- 10 Sep, 2017 8 commits
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Oliver O'Halloran authored
[ Upstream commit 2400fd82 ] The workaround for the CELL timebase bug does not correctly mark cr0 as being clobbered. This means GCC doesn't know that the asm block changes cr0 and might leave the result of an unrelated comparison in cr0 across the block, which we then trash, leading to basically random behaviour. Fixes: 859deea9 ("[POWERPC] Cell timebase bug workaround") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v2.6.19+ Signed-off-by: Oliver O'Halloran <oohall@gmail.com> [mpe: Tweak change log and flag for stable] Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <alexander.levin@verizon.com>
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Anton Blanchard authored
[ Upstream commit 64e756c5 ] From POWER4 onwards, mfocrf() only places the specified CR field into the destination GPR, and the rest of it is set to 0. The PowerPC AS from version 3.0 now requires this behaviour. The emulation code currently puts the entire CR into the destination GPR. Fix it. Fixes: 6888199f ("[POWERPC] Emulate more instructions in software") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v2.6.22+ Signed-off-by: Anton Blanchard <anton@samba.org> Acked-by: Naveen N. Rao <naveen.n.rao@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <alexander.levin@verizon.com>
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Anton Blanchard authored
[ Upstream commit 87c4b83e ] The mcrf emulation code was using the CR field number directly as the shift value, without taking into account that CR fields are numbered from 0-7 starting at the high bits. That meant it was looking at the CR fields in the reverse order. Fixes: cf87c3f6 ("powerpc: Emulate icbi, mcrf and conditional-trap instructions") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v3.18+ Signed-off-by: Anton Blanchard <anton@samba.org> Acked-by: Naveen N. Rao <naveen.n.rao@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <alexander.levin@verizon.com>
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Michael Ellerman authored
[ Upstream commit 01e6a61a ] Although it's not documented anywhere, there is an expectation that atomic64_inc_not_zero() returns a result which fits in an int. This is the behaviour implemented on all arches except powerpc. This has caused at least one bug in practice, in the percpu-refcount code, where the long result from our atomic64_inc_not_zero() was truncated to an int leading to lost references and stuck systems. That was worked around in that code in commit 966d2b04 ("percpu-refcount: fix reference leak during percpu-atomic transition"). To the best of my grepping abilities there are no other callers in-tree which truncate the value, but we should fix it anyway. Because the breakage is subtle and potentially very harmful I'm also tagging it for stable. Code generation is largely unaffected because in most cases the callers are just using the result for a test anyway. In particular the case of fget() that was mentioned in commit a6cf7ed5 ("powerpc/atomic: Implement atomic*_inc_not_zero") generates exactly the same code. Fixes: a6cf7ed5 ("powerpc/atomic: Implement atomic*_inc_not_zero") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v3.4 Noticed-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <alexander.levin@verizon.com>
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Maurizio Lombardi authored
[ Upstream commit 62e62ffd ] The enclosure_add_device() function should fail if it can't create the relevant sysfs links. Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Maurizio Lombardi <mlombard@redhat.com> Tested-by: Douglas Miller <dougmill@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Acked-by: James Bottomley <jejb@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Martin K. Petersen <martin.petersen@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <alexander.levin@verizon.com>
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Krzysztof Kozlowski authored
[ Upstream commit b556b15d ] of_genpd_del_provider() iterates over list of domain provides and removes matching element thus it has to use safe version of list iteration. Fixes: aa42240a (PM / Domains: Add generic OF-based PM domain look-up) Cc: 3.19+ <stable@vger.kernel.org> # 3.19+ Signed-off-by: Krzysztof Kozlowski <krzk@kernel.org> Acked-by: Ulf Hansson <ulf.hansson@linaro.org> Signed-off-by: Rafael J. Wysocki <rafael.j.wysocki@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <alexander.levin@verizon.com>
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Krzysztof Kozlowski authored
[ Upstream commit c6e83cac ] pm_genpd_remove_subdomain() iterates over domain's master_links list and removes matching element thus it has to use safe version of list iteration. Fixes: f721889f ("PM / Domains: Support for generic I/O PM domains (v8)") Cc: 3.1+ <stable@vger.kernel.org> # 3.1+ Signed-off-by: Krzysztof Kozlowski <krzk@kernel.org> Acked-by: Ulf Hansson <ulf.hansson@linaro.org> Signed-off-by: Rafael J. Wysocki <rafael.j.wysocki@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <alexander.levin@verizon.com>
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Satish Babu Patakokila authored
