- 27 Jan, 2020 40 commits
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Alex Shi authored
After commit 61bd0f66 ("KVM: PPC: Book3S HV: Fix guest time accounting with VIRT_CPU_ACCOUNTING_GEN"), no one use this function anymore, So better to remove it. Signed-off-by:
Alex Shi <alex.shi@linux.alibaba.com> Cc: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org> Cc: Frederic Weisbecker <frederic@kernel.org> Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by:
Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
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Paolo Bonzini authored
For ring-based dirty log tracking, it will be more efficient to account writes during schedule-out or schedule-in to the currently running VCPU. We would like to do it even if the write doesn't use the current VCPU's address space, as is the case for cached writes (see commit 4e335d9e, "Revert "KVM: Support vCPU-based gfn->hva cache"", 2017-05-02). Therefore, add a mechanism to track the currently-loaded kvm_vcpu struct. There is already something similar in KVM/ARM; one important difference is that kvm_arch_vcpu_{load,put} have two callers in virt/kvm/kvm_main.c: we have to update both the architecture-independent vcpu_{load,put} and the preempt notifiers. Another change made in the process is to allow using kvm_get_running_vcpu() in preemptible code. This is allowed because preempt notifiers ensure that the value does not change even after the VCPU thread is migrated. Signed-off-by:
Peter Xu <peterx@redhat.com> Signed-off-by:
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Peter Xu authored
The helper x86_set_memory_region() is only used in vmx_set_tss_addr() and kvm_arch_destroy_vm(). Push the lock upper in both cases. With that, drop x86_set_memory_region(). This prepares to allow __x86_set_memory_region() to return a HVA mapped, because the HVA will need to be protected by the lock too even after __x86_set_memory_region() returns. Signed-off-by:
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Peter Xu authored
We've already got the slots_lock, so we should be safe. Signed-off-by:
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Peter Xu authored
It's already going to reach 2400 Bytes (which is over half of page size on 4K page archs), so maybe it's good to have this build-time check in case it overflows when adding new fields. Signed-off-by:
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Peter Xu authored
Remove kvm_read_guest_atomic() because it's not used anywhere. Signed-off-by:
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Vitaly Kuznetsov authored
In nested_enable_evmcs() evmcs_already_enabled check doesn't really do anything: controls are already sanitized and we return '0' regardless. Just drop the check. Signed-off-by:
Vitaly Kuznetsov <vkuznets@redhat.com> Reviewed-by:
Liran Alon <liran.alon@oracle.com> Signed-off-by:
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Sean Christopherson authored
Remove the CONFIG_X86_64 condition from the low level non-canonical helpers to effectively enable non-canonical checks on 32-bit KVM. Non-canonical checks are performed by hardware if the CPU *supports* 64-bit mode, whether or not the CPU is actually in 64-bit mode is irrelevant. For the most part, skipping non-canonical checks on 32-bit KVM is ok-ish because 32-bit KVM always (hopefully) drops bits 63:32 of whatever value it's checking before propagating it to hardware, and architecturally, the expected behavior for the guest is a bit of a grey area since the vCPU itself doesn't support 64-bit mode. I.e. a 32-bit KVM guest can observe the missed checks in several paths, e.g. INVVPID and VM-Enter, but it's debatable whether or not the missed checks constitute a bug because technically the vCPU doesn't support 64-bit mode. The primary motivation for enabling the non-canonical checks is defense in depth. As mentioned above, a guest can trigger a missed check via INVVPID or VM-Enter. INVVPID is straightforward as it takes a 64-bit virtual address as part of its 128-bit INVVPID descriptor and fails if the address is non-canonical, even if INVVPID is executed in 32-bit PM. Nested VM-Enter is a bit more convoluted as it requires the guest to write natural width VMCS fields via memory accesses and then VMPTRLD the VMCS, but it's still possible. In both cases, KVM is saved from a true bug only because its flows