- 16 Feb, 2015 21 commits
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Jan Kara authored
commit 0e5cc9a4 upstream. Symlink reading code does not check whether the resulting path fits into the page provided by the generic code. This isn't as easy as just checking the symlink size because of various encoding conversions we perform on path. So we have to check whether there is still enough space in the buffer on the fly. CC: stable@vger.kernel.org Reported-by: Carl Henrik Lunde <chlunde@ping.uio.no> Signed-off-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz> Signed-off-by: Jiri Slaby <jslaby@suse.cz>
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Jan Kara authored
commit e159332b upstream. Verify that inode size is sane when loading inode with data stored in ICB. Otherwise we may get confused later when working with the inode and inode size is too big. CC: stable@vger.kernel.org Reported-by: Carl Henrik Lunde <chlunde@ping.uio.no> Signed-off-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz> Signed-off-by: Jiri Slaby <jslaby@suse.cz>
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Goldwyn Rodrigues authored
commit 86b9c6f3 upstream. Filesize is not a good indication that the file needs to be synced. An example where this breaks is: 1. Open the file in O_SYNC|O_RDWR 2. Read a small portion of the file (say 64 bytes) 3. Lseek to starting of the file 4. Write 64 bytes If the node crashes, it is not written out to disk because this was not committed in the journal and the other node which reads the file after recovery reads stale data (even if the write on the other node was successful) Signed-off-by: Goldwyn Rodrigues <rgoldwyn@suse.de> Reviewed-by: Mark Fasheh <mfasheh@suse.de> Cc: Joel Becker <jlbec@evilplan.org> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Jiri Slaby <jslaby@suse.cz>
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Trond Myklebust authored
commit 2fc193cf upstream. The callback handler xs_error_report() can end up propagating an EPIPE error by means of the call to xprt_wake_pending_tasks(). Ensure that xprt_connect_status() does not automatically convert this into an EIO error. Reported-by: Weston Andros Adamson <dros@primarydata.com> Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <trond.myklebust@primarydata.com> Acked-by: NeilBrown <neilb@suse.de> Signed-off-by: Jiri Slaby <jslaby@suse.cz>
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Trond Myklebust authored
commit 3601c4a9 upstream. Currently, an ENOBUFS error will result in a fatal error for the RPC call. Normally, we will just want to wait and then retry. Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <trond.myklebust@primarydata.com> Acked-by: NeilBrown <neilb@suse.de> Signed-off-by: Jiri Slaby <jslaby@suse.cz>
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Steve Dickson authored
commit 1fa3e2eb upstream. Don't schedule an rpc_delay before checking to see if the task is a SOFTCONN because the tk_callback from the delay (__rpc_atrun) clears the task status before the rpc_exit_task can be run. Signed-off-by: Steve Dickson <steved@redhat.com> Fixes: 561ec160 (SUNRPC: call_connect_status should recheck...) Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/5329CF7C.7090308@RedHat.comSigned-off-by: Trond Myklebust <trond.myklebust@primarydata.com> Acked-by: NeilBrown <neilb@suse.de> Signed-off-by: Jiri Slaby <jslaby@suse.cz>
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Trond Myklebust authored
commit 485f2251 upstream. When the server is unavailable due to a networking error, etc, we want the RPC client to respect the timeout delays when attempting to reconnect. Reported-by: Neil Brown <neilb@suse.de> Fixes: 561ec160 (SUNRPC: call_connect_status should recheck bind..) Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <trond.myklebust@primarydata.com> Acked-by: NeilBrown <neilb@suse.de> Signed-off-by: Jiri Slaby <jslaby@suse.cz>
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Trond Myklebust authored
commit df277270 upstream. Ensure that call_bind_status, call_connect_status, call_transmit_status and call_status all are capable of handling ECONNABORTED and EHOSTUNREACH. Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <trond.myklebust@primarydata.com> Acked-by: NeilBrown <neilb@suse.de> Signed-off-by: Jiri Slaby <jslaby@suse.cz>
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Trond Myklebust authored
