This code is only for CPUs which are affected by MSBDS, but are *not*
affected by the other two MDS issues.

For such CPUs, enabling the mds_idle_clear mitigation is enough to
mitigate SMT.

However if user boots with 'mds=off' and still has SMT enabled, we should
not report that SMT is mitigated:

$cat /sys//devices/system/cpu/vulnerabilities/mds
Vulnerable; SMT mitigated

But rather:
Vulnerable; SMT vulnerable
Signed-off-by: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: Tyler Hicks <tyhicks@canonical.com>
Reviewed-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190412215118.294906495@localhost.localdomain

s/L1TF/MDS/
Signed-off-by: Boris Ostrovsky <boris.ostrovsky@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: Tyler Hicks <tyhicks@canonical.com>
Reviewed-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>

MDS is vulnerable with SMT.  Make that clear with a one-time printk
whenever SMT first gets enabled.
Signed-off-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: Tyler Hicks <tyhicks@canonical.com>
Acked-by: Jiri Kosina <jkosina@suse.cz>

arch_smt_update() now has a dependency on both Spectre v2 and MDS
mitigations.  Move its initial call to after all the mitigation decisions
have been made.
Signed-off-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: Tyler Hicks <tyhicks@canonical.com>
Acked-by: Jiri Kosina <jkosina@suse.cz>

Add the mds=full,nosmt cmdline option.  This is like mds=full, but with
SMT disabled if the CPU is vulnerable.
Signed-off-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: Tyler Hicks <tyhicks@canonical.com>
Acked-by: Jiri Kosina <jkosina@suse.cz>

Add the initial MDS vulnerability documentation.
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: Jon Masters <jcm@redhat.com>

Move L!TF to a separate directory so the MDS stuff can be added at the
side. Otherwise the all hardware vulnerabilites have their own top level
entry. Should have done that right away.
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Reviewed-by: Jon Masters <jcm@redhat.com>

In virtualized environments it can happen that the host has the microcode
update which utilizes the VERW instruction to clear CPU buffers, but the
hypervisor is not yet updated to expose the X86_FEATURE_MD_CLEAR CPUID bit
to guests.

Introduce an internal mitigation mode VMWERV which enables the invocation
of the CPU buffer clearing even if X86_FEATURE_MD_CLEAR is not set. If the
system has no updated microcode this results in a pointless execution of
the VERW instruction wasting a few CPU cycles. If the microcode is updated,
but not exposed to a guest then the CPU buffers will be cleared.

That said: Virtual Machines Will Eventually Receive Vaccine
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Reviewed-by: Jon Masters <jcm@redhat.com>
Tested-by: Jon Masters <jcm@redhat.com>

Add the sysfs reporting file for MDS. It exposes the vulnerability and
mitigation state similar to the existing files for the other speculative
hardware vulnerabilities.
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Reviewed-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Reviewed-by: Jon Masters <jcm@redhat.com>
Tested-by: Jon Masters <jcm@redhat.com>

Now that the mitigations are in place, add a command line parameter to
control the mitigation, a mitigation selector function and a SMT update
mechanism.

This is the minimal straight forward initial implementation which just
provides an always on/off mode. The command line parameter is:

  mds=[full|off]

This is consistent with the existing mitigations for other speculative
hardware vulnerabilities.

The idle invocation is dynamically updated according to the SMT state of
the system similar to the dynamic update of the STIBP mitigation. The idle
mitigation is limited to CPUs which are only affected by MSBDS and not any
other variant, because the other variants cannot be mitigated on SMT
enabled systems.
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Reviewed-by: Jon Masters <jcm@redhat.com>
Tested-by: Jon Masters <jcm@redhat.com>

Add a static key which controls the invocation of the CPU buffer clear
mechanism on idle entry. This is independent of other MDS mitigations
because the idle entry invocation to mitigate the potential leakage due to
store buffer repartitioning is only necessary on SMT systems.

Add the actual invocations to the different halt/mwait variants which
covers all usage sites. mwaitx is not patched as it's not available on
Intel CPUs.

The buffer clear is only invoked before entering the C-State to prevent
that stale data from the idling CPU is spilled to the Hyper-Thread sibling
after the Store buffer got repartitioned and all entries are available to
the non idle sibling.

When coming out of idle the store buffer is partitioned again so each
sibling has half of it available. Now CPU which returned from idle could be
speculatively exposed to contents of the sibling, but the buffers are
flushed either on exit to user space or on VMENTER.