that propagate values to hardware (correctly) take "unsigned long" parameters and so drop bits 63:32 of the bad value. Explicitly performing the non-canonical checks makes it less likely that a bad value will be propagated to hardware, e.g. in the INVVPID case, if __invvpid() didn't implicitly drop bits 63:32 then KVM would BUG() on the resulting unexpected INVVPID failure due to hardware rejecting the non-canonical address. The only downside to enabling the non-canonical checks is that it adds a relatively small amount of overhead, but the affected flows are not hot paths, i.e. the overhead is negligible. Note, KVM technically could gate the non-canonical checks on 32-bit KVM with static_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_LM), but on bare metal that's an even bigger waste of code for everyone except the 0.00000000000001% of the population running on Yonah, and nested 32-bit on 64-bit already fudges things with respect to 64-bit CPU behavior. Signed-off-by:
Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@intel.com> [Also do so in nested_vmx_check_host_state as reported by Krish. - Paolo] Signed-off-by:
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Oliver Upton authored
Writes to MSR_CORE_PERF_GLOBAL_CONTROL should never fail if the VM-exit and VM-entry controls are exposed to L1. Promote the checks to perform a full WARN if kvm_set_msr() fails and remove the now unused macro SET_MSR_OR_WARN(). Suggested-by:
Oliver Upton <oupton@google.com> Reviewed-by:
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Sean Christopherson authored
Remove an unused struct x86_emulate_ctxt * param from low level helpers used to access guest FPU state. The unused param was left behind by commit 6ab0b9fe ("x86,kvm: remove KVM emulator get_fpu / put_fpu"). No functional change intended. Signed-off-by:
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Sean Christopherson authored
Reload the current thread's FPU state, which contains the guest's FPU state, to the CPU registers if necessary during vcpu_enter_guest(). TIF_NEED_FPU_LOAD can be set any time control is transferred out of KVM, e.g. if I/O is triggered during a KVM call to get_user_pages() or if a softirq occurs while KVM is scheduled in. Moving the handling of TIF_NEED_FPU_LOAD from vcpu_enter_guest() to kvm_arch_vcpu_load(), effectively kvm_sched_in(), papered over a bug where kvm_put_guest_fpu() failed to account for TIF_NEED_FPU_LOAD. The easiest way to the kvm_put_guest_fpu() bug was to run with involuntary preemption enable, thus handling TIF_NEED_FPU_LOAD during kvm_sched_in() made the bug go away. But, removing the handling in vcpu_enter_guest() exposed KVM to the rare case of a softirq triggering kernel_fpu_begin() between vcpu_load() and vcpu_enter_guest(). Now that kvm_{load,put}_guest_fpu() correctly handle TIF_NEED_FPU_LOAD, revert the commit to both restore the vcpu_enter_guest() behavior and eliminate the superfluous switch_fpu_return() in kvm_arch_vcpu_load(). Note, leaving the handling in kvm_arch_vcpu_load() isn't wrong per se, but it is unnecessary, and most critically, makes it extremely difficult to find bugs such as the kvm_put_guest_fpu() issue due to shrinking the window where a softirq can corrupt state. A sample trace triggered by warning if TIF_NEED_FPU_LOAD is set while vcpu state is loaded: <IRQ> gcmaes_crypt_by_sg.constprop.12+0x26e/0x660 ? 0xffffffffc024547d ? __qdisc_run+0x83/0x510 ? __dev_queue_xmit+0x45e/0x990 ? ip_finish_output2+0x1a8/0x570 ? fib4_rule_action+0x61/0x70 ? fib4_rule_action+0x70/0x70 ? fib_rules_lookup+0x13f/0x1c0 ? helper_rfc4106_decrypt+0x82/0xa0 ? crypto_aead_decrypt+0x40/0x70 ? crypto_aead_decrypt+0x40/0x70 ? crypto_aead_decrypt+0x40/0x70 ? esp_output_tail+0x8f4/0xa5a [esp4] ? skb_ext_add+0xd3/0x170 ? xfrm_input+0x7a6/0x12c0 ? xfrm4_rcv_encap+0xae/0xd0 ? xfrm4_transport_finish+0x200/0x200 ? udp_queue_rcv_one_skb+0x1ba/0x460 ? udp_unicast_rcv_skb.isra.63+0x72/0x90 ? __udp4_lib_rcv+0x51b/0xb00 ? ip_protocol_deliver_rcu+0xd2/0x1c0 ? ip_local_deliver_finish+0x44/0x50 ? ip_local_deliver+0xe0/0xf0 ? ip_protocol_deliver_rcu+0x1c0/0x1c0 ? ip_rcv+0xbc/0xd0 ? ip_rcv_finish_core.isra.19+0x380/0x380 ? __netif_receive_skb_one_core+0x7e/0x90 ? netif_receive_skb_internal+0x3d/0xb0 ? napi_gro_receive+0xed/0x150 ? 