io_uring does account any registered buffer as pinned/locked memory, and
checks limit and fails if the given user doesn't have a big enough limit
to register the ranges specified. However, if huge pages are used, we
are potentially under-accounting the memory in terms of what gets pinned
on the vm side.

This patch rectifies that, by ensuring that we account the full size of
a compound page, regardless of how much of it is being registered. Huge
pages are not accounted mulitple times - if multiple sections of a huge
page is registered, then the page is only accounted once.
Reported-by: Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>

Fixes coccicheck warning:

fs/io_uring.c:4242:13-14: Unneeded semicolon
Signed-off-by: Zheng Bin <zhengbin13@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>

In the spirit of fairness, cap the max number of SQ entries we'll submit
for SQPOLL if we have multiple rings. If we don't do that, we could be
submitting tons of entries for one ring, while others are waiting to get
service.

The value of 8 is somewhat arbitrarily chosen as something that allows
a fair bit of batching, without using an excessive time per ring.
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>

There's really no point in having this union, it just means that we're
always allocating enough room to cater to any command. But that's
pointless, as the ->io field is request type private anyway.

This gets rid of the io_async_ctx structure, and fills in the required
size in the io_op_defs[] instead.
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>

Testing ctx->user_bufs for NULL in io_import_fixed() is not neccessary,
because in that case ctx->nr_user_bufs would be zero, and the following
check would fail.
Signed-off-by: Pavel Begunkov <asml.silence@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>

When io_req_map_rw() is called from io_rw_prep_async(), it memcpy()
iorw->iter into itself. Even though it doesn't lead to an error, such a
memcpy()'s aliasing rules violation is considered to be a bad practise.

Inline io_req_map_rw() into io_rw_prep_async(). We don't really need any
remapping there, so it's much simpler than the generic implementation.
Signed-off-by: Pavel Begunkov <asml.silence@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>

Set rw->free_iovec to @iovec, that gives an identical result and stresses
that @iovec param rw->free_iovec play the same role.
Signed-off-by: Pavel Begunkov <asml.silence@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>

Don't touch iter->iov and iov in between __io_import_iovec() and
io_req_map_rw(), the former function aleady sets it correctly, because it
creates one more case with NULL'ed iov to consider in io_req_map_rw().
Signed-off-by: Pavel Begunkov <asml.silence@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>

When using SQPOLL, applications can run into the issue of running out of
SQ ring entries because the thread hasn't consumed them yet. The only
option for dealing with that is checking later, or busy checking for the
condition.

Provide IORING_ENTER_SQ_WAIT if applications want to wait on this
condition.
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>

These structures are never written, move them appropriately.
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>

We support using IORING_SETUP_ATTACH_WQ to share async backends between
rings created by the same process, this now also allows the same to
happen with SQPOLL. The setup procedure remains the same, the caller
sets io_uring_params->wq_fd to the 'parent' context, and then the newly
created ring will attach to that async backend.

This means that multiple rings can share the same SQPOLL thread, saving
resources.
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>

Remove the SQPOLL thread from the ctx, and use the io_sq_data as the
data structure we pass in. io_sq_data has a list of ctx's that we can
then iterate over and handle.

As of now we're ready to handle multiple ctx's, though we're still just
handling a single one after this patch.
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>

Move all the necessary state out of io_ring_ctx, and into a new
structure, io_sq_data. The latter now deals with any state or
variables associated with the SQPOLL thread itself.

In preparation for supporting more than one io_ring_ctx per SQPOLL
thread.
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>

This is done in preparation for handling more than one ctx, but it also
cleans up the code a bit since io_sq_thread() was a bit too unwieldy to
get a get overview on.

__io_sq_thread() is now the main handler, and it returns an enum sq_ret
that tells io_sq_thread() what it ended up doing. The parent then makes
a decision on idle, spinning, or work handling based on that.
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>

We need to decouple the clearing on wakeup from the the inline schedule,
as that is going to be required for handling multiple rings in one
thread.

Wrap our wakeup handler so we can clear it when we get the wakeup, by
definition that is when we no longer need the flag set.
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>

This is in preparation to sharing the poller thread between rings. For
that we need per-ring wait_queue_entry storage, and we can't easily put
that on the stack if one thread is managing multiple rings.

