- 19 May, 2014 33 commits
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Salva Peir authored
[ Upstream commit 96b34040 ] The fst_get_iface() code fails to initialize the two padding bytes of struct sync_serial_settings after the ->loopback member. Add an explicit memset(0) before filling the structure to avoid the info leak. Signed-off-by: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
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Marc Kleine-Budde authored
[ Upstream commit c33a39c5 ] This patch fixes the calculation of the nlmsg size, by adding the missing nla_total_size(). Cc: Patrick McHardy <kaber@trash.net> Signed-off-by: Marc Kleine-Budde <mkl@pengutronix.de> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
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Marc Kleine-Budde authored
[ Upstream commit fe119a05 ] This patch fixes the calculation of the nlmsg size, by adding the missing nla_total_size(). Signed-off-by: Marc Kleine-Budde <mkl@pengutronix.de> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
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Mathias Krause authored
[ Upstream commit e727ca82 ] Initialize event_data for all possible message types to prevent leaking kernel stack contents to userland (up to 20 bytes). Also set the flags member of the connector message to 0 to prevent leaking two more stack bytes this way. Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v2.6.15+ Signed-off-by: Mathias Krause <minipli@googlemail.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
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Dan Carpenter authored
[ Upstream commit 1661bf36 ] We need to cap ->msg_namelen or it leads to a buffer overflow when we to the memcpy() in __audit_sockaddr(). It requires CAP_AUDIT_CONTROL to exploit this bug. The call tree is: ___sys_recvmsg() move_addr_to_user() audit_sockaddr() __audit_sockaddr() Reported-by: Jri Aedla <juri.aedla@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> [wt: 2.6.32: msg_sys is a struct, not a pointer] Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
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Eric Dumazet authored
[ Upstream commit 80ad1d61 ] commit 3ab5aee7 ("net: Convert TCP & DCCP hash tables to use RCU / hlist_nulls") incorrectly used sock_put() on TIMEWAIT sockets. We should instead use inet_twsk_put() Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
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Eric Dumazet authored
[ Upstream commit c52e2421 ] TCP stack should make sure it owns skbs before mangling them. We had various crashes using bnx2x, and it turned out gso_size was cleared right before bnx2x driver was populating TC descriptor of the _previous_ packet send. TCP stack can sometime retransmit packets that are still in Qdisc. Of course we could make bnx2x driver more robust (using ACCESS_ONCE(shinfo->gso_size) for example), but the bug is TCP stack. We have identified two points where skb_unclone() was needed. This patch adds a WARN_ON_ONCE() to warn us if we missed another fix of this kind. Kudos to Neal for finding the root cause of this bug. Its visible using small MSS. Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com> Signed-off-by: Neal Cardwell <ncardwell@google.com> Cc: Yuchung Cheng <ycheng@google.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
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Eric Dumazet authored
commit 72a3effa ([NET]: Size listen hash tables using backlog hint) added a bug allowing inet6_synq_hash() to return an out of bound array index, because of u16 overflow. Bug can happen if system admins set net.core.somaxconn & net.ipv4.tcp_max_syn_backlog sysctls to values greater than 65536 Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> (cherry picked from commit c16a98ed) Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
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Nikola Pajkovsky authored