When later on conditional buffer clearing is implemented on top of this,
then there is no action required either because before returning to user
space the context switch will set the condition flag which causes a flush
on the return to user path.

Note, that the buffer clearing on idle is only sensible on CPUs which are
solely affected by MSBDS and not any other variant of MDS because the other
MDS variants cannot be mitigated when SMT is enabled, so the buffer
clearing on idle would be a window dressing exercise.

This intentionally does not handle the case in the acpi/processor_idle
driver which uses the legacy IO port interface for C-State transitions for
two reasons:

 - The acpi/processor_idle driver was replaced by the intel_idle driver
   almost a decade ago. Anything Nehalem upwards supports it and defaults
   to that new driver.

 - The legacy IO port interface is likely to be used on older and therefore
   unaffected CPUs or on systems which do not receive microcode updates
   anymore, so there is no point in adding that.
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Reviewed-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Reviewed-by: Frederic Weisbecker <frederic@kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: Jon Masters <jcm@redhat.com>
Tested-by: Jon Masters <jcm@redhat.com>

CPUs which are affected by L1TF and MDS mitigate MDS with the L1D Flush on
VMENTER when updated microcode is installed.

If a CPU is not affected by L1TF or if the L1D Flush is not in use, then
MDS mitigation needs to be invoked explicitly.

For these cases, follow the host mitigation state and invoke the MDS
mitigation before VMENTER.
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Reviewed-by: Frederic Weisbecker <frederic@kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Reviewed-by: Jon Masters <jcm@redhat.com>
Tested-by: Jon Masters <jcm@redhat.com>

Add a static key which controls the invocation of the CPU buffer clear
mechanism on exit to user space and add the call into
prepare_exit_to_usermode() and do_nmi() right before actually returning.

Add documentation which kernel to user space transition this covers and
explain why some corner cases are not mitigated.
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Reviewed-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Reviewed-by: Frederic Weisbecker <frederic@kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: Jon Masters <jcm@redhat.com>
Tested-by: Jon Masters <jcm@redhat.com>

The Microarchitectural Data Sampling (MDS) vulernabilities are mitigated by
clearing the affected CPU buffers. The mechanism for clearing the buffers
uses the unused and obsolete VERW instruction in combination with a
microcode update which triggers a CPU buffer clear when VERW is executed.

Provide a inline function with the assembly magic. The argument of the VERW
instruction must be a memory operand as documented:

  "MD_CLEAR enumerates that the memory-operand variant of VERW (for
   example, VERW m16) has been extended to also overwrite buffers affected
   by MDS. This buffer overwriting functionality is not guaranteed for the
   register operand variant of VERW."

Documentation also recommends to use a writable data segment selector:

  "The buffer overwriting occurs regardless of the result of the VERW
   permission check, as well as when the selector is null or causes a
   descriptor load segment violation. However, for lowest latency we
   recommend using a selector that indicates a valid writable data
   segment."

Add x86 specific documentation about MDS and the internal workings of the
mitigation.
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Reviewed-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Reviewed-by: Frederic Weisbecker <frederic@kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: Jon Masters <jcm@redhat.com>
Tested-by: Jon Masters <jcm@redhat.com>

X86_FEATURE_MD_CLEAR is a new CPUID bit which is set when microcode
provides the mechanism to invoke a flush of various exploitable CPU buffers
by invoking the VERW instruction.

Hand it through to guests so they can adjust their mitigations.

This also requires corresponding qemu changes, which are available
separately.

[ tglx: Massaged changelog ]
Signed-off-by: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Reviewed-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Reviewed-by: Frederic Weisbecker <frederic@kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: Jon Masters <jcm@redhat.com>
Tested-by: Jon Masters <jcm@redhat.com>

This bug bit is set on CPUs which are only affected by Microarchitectural
Store Buffer Data Sampling (MSBDS) and not by any other MDS variant.

This is important because the Store Buffers are partitioned between
Hyper-Threads so cross thread forwarding is not possible. But if a thread
enters or exits a sleep state the store buffer is repartitioned which can
expose data from one thread to the other. This transition can be mitigated.