[ Upstream commit 01b8cedf ] Currently compress driver hardcodes direction as playback to get substream from the stream. This results in getting the incorrect substream for compressed capture usecase. To fix this, remove the hardcoding and derive substream based on the stream direction. Signed-off-by: Satish Babu Patakokila <sbpata@codeaurora.org> Signed-off-by: Banajit Goswami <bgoswami@codeaurora.org> Acked-By: Vinod Koul <vinod.koul@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Mark Brown <broonie@kernel.org> Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <alexander.levin@verizon.com>
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- 01 Sep, 2017 8 commits
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Jason A. Donenfeld authored
[ Upstream commit 329d8230 ] This file is filled with complex cryptography. Thus, the comparisons of MACs and secret keys and curve points and so forth should not add timing attacks, which could either result in a direct forgery, or, given the complexity, some other type of attack. Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com> Signed-off-by: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org> Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <alexander.levin@verizon.com>
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Mateusz Jurczyk authored
[ Upstream commit f6a5885f ] Verify that the caller-provided sockaddr structure is large enough to contain the sa_family field, before accessing it in bind() handlers of the AF_NFC socket. Since the syscall doesn't enforce a minimum size of the corresponding memory region, very short sockaddrs (zero or one byte long) result in operating on uninitialized memory while referencing .sa_family. Signed-off-by: Mateusz Jurczyk <mjurczyk@google.com> Signed-off-by: Samuel Ortiz <sameo@linux.intel.com> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <alexander.levin@verizon.com>
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Mateusz Jurczyk authored
[ Upstream commit 608c4adf ] Fix the sockaddr length verification in the connect() handler of NFC/LLCP sockets, to compare against the size of the actual structure expected on input (sockaddr_nfc_llcp) instead of its shorter version (sockaddr_nfc). Both structures are defined in include/uapi/linux/nfc.h. The fields specific to the _llcp extended struct are as follows: 276 __u8 dsap; /* Destination SAP, if known */ 277 __u8 ssap; /* Source SAP to be bound to */ 278 char service_name[NFC_LLCP_MAX_SERVICE_NAME]; /* Service name URI */; 279 size_t service_name_len; If the caller doesn't provide a sufficiently long sockaddr buffer, these fields remain uninitialized (and they currently originate from the stack frame of the top-level sys_connect handler). They are then copied by llcp_sock_connect() into internal storage (nfc_llcp_sock structure), and could be subsequently read back through the user-mode getsockname() function (handled by llcp_sock_getname()). This would result in the disclosure of up to ~70 uninitialized bytes from the kernel stack to user-mode clients capable of creating AFC_NFC sockets. Signed-off-by: Mateusz Jurczyk <mjurczyk@google.com> Acked-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Signed-off-by: Samuel Ortiz <sameo@linux.intel.com> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <alexander.levin@verizon.com>
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Mateusz Jurczyk authored
[ Upstream commit a0323b97 ] Check that the NFC_ATTR_TARGET_INDEX and NFC_ATTR_PROTOCOLS attributes (in addition to NFC_ATTR_DEVICE_INDEX) are provided by the netlink client prior to accessing them. This prevents potential unhandled NULL pointer dereference exceptions which can be triggered by malicious user-mode programs, if they omit one or both of these attributes. Signed-off-by: Mateusz Jurczyk <mjurczyk@google.com> Acked-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Signed-off-by: Samuel Ortiz <sameo@linux.intel.com> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <alexander.levin@verizon.com>
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Johan Hovold authored
[ Upstream commit 20777bc5 ] Commit 7eda8b8e ("NFC: Use IDR library to assing NFC devices IDs") moved device-id allocation and struct-device initialisation from nfc_allocate_device() to nfc_register_device(). This broke just about every nfc-device-registration error path, which continue to call nfc_free_device() that tries to put the device reference of the now uninitialised (but zeroed) struct device: kobject: '(null)' (ce316420): is not initialized, yet kobject_put() is being called. The late struct-device initialisation also meant that various work queues whose names are derived from the nfc device name were also misnamed: 421 root 0 SW< [(null)_nci_cmd_] 422 root 0 SW< [(null)_nci_rx_w] 423 root 0 SW< [(null)_nci_tx_w] Move the id-allocation and struct-device initialisation back to nfc_allocate_device() and fix up the single call site which did not use nfc_free_device() in its error path. Fixes: 7eda8b8e ("NFC: Use IDR library to assing NFC devices IDs") Cc: stable <stable@vger.kernel.org> # 3.8 Cc: Samuel Ortiz <sameo@linux.intel.com> Signed-off-by: Johan Hovold <johan@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Samuel Ortiz <sameo@linux.intel.com> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <alexander.levin@verizon.com>