commit 0fe8d04e upstream. Currently, xprt_connect_status will convert connection error values such as ECONNREFUSED, ECONNRESET, ... into EIO, which means that they never get handled. Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <trond.myklebust@primarydata.com> Acked-by: NeilBrown <neilb@suse.de> Signed-off-by: Jiri Slaby <jslaby@suse.cz>
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Trond Myklebust authored
commit 561ec160 upstream. Currently, we go directly to call_transmit which sends us to call_status on error. If we know that the connect attempt failed, we should rather just jump straight back to call_bind and call_connect. Ditto for EAGAIN, except do not delay. Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <Trond.Myklebust@netapp.com> Acked-by: NeilBrown <neilb@suse.de> Signed-off-by: Jiri Slaby <jslaby@suse.cz>
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David Rientjes authored
commit c6c8fe79 upstream. rpc_malloc() allocates with GFP_NOWAIT without making any attempt at reclaim so it easily fails when low on memory. This ends up spamming the kernel log: SLAB: Unable to allocate memory on node 0 (gfp=0x4000) cache: kmalloc-8192, object size: 8192, order: 1 node 0: slabs: 207/207, objs: 207/207, free: 0 rekonq: page allocation failure: order:1, mode:0x204000 CPU: 2 PID: 14321 Comm: rekonq Tainted: G O 3.15.0-rc3-12.gfc9498b-desktop+ #6 Hardware name: System manufacturer System Product Name/M4A785TD-V EVO, BIOS 2105 07/23/2010 0000000000000000 ffff880010ff17d0 ffffffff815e693c 0000000000204000 ffff880010ff1858 ffffffff81137bd2 0000000000000000 0000001000000000 ffff88011ffebc38 0000000000000001 0000000000204000 ffff88011ffea000 Call Trace: [<ffffffff815e693c>] dump_stack+0x4d/0x6f [<ffffffff81137bd2>] warn_alloc_failed+0xd2/0x140 [<ffffffff8113be19>] __alloc_pages_nodemask+0x7e9/0xa30 [<ffffffff811824a8>] kmem_getpages+0x58/0x140 [<ffffffff81183de6>] fallback_alloc+0x1d6/0x210 [<ffffffff81183be3>] ____cache_alloc_node+0x123/0x150 [<ffffffff81185953>] __kmalloc+0x203/0x490 [<ffffffffa06b0ee2>] rpc_malloc+0x32/0xa0 [sunrpc] [<ffffffffa06a6999>] call_allocate+0xb9/0x170 [sunrpc] [<ffffffffa06b19d8>] __rpc_execute+0x88/0x460 [sunrpc] [<ffffffffa06b2da9>] rpc_execute+0x59/0xc0 [sunrpc] [<ffffffffa06a932b>] rpc_run_task+0x6b/0x90 [sunrpc] [<ffffffffa077b5c1>] nfs4_call_sync_sequence+0x51/0x80 [nfsv4] [<ffffffffa077d45d>] _nfs4_do_setattr+0x1ed/0x280 [nfsv4] [<ffffffffa0782a72>] nfs4_do_setattr+0x72/0x180 [nfsv4] [<ffffffffa078334c>] nfs4_proc_setattr+0xbc/0x140 [nfsv4] [<ffffffffa074a7e8>] nfs_setattr+0xd8/0x240 [nfs] [<ffffffff811baa71>] notify_change+0x231/0x380 [<ffffffff8119cf5c>] chmod_common+0xfc/0x120 [<ffffffff8119df80>] SyS_chmod+0x40/0x90 [<ffffffff815f4cfd>] system_call_fastpath+0x1a/0x1f ... If the allocation fails, simply return NULL and avoid spamming the kernel log. Reported-by: Marc Dietrich <marvin24@gmx.de> Signed-off-by: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com> Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <trond.myklebust@primarydata.com> Signed-off-by: Jiri Slaby <jslaby@suse.cz>
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Len Brown authored
commit 2194324d upstream. Linux uses CPUID.MWAIT.EDX to validate the C-states reported by ACPI, silently discarding states which are not supported by the HW. This test is too restrictive, as some HW now uses sparse sub-state numbering, so the sub-state number may be higher than the number of sub-states... Also, rather than silently ignoring an invalid state, we should complain about a firmware bug. In practice... Bay Trail systems originally supported C6-no-shrink as MWAIT sub-state 0x58, and in CPUID.MWAIT.EDX 0x03000000 indicated that there were 3 MWAIT-C6 sub-states. So acpi_idle would discard that C-state because 8 >= 3. Upon discovering this issue, the ucode was updated so that C6-no-shrink was also exported as 0x51, and the BIOS was updated to match. However, systems shipped with 0x58, will never get a BIOS update, and this patch allows Linux to see C6-no-shrink on early Bay Trail. Signed-off-by: Len Brown <len.brown@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Jiri Slaby <jslaby@suse.cz>
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Manfred Spraul authored