https://bugzilla.redhat.com/1016108 64z is missing rhel6 commit 3af031a395c0 ("[crypto] algboss: Hold ref count on larval") which is causing cosmetic fuzz, because crypto_alg_get was move from crypto/api.c to crypto/internal.h. From: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au> [ upstream commit 77dbd7a9 ] crypto_larval_lookup should only return a larval if it created one. Any larval created by another entity must be processed through crypto_larval_wait before being returned. Otherwise this will lead to a larval being killed twice, which will most likely lead to a crash. Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Reported-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Tested-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au> Signed-off-by: Nikola Pajkovsky <npajkovs@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
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Kees Cook authored
commit 331415ff upstream Many drivers need to validate the characteristics of their HID report during initialization to avoid misusing the reports. This adds a common helper to perform validation of the report exisitng, the field existing, and the expected number of values within the field. Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Reviewed-by: Benjamin Tissoires <benjamin.tissoires@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Jiri Kosina <jkosina@suse.cz> [jmm: backported to 2.6.32] [wt: dev_err() in 2.6.32 instead of hid_err()] Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
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Kees Cook authored
commit be67b68d upstream Defensively check that the field to be worked on is not NULL. Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Cc: stable@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Jiri Kosina <jkosina@suse.cz> Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
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Kees Cook authored
commit 0fb6bd06 upstream A HID device could send a malicious output report that would cause the lg, lg3, and lg4 HID drivers to write beyond the output report allocation during an event, causing a heap overflow: [ 325.245240] usb 1-1: New USB device found, idVendor=046d, idProduct=c287 ... [ 414.518960] BUG kmalloc-4096 (Not tainted): Redzone overwritten Additionally, while lg2 did correctly validate the report details, it was cleaned up and shortened. CVE-2013-2893 Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Reviewed-by: Benjamin Tissoires <benjamin.tissoires@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Jiri Kosina <jkosina@suse.cz> [jmm: backported to 2.6.32] Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
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Kees Cook authored
commit 412f3010 upstream A HID device could send a malicious output report that would cause the pantherlord HID driver to write beyond the output report allocation during initialization, causing a heap overflow: [ 310.939483] usb 1-1: New USB device found, idVendor=0e8f, idProduct=0003 ... [ 315.980774] BUG kmalloc-192 (Tainted: G W ): Redzone overwritten CVE-2013-2892 Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Cc: stable@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Jiri Kosina <jkosina@suse.cz> Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
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Kees Cook authored
commit 78214e81 upstream The zeroplus HID driver was not checking the size of allocated values in fields it used. A HID device could send a malicious output report that would cause the driver to write beyond the output report allocation during initialization, causing a heap overflow: [ 1442.728680] usb 1-1: New USB device found, idVendor=0c12, idProduct=0005 ... [ 1466.243173] BUG kmalloc-192 (Tainted: G W ): Redzone overwritten CVE-2013-2889 Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Reviewed-by: Benjamin Tissoires <benjamin.tissoires@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Jiri Kosina <jkosina@suse.cz> [jmm: backport to 2.6.32] Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
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Kees Cook authored
commit 43622021 upstream The "Report ID" field of a HID report is used to build indexes of reports. The kernel's index of these is limited to 256 entries, so any malicious device that sets a Report ID greater than 255 will trigger memory corruption on the host: [ 1347.156239] BUG: unable to handle kernel paging request at ffff88094958a878 [ 1347.156261] IP: [<ffffffff813e4da0>] hid_register_report+0x2a/0x8b CVE-2013-2888 Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Cc: stable@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Jiri Kosina <jkosina@suse.cz> [jmm: backport to 2.6.32] Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