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Miaoqing Pan authored
[ Upstream commit bde717ab ] The hard coded register 0x9864 and 0x9924 are invalid for ar9300 chips. Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Miaoqing Pan <miaoqing@codeaurora.org> Signed-off-by: Kalle Valo <kvalo@qca.qualcomm.com> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <alexander.levin@verizon.com>
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Miaoqing Pan authored
[ Upstream commit cf8ce1ea ] One scenario that could lead to UAF is two threads writing simultaneously to the "tx99" debug file. One of them would set the "start" value to true and follow to ath9k_tx99_init(). Inside the function it would set the sc->tx99_state to true after allocating sc->tx99skb. Then, the other thread would execute write_file_tx99() and call ath9k_tx99_deinit(). sc->tx99_state would be freed. After that, the first thread would continue inside ath9k_tx99_init() and call r = ath9k_tx99_send(sc, sc->tx99_skb, &txctl); that would make use of the freed sc->tx99_skb memory. Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Miaoqing Pan <miaoqing@codeaurora.org> Signed-off-by: Kalle Valo <kvalo@qca.qualcomm.com> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <alexander.levin@verizon.com>
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Arnd Bergmann authored
[ Upstream commit bd7e31bb ] gcc-7 suggests that an expression using a bitwise not and a bitmask on a 'bool' variable is better written using boolean logic: drivers/media/rc/imon.c: In function 'imon_incoming_scancode': drivers/media/rc/imon.c:1725:22: error: '~' on a boolean expression [-Werror=bool-operation] ictx->pad_mouse = ~(ictx->pad_mouse) & 0x1; ^ drivers/media/rc/imon.c:1725:22: note: did you mean to use logical not? I agree. Fixes: 21677cfc ("V4L/DVB: ir-core: add imon driver") Signed-off-by: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de> Signed-off-by: Mauro Carvalho Chehab <mchehab@s-opensource.com> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <alexander.levin@verizon.com>
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- 05 Aug, 2017 2 commits
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Sasha Levin authored
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <alexander.levin@verizon.com>
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Benjamin Tissoires authored
[ Upstream commit 50220dea ] Plugging a Logitech DJ receiver with KASAN activated raises a bunch of out-of-bound readings. The fields are allocated up to MAX_USAGE, meaning that potentially, we do not have enough fields to fit the incoming values. Add checks and silence KASAN. Signed-off-by: Benjamin Tissoires <benjamin.tissoires@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Jiri Kosina <jkosina@suse.cz> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <alexander.levin@verizon.com>
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- 31 Jul, 2017 22 commits
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Sasha Levin authored
[ Upstream commit 3c5ab3f3 ] We do not check if packet from real server is for NAT connection before performing SNAT. This causes problems for setups that use DR/TUN and allow local clients to access the real server directly, for example: - local client in director creates IPVS-DR/TUN connection CIP->VIP and the request packets are routed to RIP. Talks are finished but IPVS connection is not expired yet. - second local client creates non-IPVS connection CIP->RIP with same reply tuple RIP->CIP and when replies are received on LOCAL_IN we wrongly assign them for the first client connection because RIP->CIP matches the reply direction. As result, IPVS SNATs replies for non-IPVS connections. The problem is more visible to local UDP clients but in rare cases it can happen also for TCP or remote clients when the real server sends the reply traffic via the director. So, better to be more precise for the reply traffic. As replies are not expected for DR/TUN connections, better to not touch them. Reported-by: Nick Moriarty <nick.moriarty@york.ac.uk> Tested-by: Nick Moriarty <nick.moriarty@york.ac.uk> Signed-off-by: Julian Anastasov <ja@ssi.bg> Signed-off-by: Simon Horman <horms@verge.net.au> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <alexander.levin@verizon.com>
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Sasha Levin authored
This reverts commit 81402e40. Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <alexander.levin@verizon.com>
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Ian Abbott authored