0xffffffffc0243c77 ? net_rx_action+0x149/0x3b0 ? __do_softirq+0xe4/0x2f8 ? handle_irq_event_percpu+0x6a/0x80 ? irq_exit+0xe6/0xf0 ? do_IRQ+0x7f/0xd0 ? common_interrupt+0xf/0xf </IRQ> ? irq_entries_start+0x20/0x660 ? vmx_get_interrupt_shadow+0x2f0/0x710 [kvm_intel] ? kvm_set_msr_common+0xfc7/0x2380 [kvm] ? recalibrate_cpu_khz+0x10/0x10 ? ktime_get+0x3a/0xa0 ? kvm_arch_vcpu_ioctl_run+0x107/0x560 [kvm] ? kvm_init+0x6bf/0xd00 [kvm] ? __seccomp_filter+0x7a/0x680 ? do_vfs_ioctl+0xa4/0x630 ? security_file_ioctl+0x32/0x50 ? ksys_ioctl+0x60/0x90 ? __x64_sys_ioctl+0x16/0x20 ? do_syscall_64+0x5f/0x1a0 ? entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9 ---[ end trace 9564a1ccad733a90 ]--- This reverts commit e7517324. Fixes: e7517324 ("KVM: X86: Fix fpu state crash in kvm guest") Reported-by:Derek Yerger <derek@djy.llc> Reported-by: kernel@najdan.com Cc: Wanpeng Li <wanpengli@tencent.com> Cc: Thomas Lambertz <mail@thomaslambertz.de> Cc: Rik van Riel <riel@surriel.com> Cc: Sebastian Andrzej Siewior <bigeasy@linutronix.de> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by:
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Sean Christopherson authored
Lock the FPU regs and reload the current thread's FPU state, which holds the guest's FPU state, to the CPU registers if necessary prior to accessing guest FPU state as part of emulation. kernel_fpu_begin() can be called from softirq context, therefore KVM must ensure softirqs are disabled (locking the FPU regs disables softirqs) when touching CPU FPU state. Note, for all intents and purposes this reverts commit 6ab0b9fe ("x86,kvm: remove KVM emulator get_fpu / put_fpu"), but at the time it was applied, removing get/put_fpu() was correct. The re-introduction of {get,put}_fpu() is necessitated by the deferring of FPU state load. Fixes: 5f409e20 ("x86/fpu: Defer FPU state load until return to userspace") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by:
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Sean Christopherson authored
Handle TIF_NEED_FPU_LOAD similar to how fpu__copy() handles the flag when duplicating FPU state to a new task struct. TIF_NEED_FPU_LOAD can be set any time control is transferred out of KVM, be it voluntarily, e.g. if I/O is triggered during a KVM call to get_user_pages, or involuntarily, e.g. if softirq runs after an IRQ occurs. Therefore, KVM must account for TIF_NEED_FPU_LOAD whenever it is (potentially) accessing CPU FPU state. Fixes: 5f409e20 ("x86/fpu: Defer FPU state load until return to userspace") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by:
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Paolo Bonzini authored
This reverts commit 95145c25. The next few patches will fix the issue so the warning is not needed anymore; revert it separately to simplify application to stable kernels. Signed-off-by:
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Miaohe Lin authored
Short-circuit kvm_apic_accept_pic_intr() when pic intr is accepted, there is no need to proceed further. Also remove unnecessary var r. Signed-off-by:
Miaohe Lin <linmiaohe@huawei.com> Signed-off-by:
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Miaohe Lin authored
The exception pending event is cleared by kvm_clear_exception_queue(). We shouldn't clear it again. Signed-off-by:
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Marios Pomonis authored
This fixes Spectre-v1/L1TF vulnerabilities in intel_find_fixed_event() and intel_rdpmc_ecx_to_pmc(). kvm_rdpmc() (ancestor of intel_find_fixed_event()) and reprogram_fixed_counter() (ancestor of intel_rdpmc_ecx_to_pmc()) are exported symbols so KVM should treat them conservatively from a security perspective. Fixes: 25462f7f ("KVM: x86/vPMU: Define kvm_pmu_ops to support vPMU function dispatch") Signed-off-by:
Nick Finco <nifi@google.com> Signed-off-by:
Marios Pomonis <pomonis@google.com> Reviewed-by:
Andrew Honig <ahonig@google.com> Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Reviewed-by:
Jim Mattson <jmattson@google.com> Signed-off-by:
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Marios Pomonis authored
This fixes a Spectre-v1/L1TF vulnerability in __kvm_set_dr() and kvm_get_dr(). Both kvm_get_dr() and kvm_set_dr() (a wrapper of __kvm_set_dr()) are exported symbols so KVM should tream them conservatively from a security perspective. Fixes: 020df079 ("KVM: move DR register access handling into generic code") Signed-off-by:
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Marios Pomonis authored