We'll also be sharing the wait_queue_head across rings for the purposes
of wakeups, provide the usual private ring wait_queue_head for now but
make it a pointer so we can easily override it when sharing.
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>

We have a set of flags that are shared between the two and inherired
in kiocb_set_rw_flags(), but we check and set these individually.
Reorder the IOCB flags so that the bottom part of the space is synced
with the RWF flag space, and then we can do them all in one mask and
set operation.

The only exception is RWF_SYNC, which needs to mark IOCB_SYNC and
IOCB_DSYNC. Do that one separately.

This shaves 15 bytes of text from kiocb_set_rw_flags() for me.
Suggested-by: Matthew Wilcox (Oracle) <willy@infradead.org>
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>

We're not handling signals by default in kernel threads, and we never
use TWA_SIGNAL for the SQPOLL thread internally. Hence we can never
have a signal pending, and we don't need to check for it (nor flush it).
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>

During a context switch the scheduler invokes wq_worker_sleeping() with
disabled preemption. Disabling preemption is needed because it protects
access to `worker->sleeping'. As an optimisation it avoids invoking
schedule() within the schedule path as part of possible wake up (thus
preempt_enable_no_resched() afterwards).

The io-wq has been added to the mix in the same section with disabled
preemption. This breaks on PREEMPT_RT because io_wq_worker_sleeping()
acquires a spinlock_t. Also within the schedule() the spinlock_t must be
acquired after tsk_is_pi_blocked() otherwise it will block on the
sleeping lock again while scheduling out.

While playing with `io_uring-bench' I didn't notice a significant
latency spike after converting io_wqe::lock to a raw_spinlock_t. The
latency was more or less the same.

In order to keep the spinlock_t it would have to be moved after the
tsk_is_pi_blocked() check which would introduce a branch instruction
into the hot path.

The lock is used to maintain the `work_list' and wakes one task up at
most.
Should io_wqe_cancel_pending_work() cause latency spikes, while
searching for a specific item, then it would need to drop the lock
during iterations.
revert_creds() is also invoked under the lock. According to debug
cred::non_rcu is 0. Otherwise it should be moved outside of the locked
section because put_cred_rcu()->free_uid() acquires a sleeping lock.

Convert io_wqe::lock to a raw_spinlock_t.c
Signed-off-by: Sebastian Andrzej Siewior <bigeasy@linutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>

This patch adds a new IORING_SETUP_R_DISABLED flag to start the
rings disabled, allowing the user to register restrictions,
buffers, files, before to start processing SQEs.

When IORING_SETUP_R_DISABLED is set, SQE are not processed and
SQPOLL kthread is not started.

The restrictions registration are allowed only when the rings
are disable to prevent concurrency issue while processing SQEs.

The rings can be enabled using IORING_REGISTER_ENABLE_RINGS
opcode with io_uring_register(2).
Suggested-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
Signed-off-by: Stefano Garzarella <sgarzare@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>

The new io_uring_register(2) IOURING_REGISTER_RESTRICTIONS opcode
permanently installs a feature allowlist on an io_ring_ctx.
The io_ring_ctx can then be passed to untrusted code with the
knowledge that only operations present in the allowlist can be
executed.

The allowlist approach ensures that new features added to io_uring
do not accidentally become available when an existing application
is launched on a newer kernel version.

Currently is it possible to restrict sqe opcodes, sqe flags, and
register opcodes.

IOURING_REGISTER_RESTRICTIONS can only be made once. Afterwards
it is not possible to change restrictions anymore.
This prevents untrusted code from removing restrictions.
Suggested-by: Stefan Hajnoczi <stefanha@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Stefano Garzarella <sgarzare@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>

The enumeration allows us to keep track of the last
io_uring_register(2) opcode available.

Behaviour and opcodes names don't change.
Signed-off-by: Stefano Garzarella <sgarzare@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>

Now we have a io_uring kernel header, move this definition out of fs.h
and into io_uring.h where it belongs.
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>

If we don't get and assign the namespace for the async work, then certain
paths just don't work properly (like /dev/stdin, /proc/mounts, etc).
Anything that references the current namespace of the given task should
be assigned for async work on behalf of that task.