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Kees Cook authored
commit e0e29b68 upstream The module parameter "fwpostfix" is userspace controllable, unfiltered, and is used to define the firmware filename. b43_do_request_fw() populates ctx->errors[] on error, containing the firmware filename. b43err() parses its arguments as a format string. For systems with b43 hardware, this could lead to a uid-0 to ring-0 escalation. CVE-2013-2852 Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: John W. Linville <linville@tuxdriver.com> Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
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Kees Cook authored
commit ffc8b308 upstream Disk names may contain arbitrary strings, so they must not be interpreted as format strings. It seems that only md allows arbitrary strings to be used for disk names, but this could allow for a local memory corruption from uid 0 into ring 0. CVE-2013-2851 Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Cc: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk> Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> [jmm: Backport to 2.6.32] Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
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Nicolas Dichtel authored
commit 85dfb745 upstream This field was left uninitialized. Some user daemons perform check against this field. Signed-off-by: Nicolas Dichtel <nicolas.dichtel@6wind.com> Signed-off-by: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com> Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
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Mathias Krause authored
commit a5cc68f3 upstream key_notify_sa_flush() and key_notify_policy_flush() miss to initialize the sadb_msg_reserved member of the broadcasted message and thereby leak 2 bytes of heap memory to listeners. Fix that. Signed-off-by: Mathias Krause <minipli@googlemail.com> Cc: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com> Cc: "David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net> Cc: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
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Eric Dumazet authored
commit a963a37d upstream It's possible to use AF_INET6 sockets and to connect to an IPv4 destination. After this, socket dst cache is a pointer to a rtable, not rt6_info. ip6_sk_dst_check() should check the socket dst cache is IPv6, or else various corruptions/crashes can happen. Dave Jones can reproduce immediate crash with trinity -q -l off -n -c sendmsg -c connect With help from Hannes Frederic Sowa Reported-by: Dave Jones <davej@redhat.com> Reported-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa <hannes@stressinduktion.org> Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com> Acked-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa <hannes@stressinduktion.org> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
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Vlad Yasevich authored
commit f2815633 upstream When SCTP is done processing a duplicate cookie chunk, it tries to delete a newly created association. For that, it has to set the right association for the side-effect processing to work. However, when it uses the SCTP_CMD_NEW_ASOC command, that performs more work then really needed (like hashing the associationa and assigning it an id) and there is no point to do that only to delete the association as a next step. In fact, it also creates an impossible condition where an association may be found by the getsockopt() call, and that association is empty. This causes a crash in some sctp getsockopts. The solution is rather simple. We simply use SCTP_CMD_SET_ASOC command that doesn't have all the overhead and does exactly what we need. Reported-by: Karl Heiss <kheiss@gmail.com> Tested-by: Karl Heiss <kheiss@gmail.com> CC: Neil Horman <nhorman@tuxdriver.com> Signed-off-by: Vlad Yasevich <vyasevich@gmail.com> Acked-by: Neil Horman <nhorman@tuxdriver.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