[ Upstream commit 857a6610 ] Commit 0557344e ("staging: comedi: ni_mio_common: fix local var for 32-bit read") changed the type of local variable `d` from `unsigned short` to `unsigned int` to fix a bug introduced in commit 9c340ac9 ("staging: comedi: ni_stc.h: add read/write callbacks to struct ni_private") when reading AI data for NI PCI-6110 and PCI-6111 cards. Unfortunately, other parts of the function rely on the variable being `unsigned short` when an offset value in local variable `signbits` is added to `d` before writing the value to the `data` array: d += signbits; data[n] = d; The `signbits` variable will be non-zero in bipolar mode, and is used to convert the hardware's 2's complement, 16-bit numbers to Comedi's straight binary sample format (with 0 representing the most negative voltage). This breaks because `d` is now 32 bits wide instead of 16 bits wide, so after the addition of `signbits`, `data[n]` ends up being set to values above 65536 for negative voltages. This affects all supported "E series" cards except PCI-6143 (and PXI-6143). Fix it by ANDing the value written to the `data[n]` with the mask 0xffff. Fixes: 0557344e ("staging: comedi: ni_mio_common: fix local var for 32-bit read") Signed-off-by: Ian Abbott <abbotti@mev.co.uk> Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <alexander.levin@verizon.com>
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Jim Mattson authored
[ Upstream commit a8b6fda3 ] The MSR permission bitmaps are shared by all VMs. However, some VMs may not be configured to support MPX, even when the host does. If the host supports VMX and the guest does not, we should intercept accesses to the BNDCFGS MSR, so that we can synthesize a #GP fault. Furthermore, if the host does not support MPX and the "ignore_msrs" kvm kernel parameter is set, then we should intercept accesses to the BNDCFGS MSR, so that we can skip over the rdmsr/wrmsr without raising a #GP fault. Fixes: da8999d3 ("KVM: x86: Intel MPX vmx and msr handle") Signed-off-by: Jim Mattson <jmattson@google.com> Signed-off-by: Radim Krčmář <rkrcmar@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <alexander.levin@verizon.com>
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Pavankumar Kondeti authored
[ Upstream commit c59f29cb ] The 's' flag is supposed to indicate that a softirq is running. This can be detected by testing the preempt_count with SOFTIRQ_OFFSET. The current code tests the preempt_count with SOFTIRQ_MASK, which would be true even when softirqs are disabled but not serving a softirq. Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1481300417-3564-1-git-send-email-pkondeti@codeaurora.orgSigned-off-by: Pavankumar Kondeti <pkondeti@codeaurora.org> Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <alexander.levin@verizon.com>
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Dan Carpenter authored
[ Upstream commit 2ca30331 ] In the current code, if the user accidentally writes a bogus command to this sysfs file, then we set the latency tolerance to an uninitialized variable. Fixes: 2d984ad1 (PM / QoS: Introcuce latency tolerance device PM QoS type) Signed-off-by: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@oracle.com> Acked-by: Pavel Machek <pavel@ucw.cz> Cc: 3.15+ <stable@vger.kernel.org> # 3.15+ Signed-off-by: Rafael J. Wysocki <rafael.j.wysocki@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <alexander.levin@verizon.com>
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Lauro Ramos Venancio authored
[ Upstream commit f32d782e ] The group mask is always used in intersection with the group CPUs. So, when building the group mask, we don't have to care about CPUs that are not part of the group. Signed-off-by: Lauro Ramos Venancio <lvenanci@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Mike Galbraith <efault@gmx.de> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: lwang@redhat.com Cc: riel@redhat.com Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1492717903-5195-2-git-send-email-lvenanci@redhat.comSigned-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <alexander.levin@verizon.com>
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Peter Zijlstra authored
[ Upstream commit 73bb059f ] The point of sched_group_mask is to select those CPUs from sched_group_cpus that can actually arrive at this balance domain. The current code gets it wrong, as can be readily demonstrated with a topology like: node 0 1 2 3 0: 10 20 30 20 1: 20 10 20 30 2: 30 20 10 20 3: 20 30 20 10 Where (for example) domain 1 on CPU1 ends up with a mask that includes CPU0: [] CPU1 attaching sched-domain: [] domain 0: span 0-2 level NUMA [] groups: 1 (mask: 1), 2, 0 [] domain 1: span 0-3 level NUMA [] groups: 0-2 (mask: 0-2) (cpu_capacity: 3072), 0,2-3 (cpu_capacity: 3072) This causes sched_balance_cpu() to compute the wrong CPU and consequently should_we_balance() will terminate early resulting in missed load-balance opportunities. The fixed topology looks like: [] CPU1 attaching sched-domain: [] domain 0: span 0-2 level NUMA [] groups: 1 (mask: 1), 2, 0 [] domain 1: span 0-3 level NUMA [] groups: 0-2 (mask: 1) (cpu_capacity: 3072), 0,2-3 (cpu_capacity: 3072) (note: this relies on OVERLAP domains to always have children, this is true because the regular topology domains are still here -- this is before degenerate trimming) Debugged-by: Lauro Ramos Venancio <lvenanci@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Mike Galbraith <efault@gmx.de> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Fixes: e3589f6c ("sched: Allow for overlapping sched_domain spans") Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <alexander.levin@verizon.com>
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Horia Geantă authored