That means that for CPUs which are only affected by MSBDS SMT can be
enabled, if the CPU is not affected by other SMT sensitive vulnerabilities,
e.g. L1TF. The XEON PHI variants fall into that category. Also the
Silvermont/Airmont ATOMs, but for them it's not really relevant as they do
not support SMT, but mark them for completeness sake.
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: Frederic Weisbecker <frederic@kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: Jon Masters <jcm@redhat.com>
Tested-by: Jon Masters <jcm@redhat.com>

Microarchitectural Data Sampling (MDS), is a class of side channel attacks
on internal buffers in Intel CPUs. The variants are:

 - Microarchitectural Store Buffer Data Sampling (MSBDS) (CVE-2018-12126)
 - Microarchitectural Fill Buffer Data Sampling (MFBDS) (CVE-2018-12130)
 - Microarchitectural Load Port Data Sampling (MLPDS) (CVE-2018-12127)

MSBDS leaks Store Buffer Entries which can be speculatively forwarded to a
dependent load (store-to-load forwarding) as an optimization. The forward
can also happen to a faulting or assisting load operation for a different
memory address, which can be exploited under certain conditions. Store
buffers are partitioned between Hyper-Threads so cross thread forwarding is
not possible. But if a thread enters or exits a sleep state the store
buffer is repartitioned which can expose data from one thread to the other.

MFBDS leaks Fill Buffer Entries. Fill buffers are used internally to manage
L1 miss situations and to hold data which is returned or sent in response
to a memory or I/O operation. Fill buffers can forward data to a load
operation and also write data to the cache. When the fill buffer is
deallocated it can retain the stale data of the preceding operations which
can then be forwarded to a faulting or assisting load operation, which can
be exploited under certain conditions. Fill buffers are shared between
Hyper-Threads so cross thread leakage is possible.

MLDPS leaks Load Port Data. Load ports are used to perform load operations
from memory or I/O. The received data is then forwarded to the register
file or a subsequent operation. In some implementations the Load Port can
contain stale data from a previous operation which can be forwarded to
faulting or assisting loads under certain conditions, which again can be
exploited eventually. Load ports are shared between Hyper-Threads so cross
thread leakage is possible.

All variants have the same mitigation for single CPU thread case (SMT off),
so the kernel can treat them as one MDS issue.

Add the basic infrastructure to detect if the current CPU is affected by
MDS.

[ tglx: Rewrote changelog ]
Signed-off-by: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Reviewed-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Reviewed-by: Frederic Weisbecker <frederic@kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: Jon Masters <jcm@redhat.com>
Tested-by: Jon Masters <jcm@redhat.com>

The CPU vulnerability whitelists have some overlap and there are more
whitelists coming along.

Use the driver_data field in the x86_cpu_id struct to denote the
whitelisted vulnerabilities and combine all whitelists into one.
Suggested-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: Frederic Weisbecker <frederic@kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Reviewed-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Reviewed-by: Jon Masters <jcm@redhat.com>
Tested-by: Jon Masters <jcm@redhat.com>

Greg pointed out that speculation related bit defines are using (1 << N)
format instead of BIT(N). Aside of that (1 << N) is wrong as it should use
1UL at least.

Clean it up.

[ Josh Poimboeuf: Fix tools build ]
Reported-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Reviewed-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Reviewed-by: Frederic Weisbecker <frederic@kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: Jon Masters <jcm@redhat.com>
Tested-by: Jon Masters <jcm@redhat.com>

Pull ARM SoC fixes from Arnd Bergmann:
 "One more set of simple ARM platform fixes:

   - A boot regression on qualcomm msm8998

   - Gemini display controllers got turned off by accident

   - incorrect reference counting in optee"

* tag 'armsoc-fixes' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/soc/soc:
  tee: optee: add missing of_node_put after of_device_is_available
  arm64: dts: qcom: msm8998: Extend TZ reserved memory area
  ARM: dts: gemini: Re-enable display controller

Pull x86 fixes from Thomas Gleixner:
 "Two last minute fixes:

   - Prevent value evaluation via functions happening in the user access
     enabled region of __put_user() (put another way: make sure to
     evaluate the value to be stored in user space _before_ enabling
     user space accesses)

   - Correct the definition of a Hyper-V hypercall constant"

* 'x86-urgent-for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip:
  x86/hyper-v: Fix definition of HV_MAX_FLUSH_REP_COUNT
  x86/uaccess: Don't leak the AC flag into __put_user() value evaluation

Pull SCSI fixes from James Bottomley:
 "Nine small fixes.