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Max Matveev authored
commit d5ccd496 upstream Attempt to reduce the number of IP packets emitted in response to single SCTP packet (2e3216cd) introduced a complication - if a packet contains two COOKIE_ECHO chunks and nothing else then SCTP state machine corks the socket while processing first COOKIE_ECHO and then loses the association and forgets to uncork the socket. To deal with the issue add new SCTP command which can be used to set association explictly. Use this new command when processing second COOKIE_ECHO chunk to restore the context for SCTP state machine. Signed-off-by: Max Matveev <makc@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> [dannf: backported to Debian's 2.6.32] Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
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Jonathan Salwan authored
commit 542db015 upstream In drivers/cdrom/cdrom.c mmc_ioctl_cdrom_read_data() allocates a memory area with kmalloc in line 2885. 2885 cgc->buffer = kmalloc(blocksize, GFP_KERNEL); 2886 if (cgc->buffer == NULL) 2887 return -ENOMEM; In line 2908 we can find the copy_to_user function: 2908 if (!ret && copy_to_user(arg, cgc->buffer, blocksize)) The cgc->buffer is never cleaned and initialized before this function. If ret = 0 with the previous basic block, it's possible to display some memory bytes in kernel space from userspace. When we read a block from the disk it normally fills the ->buffer but if the drive is malfunctioning there is a chance that it would only be partially filled. The result is an leak information to userspace. Signed-off-by: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@oracle.com> Cc: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
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Dan Carpenter authored
commit 627aad1c upstream The pciinfo struct has a two byte hole after ->dev_fn so stack information could be leaked to the user. This was assigned CVE-2013-2147. Signed-off-by: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@oracle.com> Acked-by: Mike Miller <mike.miller@hp.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
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Dan Carpenter authored
commit 58f09e00 upstream. The arg64 struct has a hole after ->buf_size which isn't cleared. Or if any of the calls to copy_from_user() fail then that would cause an information leak as well. This was assigned CVE-2013-2147. Signed-off-by: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@oracle.com> Acked-by: Mike Miller <mike.miller@hp.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
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Tetsuo Handa authored
If /proc/sys/kernel/core_pattern contains only "|", a NULL pointer dereference happens upon core dump because argv_split("") returns argv[0] == NULL. This bug was once fixed by commit 264b83c0 ("usermodehelper: check subprocess_info->path != NULL") but was by error reintroduced by commit 7f57cfa4 ("usermodehelper: kill the sub_info->path[0] check"). This bug seems to exist since 2.6.19 (the version which core dump to pipe was added). Depending on kernel version and config, some side effect might happen immediately after this oops (e.g. kernel panic with 2.6.32-358.18.1.el6). Signed-off-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp> Acked-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com> Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> (cherry picked from commit 4c1c7be9) Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
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Ian Abbott authored
Commit 677a3156 upstream. The `insn_bits` handler `ni_65xx_dio_insn_bits()` has a `for` loop that currently writes (optionally) and reads back up to 5 "ports" consisting of 8 channels each. It reads up to 32 1-bit channels but can only read and write a whole port at once - it needs to handle up to 5 ports as the first channel it reads might not be aligned on a port boundary. It breaks out of the loop early if the next port it handles is beyond the final port on the card. It also breaks out early on the 5th port in the loop if the first channel was aligned. Unfortunately, it doesn't check that the current port it is dealing with belongs to the