[ Upstream commit 7459e1d2 ] Driver does not properly handle the case when signals interrupt wait_for_completion_interruptible(): -it does not check for return value -completion structure is allocated on stack; in case a signal interrupts the sleep, it will go out of scope, causing the worker thread (caam_jr_dequeue) to fail when it accesses it wait_for_completion_interruptible() is replaced with uninterruptable wait_for_completion(). We choose to block all signals while waiting for I/O (device executing the split key generation job descriptor) since the alternative - in order to have a deterministic device state - would be to flush the job ring (aborting *all* in-progress jobs). Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> Fixes: 045e3678 ("crypto: caam - ahash hmac support") Fixes: 4c1ec1f9 ("crypto: caam - refactor key_gen, sg") Signed-off-by: Horia Geantă <horia.geanta@nxp.com> Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <alexander.levin@verizon.com>
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Gilad Ben-Yossef authored
[ Upstream commit 1606043f ] The Atmel SHA driver was treating -EBUSY as indication of queueing to backlog without checking that backlog is enabled for the request. Fix it by checking request flags. Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Gilad Ben-Yossef <gilad@benyossef.com> Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <alexander.levin@verizon.com>
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Martin Hicks authored
[ Upstream commit 03d2c511 ] An updated patch that also handles the additional key length requirements for the AEAD algorithms. The max keysize is not 96. For SHA384/512 it's 128, and for the AEAD algorithms it's longer still. Extend the max keysize for the AEAD size for AES256 + HMAC(SHA512). Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # 3.6+ Fixes: 357fb605 ("crypto: talitos - add sha224, sha384 and sha512 to existing AEAD algorithms") Signed-off-by: Martin Hicks <mort@bork.org> Acked-by: Horia Geantă <horia.geanta@nxp.com> Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <alexander.levin@verizon.com>
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Josh Zimmerman authored
[ Upstream commit f77af151 ] The TPM class has some common shutdown code that must be executed for all drivers. This adds some needed functionality for that. Signed-off-by: Josh Zimmerman <joshz@google.com> Acked-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Fixes: 74d6b3ce ("tpm: fix suspend/resume paths for TPM 2.0") Reviewed-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com> Tested-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com> Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <alexander.levin@verizon.com>
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Eric W. Biederman authored
[ Upstream commit 296990de ] Andrei Vagin pointed out that time to executue propagate_umount can go non-linear (and take a ludicrious amount of time) when the mount propogation trees of the mounts to be unmunted by a lazy unmount overlap. Make the walk of the mount propagation trees nearly linear by remembering which mounts have already been visited, allowing subsequent walks to detect when walking a mount propgation tree or a subtree of a mount propgation tree would be duplicate work and to skip them entirely. Walk the list of mounts whose propgatation trees need to be traversed from the mount highest in the mount tree to mounts lower in the mount tree so that odds are higher that the code will walk the largest trees first, allowing later tree walks to be skipped entirely. Add cleanup_umount_visitation to remover the code's memory of which mounts have been visited. Add the functions last_slave and skip_propagation_subtree to allow skipping appropriate parts of the mount propagation tree without needing to change the logic of the rest of the code. A script to generate overlapping mount propagation trees: $ cat runs.h set -e mount -t tmpfs zdtm /mnt mkdir -p /mnt/1 /mnt/2 mount -t tmpfs zdtm /mnt/1 mount --make-shared /mnt/1 mkdir /mnt/1/1 iteration=10 if [ -n "$1" ] ; then iteration=$1 fi for i in $(seq $iteration); do mount --bind /mnt/1/1 /mnt/1/1 done mount --rbind /mnt/1 /mnt/2 TIMEFORMAT='%Rs' nr=$(( ( 2 ** ( $iteration + 1 ) ) + 1 )) echo -n "umount -l /mnt/1 -> $nr " time umount -l /mnt/1 nr=$(cat /proc/self/mountinfo | grep zdtm | wc -l ) time umount -l /mnt/2 $ for i in $(seq 9 19); do echo $i; unshare -Urm bash ./run.sh $i; done Here are the performance numbers with and without the patch: mhash | 8192 | 8192 | 1048576 | 1048576 mounts | before | after | before | after ------------------------------------------------ 1025 | 0.040s | 0.016s | 0.038s | 0.019s 2049 | 0.094s | 0.017s | 0.080s | 0.018s 4097 | 0.243s | 0.019s | 0.206s | 0.023s 8193 | 1.202s | 0.028s | 1.562s | 0.032s 16385 | 9.635s | 0.036s | 9.952s | 0.041s 32769 | 60.928s | 0.063s | 44.321s | 0.064s 65537 | | 0.097s | | 0.097s 131073 | | 0.233s | | 0.176s 262145 | | 0.653s | | 0.344s 524289 | | 2.305s | | 0.735s 1048577 | | 7.107s | | 2.603s Andrei Vagin reports fixing the performance problem is part of the work to fix CVE-2016-6213. Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Fixes: a05964f3 ("[PATCH] shared mounts handling: umount") Reported-by: Andrei Vagin <avagin@openvz.org> Reviewed-by: Andrei Vagin <avagin@virtuozzo.com> Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <alexander.levin@verizon.com>