  The resume fix is a cosmetic removal of a warning with an incorrect
  condition causing it to alarm people wrongly.

  The other eight patches correct a thinko in Christoph Hellwig's DMA
  conversion series. Without it all these drivers end up with 32 bit DMA
  masks meaning they bounce any page over 4GB before sending it to the
  controller.

  Nowadays, even laptops mostly have memory above 4GB, so this can lead
  to significant performance degradation with all the bouncing"

* tag 'scsi-fixes' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jejb/scsi:
  scsi: core: Avoid that system resume triggers a kernel warning
  scsi: hptiop: fix calls to dma_set_mask()
  scsi: hisi_sas: fix calls to dma_set_mask_and_coherent()
  scsi: csiostor: fix calls to dma_set_mask_and_coherent()
  scsi: bfa: fix calls to dma_set_mask_and_coherent()
  scsi: aic94xx: fix calls to dma_set_mask_and_coherent()
  scsi: 3w-sas: fix calls to dma_set_mask_and_coherent()
  scsi: 3w-9xxx: fix calls to dma_set_mask_and_coherent()
  scsi: lpfc: fix calls to dma_set_mask_and_coherent()

Pull networking fixes from David Miller:

 1) Fix refcount leak in act_ipt during replace, from Davide Caratti.

 2) Set task state properly in tun during blocking reads, from Timur
    Celik.

 3) Leaked reference in DSA, from Wen Yang.

 4) NULL deref in act_tunnel_key, from Vlad Buslov.

 5) cipso_v4_erro can reference the skb IPCB in inappropriate contexts
    thus referencing garbage, from Nazarov Sergey.

 6) Don't accept RTA_VIA and RTA_GATEWAY in contexts where those
    attributes make no sense.

 7) Fix hung sendto in tipc, from Tung Nguyen.

 8) Out-of-bounds access in netlabel, from Paul Moore.

 9) Grant reference leak in xen-netback, from Igor Druzhinin.

10) Fix tx stalls with lan743x, from Bryan Whitehead.

11) Fix interrupt storm with mv88e6xxx, from Hein Kallweit.

12) Memory leak in sit on device registry failure, from Mao Wenan.

* git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/davem/net: (44 commits)
  net: sit: fix memory leak in sit_init_net()
  net: dsa: mv88e6xxx: Fix statistics on mv88e6161
  geneve: correctly handle ipv6.disable module parameter
  net: dsa: mv88e6xxx: prevent interrupt storm caused by mv88e6390x_port_set_cmode
  bpf: fix sanitation rewrite in case of non-pointers
  ipv4: Add ICMPv6 support when parse route ipproto
  MIPS: eBPF: Fix icache flush end address
  lan743x: Fix TX Stall Issue
  net: phy: phylink: fix uninitialized variable in phylink_get_mac_state
  net: aquantia: regression on cpus with high cores: set mode with 8 queues
  selftests: fixes for UDP GRO
  bpf: drop refcount if bpf_map_new_fd() fails in map_create()
  net: dsa: mv88e6xxx: power serdes on/off for 10G interfaces on 6390X
  net: dsa: mv88e6xxx: Fix u64 statistics
  xen-netback: don't populate the hash cache on XenBus disconnect
  xen-netback: fix occasional leak of grant ref mappings under memory pressure
  sctp: chunk.c: correct format string for size_t in printk
  net: netem: fix skb length BUG_ON in __skb_to_sgvec
  netlabel: fix out-of-bounds memory accesses
  ipv4: Pass original device to ip_rcv_finish_core
  ...

Pull more crypto fixes from Herbert Xu:
 "This fixes a couple of issues in arm64/chacha that was introduced in
  5.0"

* 'linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/herbert/crypto-2.6:
  crypto: arm64/chacha - fix hchacha_block_neon() for big endian
  crypto: arm64/chacha - fix chacha_4block_xor_neon() for big endian

If register_netdev() is failed to register sitn->fb_tunnel_dev,
it will go to err_reg_dev and forget to free netdev(sitn->fb_tunnel_dev).