comedi subdevice the `insn_bits` handler is acting on. That's a bug. Redo the `for` loop to terminate after the final port belonging to the subdevice, changing the loop variable in the process to simplify things a bit. The `for` loop could now try and handle more than 5 ports if the subdevice has more than 40 channels, but the test `if (bitshift >= 32)` ensures it will break out early after 4 or 5 ports (depending on whether the first channel is aligned on a port boundary). (`bitshift` will be between -7 and 7 inclusive on the first iteration, increasing by 8 for each subsequent operation.) Signed-off-by: Ian Abbott <abbotti@mev.co.uk> Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
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Jitendra Bhivare authored
Backported Alex Williamson's commit to 2.6.32.y http://git.kernel.org/linus/7b668357810ecb5fdda4418689d50f5d95aea6a8 It resolves the following assert when module is immediately reloaded. kernel BUG at drivers/pci/iova.c:155! <snip> Call Trace: [<ffffffff812645c5>] intel_alloc_iova+0xb5/0xe0 [<ffffffff8126725e>] __intel_map_single+0xbe/0x210 [<ffffffff812674ae>] intel_alloc_coherent+0xae/0x120 [<ffffffffa035f909>] be_queue_alloc+0xb9/0x140 [be2net] [<ffffffffa035fa5a>] be_rx_qs_create+0xca/0x370 [be2net] <snip> The issue is reproducible in 2.6.32.60 and also gets resolved by passing intel-iommu=strict to kernel. Signed-off-by: Jitendra Bhivare <jitendra.bhivare@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
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Julian Anastasov authored
Fix CHECKSUM_PARTIAL handling. Tested for IPv4 TCP, UDP not tested because it needs network card with HW CSUM support. May be fixes problem where IPVS can not be used in virtual boxes. Problem appears with DNAT to local address when the local stack sends reply in CHECKSUM_PARTIAL mode. Fix tcp_dnat_handler and udp_dnat_handler to provide vaddr and daddr in right order (old and new IP) when calling tcp_partial_csum_update/udp_partial_csum_update (CHECKSUM_PARTIAL). Signed-off-by: Julian Anastasov <ja@ssi.bg> Signed-off-by: Simon Horman <horms@verge.net.au> (cherry picked from commit 5bc9068e) Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
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Willy Tarreau authored
syscall_trace_enter() and syscall_trace_leave() are only called from within asm code and do not need to be declared in the .c at all. Removing their reference fixes the build issue that was happening with gcc 4.7. Both Sven-Haegar Koch and Christoph Biedl confirmed this patch addresses their respective build issues. Cc: Sven-Haegar Koch <haegar@sdinet.de> Cc: Christoph Biedl <linux-kernel.bfrz@manchmal.in-ulm.de> Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
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Willy Tarreau authored
This reverts commit 4ed3bb08. As reported by Sven-Haegar Koch, this patch breaks make headers_check : CHECK include (0 files) CHECK include/asm (54 files) /home/haegar/src/2.6.32/linux/usr/include/asm/ptrace.h:5: included file 'linux/linkage.h' is not exported Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
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Ben Greear authored
The stop machine logic can lock up if all but one of the migration threads make it through the disable-irq step and the one remaining thread gets stuck in __do_softirq. The reason __do_softirq can hang is that it has a bail-out based on jiffies timeout, but in the lockup case, jiffies itself is not incremented. To work around this, re-add the max_restart counter in __do_irq and stop processing irqs after 10 restarts. Thanks to Tejun Heo and Rusty Russell and others for helping me track this down. This was introduced in 3.9 by commit c10d7367 ("softirq: reduce latencies"). It may be worth looking into ath9k to see if it has issues with its irq handler at a later date. The hang stack traces look something like this: ------------[ cut here ]------------ WARNING: at kernel/watchdog.c:245 watchdog_overflow_callback+0x9c/0xa7() Watchdog detected hard LOCKUP on cpu 2 Modules linked in: ath9k ath9k_common ath9k_hw ath mac80211 cfg80211 nfsv4 auth_rpcgss nfs fscache nf_nat_ipv4 nf_nat veth 8021q garp stp mrp llc pktgen lockd sunrpc] Pid: 23, comm: migration/2 Tainted: G C 3.9.4+ #11 Call Trace: <NMI> warn_slowpath_common+0x85/0x9f warn_slowpath_fmt+0x46/0x48 watchdog_overflow_callback+0x9c/0xa7 __perf_event_overflow+0x137/0x1cb perf_event_overflow+0x14/0x16 intel_pmu_handle_irq+0x2dc/0x359 perf_event_nmi_handler+0x19/0x1b nmi_handle+0x7f/0xc2 do_nmi+0xbc/0x304 end_repeat_nmi+0x1e/0x2e <<EOE>> cpu_stopper_thread+0xae/0x162 smpboot_thread_fn+0x258/0x260 kthread+0xc7/0xcf ret_from_fork+0x7c/0xb0 ---[ end trace 4947dfa9b0a4cec3 ]--- BUG: soft lockup - CPU#1 stuck for 22s! [migration/1:17] Modules linked in: ath9k ath9k_common ath9k_hw ath mac80211 cfg80211 nfsv4 auth_rpcgss nfs fscache nf_nat_ipv4 nf_nat veth 8021q garp stp mrp llc pktgen lockd sunrpc] irq event stamp: 835637905 hardirqs last enabled at (835637904): __do_softirq+0x9f/0x257 hardirqs last disabled at (835637905): apic_timer_interrupt+0x6d/0x80 softirqs last enabled at (5654720): __do_softirq+0x1ff/0x257 softirqs last disabled at (5654725): irq_exit+0x5f/0xbb CPU 1 Pid: 17, comm: migration/1 Tainted: G WC 3.9.4+ #11 To be filled by O.E.M. To be filled by O.E.M./To be filled by O.E.M. RIP: tasklet_hi_action+0xf0/0xf0 Process migration/1 Call Trace: <IRQ> __do_softirq+0x117/0x257 irq_exit+0x5f/0xbb smp_apic_timer_interrupt+0x8a/0x98 apic_timer_interrupt+0x72/0x80 <EOI> printk+0x4d/0x4f stop_machine_cpu_stop+0x22c/0x274 cpu_stopper_thread+0xae/0x162 smpboot_thread_fn+0x258/0x260 kthread+0xc7/0xcf ret_from_fork+0x7c/0xb0 Signed-off-by: Ben Greear <greearb@candelatech.com> Acked-by: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org> Acked-by: Pekka Riikonen <priikone@iki.fi> Cc: Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@gmail.com> Cc: stable@kernel.org Cc: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> (cherry picked from commit 34376a50) Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
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Thomas Bork authored
Thomas Bork reported that commit c6203cd4 ("scsi: use __uX types for headers exported to user space") caused a regression as now he's getting this warning : > /usr/src/linux-2.6.32-eisfair-1/usr/include/scsi/scsi_netlink.h:108: > found __[us]{8,16,32,64} type without #include <linux/types.h> This issue was addressed later by commit 10db4e1e ("headers: include linux/types.h where appropriate"), so let's just pick the relevant part from it. Cc: Thomas Bork <tom@eisfair.net> Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
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- 10 Jun, 2013 7 commits
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Willy Tarreau authored
Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
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Willy Tarreau authored
Christoph Biedl reported that 2.6.32 does not build with gcc 4.7 on i386 : CC arch/x86/kernel/ptrace.o arch/x86/kernel/ptrace.c:1472:17: error: conflicting types for 'syscall_trace_enter' In file included from /PKGBUILDDIR/arch/x86/include/asm/vm86.h:130:0, from /PKGBUILDDIR/arch/x86/include/asm/processor.h:10, from /PKGBUILDDIR/arch/x86/include/asm/thread_info.h:22, from include/linux/thread_info.h:56, from include/linux/preempt.h:9, from include/linux/spinlock.h:50, from include/linux/seqlock.h:29, from include/linux/time.h:8, from include/linux/timex.h:56, from include/linux/sched.h:56, from arch/x86/kernel/ptrace.c:11: /PKGBUILDDIR/arch/x86/include/asm/ptrace.h:145:13: note: previous declaration of 'syscall_trace_enter' was here arch/x86/kernel/ptrace.c:1517:17: error: conflicting types for 'syscall_trace_leave' In file included from /PKGBUILDDIR/arch/x86/include/asm/vm86.h:130:0, from /PKGBUILDDIR/arch/x86/include/asm/processor.h:10, from /PKGBUILDDIR/arch/x86/include/asm/thread_info.h:22, from include/linux/thread_info.h:56, from include/linux/preempt.h:9, from include/linux/spinlock.h:50, from include/linux/seqlock.h:29, from include/linux/time.h:8, from include/linux/timex.h:56, from include/linux/sched.h:56, from arch/x86/kernel/ptrace.c:11: /PKGBUILDDIR/arch/x86/include/asm/ptrace.h:146:13: note: previous declaration of 'syscall_trace_leave' was here make[4]: *** [arch/x86/kernel/ptrace.o] Error 1 make[3]: *** [arch/x86/kernel] Error 2 make[3]: *** Waiting for unfinished jobs.... He also found that this issue did not appear in more recent kernels since this asmregparm disappeared in 3.0-rc1 with commit 1b4ac2a9 that was applied after some UM changes that we don't necessarily want in 2.6.32. Thus, the cleanest fix for older kernels is to make the declaration in ptrace.h match the one in ptrace.c by specifying asmregparm on these functions. They're only called from asm which explains why it used to work despite the inconsistency in the declaration. Reported-by: Christoph Biedl <linux-kernel.bfrz@manchmal.in-ulm.de> Tested-by: Christoph Biedl <linux-kernel.bfrz@manchmal.in-ulm.de> Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