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v5.5+
Reported-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>

Grab actual references to the files_struct. To avoid circular references
issues due to this, we add a per-task note that keeps track of what
io_uring contexts a task has used. When the tasks execs or exits its
assigned files, we cancel requests based on this tracking.

With that, we can grab proper references to the files table, and no
longer need to rely on stashing away ring_fd and ring_file to check
if the ring_fd may have been closed.

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v5.5+
Reviewed-by: Pavel Begunkov <asml.silence@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>

This allows us to selectively flush out pending overflows, depending on
the task and/or files_struct being passed in.

No intended functional changes in this patch.
Reviewed-by: Pavel Begunkov <asml.silence@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>

Return whether we found and canceled requests or not. This is in
preparation for using this information, no functional changes in this
patch.
Reviewed-by: Pavel Begunkov <asml.silence@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>

Sometimes we assign a weak reference to it, sometimes we grab a
reference to it. Clean this up and make it unconditional, and drop the
flag related to tracking this state.
Reviewed-by: Pavel Begunkov <asml.silence@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>

We can grab a reference to the task instead of stashing away the task
files_struct. This is doable without creating a circular reference
between the ring fd and the task itself.
Reviewed-by: Pavel Begunkov <asml.silence@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>

No functional changes in this patch, prep patch for grabbing references
to the files_struct.
Reviewed-by: Pavel Begunkov <asml.silence@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>

We currently cancel these when the ring exits, and we cancel all of
them. This is in preparation for killing only the ones associated
with a given task.
Reviewed-by: Pavel Begunkov <asml.silence@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>

* io_uring-5.9:
  io_uring: fix async buffered reads when readahead is disabled
  io_uring: fix potential ABBA deadlock in ->show_fdinfo()
  io_uring: always delete double poll wait entry on match

The async buffered reads feature is not working when readahead is
turned off. There are two things to concern:

- when doing retry in io_read, not only the IOCB_WAITQ flag but also
  the IOCB_NOWAIT flag is still set, which makes it goes to would_block
  phase in generic_file_buffered_read() and then return -EAGAIN. After
  that, the io-wq thread work is queued, and later doing the async
  reads in the old way.

- even if we remove IOCB_NOWAIT when doing retry, the feature is still
  not running properly, since in generic_file_buffered_read() it goes to
  lock_page_killable() after calling mapping->a_ops->readpage() to do
  IO, and thus causing process to sleep.

Fixes: 1a0a7853 ("mm: support async buffered reads in generic_file_buffered_read()")
Fixes: 3b2a4439 ("io_uring: get rid of kiocb_wait_page_queue_init()")
Signed-off-by: Hao Xu <haoxu@linux.alibaba.com>
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>

Pull NFS client bugfixes from Trond Myklebust:
 "Highlights include:

   - NFSv4.2: copy_file_range needs to invalidate caches on success

   - NFSv4.2: Fix security label length not being reset

   - pNFS/flexfiles: Ensure we initialise the mirror bsizes correctly
     on read

   - pNFS/flexfiles: Fix signed/unsigned type issues with mirror
     indices"

* tag 'nfs-for-5.9-3' of git://git.linux-nfs.org/projects/trondmy/linux-nfs:
  pNFS/flexfiles: Be consistent about mirror index types
  pNFS/flexfiles: Ensure we initialise the mirror bsizes correctly on read
  NFSv4.2: fix client's attribute cache management for copy_file_range
  nfs: Fix security label length not being reset

It seems likely this block was pasted from internal_get_user_pages_fast,
which is not passed an mm struct and therefore uses current's.  But
__get_user_pages_locked is passed an explicit mm, and current->mm is not
always valid. This was hit when being called from i915, which uses:

  pin_user_pages_remote->
    __get_user_pages_remote->
      __gup_longterm_locked->
        __get_user_pages_locked

Before, this would lead to an OOPS:

  BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 0000000000000064
  #PF: supervisor write access in kernel mode
  #PF: error_code(0x0002) - not-present page
  CPU: 10 PID: 1431 Comm: kworker/u33:1 Tainted: P S   U     O      5.9.0-rc7+ #140
  Hardware name: LENOVO 20QTCTO1WW/20QTCTO1WW, BIOS N2OET47W (1.34 ) 08/06/2020
  Workqueue: i915-userptr-acquire __i915_gem_userptr_get_pages_worker [i915]
  RIP: 0010:__get_user_pages_remote+0xd7/0x310
  Call Trace:
   __i915_gem_userptr_get_pages_worker+0xc8/0x260 [i915]
   process_one_work+0x1ca/0x390
   worker_thread+0x48/0x3c0
   kthread+0x114/0x130
   ret_from_fork+0x1f/0x30
  CR2: 0000000000000064

This commit fixes the problem by using the mm pointer passed to the
function rather than the bogus one in current.