commit 2e094abf upstream. When I fixed bugs in the sem_lock() logic, I was more conservative than necessary. Therefore it is safe to replace the smp_mb() with smp_rmb(). And: With smp_rmb(), semop() syscalls are up to 10% faster. The race we must protect against is: sem->lock is free sma->complex_count = 0 sma->sem_perm.lock held by thread B thread A: A: spin_lock(&sem->lock) B: sma->complex_count++; (now 1) B: spin_unlock(&sma->sem_perm.lock); A: spin_is_locked(&sma->sem_perm.lock); A: XXXXX memory barrier A: if (sma->complex_count == 0) Thread A must read the increased complex_count value, i.e. the read must not be reordered with the read of sem_perm.lock done by spin_is_locked(). Since it's about ordering of reads, smp_rmb() is sufficient. [akpm@linux-foundation.org: update sem_lock() comment, from Davidlohr] Signed-off-by: Manfred Spraul <manfred@colorfullife.com> Reviewed-by: Davidlohr Bueso <dave@stgolabs.net> Acked-by: Rafael Aquini <aquini@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Jiri Slaby <jslaby@suse.cz>
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Nadav Amit authored
commit bf0b682c upstream. If the operand size is not 64-bit, then the sysexit instruction should assign ECX to RSP and EDX to RIP. The current code assigns the full 64-bits. Fix it by masking. Signed-off-by: Nadav Amit <namit@cs.technion.ac.il> Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Jiri Slaby <jslaby@suse.cz>
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Nadav Amit authored
commit 4566654b upstream. Guest which sets the PAT CR to invalid value should get a #GP. Currently, if vmx supports loading PAT CR during entry, then the value is not checked. This patch makes the required check in that case. Signed-off-by: Nadav Amit <namit@cs.technion.ac.il> Signed-off-by: Bruce Rogers <brogers@suse.com> Signed-off-by: Jiri Slaby <jslaby@suse.cz>
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Nadav Amit authored
commit 040c8dc8 upstream. In 64-bit mode a #GP should be delivered to the guest "if the code segment descriptor pointed to by the selector in the 64-bit gate doesn't have the L-bit set and the D-bit clear." - Intel SDM "Interrupt 13—General Protection Exception (#GP)". This patch fixes the behavior of CS loading emulation code. Although the comment says that segment loading is not supported in long mode, this function is executed in long mode, so the fix is necassary. Signed-off-by: Nadav Amit <namit@cs.technion.ac.il> Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Jiri Slaby <jslaby@suse.cz>
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Nadav Amit authored
commit 58b7075d upstream. In 64-bit, stack operations default to 64-bits, but can be overriden (to 16-bit) using opsize override prefix. In contrast, near-branches are always 64-bit. This patch distinguish between the different behaviors. Signed-off-by: Nadav Amit <namit@cs.technion.ac.il> Signed-off-by: Bruce Rogers <brogers@suse.com> Signed-off-by: Jiri Slaby <jslaby@suse.cz>
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Nadav Amit authored
commit f7784046 upstream. Breaking grp45 to the relevant functions to speed up the emulation and simplify the code. In addition, it is necassary the next patch will distinguish between far and near branches according to the flags. Signed-off-by: Nadav Amit <namit@cs.technion.ac.il> Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Jiri Slaby <jslaby@suse.cz>
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Nadav Amit authored
commit d1442d85 upstream. Far jmp/call/ret may fault while loading a new RIP. Currently KVM does not handle this case, and may result in failed vm-entry once the assignment is done. The tricky part of doing so is that loading the new CS affects the VMCS/VMCB state, so if we fail during loading the new RIP, we are left in unconsistent state. Therefore, this patch saves on 64-bit the old CS descriptor and restores it if loading RIP failed. Signed-off-by: Nadav Amit <namit@cs.technion.ac.il> Signed-off-by: Bruce Rogers <brogers@suse.com> Signed-off-by: Jiri Slaby <jslaby@suse.cz>
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Nadav Amit authored
commit dd598091 upstream. The KVM emulator code assumes that the guest virtual address space (in 64-bit) is 48-bits wide. Since we are about to add more code that makes the same assumption, this patch adds an assertion to make sure guest virtual address space is indeed 48-bits wide. Signed-off-by: Nadav Amit <namit@cs.technion.ac.il> Signed-off-by: Bruce Rogers <brogers@suse.com> Signed-off-by: Jiri Slaby <jslaby@suse.cz>
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Adam Lee authored