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Kashyap, Desai authored
commit ebda4d38 upstream. RAID_SCSI_IO_PASSTHROUGH: Driver needs to be sending the default descriptor for RAID Passthru, currently its sending SCSI_IO descriptor. Signed-off-by: Kashyap Desai <kashyap.desai@lsi.com> Signed-off-by: James Bottomley <James.Bottomley@suse.de> Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
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Mathias Krause authored
commit 60085c3d upstream. The code in set_orig_addr() does not initialize all of the members of struct sockaddr_tipc when filling the sockaddr info -- namely the union is only partly filled. This will make recv_msg() and recv_stream() -- the only users of this function -- leak kernel stack memory as the msg_name member is a local variable in net/socket.c. Additionally to that both recv_msg() and recv_stream() fail to update the msg_namelen member to 0 while otherwise returning with 0, i.e. "success". This is the case for, e.g., non-blocking sockets. This will lead to a 128 byte kernel stack leak in net/socket.c. Fix the first issue by initializing the memory of the union with memset(0). Fix the second one by setting msg_namelen to 0 early as it will be updated later if we're going to fill the msg_name member. Cc: Jon Maloy <jon.maloy@ericsson.com> Cc: Allan Stephens <allan.stephens@windriver.com> Signed-off-by: Mathias Krause <minipli@googlemail.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> [dannf: backported to Debian's 2.6.32] Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
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Mathias Krause authored
commit 5ae94c0d upstream. The current code does not fill the msg_name member in case it is set. It also does not set the msg_namelen member to 0 and therefore makes net/socket.c leak the local, uninitialized sockaddr_storage variable to userland -- 128 bytes of kernel stack memory. Fix that by simply setting msg_namelen to 0 as obviously nobody cared about irda_recvmsg_dgram() not filling the msg_name in case it was set. Cc: Samuel Ortiz <samuel@sortiz.org> Signed-off-by: Mathias Krause <minipli@googlemail.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> [dannf: adjusted to apply to Debian's 2.6.32] Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
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Mathias Krause authored
[ Upstream commit 4a184233 ] The code in rose_recvmsg() does not initialize all of the members of struct sockaddr_rose/full_sockaddr_rose when filling the sockaddr info. Nor does it initialize the padding bytes of the structure inserted by the compiler for alignment. This will lead to leaking uninitialized kernel stack bytes in net/socket.c. Fix the issue by initializing the memory used for sockaddr info with memset(0). Signed-off-by: Mathias Krause <minipli@googlemail.com> Cc: Ralf Baechle <ralf@linux-mips.org> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
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Weiping Pan authored