BUG: memory leak
unreferenced object 0xffff888378daad00 (size 512):
  comm "syz-executor.1", pid 4006, jiffies 4295121142 (age 16.115s)
  hex dump (first 32 bytes):
    00 e6 ed c0 83 88 ff ff 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00  ................
    00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00  ................
backtrace:
    [<00000000d6dcb63e>] kvmalloc include/linux/mm.h:577 [inline]
    [<00000000d6dcb63e>] kvzalloc include/linux/mm.h:585 [inline]
    [<00000000d6dcb63e>] netif_alloc_netdev_queues net/core/dev.c:8380 [inline]
    [<00000000d6dcb63e>] alloc_netdev_mqs+0x600/0xcc0 net/core/dev.c:8970
    [<00000000867e172f>] sit_init_net+0x295/0xa40 net/ipv6/sit.c:1848
    [<00000000871019fa>] ops_init+0xad/0x3e0 net/core/net_namespace.c:129
    [<00000000319507f6>] setup_net+0x2ba/0x690 net/core/net_namespace.c:314
    [<0000000087db4f96>] copy_net_ns+0x1dc/0x330 net/core/net_namespace.c:437
    [<0000000057efc651>] create_new_namespaces+0x382/0x730 kernel/nsproxy.c:107
    [<00000000676f83de>] copy_namespaces+0x2ed/0x3d0 kernel/nsproxy.c:165
    [<0000000030b74bac>] copy_process.part.27+0x231e/0x6db0 kernel/fork.c:1919
    [<00000000fff78746>] copy_process kernel/fork.c:1713 [inline]
    [<00000000fff78746>] _do_fork+0x1bc/0xe90 kernel/fork.c:2224
    [<000000001c2e0d1c>] do_syscall_64+0xc8/0x580 arch/x86/entry/common.c:290
    [<00000000ec48bd44>] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x49/0xbe
    [<0000000039acff8a>] 0xffffffffffffffff
Signed-off-by: Mao Wenan <maowenan@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>

Despite what the datesheet says, the silicon implements the older way
of snapshoting the statistics. Change the op.

Reported-by: Chris.Healy@zii.aero
Tested-by: Chris.Healy@zii.aero
Fixes: 0ac64c39 ("net: dsa: mv88e6xxx: mv88e6161 uses mv88e6320 stats snapshot")
Signed-off-by: Andrew Lunn <andrew@lunn.ch>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>

When IPv6 is compiled but disabled at runtime, geneve_sock_add returns
-EAFNOSUPPORT. For metadata based tunnels, this causes failure of the whole
operation of bringing up the tunnel.

Ignore failure of IPv6 socket creation for metadata based tunnels caused by
IPv6 not being available.

This is the same fix as what commit d074bf96 ("vxlan: correctly handle
ipv6.disable module parameter") is doing for vxlan.

Note there's also commit c0a47e44 ("geneve: should not call rt6_lookup()
when ipv6 was disabled") which fixes a similar issue but for regular
tunnels, while this patch is needed for metadata based tunnels.
Signed-off-by: Jiri Benc <jbenc@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>

Alexei Starovoitov says:

====================
pull-request: bpf 2019-03-01

The following pull-request contains BPF updates for your *net* tree.

The main changes are:

1) fix sanitation rewrite, from Daniel.

2) fix error path on map_new_fd, from Peng.

3) fix icache flush address, from Paul.
====================
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>

When debugging another issue I faced an interrupt storm in this
driver (88E6390, port 9 in SGMII mode), consisting of alternating
link-up / link-down interrupts. Analysis showed that the driver
wanted to set a cmode that was set already. But so far
mv88e6390x_port_set_cmode() doesn't check this and powers down
SERDES, what causes the link to break, and eventually results in
the described interrupt storm.

Fix this by checking whether the cmode actually changes. We want
that the very first call to mv88e6390x_port_set_cmode() always
configures the registers, therefore initialize port.cmode with
a value that is different from any supported cmode value.
We have to take care that we only init the ports cmode once
chip->info->num_ports is set.

v2:
- add small helper and init the number of actual ports only

Fixes: 364e9d77 ("net: dsa: mv88e6xxx: Power on/off SERDES on cmode change")
Signed-off-by: Heiner Kallweit <hkallweit1@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>

Marek reported that he saw an issue with the below snippet in that
timing measurements where off when loaded as unpriv while results
were reasonable when loaded as privileged:

    [...]
    uint64_t a = bpf_ktime_get_ns();
    uint64_t b = bpf_ktime_get_ns();
    uint64_t delta = b - a;
    if ((int64_t)delta > 0) {
    [...]

