin.m.gupta@oracle.com> Tested-by:
Mikael Pettersson <mikpelinux@gmail.com> Signed-off-by:
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David S. Miller authored
[ Upstream commit 49fa5230 ] The system call tracing bug fix mentioned in the Fixes tag below increased the amount of assembler code in the sequence of assembler files included by head_64.S This caused to total set of code to exceed 0x4000 bytes in size, which overflows the expression in head_64.S that works to place swapper_tsb at address 0x408000. When this is violated, the TSB is not properly aligned, and also the trap table is not aligned properly either. All of this together results in failed boots. So, do two things: 1) Simplify some code by using ba,a instead of ba/nop to get those bytes back. 2) Add a linker script assertion to make sure that if this happens again the build will fail. Fixes: 1a40b953 ("sparc: Fix system call tracing register handling.") Reported-by:
Joerg Abraham <joerg.abraham@nokia.com> Signed-off-by:
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Mike Frysinger authored
[ Upstream commit 1a40b953 ] A system call trace trigger on entry allows the tracing process to inspect and potentially change the traced process's registers. Account for that by reloading the %g1 (syscall number) and %i0-%i5 (syscall argument) values. We need to be careful to revalidate the range of %g1, and reload the system call table entry it corresponds to into %l7. Reported-by:
Mike Frysinger <vapier@gentoo.org> Signed-off-by:
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Yuchung Cheng authored
[ Upstream commit ce3cf4ec ] The v6 tcp stats scan do not provide TLP and ER timer information correctly like the v4 version . This patch fixes that. Fixes: 6ba8a3b1 ("tcp: Tail loss probe (TLP)") Fixes: eed530b6 ("tcp: early retransmit") Signed-off-by:
Yuchung Cheng <ycheng@google.com> Signed-off-by:
Neal Cardwell <ncardwell@google.com> Signed-off-by:
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