commit 06b6a1cf upstream Jay Fenlason (fenlason@redhat.com) found a bug, that recvfrom() on an RDS socket can return the contents of random kernel memory to userspace if it was called with a address length larger than sizeof(struct sockaddr_in). rds_recvmsg() also fails to set the addr_len paramater properly before returning, but that's just a bug. There are also a number of cases wher recvfrom() can return an entirely bogus address. Anything in rds_recvmsg() that returns a non-negative value but does not go through the "sin = (struct sockaddr_in *)msg->msg_name;" code path at the end of the while(1) loop will return up to 128 bytes of kernel memory to userspace. And I write two test programs to reproduce this bug, you will see that in rds_server, fromAddr will be overwritten and the following sock_fd will be destroyed. Yes, it is the programmer's fault to set msg_namelen incorrectly, but it is better to make the kernel copy the real length of address to user space in such case. How to run the test programs ? I test them on 32bit x86 system, 3.5.0-rc7. 1 compile gcc -o rds_client rds_client.c gcc -o rds_server rds_server.c 2 run ./rds_server on one console 3 run ./rds_client on another console 4 you will see something like: server is waiting to receive data... old socket fd=3 server received data from client:data from client msg.msg_namelen=32 new socket fd=-1067277685 sendmsg() : Bad file descriptor /***************** rds_client.c ********************/ int main(void) { int sock_fd; struct sockaddr_in serverAddr; struct sockaddr_in toAddr; char recvBuffer[128] = "data from client"; struct msghdr msg; struct iovec iov; sock_fd = socket(AF_RDS, SOCK_SEQPACKET, 0); if (sock_fd < 0) { perror("create socket error\n"); exit(1); } memset(&serverAddr, 0, sizeof(serverAddr)); serverAddr.sin_family = AF_INET; serverAddr.sin_addr.s_addr = inet_addr("127.0.0.1"); serverAddr.sin_port = htons(4001); if (bind(sock_fd, (struct sockaddr*)&serverAddr, sizeof(serverAddr)) < 0) { perror("bind() error\n"); close(sock_fd); exit(1); } memset(&toAddr, 0, sizeof(toAddr)); toAddr.sin_family = AF_INET; toAddr.sin_addr.s_addr = inet_addr("127.0.0.1"); toAddr.sin_port = htons(4000); msg.msg_name = &toAddr; msg.msg_namelen = sizeof(toAddr); msg.msg_iov = &iov; msg.msg_iovlen = 1; msg.msg_iov->iov_base = recvBuffer; msg.msg_iov->iov_len = strlen(recvBuffer) + 1; msg.msg_control = 0; msg.msg_controllen = 0; msg.msg_flags = 0; if (sendmsg(sock_fd, &msg, 0) == -1) { perror("sendto() error\n"); close(sock_fd); exit(1); } printf("client send data:%s\n", recvBuffer); memset(recvBuffer, '\0', 128); msg.msg_name = &toAddr; msg.msg_namelen = sizeof(toAddr); msg.msg_iov = &iov; msg.msg_iovlen = 1; msg.msg_iov->iov_base = recvBuffer; msg.msg_iov->iov_len = 128; msg.msg_control = 0; msg.msg_controllen = 0; msg.msg_flags = 0; if (recvmsg(sock_fd, &msg, 0) == -1) { perror("recvmsg() error\n"); close(sock_fd); exit(1); } printf("receive data from server:%s\n", recvBuffer); close(sock_fd); return 0; } /***************** rds_server.c ********************/ int main(void) { struct sockaddr_in fromAddr; int sock_fd; struct sockaddr_in serverAddr; unsigned int addrLen; char recvBuffer[128]; struct msghdr msg; struct iovec iov; sock_fd = socket(AF_RDS, SOCK_SEQPACKET, 0); if(sock_fd < 0) { perror("create socket error\n"); exit(0); } memset(&serverAddr, 0, sizeof(serverAddr)); serverAddr.sin_family = AF_INET; serverAddr.sin_addr.s_addr = inet_addr("127.0.0.1"); serverAddr.sin_port = htons(4000); if (bind(sock_fd, (struct sockaddr*)&serverAddr, sizeof(serverAddr)) < 0) { perror("bind error\n"); close(sock_fd); exit(1); } printf("server is waiting to receive data...\n"); msg.msg_name = &fromAddr; /* * I add 16 to sizeof(fromAddr), ie 32, * and pay attention to the definition of fromAddr, * recvmsg() will overwrite sock_fd, * since kernel will copy 32 bytes to userspace. * * If you just use sizeof(fromAddr), it works fine. * */ msg.msg_namelen = sizeof(fromAddr) + 16; /* msg.msg_namelen = sizeof(fromAddr); */ msg.msg_iov = &iov; msg.msg_iovlen = 1; msg.msg_iov->iov_base = recvBuffer; msg.msg_iov->iov_len = 128; msg.msg_control = 0; msg.msg_controllen = 0; msg.msg_flags = 0; while (1) { printf("old socket fd=%d\n", sock_fd); if (recvmsg(sock_fd, &msg, 0) == -1) { perror("recvmsg() error\n"); close(sock_fd); exit(1); } printf("server received data from client:%s\n", recvBuffer); printf("msg.msg_namelen=%d\n", msg.msg_namelen); printf("new socket fd=%d\n", sock_fd); strcat(recvBuffer, "--data from server"); if (sendmsg(sock_fd, &msg, 0) == -1) { perror("sendmsg()\n"); close(sock_fd); exit(1); } } close(sock_fd); return 0; } Signed-off-by: Weiping Pan <wpan@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> [dannf: Adjusted to apply to Debian's 2.6.32] Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
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