Turns out there is a bug where a corner case is missing in the fix
d3bd7413 ("bpf: fix sanitation of alu op with pointer / scalar
type from different paths"), namely fixup_bpf_calls() only checks
whether aux has a non-zero alu_state, but it also needs to test for
the case of BPF_ALU_NON_POINTER since in both occasions we need to
skip the masking rewrite (as there is nothing to mask).

Fixes: d3bd7413 ("bpf: fix sanitation of alu op with pointer / scalar type from different paths")
Reported-by: Marek Majkowski <marek@cloudflare.com>
Reported-by: Arthur Fabre <afabre@cloudflare.com>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/netdev/CAJPywTJqP34cK20iLM5YmUMz9KXQOdu1-+BZrGMAGgLuBWz7fg@mail.gmail.com/T/Acked-by: Song Liu <songliubraving@fb.com>
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>

For ip rules, we need to use 'ipproto ipv6-icmp' to match ICMPv6 headers.
But for ip -6 route, currently we only support tcp, udp and icmp.

Add ICMPv6 support so we can match ipv6-icmp rules for route lookup.

v2: As David Ahern and Sabrina Dubroca suggested, Add an argument to
rtm_getroute_parse_ip_proto() to handle ICMP/ICMPv6 with different family.
Reported-by: Jianlin Shi <jishi@redhat.com>
Fixes: eacb9384 ("ipv6: support sport, dport and ip_proto in RTM_GETROUTE")
Signed-off-by: Hangbin Liu <liuhangbin@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>

The MIPS eBPF JIT calls flush_icache_range() in order to ensure the
icache observes the code that we just wrote. Unfortunately it gets the
end address calculation wrong due to some bad pointer arithmetic.

The struct jit_ctx target field is of type pointer to u32, and as such
adding one to it will increment the address being pointed to by 4 bytes.
Therefore in order to find the address of the end of the code we simply
need to add the number of 4 byte instructions emitted, but we mistakenly
add the number of instructions multiplied by 4. This results in the call
to flush_icache_range() operating on a memory region 4x larger than
intended, which is always wasteful and can cause crashes if we overrun
into an unmapped page.

Fix this by correcting the pointer arithmetic to remove the bogus
multiplication, and use braces to remove the need for a set of brackets
whilst also making it obvious that the target field is a pointer.
Signed-off-by: Paul Burton <paul.burton@mips.com>
Fixes: b6bd53f9 ("MIPS: Add missing file for eBPF JIT.")
Cc: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Cc: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Cc: Martin KaFai Lau <kafai@fb.com>
Cc: Song Liu <songliubraving@fb.com>
Cc: Yonghong Song <yhs@fb.com>
Cc: netdev@vger.kernel.org
Cc: bpf@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-mips@vger.kernel.org
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v4.13+
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>

It has been observed that tx queue stalls while downloading
from certain web sites (example www.speedtest.net)

The cause has been tracked down to a corner case where
dma descriptors where not setup properly. And there for a tx
completion interrupt was not signaled.

This fix corrects the problem by properly marking the end of
a multi descriptor transmission.

Fixes: 23f0703c ("lan743x: Add main source files for new lan743x driver")
Signed-off-by: Bryan Whitehead <Bryan.Whitehead@microchip.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>

When debugging an issue I found implausible values in state->pause.
Reason in that state->pause isn't initialized and later only single
bits are changed. Also the struct itself isn't initialized in
phylink_resolve(). So better initialize state->pause and other
not yet initialized fields.

v2:
- use right function name in subject
v3:
- initialize additional fields

Fixes: 9525ae83 ("phylink: add phylink infrastructure")
Signed-off-by: Heiner Kallweit <hkallweit1@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>

Recently the maximum number of queues was increased up to 8, but
NIC was not fully configured for 8 queues. In setups with more than 4 CPU
cores parts of TX traffic gets lost if the kernel routes it to queues 4th-8th.

This patch sets a tx hw traffic mode with 8 queues.

Bugzilla: https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=202651

Fixes: 71a963cf ("net: aquantia: increase max number of hw queues")
Reported-by: Nicholas Johnson <nicholas.johnson@outlook.com.au>
Signed-off-by: Dmitry Bogdanov <dmitry.bogdanov@aquantia.com>
Signed-off-by: Igor Russkikh <igor.russkikh@aquantia.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>

The current implementation for UDP GRO tests is racy: the receiver
may flush the RX queue while the sending is still transmitting and
incorrectly report RX errors, with a wrong number of packet received.