This fixes a Spectre-v1/L1TF vulnerability in vmx_handle_exit(). While exit_reason is set by the hardware and therefore should not be attacker-influenced, an unknown exit_reason could potentially be used to perform such an attack. Fixes: 55d2375e ("KVM: nVMX: Move nested code to dedicated files") Signed-off-by:
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Marios Pomonis authored
This fixes Spectre-v1/L1TF vulnerabilities in vmx_read_guest_seg_selector(), vmx_read_guest_seg_base(), vmx_read_guest_seg_limit() and vmx_read_guest_seg_ar(). When invoked from emulation, these functions contain index computations based on the (attacker-influenced) segment value. Using constants prevents the attack. Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: -
Marios Pomonis authored
This fixes a Spectre-v1/L1TF vulnerability in set_msr_mce() and get_msr_mce(). Both functions contain index computations based on the (attacker-controlled) MSR number. Fixes: 890ca9ae ("KVM: Add MCE support") Signed-off-by:
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Marios Pomonis authored
This fixes a Spectre-v1/L1TF vulnerability in the get_gp_pmc() and get_fixed_pmc() functions. They both contain index computations based on the (attacker-controlled) MSR number. Fixes: 25462f7f ("KVM: x86/vPMU: Define kvm_pmu_ops to support vPMU function dispatch") Signed-off-by:
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Marios Pomonis authored
KVM: x86: Protect MSR-based index computations in fixed_msr_to_seg_unit() from Spectre-v1/L1TF attacks This fixes a Spectre-v1/L1TF vulnerability in fixed_msr_to_seg_unit(). This function contains index computations based on the (attacker-controlled) MSR number. Fixes: de9aef5e ("KVM: MTRR: introduce fixed_mtrr_segment table") Signed-off-by:
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Marios Pomonis authored
This fixes a Spectre-v1/L1TF vulnerability in kvm_lapic_reg_write(). This function contains index computations based on the (attacker-controlled) MSR number. Fixes: 0105d1a5 ("KVM: x2apic interface to lapic") Signed-off-by:
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Marios Pomonis authored
This fixes a Spectre-v1/L1TF vulnerability in ioapic_write_indirect(). This function contains index computations based on the (attacker-controlled) IOREGSEL register. This patch depends on patch "KVM: x86: Protect ioapic_read_indirect() from Spectre-v1/L1TF attacks". Fixes: 70f93dae ("KVM: Use temporary variable to shorten lines.") Signed-off-by:
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Marios Pomonis authored
This fixes a Spectre-v1/L1TF vulnerability in ioapic_read_indirect(). This function contains index computations based on the (attacker-controlled) IOREGSEL register. Fixes: a2c118bf ("KVM: Fix bounds checking in ioapic indirect register reads (CVE-2013-1798)") Signed-off-by:
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Marios Pomonis authored
This fixes a Spectre-v1/L1TF vulnerability in picdev_write(). It replaces index computations based on the (attacked-controlled) port number with constants through a minor refactoring. Fixes: 85f455f7 ("KVM: Add support for in-kernel PIC emulation") Signed-off-by:
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Marios Pomonis authored
This fixes Spectre-v1/L1TF vulnerabilities in kvm_hv_msr_get_crash_data() and kvm_hv_msr_set_crash_data(). These functions contain index computations that use the (attacker-controlled) MSR number. Fixes: e7d9513b ("kvm/x86: added hyper-v crash msrs into kvm hyperv context") Signed-off-by:
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Marios Pomonis authored
This fixes a Spectre-v1/L1TF vulnerability in x86_decode_insn(). kvm_emulate_instruction() (an ancestor of x86_decode_insn()) is an exported symbol, so KVM should treat it conservatively from a security perspective. Fixes: 045a282c ("KVM: emulator: implement fninit, fnstsw, fnstcw") Signed-off-by:
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John Allen authored
Current SVM implementation does not have support for handling PKU. Guests running on a host with future AMD cpus that support the feature will read garbage from the PKRU register and will hit segmentation faults on boot as memory is getting marked as protected that should not be. Ensure that cpuid from SVM does not advertise the feature. Signed-off-by:
John Allen <john.allen@amd.com> Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Fixes: 0556cbdc ("x86/pkeys: Don't check if PKRU is zero before writing it") Signed-off-by:
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Sean Christopherson authored
Open code the allocation and freeing of the vcpu->run page in kvm_vm_ioctl_create_vcpu() and kvm_vcpu_destroy() respectively. Doing so allows kvm_vcpu_init() to be a pure init function and eliminates kvm_vcpu_uninit() entirely. Signed-off-by:
Cornelia Huck <cohuck@redhat.com> Signed-off-by:
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Sean Christopherson authored
Move the putting of vcpu->pid to kvm_vcpu_destroy(). vcpu->pid is guaranteed to be NULL when kvm_vcpu_uninit() is called in the error path of kvm_vm_ioctl_create_vcpu(), e.g. it is explicitly nullified by kvm_vcpu_init() and is only changed by KVM_RUN. No functional change intended. Acked-by:
Christoffer Dall <christoffer.dall@arm.com> Signed-off-by:
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Sean Christopherson authored
Remove kvm_arch_vcpu_init() and kvm_arch_vcpu_uninit() now that all arch specific implementations are nops. Acked-by:
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Sean Christopherson authored
Add an arm specific hook to free the arm64-only sve_state. Doing so eliminates the last functional code from kvm_arch_vcpu_uninit() across all architectures and paves the way for removing kvm_arch_vcpu_init() and kvm_arch_vcpu_uninit() entirely. Signed-off-by:
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Sean Christopherson authored
Fold init() into create() now that the two are called back-to-back by common KVM code (kvm_vcpu_init() calls kvm_arch_vcpu_init() as its last action, and kvm_vm_ioctl_create_vcpu() calls kvm_arch_vcpu_create() immediately thereafter). Rinse and repeat for kvm_arch_vcpu_uninit() and kvm_arch_vcpu_destroy(). This paves the way for removing kvm_arch_vcpu_{un}init() entirely. Note, calling kvmppc_mmu_destroy() if kvmppc_core_vcpu_create() fails may or may not be necessary. Move it along with the more obvious call to kvmppc_subarch_vcpu_uninit() so as not to inadvertantly introduce a functional change and/or bug. No functional change intended. Signed-off-by: -
Sean Christopherson authored
Fold init() into create() now that the two are called back-to-back by common KVM code (kvm_vcpu_init() calls kvm_arch_vcpu_init() as its last action, and kvm_vm_ioctl_create_vcpu() calls kvm_arch_vcpu_create() immediately thereafter). This paves the way for removing kvm_arch_vcpu_{un}init() entirely. Note, there is no associated unwinding in kvm_arch_vcpu_uninit() that needs to be relocated (to kvm_arch_vcpu_destroy()). No functional change intended. Signed-off-by: -
Sean Christopherson authored
Fold init() into create() now that the two are called back-to-back by common KVM code (kvm_vcpu_init() calls kvm_arch_vcpu_init() as its last action, and kvm_vm_ioctl_create_vcpu() calls kvm_arch_vcpu_create() immediately thereafter). Rinse and repeat for kvm_arch_vcpu_uninit() and kvm_arch_vcpu_destroy(). This paves the way for removing kvm_arch_vcpu_{un}init() entirely. No functional change intended. Signed-off-by: -
Sean Christopherson authored
Fold init() into create() now that the two are called back-to-back by common KVM code (kvm_vcpu_init() calls kvm_arch_vcpu_init() as its last action, and kvm_vm_ioctl_create_vcpu() calls kvm_arch_vcpu_create() immediately thereafter). This paves the way for removing kvm_arch_vcpu_init() entirely. No functional change intended. Signed-off-by:
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Sean Christopherson authored
Remove kvm_arch_vcpu_setup() now that all arch specific implementations are nops. Acked-by:
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Sean Christopherson authored
Fold setup() into create() now that the two are called back-to-back by common KVM code. This paves the way for removing kvm_arch_vcpu_setup(). Note, BookE directly implements kvm_arch_vcpu_setup() and PPC's common kvm_arch_vcpu_create() is responsible for its own cleanup, thus the only cleanup required when directly invoking kvmppc_core_vcpu_setup() is to call .vcpu_free(), which is the BookE specific portion of PPC's kvm_arch_vcpu_destroy() by way of kvmppc_core_vcpu_free(). No functional change intended. Signed-off-by:
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