commit c561a575 upstream. BugLink: https://bugs.launchpad.net/bugs/1400215 ath3k devices fail to load firmwares on xHCI buses, but work well on EHCI, this might be a compatibility issue between xHCI and ath3k chips. As my testing result, those chips will work on xHCI buses again with this patch. This workaround is from Qualcomm, they also did some workarounds in Windows driver. Signed-off-by: Adam Lee <adam.lee@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org> Signed-off-by: Jiri Slaby <jslaby@suse.cz>
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- 13 Feb, 2015 2 commits
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Austin Lund authored
commit a8f29e89 upstream. Userspace expects to see a long space before the first pulse is sent on the lirc device. Currently, if a long time has passed and a new packet is started, the lirc codec just returns and doesn't send anything. This makes lircd ignore many perfectly valid signals unless they are sent in quick sucession. When a reset event is delivered, we cannot know anything about the duration of the space. But it should be safe to assume it has been a long time and we just set the duration to maximum. Signed-off-by: Austin Lund <austin.lund@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Mauro Carvalho Chehab <mchehab@osg.samsung.com> Signed-off-by: Jiri Slaby <jslaby@suse.cz>
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Alex Elder authored
commit 638c323c upstream. Olivier Bonvalet reported having repeated crashes due to a failed assertion he was hitting in rbd_img_obj_callback(): Assertion failure in rbd_img_obj_callback() at line 2165: rbd_assert(which >= img_request->next_completion); With a lot of help from Olivier with reproducing the problem we were able to determine the object and image requests had already been completed (and often freed) at the point the assertion failed. There was a great deal of discussion on the ceph-devel mailing list about this. The problem only arose when there were two (or more) object requests in an image request, and the problem was always seen when the second request was being completed. The problem is due to a race in the window between setting the "done" flag on an object request and checking the image request's next completion value. When the first object request completes, it checks to see if its successor request is marked "done", and if so, that request is also completed. In the process, the image request's next_completion value is updated to reflect that both the first and second requests are completed. By the time the second request is able to check the next_completion value, it has been set to a value *greater* than its own "which" value, which caused an assertion to fail. Fix this problem by skipping over any completion processing unless the completing object request is the next one expected. Test only for inequality (not >=), and eliminate the bad assertion. Tested-by: Olivier Bonvalet <ob@daevel.fr> Signed-off-by: Alex Elder <elder@linaro.org> Reviewed-by: Sage Weil <sage@inktank.com> Reviewed-by: Ilya Dryomov <ilya.dryomov@inktank.com> Signed-off-by: Jiri Slaby <jslaby@suse.cz>
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- 10 Feb, 2015 17 commits
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Saran Maruti Ramanara authored
[ Upstream commit cfbf654e ] When making use of RFC5061, section 4.2.4. for setting the primary IP address, we're passing a wrong parameter header to param_type2af(), resulting always in NULL being returned. At this point, param.p points to a sctp_addip_param struct, containing a sctp_paramhdr (type = 0xc004, length = var), and crr_id as a correlation id. Followed by that, as also presented in RFC5061 section 4.2.4., comes the actual sctp_addr_param, which also contains a sctp_paramhdr, but this time with the correct type SCTP_PARAM_IPV{4,6}_ADDRESS that param_type2af() can make use of. Since we already hold a pointer to addr_param from previous line, just reuse it for param_type2af(). Fixes: d6de3097 ("[SCTP]: Add the handling of "Set Primary IP Address" parameter to INIT") Signed-off-by: Saran Maruti Ramanara <saran.neti@telus.com> Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <dborkman@redhat.com> Acked-by: Vlad Yasevich <vyasevich@gmail.com> Acked-by: Neil Horman <nhorman@tuxdriver.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Signed-off-by: Jiri Slaby <jslaby@suse.cz>
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Florian Westphal authored