Add explicit timeouts to the receiver for both connection activation
(first packet received for UDP) and reception completion, so that
in the above critical scenario the receiver will wait for the
transfer completion.

Fixes: 3327a9c4 ("selftests: add functionals test for UDP GRO")
Signed-off-by: Paolo Abeni <pabeni@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Willem de Bruijn <willemb@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>

Pull IOMMU fix from Joerg Roedel:
 "One important fix for a memory corruption issue in the Intel VT-d
  driver that triggers on hardware with deep PCI hierarchies"

* tag 'iommu-fix-v5.0-rc8' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/joro/iommu:
  iommu/dmar: Fix buffer overflow during PCI bus notification

Merge misc fixes from Andrew Morton:
 "2 fixes"

* emailed patches from Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>:
  hugetlbfs: fix races and page leaks during migration
  kasan: turn off asan-stack for clang-8 and earlier

hugetlb pages should only be migrated if they are 'active'.  The
routines set/clear_page_huge_active() modify the active state of hugetlb
pages.

When a new hugetlb page is allocated at fault time, set_page_huge_active
is called before the page is locked.  Therefore, another thread could
race and migrate the page while it is being added to page table by the
fault code.  This race is somewhat hard to trigger, but can be seen by
strategically adding udelay to simulate worst case scheduling behavior.
Depending on 'how' the code races, various BUG()s could be triggered.

To address this issue, simply delay the set_page_huge_active call until
after the page is successfully added to the page table.

Hugetlb pages can also be leaked at migration time if the pages are
associated with a file in an explicitly mounted hugetlbfs filesystem.
For example, consider a two node system with 4GB worth of huge pages
available.  A program mmaps a 2G file in a hugetlbfs filesystem.  It
then migrates the pages associated with the file from one node to
another.  When the program exits, huge page counts are as follows:

  node0
  1024    free_hugepages
  1024    nr_hugepages

  node1
  0       free_hugepages
  1024    nr_hugepages

  Filesystem                         Size  Used Avail Use% Mounted on
  nodev                              4.0G  2.0G  2.0G  50% /var/opt/hugepool

That is as expected.  2G of huge pages are taken from the free_hugepages
counts, and 2G is the size of the file in the explicitly mounted
filesystem.  If the file is then removed, the counts become:

  node0
  1024    free_hugepages
  1024    nr_hugepages

  node1
  1024    free_hugepages
  1024    nr_hugepages

  Filesystem                         Size  Used Avail Use% Mounted on
  nodev                              4.0G  2.0G  2.0G  50% /var/opt/hugepool

Note that the filesystem still shows 2G of pages used, while there
actually are no huge pages in use.  The only way to 'fix' the filesystem
accounting is to unmount the filesystem

If a hugetlb page is associated with an explicitly mounted filesystem,
this information in contained in the page_private field.  At migration
time, this information is not preserved.  To fix, simply transfer
page_private from old to new page at migration time if necessary.

There is a related race with removing a huge page from a file and
migration.  When a huge page is removed from the pagecache, the
page_mapping() field is cleared, yet page_private remains set until the
page is actually freed by free_huge_page().  A page could be migrated
while in this state.  However, since page_mapping() is not set the
hugetlbfs specific routine to transfer page_private is not called and we
leak the page count in the filesystem.

To fix that, check for this condition before migrating a huge page.  If
the condition is detected, return EBUSY for the page.

Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/74510272-7319-7372-9ea6-ec914734c179@oracle.com
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190212221400.3512-1-mike.kravetz@oracle.com
Fixes: bcc54222 ("mm: hugetlb: introduce page_huge_active")
Signed-off-by: Mike Kravetz <mike.kravetz@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Naoya Horiguchi <n-horiguchi@ah.jp.nec.com>
Cc: Michal Hocko <mhocko@kernel.org>
Cc: Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com>
Cc: "Kirill A . Shutemov" <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Mel Gorman <mgorman@techsingularity.net>
Cc: Davidlohr Bueso <dave@stgolabs.net>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
[mike.kravetz@oracle.com: v2]
  Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/7534d322-d782-8ac6-1c8d-a8dc380eb3ab@oracle.com
[mike.kravetz@oracle.com: update comment and changelog]
  Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/420bcfd6-158b-38e4-98da-26d0cd85bd01@oracle.comSigned-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>