Fixes: 008cfe44 ("mm: Introduce mm_struct.has_pinned")
Tested-by: Chris Wilson <chris@chris-wilson.co.uk>
Reported-by: Harald Arnesen <harald@skogtun.org>
Reviewed-by: Jason Gunthorpe <jgg@nvidia.com>
Reviewed-by: Peter Xu <peterx@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>

syzbot reports a potential lock deadlock between the normal IO path and
->show_fdinfo():

======================================================
WARNING: possible circular locking dependency detected
5.9.0-rc6-syzkaller #0 Not tainted
------------------------------------------------------
syz-executor.2/19710 is trying to acquire lock:
ffff888098ddc450 (sb_writers#4){.+.+}-{0:0}, at: io_write+0x6b5/0xb30 fs/io_uring.c:3296

but task is already holding lock:
ffff8880a11b8428 (&ctx->uring_lock){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: __do_sys_io_uring_enter+0xe9a/0x1bd0 fs/io_uring.c:8348

which lock already depends on the new lock.

the existing dependency chain (in reverse order) is:

-> #2 (&ctx->uring_lock){+.+.}-{3:3}:
       __mutex_lock_common kernel/locking/mutex.c:956 [inline]
       __mutex_lock+0x134/0x10e0 kernel/locking/mutex.c:1103
       __io_uring_show_fdinfo fs/io_uring.c:8417 [inline]
       io_uring_show_fdinfo+0x194/0xc70 fs/io_uring.c:8460
       seq_show+0x4a8/0x700 fs/proc/fd.c:65
       seq_read+0x432/0x1070 fs/seq_file.c:208
       do_loop_readv_writev fs/read_write.c:734 [inline]
       do_loop_readv_writev fs/read_write.c:721 [inline]
       do_iter_read+0x48e/0x6e0 fs/read_write.c:955
       vfs_readv+0xe5/0x150 fs/read_write.c:1073
       kernel_readv fs/splice.c:355 [inline]
       default_file_splice_read.constprop.0+0x4e6/0x9e0 fs/splice.c:412
       do_splice_to+0x137/0x170 fs/splice.c:871
       splice_direct_to_actor+0x307/0x980 fs/splice.c:950
       do_splice_direct+0x1b3/0x280 fs/splice.c:1059
       do_sendfile+0x55f/0xd40 fs/read_write.c:1540
       __do_sys_sendfile64 fs/read_write.c:1601 [inline]
       __se_sys_sendfile64 fs/read_write.c:1587 [inline]
       __x64_sys_sendfile64+0x1cc/0x210 fs/read_write.c:1587
       do_syscall_64+0x2d/0x70 arch/x86/entry/common.c:46
       entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9

-> #1 (&p->lock){+.+.}-{3:3}:
       __mutex_lock_common kernel/locking/mutex.c:956 [inline]
       __mutex_lock+0x134/0x10e0 kernel/locking/mutex.c:1103
       seq_read+0x61/0x1070 fs/seq_file.c:155
       pde_read fs/proc/inode.c:306 [inline]
       proc_reg_read+0x221/0x300 fs/proc/inode.c:318
       do_loop_readv_writev fs/read_write.c:734 [inline]
       do_loop_readv_writev fs/read_write.c:721 [inline]
       do_iter_read+0x48e/0x6e0 fs/read_write.c:955
       vfs_readv+0xe5/0x150 fs/read_write.c:1073
       kernel_readv fs/splice.c:355 [inline]
       default_file_splice_read.constprop.0+0x4e6/0x9e0 fs/splice.c:412
       do_splice_to+0x137/0x170 fs/splice.c:871
       splice_direct_to_actor+0x307/0x980 fs/splice.c:950
       do_splice_direct+0x1b3/0x280 fs/splice.c:1059
       do_sendfile+0x55f/0xd40 fs/read_write.c:1540
       __do_sys_sendfile64 fs/read_write.c:1601 [inline]
       __se_sys_sendfile64 fs/read_write.c:1587 [inline]
       __x64_sys_sendfile64+0x1cc/0x210 fs/read_write.c:1587
       do_syscall_64+0x2d/0x70 arch/x86/entry/common.c:46
       entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9