[ Upstream commit e2a4800e ] When we've run out of space in the output buffer to store more data, we will call zlib_deflate with a NULL output buffer until we've consumed remaining input. When this happens, olen contains the size the output buffer would have consumed iff we'd have had enough room. This can later cause skb_over_panic when ppp_generic skb_put()s the returned length. Reported-by: Iain Douglas <centos@1n6.org.uk> Signed-off-by: Florian Westphal <fw@strlen.de> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Signed-off-by: Jiri Slaby <jslaby@suse.cz>
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Eric Dumazet authored
[ Upstream commit bdbbb852 ] In commit be9f4a44 ("ipv4: tcp: remove per net tcp_sock") I tried to address contention on a socket lock, but the solution I chose was horrible : commit 3a7c384f ("ipv4: tcp: unicast_sock should not land outside of TCP stack") addressed a selinux regression. commit 0980e56e ("ipv4: tcp: set unicast_sock uc_ttl to -1") took care of another regression. commit b5ec8eea ("ipv4: fix ip_send_skb()") fixed another regression. commit 811230cd ("tcp: ipv4: initialize unicast_sock sk_pacing_rate") was another shot in the dark. Really, just use a proper socket per cpu, and remove the skb_orphan() call, to re-enable flow control. This solves a serious problem with FQ packet scheduler when used in hostile environments, as we do not want to allocate a flow structure for every RST packet sent in response to a spoofed packet. Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Signed-off-by: Jiri Slaby <jslaby@suse.cz>
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Eric Dumazet authored
[ Upstream commit 811230cd ] When I added sk_pacing_rate field, I forgot to initialize its value in the per cpu unicast_sock used in ip_send_unicast_reply() This means that for sch_fq users, RST packets, or ACK packets sent on behalf of TIME_WAIT sockets might be sent to slowly or even dropped once we reach the per flow limit. Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com> Fixes: 95bd09eb ("tcp: TSO packets automatic sizing") Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Signed-off-by: Jiri Slaby <jslaby@suse.cz>
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Roopa Prabhu authored
[ Upstream commit 59ccaaaa ] Reported in: https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=92081 This patch avoids calling rtnl_notify if the device ndo_bridge_getlink handler does not return any bytes in the skb. Alternately, the skb->len check can be moved inside rtnl_notify. For the bridge vlan case described in 92081, there is also a fix needed in bridge driver to generate a proper notification. Will fix that in subsequent patch. v2: rebase patch on net tree Signed-off-by: Roopa Prabhu <roopa@cumulusnetworks.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Signed-off-by: Jiri Slaby <jslaby@suse.cz>
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Christoph Hellwig authored
[ Upstream commit 06539d30 ] Signed-off-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Signed-off-by: Jiri Slaby <jslaby@suse.cz>
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Govindarajulu Varadarajan authored
[ Upstream commit 24e579c8 ] With the commit d75b1ade ("net: less interrupt masking in NAPI") napi repoll is done only when work_done == budget. When in busy_poll is we return 0 in napi_poll. We should return budget. Signed-off-by: Govindarajulu Varadarajan <_govind@gmx.com> Acked-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Signed-off-by: Jiri Slaby <jslaby@suse.cz>
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Hannes Frederic Sowa authored
[ Upstream commit 6e9e16e6 ] Lubomir Rintel reported that during replacing a route the interface reference counter isn't correctly decremented. To quote bug <https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=91941>: | [root@rhel7-5 lkundrak]# sh -x lal | + ip link add dev0 type dummy | + ip link set dev0 up | + ip link add dev1 type dummy | + ip link set dev1 up | + ip addr add 2001:db8:8086::2/64 dev dev0 | + ip route add 2001:db8:8086::/48 dev dev0 proto static metric 20 | + ip route add 2001:db8:8088::/48 dev dev1 proto static metric 10 | + ip route replace 2001:db8:8086::/48 dev dev1 proto static metric 20 | + ip link del dev0 type dummy | Message from syslogd@rhel7-5 at Jan 23 10:54:41 ... | kernel:unregister_netdevice: waiting for dev0 to become free. Usage count = 2 | | Message from syslogd@rhel7-5 at Jan 23 10:54:51 ... | kernel:unregister_netdevice: waiting for dev0 to become free. Usage count = 2 During replacement of a rt6_info we must walk all parent nodes and check if the to be replaced rt6_info got propagated. If so, replace it with an alive one. Fixes: 4a287eba ("IPv6 routing, NLM_F_* flag support: REPLACE and EXCL flags support, warn about missing CREATE flag") Reported-by: Lubomir Rintel <lkundrak@v3.sk> Signed-off-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa <hannes@stressinduktion.org> Tested-by: Lubomir Rintel <lkundrak@v3.sk> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Signed-off-by: Jiri Slaby <jslaby@suse.cz>