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Eric W. Biederman authored
[ Upstream commit 99b19d16 ] While investigating some poor umount performance I realized that in the case of overlapping mount trees where some of the mounts are locked the code has been failing to unmount all of the mounts it should have been unmounting. This failure to unmount all of the necessary mounts can be reproduced with: $ cat locked_mounts_test.sh mount -t tmpfs test-base /mnt mount --make-shared /mnt mkdir -p /mnt/b mount -t tmpfs test1 /mnt/b mount --make-shared /mnt/b mkdir -p /mnt/b/10 mount -t tmpfs test2 /mnt/b/10 mount --make-shared /mnt/b/10 mkdir -p /mnt/b/10/20 mount --rbind /mnt/b /mnt/b/10/20 unshare -Urm --propagation unchaged /bin/sh -c 'sleep 5; if [ $(grep test /proc/self/mountinfo | wc -l) -eq 1 ] ; then echo SUCCESS ; else echo FAILURE ; fi' sleep 1 umount -l /mnt/b wait %% $ unshare -Urm ./locked_mounts_test.sh This failure is corrected by removing the prepass that marks mounts that may be umounted. A first pass is added that umounts mounts if possible and if not sets mount mark if they could be unmounted if they weren't locked and adds them to a list to umount possibilities. This first pass reconsiders the mounts parent if it is on the list of umount possibilities, ensuring that information of umoutability will pass from child to mount parent. A second pass then walks through all mounts that are umounted and processes their children unmounting them or marking them for reparenting. A last pass cleans up the state on the mounts that could not be umounted and if applicable reparents them to their first parent that remained mounted. While a bit longer than the old code this code is much more robust as it allows information to flow up from the leaves and down from the trunk making the order in which mounts are encountered in the umount propgation tree irrelevant. Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Fixes: 0c56fe31 ("mnt: Don't propagate unmounts to locked mounts") Reviewed-by: Andrei Vagin <avagin@virtuozzo.com> Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <alexander.levin@verizon.com>
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Eric W. Biederman authored
[ Upstream commit 570487d3 ] It was observed that in some pathlogical cases that the current code does not unmount everything it should. After investigation it was determined that the issue is that mnt_change_mntpoint can can change which mounts are available to be unmounted during mount propagation which is wrong. The trivial reproducer is: $ cat ./pathological.sh mount -t tmpfs test-base /mnt cd /mnt mkdir 1 2 1/1 mount --bind 1 1 mount --make-shared 1 mount --bind 1 2 mount --bind 1/1 1/1 mount --bind 1/1 1/1 echo grep test-base /proc/self/mountinfo umount 1/1 echo grep test-base /proc/self/mountinfo $ unshare -Urm ./pathological.sh The expected output looks like: 46 31 0:25 / /mnt rw,relatime - tmpfs test-base rw,uid=1000,gid=1000 47 46 0:25 /1 /mnt/1 rw,relatime shared:1 - tmpfs test-base rw,uid=1000,gid=1000 48 46 0:25 /1 /mnt/2 rw,relatime shared:1 - tmpfs test-base rw,uid=1000,gid=1000 49 54 0:25 /1/1 /mnt/1/1 rw,relatime shared:1 - tmpfs test-base rw,uid=1000,gid=1000 50 53 0:25 /1/1 /mnt/2/1 rw,relatime shared:1 - tmpfs test-base rw,uid=1000,gid=1000 51 49 0:25 /1/1 /mnt/1/1 rw,relatime shared:1 - tmpfs test-base rw,uid=1000,gid=1000 54 47 0:25 /1/1 /mnt/1/1 rw,relatime shared:1 - tmpfs test-base rw,uid=1000,gid=1000 53 48 0:25 /1/1 /mnt/2/1 rw,relatime shared:1 - tmpfs test-base rw,uid=1000,gid=1000 52 50 0:25 /1/1 /mnt/2/1 rw,relatime shared:1 - tmpfs test-base rw,uid=1000,gid=1000 46 31 0:25 / /mnt rw,relatime - tmpfs test-base rw,uid=1000,gid=1000 47 46 0:25 /1 /mnt/1 rw,relatime shared:1 - tmpfs test-base rw,uid=1000,gid=1000 48 46 0:25 /1 /mnt/2 rw,relatime shared:1 - tmpfs test-base rw,uid=1000,gid=1000 The output without the fix looks like: 46 31 0:25 / /mnt rw,relatime - tmpfs test-base rw,uid=1000,gid=1000 47 46 0:25 /1 /mnt/1 rw,relatime shared:1 - tmpfs test-base rw,uid=1000,gid=1000 48 46 0:25 /1 /mnt/2 rw,relatime shared:1 - tmpfs test-base rw,uid=1000,gid=1000 49 54 0:25 /1/1 /mnt/1/1 rw,relatime shared:1 - tmpfs test-base rw,uid=1000,gid=1000 50 53 0:25 /1/1 /mnt/2/1 rw,relatime shared:1 - tmpfs test-base rw,uid=1000,gid=1000 51 49 0:25 /1/1 /mnt/1/1 rw,relatime shared:1 - tmpfs test-base rw,uid=1000,gid=1000 54 47 0:25 /1/1 /mnt/1/1 rw,relatime shared:1 - tmpfs test-base rw,uid=1000,gid=1000 53 48 0:25 /1/1 /mnt/2/1 rw,relatime shared:1 - tmpfs test-base rw,uid=1000,gid=1000 52 50 0:25 /1/1 /mnt/2/1 rw,relatime shared:1 - tmpfs test-base rw,uid=1000,gid=1000 46 31 0:25 / /mnt rw,relatime - tmpfs test-base rw,uid=1000,gid=1000 47 46 0:25 /1 /mnt/1 rw,relatime shared:1 - tmpfs test-base rw,uid=1000,gid=1000 48 46 0:25 /1 /mnt/2 rw,relatime shared:1 - tmpfs test-base rw,uid=1000,gid=1000 52 48 0:25 /1/1 /mnt/2/1 rw,relatime shared:1 - tmpfs test-base rw,uid=1000,gid=1000 That last mount in the output was in the propgation tree to be unmounted but was missed because the mnt_change_mountpoint changed it's parent before the walk through the mount propagation tree observed it. Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Fixes: 1064f874 ("mnt: Tuck mounts under others instead of creating shadow/side mounts.") Acked-by: Andrei Vagin <avagin@virtuozzo.com> Reviewed-by: Ram Pai <linuxram@us.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <alexander.levin@verizon.com>
