Commit 20b0c718 authored by Mathias Krause's avatar Mathias Krause Committed by David S. Miller

pktgen: fix out-of-bounds access in pgctrl_write()

If a privileged user writes an empty string to /proc/net/pktgen/pgctrl
the code for stripping the (then non-existent) '\n' actually writes the
zero byte at index -1 of data[]. The then still uninitialized array will
very likely fail the command matching tests and the pr_warning() at the
end will therefore leak stack bytes to the kernel log.

Fix those issues by simply ensuring we're passed a non-empty string as
the user API apparently expects a trailing '\n' for all commands.

Cc: "David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: default avatarMathias Krause <minipli@googlemail.com>
Signed-off-by: default avatarDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
parent 8bfdfbc1
......@@ -485,6 +485,9 @@ static ssize_t pgctrl_write(struct file *file, const char __user *buf,
goto out;
}
if (count == 0)
return -EINVAL;
if (count > sizeof(data))
count = sizeof(data);
......@@ -492,7 +495,7 @@ static ssize_t pgctrl_write(struct file *file, const char __user *buf,
err = -EFAULT;
goto out;
}
data[count - 1] = 0; /* Make string */
data[count - 1] = 0; /* Strip trailing '\n' and terminate string */
if (!strcmp(data, "stop"))
pktgen_stop_all_threads_ifs(pn);
......
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