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subashab@codeaurora.org authored
[ Upstream commit fc752f1f ] An exception is seen in ICMP ping receive path where the skb destructor sock_rfree() tries to access a freed socket. This happens because ping_rcv() releases socket reference with sock_put() and this internally frees up the socket. Later icmp_rcv() will try to free the skb and as part of this, skb destructor is called and which leads to a kernel panic as the socket is freed already in ping_rcv(). -->|exception -007|sk_mem_uncharge -007|sock_rfree -008|skb_release_head_state -009|skb_release_all -009|__kfree_skb -010|kfree_skb -011|icmp_rcv -012|ip_local_deliver_finish Fix this incorrect free by cloning this skb and processing this cloned skb instead. This patch was suggested by Eric Dumazet Signed-off-by: Subash Abhinov Kasiviswanathan <subashab@codeaurora.org> Cc: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com> Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Signed-off-by: Jiri Slaby <jslaby@suse.cz>
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Herbert Xu authored
[ Upstream commit 86f3cddb ] While working on rhashtable walking I noticed that the UDP diag dumping code is buggy. In particular, the socket skipping within a chain never happens, even though we record the number of sockets that should be skipped. As this code was supposedly copied from TCP, this patch does what TCP does and resets num before we walk a chain. Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au> Acked-by: Pavel Emelyanov <xemul@parallels.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Signed-off-by: Jiri Slaby <jslaby@suse.cz>
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Hannes Frederic Sowa authored
[ Upstream commit df4d9254 ] Not caching dst_entries which cause redirects could be exploited by hosts on the same subnet, causing a severe DoS attack. This effect aggravated since commit f8864972 ("ipv4: fix dst race in sk_dst_get()"). Lookups causing redirects will be allocated with DST_NOCACHE set which will force dst_release to free them via RCU. Unfortunately waiting for RCU grace period just takes too long, we can end up with >1M dst_entries waiting to be released and the system will run OOM. rcuos threads cannot catch up under high softirq load. Attaching the flag to emit a redirect later on to the specific skb allows us to cache those dst_entries thus reducing the pressure on allocation and deallocation. This issue was discovered by Marcelo Leitner. Cc: Julian Anastasov <ja@ssi.bg> Signed-off-by: Marcelo Leitner <mleitner@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Florian Westphal <fw@strlen.de> Signed-off-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa <hannes@stressinduktion.org> Signed-off-by: Julian Anastasov <ja@ssi.bg> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Signed-off-by: Jiri Slaby <jslaby@suse.cz>
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Daniel Borkmann authored
[ Upstream commit 600ddd68 ] When hitting an INIT collision case during the 4WHS with AUTH enabled, as already described in detail in commit 1be9a950 ("net: sctp: inherit auth_capable on INIT collisions"), it can happen that we occasionally still remotely trigger the following panic on server side which seems to have been uncovered after the fix from commit 1be9a950 ... [ 533.876389] BUG: unable to handle kernel paging request at 00000000ffffffff [ 533.913657] IP: [<ffffffff811ac385>] __kmalloc+0x95/0x230 [ 533.940559] PGD 5030f2067 PUD 0 [ 533.957104] Oops: 0000 [#1] SMP [ 533.974283] Modules linked in: sctp mlx4_en [...] [ 534.939704] Call Trace: [ 534.951833] [<ffffffff81294e30>] ? crypto_init_shash_ops+0x60/0xf0 [ 534.984213] [<ffffffff81294e30>] crypto_init_shash_ops+0x60/0xf0 [ 535.015025] [<ffffffff8128c8ed>] __crypto_alloc_tfm+0x6d/0x170 [ 535.045661] [<ffffffff8128d12c>] crypto_alloc_base+0x4c/0xb0 [ 535.074593] [<ffffffff8160bd42>] ? _raw_spin_lock_bh+0x12/0x50 [ 535.105239] [<ffffffffa0418c11>] sctp_inet_listen+0x161/0x1e0 [sctp] [ 535.138606] [<ffffffff814e43bd>] SyS_listen+0x9d/0xb0 [ 