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Adam Borowski authored
[ Upstream commit 6987dc8a ] Only read access is checked before this call. Actually, at the moment this is not an issue, as every in-tree arch does the same manual checks for VERIFY_READ vs VERIFY_WRITE, relying on the MMU to tell them apart, but this wasn't the case in the past and may happen again on some odd arch in the future. If anyone cares about 3.7 and earlier, this is a security hole (untested) on real 80386 CPUs. Signed-off-by: Adam Borowski <kilobyte@angband.pl> CC: stable@vger.kernel.org # v3.7- Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <alexander.levin@verizon.com>
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Kees Cook authored
[ Upstream commit da029c11 ] To avoid pathological stack usage or the need to special-case setuid execs, just limit all arg stack usage to at most 75% of _STK_LIM (6MB). Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <alexander.levin@verizon.com>
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Kees Cook authored
[ Upstream commit a73dc537 ] Now that explicitly executed loaders are loaded in the mmap region, we have more freedom to decide where we position PIE binaries in the address space to avoid possible collisions with mmap or stack regions. For 64-bit, align to 4GB to allow runtimes to use the entire 32-bit address space for 32-bit pointers. On 32-bit use 4MB, which is the traditional x86 minimum load location, likely to avoid historically requiring a 4MB page table entry when only a portion of the first 4MB would be used (since the NULL address is avoided). For s390 the position could be 0x10000, but that is needlessly close to the NULL address. Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1498154792-49952-5-git-send-email-keescook@chromium.orgSigned-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Cc: Russell King <linux@armlinux.org.uk> Cc: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com> Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com> Cc: Benjamin Herrenschmidt <benh@kernel.crashing.org> Cc: Paul Mackerras <paulus@samba.org> Cc: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au> Cc: Martin Schwidefsky <schwidefsky@de.ibm.com> Cc: Heiko Carstens <heiko.carstens@de.ibm.com> Cc: James Hogan <james.hogan@imgtec.com> Cc: Pratyush Anand <panand@redhat.com> Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org> Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <alexander.levin@verizon.com>
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Kees Cook authored
[ Upstream commit 47ebb09d ] Now that explicitly executed loaders are loaded in the mmap region, we have more freedom to decide where we position PIE binaries in the address space to avoid possible collisions with mmap or stack regions. For 64-bit, align to 4GB to allow runtimes to use the entire 32-bit address space for 32-bit pointers. On 32-bit use 4MB, which is the traditional x86 minimum load location, likely to avoid historically requiring a 4MB page table entry when only a portion of the first 4MB would be used (since the NULL address is avoided). Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1498154792-49952-4-git-send-email-keescook@chromium.orgSigned-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Tested-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au> Acked-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au> Cc: Russell King <linux@armlinux.org.uk> Cc: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com> Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com> Cc: Benjamin Herrenschmidt <benh@kernel.crashing.org> Cc: Paul Mackerras <paulus@samba.org> Cc: Martin Schwidefsky <schwidefsky@de.ibm.com> Cc: Heiko Carstens <heiko.carstens@de.ibm.com> Cc: James Hogan <james.hogan@imgtec.com> Cc: Pratyush Anand <panand@redhat.com> Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org> Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <alexander.levin@verizon.com>
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Kees Cook authored
[ Upstream commit 6a9af90a ] Now that explicitly executed loaders are loaded in the mmap region, we have more freedom to decide where we position PIE binaries in the address space to avoid possible collisions with mmap or stack regions. 4MB is chosen here mainly to have parity with x86, where this is the traditional minimum load location, likely to avoid historically requiring a 4MB page table entry when only a portion of the first 4MB would be used (since the NULL address is avoided). For ARM the position could be 0x8000, the standard ET_EXEC load address, but that is needlessly close to the NULL address, and anyone running PIE on 32-bit ARM will have an MMU, so the tight mapping is not needed. Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1498154792-49952-2-git-send-email-keescook@chromium.orgSigned-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Cc: Russell King <linux@armlinux.org.uk> Cc: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com> Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com> Cc: Benjamin Herrenschmidt <benh@kernel.crashing.org> Cc: Paul Mackerras <paulus@samba.org> Cc: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au> Cc: Martin Schwidefsky <schwidefsky@de.ibm.com> Cc: Heiko Carstens <heiko.carstens@de.ibm.com> Cc: James Hogan <james.hogan@imgtec.com> Cc: Pratyush Anand <panand@redhat.com> Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org> Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com> Cc: Alexander Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net> Cc: Daniel Micay <danielmicay@gmail.com> Cc: Dmitry Safonov <dsafonov@virtuozzo.com> Cc: Grzegorz Andrejczuk <grzegorz.andrejczuk@intel.com> Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Cc: Masahiro Yamada <yamada.masahiro@socionext.com> Cc: Qualys Security Advisory <qsa@qualys.com> Cc: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <alexander.levin@verizon.com>
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Kees Cook authored
[ Upstream commit eab09532 ] The ELF_ET_DYN_BASE position was originally intended to keep loaders away from ET_EXEC binaries. (For example, running "/lib/ld-linux.so.2 /bin/cat" might cause the subsequent load of /bin/cat into where the loader had been loaded.) With the advent of PIE (ET_DYN binaries with an INTERP Program Header), ELF_ET_DYN_BASE continued to be used since the kernel was only looking at ET_DYN. However, since ELF_ET_DYN_BASE is traditionally set at the top 1/3rd of the TASK_SIZE, a substantial portion of the address space is unused. For 32-bit tasks when RLIMIT_STACK is set to RLIM_INFINITY, programs are loaded above the mmap region. This means they can be made to collide (CVE-2017-1000370) or nearly collide (CVE-2017-1000371) with pathological stack regions. Lowering ELF_ET_DYN_BASE solves both by moving programs below the mmap region in all cases, and will now additionally avoid programs falling back to the mmap region by enforcing MAP_FIXED for program loads (i.e. if it would have collided with the stack, now it will fail to load instead of falling back to the mmap region). To allow for a lower ELF_ET_DYN_BASE, loaders (ET_DYN without INTERP) are loaded into the mmap region, leaving space available for either an ET_EXEC binary with a fixed location or PIE being loaded into mmap by the loader. Only PIE programs are loaded offset from ELF_ET_DYN_BASE, which means architectures can now safely lower their values without risk of loaders colliding with their subsequently loaded programs. For 64-bit, ELF_ET_DYN_BASE is best set to 4GB to allow runtimes to use the entire 32-bit address space for 32-bit pointers. Thanks to PaX Team, Daniel Micay, and Rik van Riel for inspiration and suggestions on how to implement this solution. Fixes: d1fd836d ("mm: split ET_DYN ASLR from mmap ASLR") Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20170621173201.GA114489@beastSigned-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Acked-by: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com> Cc: Daniel Micay <danielmicay@gmail.com> Cc: Qualys Security Advisory <qsa@qualys.com> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com> Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com> Cc: Alexander Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk> Cc: Dmitry Safonov <dsafonov@virtuozzo.com> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net> Cc: Grzegorz Andrejczuk <grzegorz.andrejczuk@intel.com> Cc: Masahiro Yamada <yamada.masahiro@socionext.com> Cc: Benjamin Herrenschmidt <benh@kernel.crashing.org> Cc: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com> Cc: Heiko Carstens <heiko.carstens@de.ibm.com> Cc: James Hogan <james.hogan@imgtec.com> Cc: Martin Schwidefsky <schwidefsky@de.ibm.com> Cc: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au> Cc: Paul Mackerras <paulus@samba.org> Cc: Pratyush Anand <panand@redhat.com> Cc: Russell King <linux@armlinux.org.uk> Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com> Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <alexander.levin@verizon.com>
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Cyril Bur authored
[ Upstream commit 8d81ae05 ] As of perl 5, version 26, subversion 0 (v5.26.0) some new warnings have occurred when running checkpatch. Unescaped left brace in regex is deprecated here (and will be fatal in Perl 5.30), passed through in regex; marked by <-- HERE in m/^(.\s*){ <-- HERE \s*/ at scripts/checkpatch.pl line 3544. Unescaped left brace in regex is deprecated here (and will be fatal in Perl 5.30), passed through in regex; marked by <-- HERE in m/^(.\s*){ <-- HERE \s*/ at scripts/checkpatch.pl line 3885. Unescaped left brace in regex is deprecated here (and will be fatal in Perl 5.30), passed through in regex; marked by <-- HERE in m/^(\+.*(?:do|\))){ <-- HERE / at scripts/checkpatch.pl line 4374. It seems perfectly reasonable to do as the warning suggests and simply escape the left brace in these three locations. Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20170607060135.17384-1-cyrilbur@gmail.comSigned-off-by: Cyril Bur <cyrilbur@gmail.com> Acked-by: Joe Perches <joe@perches.com> Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <alexander.levin@verizon.com>
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