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  1. 29 Jun, 2017 1 commit
  3. 28 Jun, 2017 2 commits
    • Hugh Dickins's avatar
      mm: fix new crash in unmapped_area_topdown() · dcda279d
      Hugh Dickins authored 
      [ Upstream commit f4cb767d ]

Trinity gets kernel BUG at mm/mmap.c:1963! in about 3 minutes of
mmap testing.  That's the VM_BUG_ON(gap_end < gap_start) at the
end of unmapped_area_topdown().  Linus points out how MAP_FIXED
(which does not have to respect our stack guard gap intentions)
could result in gap_end below gap_start there.  Fix that, and
the similar case in its alternative, unmapped_area().

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: 1be7107f ("mm: larger stack guard gap, between vmas")
Reported-by: default avatarDave Jones <davej@codemonkey.org.uk>
Debugged-by: default avatarLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: default avatarHugh Dickins <hughd@google.com>
Acked-by: default avatarMichal Hocko <mhocko@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: default avatarLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: default avatarSasha Levin <alexander.levin@verizon.com>
      dcda279d
    • Sasha Levin's avatar
      mm: larger stack guard gap, between vmas · 8b18c6b2
      Sasha Levin authored 
      [ Upstream commit 1be7107f ]

Stack guard page is a useful feature to reduce a risk of stack smashing
into a different mapping. We have been using a single page gap which
is sufficient to prevent having stack adjacent to a different mapping.
But this seems to be insufficient in the light of the stack usage in
userspace. E.g. glibc uses as large as 64kB alloca() in many commonly
used functions. Others use constructs liks gid_t buffer[NGROUPS_MAX]
which is 256kB or stack strings with MAX_ARG_STRLEN.

This will become especially dangerous for suid binaries and the default
no limit for the stack size limit because those applications can be
tricked to consume a large portion of the stack and a single glibc call
could jump over the guard page. These attacks are not theoretical,
unfortunatelly.

Make those attacks less probable by increasing the stack guard gap
to 1MB (on systems with 4k pages; but make it depend on the page size
because systems with larger base pages might cap stack allocations in
the PAGE_SIZE units) which should cover larger alloca() and VLA stack
allocations. It is obviously not a full fix because the problem is
somehow inherent, but it should reduce attack space a lot.

One could argue that the gap size should be configurable from userspace,
but that can be done later when somebody finds that the new 1MB is wrong
for some special case applications.  For now, add a kernel command line
option (stack_guard_gap) to specify the stack gap size (in page units).

Implementation wise, first delete all the old code for stack guard page:
because although we could get away with accounting one extra page in a
stack vma, accounting a larger gap can break userspace - case in point,
a program run with "ulimit -S -v 20000" failed when the 1MB gap was
counted for RLIMIT_AS; similar problems could come with RLIMIT_MLOCK
and strict non-overcommit mode.

Instead of keeping gap inside the stack vma, maintain the stack guard
gap as a gap between vmas: using vm_start_gap() in place of vm_start
(or vm_end_gap() in place of vm_end if VM_GROWSUP) in just those few
places which need to respect the gap - mainly arch_get_unmapped_area(),
and and the vma tree's subtree_gap support for that.
Original-patch-by: default avatarOleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Original-patch-by: default avatarMichal Hocko <mhocko@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: default avatarHugh Dickins <hughd@google.com>
Acked-by: default avatarMichal Hocko <mhocko@suse.com>
Tested-by: Helge Deller <deller@gmx.de> # parisc
Signed-off-by: default avatarLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: default avatarSasha Levin <alexander.levin@verizon.com>
      8b18c6b2
  5. 26 Jun, 2017 37 commits
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