535.166848] [<ffffffff816149a9>] system_call_fastpath+0x16/0x1b ... or depending on the the application, for example this one: [ 1370.026490] BUG: unable to handle kernel paging request at 00000000ffffffff [ 1370.026506] IP: [<ffffffff811ab455>] kmem_cache_alloc+0x75/0x1d0 [ 1370.054568] PGD 633c94067 PUD 0 [ 1370.070446] Oops: 0000 [#1] SMP [ 1370.085010] Modules linked in: sctp kvm_amd kvm [...] [ 1370.963431] Call Trace: [ 1370.974632] [<ffffffff8120f7cf>] ? SyS_epoll_ctl+0x53f/0x960 [ 1371.000863] [<ffffffff8120f7cf>] SyS_epoll_ctl+0x53f/0x960 [ 1371.027154] [<ffffffff812100d3>] ? anon_inode_getfile+0xd3/0x170 [ 1371.054679] [<ffffffff811e3d67>] ? __alloc_fd+0xa7/0x130 [ 1371.080183] [<ffffffff816149a9>] system_call_fastpath+0x16/0x1b With slab debugging enabled, we can see that the poison has been overwritten: [ 669.826368] BUG kmalloc-128 (Tainted: G W ): Poison overwritten [ 669.826385] INFO: 0xffff880228b32e50-0xffff880228b32e50. First byte 0x6a instead of 0x6b [ 669.826414] INFO: Allocated in sctp_auth_create_key+0x23/0x50 [sctp] age=3 cpu=0 pid=18494 [ 669.826424] __slab_alloc+0x4bf/0x566 [ 669.826433] __kmalloc+0x280/0x310 [ 669.826453] sctp_auth_create_key+0x23/0x50 [sctp] [ 669.826471] sctp_auth_asoc_create_secret+0xcb/0x1e0 [sctp] [ 669.826488] sctp_auth_asoc_init_active_key+0x68/0xa0 [sctp] [ 669.826505] sctp_do_sm+0x29d/0x17c0 [sctp] [...] [ 669.826629] INFO: Freed in kzfree+0x31/0x40 age=1 cpu=0 pid=18494 [ 669.826635] __slab_free+0x39/0x2a8 [ 669.826643] kfree+0x1d6/0x230 [ 669.826650] kzfree+0x31/0x40 [ 669.826666] sctp_auth_key_put+0x19/0x20 [sctp] [ 669.826681] sctp_assoc_update+0x1ee/0x2d0 [sctp] [ 669.826695] sctp_do_sm+0x674/0x17c0 [sctp] Since this only triggers in some collision-cases with AUTH, the problem at heart is that sctp_auth_key_put() on asoc->asoc_shared_key is called twice when having refcnt 1, once directly in sctp_assoc_update() and yet again from within sctp_auth_asoc_init_active_key() via sctp_assoc_update() on the already kzfree'd memory, which is also consistent with the observation of the poison decrease from 0x6b to 0x6a (note: the overwrite is detected at a later point in time when poison is checked on new allocation). Reference counting of auth keys revisited: Shared keys for AUTH chunks are being stored in endpoints and associations in endpoint_shared_keys list. On endpoint creation, a null key is being added; on association creation, all endpoint shared keys are being cached and thus cloned over to the association. struct sctp_shared_key only holds a pointer to the actual key bytes, that is, struct sctp_auth_bytes which keeps track of users internally through refcounting. Naturally, on assoc or enpoint destruction, sctp_shared_key are being destroyed directly and the reference on sctp_auth_bytes dropped. User space can add keys to either list via setsockopt(2) through struct sctp_authkey and by passing that to sctp_auth_set_key() which replaces or adds a new auth key. There, sctp_auth_create_key() creates a new sctp_auth_bytes with refcount 1 and in case of replacement drops the reference on the old sctp_auth_bytes. A key can be set active from user space through setsockopt() on the id via sctp_auth_set_active_key(), which iterates through either endpoint_shared_keys and in case of an assoc, invokes (one of various places) sctp_auth_asoc_init_active_key(). sctp_auth_asoc_init_active_key() computes the actual secret from local's and peer's random, hmac and shared key parameters and returns a new key directly as sctp_auth_bytes, that is asoc->asoc_shared_key, plus drops the reference if there was a previous one. The secret, which where we eventually double drop the ref comes from sctp_auth_asoc_set_secret() with intitial refcount of 1, which also stays unchanged eventually in sctp_assoc_update(). This key is later being used for crypto layer to set the key for the hash in crypto_hash_setkey() from sctp_auth_calculate_hmac(). To close the loop: asoc->asoc_shared_key is freshly allocated secret material and independant of the sctp_shared_key management keeping track of only shared keys in endpoints and assocs. Hence, also commit 4184b2a7 ("net: sctp: fix memory leak in auth key management") is independant of this bug here since it concerns a different layer (though same structures being used eventually). asoc->asoc_shared_key is reference dropped correctly on assoc destruction in sctp_association_free() and when active keys are being replaced in sctp_auth_asoc_init_active_key(), it always has a refcount of 1. Hence, it's freed prematurely in sctp_assoc_update(). Simple fix is to remove that sctp_auth_key_put() from there which fixes these panics. Fixes: 730fc3d0 ("[SCTP]: Implete SCTP-AUTH parameter processing") Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <dborkman@redhat.com> Acked-by: Vlad Yasevich <vyasevich@gmail.com> Acked-by: Neil Horman <nhorman@tuxdriver.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Signed-off-by: Jiri Slaby <jslaby@suse.cz>