-> #0 (sb_writers#4){.+.+}-{0:0}:
       check_prev_add kernel/locking/lockdep.c:2496 [inline]
       check_prevs_add kernel/locking/lockdep.c:2601 [inline]
       validate_chain kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3218 [inline]
       __lock_acquire+0x2a96/0x5780 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:4441
       lock_acquire+0x1f3/0xaf0 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5029
       percpu_down_read include/linux/percpu-rwsem.h:51 [inline]
       __sb_start_write+0x228/0x450 fs/super.c:1672
       io_write+0x6b5/0xb30 fs/io_uring.c:3296
       io_issue_sqe+0x18f/0x5c50 fs/io_uring.c:5719
       __io_queue_sqe+0x280/0x1160 fs/io_uring.c:6175
       io_queue_sqe+0x692/0xfa0 fs/io_uring.c:6254
       io_submit_sqe fs/io_uring.c:6324 [inline]
       io_submit_sqes+0x1761/0x2400 fs/io_uring.c:6521
       __do_sys_io_uring_enter+0xeac/0x1bd0 fs/io_uring.c:8349
       do_syscall_64+0x2d/0x70 arch/x86/entry/common.c:46
       entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9

other info that might help us debug this:

Chain exists of:
  sb_writers#4 --> &p->lock --> &ctx->uring_lock

 Possible unsafe locking scenario:

       CPU0                    CPU1
       ----                    ----
  lock(&ctx->uring_lock);
                               lock(&p->lock);
                               lock(&ctx->uring_lock);
  lock(sb_writers#4);

 *** DEADLOCK ***

1 lock held by syz-executor.2/19710:
 #0: ffff8880a11b8428 (&ctx->uring_lock){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: __do_sys_io_uring_enter+0xe9a/0x1bd0 fs/io_uring.c:8348

stack backtrace:
CPU: 0 PID: 19710 Comm: syz-executor.2 Not tainted 5.9.0-rc6-syzkaller #0
Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 01/01/2011
Call Trace:
 __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:77 [inline]
 dump_stack+0x198/0x1fd lib/dump_stack.c:118
 check_noncircular+0x324/0x3e0 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:1827
 check_prev_add kernel/locking/lockdep.c:2496 [inline]
 check_prevs_add kernel/locking/lockdep.c:2601 [inline]
 validate_chain kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3218 [inline]
 __lock_acquire+0x2a96/0x5780 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:4441
 lock_acquire+0x1f3/0xaf0 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5029
 percpu_down_read include/linux/percpu-rwsem.h:51 [inline]
 __sb_start_write+0x228/0x450 fs/super.c:1672
 io_write+0x6b5/0xb30 fs/io_uring.c:3296
 io_issue_sqe+0x18f/0x5c50 fs/io_uring.c:5719
 __io_queue_sqe+0x280/0x1160 fs/io_uring.c:6175
 io_queue_sqe+0x692/0xfa0 fs/io_uring.c:6254
 io_submit_sqe fs/io_uring.c:6324 [inline]
 io_submit_sqes+0x1761/0x2400 fs/io_uring.c:6521
 __do_sys_io_uring_enter+0xeac/0x1bd0 fs/io_uring.c:8349
 do_syscall_64+0x2d/0x70 arch/x86/entry/common.c:46
 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9
RIP: 0033:0x45e179
Code: 3d b2 fb ff c3 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 66 90 48 89 f8 48 89 f7 48 89 d6 48 89 ca 4d 89 c2 4d 89 c8 4c 8b 4c 24 08 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 0f 83 0b b2 fb ff c3 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00
RSP: 002b:00007f1194e74c78 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 00000000000001aa
RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00000000000082c0 RCX: 000000000045e179
RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000001 RDI: 0000000000000004
RBP: 000000000118cf98 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000
R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 000000000118cf4c
R13: 00007ffd1aa5756f R14: 00007f1194e759c0 R15: 000000000118cf4c

Fix this by just not diving into details if we fail to trylock the
io_uring mutex. We know the ctx isn't going away during this operation,
but we cannot safely iterate buffers/files/personalities if we don't
hold the io_uring mutex.