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Eric Dumazet authored
[ Upstream commit 6088beef ] NAPI poll logic now enforces that a poller returns exactly the budget when it wants to be called again. If a driver limits TX completion, it has to return budget as well when the limit is hit, not the number of received packets. Reported-and-tested-by: Mike Galbraith <umgwanakikbuti@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com> Fixes: d75b1ade ("net: less interrupt masking in NAPI") Cc: Manish Chopra <manish.chopra@qlogic.com> Acked-by: Manish Chopra <manish.chopra@qlogic.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Signed-off-by: Jiri Slaby <jslaby@suse.cz>
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Hagen Paul Pfeifer authored
[ Upstream commit 9d289715 ] Reduce the attack vector and stop generating IPv6 Fragment Header for paths with an MTU smaller than the minimum required IPv6 MTU size (1280 byte) - called atomic fragments. See IETF I-D "Deprecating the Generation of IPv6 Atomic Fragments" [1] for more information and how this "feature" can be misused. [1] https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-6man-deprecate-atomfrag-generation-00Signed-off-by: Fernando Gont <fgont@si6networks.com> Signed-off-by: Hagen Paul Pfeifer <hagen@jauu.net> Acked-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa <hannes@stressinduktion.org> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Signed-off-by: Jiri Slaby <jslaby@suse.cz>
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Eric Dumazet authored
[ Upstream commit ac64da0b ] softnet_data.input_pkt_queue is protected by a spinlock that we must hold when transferring packets from victim queue to an active one. This is because other cpus could still be trying to enqueue packets into victim queue. A second problem is that when we transfert the NAPI poll_list from victim to current cpu, we absolutely need to special case the percpu backlog, because we do not want to add complex locking to protect process_queue : Only owner cpu is allowed to manipulate it, unless cpu is offline. Based on initial patch from Prasad Sodagudi & Subash Abhinov Kasiviswanathan. This version is better because we do not slow down packet processing, only make migration safer. Reported-by: Prasad Sodagudi <psodagud@codeaurora.org> Reported-by: Subash Abhinov Kasiviswanathan <subashab@codeaurora.org> Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com> Cc: Tom Herbert <therbert@google.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Signed-off-by: Jiri Slaby <jslaby@suse.cz>
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Willem de Bruijn authored
[ Upstream commit f812116b ] The sockaddr is returned in IP(V6)_RECVERR as part of errhdr. That structure is defined and allocated on the stack as struct { struct sock_extended_err ee; struct sockaddr_in(6) offender; } errhdr; The second part is only initialized for certain SO_EE_ORIGIN values. Always initialize it completely. An MTU exceeded error on a SOCK_RAW/IPPROTO_RAW is one example that would return uninitialized bytes. Signed-off-by: Willem de Bruijn <willemb@google.com> ---- Also verified that there is no padding between errhdr.ee and errhdr.offender that could leak additional kernel data. Acked-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Signed-off-by: Jiri Slaby <jslaby@suse.cz>
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Mathias Krause authored
The backport of commit 5d26a105 ("crypto: prefix module autoloading with "crypto-"") lost the MODULE_ALIAS_CRYPTO() annotation of crc32c.c. Add it to fix the reported filesystem related regressions. Signed-off-by: Mathias Krause <minipli@googlemail.com> Reported-by: Philip Müller <philm@manjaro.org> Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Cc: Rob McCathie <rob@manjaro.org> Cc: Luis Henriques <luis.henriques@canonical.com> Cc: Kamal Mostafa <kamal@canonical.com> Cc: Jiri Slaby <jslaby@suse.cz> Signed-off-by: Jiri Slaby <jslaby@suse.cz>
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