Reported-by: syzbot+2f8fa4e860edc3066aba@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>

syzbot reports a crash with tty polling, which is using the double poll
handling:

general protection fault, probably for non-canonical address 0xdffffc0000000009: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP KASAN
KASAN: null-ptr-deref in range [0x0000000000000048-0x000000000000004f]
CPU: 0 PID: 6874 Comm: syz-executor749 Not tainted 5.9.0-rc6-next-20200924-syzkaller #0
Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 01/01/2011
RIP: 0010:io_poll_get_single fs/io_uring.c:4778 [inline]
RIP: 0010:io_poll_double_wake+0x51/0x510 fs/io_uring.c:4845
Code: fc ff df 48 c1 ea 03 80 3c 02 00 0f 85 9e 03 00 00 48 b8 00 00 00 00 00 fc ff df 49 8b 5d 08 48 8d 7b 48 48 89 fa 48 c1 ea 03 <0f> b6 04 02 84 c0 74 06 0f 8e 63 03 00 00 0f b6 6b 48 bf 06 00 00
RSP: 0018:ffffc90001c1fb70 EFLAGS: 00010006
RAX: dffffc0000000000 RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: 0000000000000004
RDX: 0000000000000009 RSI: ffffffff81d9b3ad RDI: 0000000000000048
RBP: dffffc0000000000 R08: ffff8880a3cac798 R09: ffffc90001c1fc60
R10: fffff52000383f73 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: 0000000000000004
R13: ffff8880a3cac798 R14: ffff8880a3cac7a0 R15: 0000000000000004
FS:  0000000001f98880(0000) GS:ffff8880ae400000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: 00007f18886916c0 CR3: 0000000094c5a000 CR4: 00000000001506f0
DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400
Call Trace:
 __wake_up_common+0x147/0x650 kernel/sched/wait.c:93
 __wake_up_common_lock+0xd0/0x130 kernel/sched/wait.c:123
 tty_ldisc_hangup+0x1cf/0x680 drivers/tty/tty_ldisc.c:735
 __tty_hangup.part.0+0x403/0x870 drivers/tty/tty_io.c:625
 __tty_hangup drivers/tty/tty_io.c:575 [inline]
 tty_vhangup+0x1d/0x30 drivers/tty/tty_io.c:698
 pty_close+0x3f5/0x550 drivers/tty/pty.c:79
 tty_release+0x455/0xf60 drivers/tty/tty_io.c:1679
 __fput+0x285/0x920 fs/file_table.c:281
 task_work_run+0xdd/0x190 kernel/task_work.c:141
 tracehook_notify_resume include/linux/tracehook.h:188 [inline]
 exit_to_user_mode_loop kernel/entry/common.c:165 [inline]
 exit_to_user_mode_prepare+0x1e2/0x1f0 kernel/entry/common.c:192
 syscall_exit_to_user_mode+0x7a/0x2c0 kernel/entry/common.c:267
 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9
RIP: 0033:0x401210

which is due to a failure in removing the double poll wait entry if we
hit a wakeup match. This can cause multiple invocations of the wakeup,
which isn't safe.

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v5.8
Reported-by: syzbot+81b3883093f772addf6d@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>

Merge tag 'kbuild-fixes-v5.9-4' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/masahiroy/linux-kbuild

Pull Kbuild fixes from Masahiro Yamada:

 - ignore compiler stubs for PPC to fix builds

 - fix the usage of --target mentioned in the LLVM document

* tag 'kbuild-fixes-v5.9-4' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/masahiroy/linux-kbuild:
  Documentation/llvm: Fix clang target examples
  scripts/kallsyms: skip ppc compiler stub *.long_branch.* / *.plt_branch.*

Pull x86 fixes from Thomas Gleixner:
 "Two fixes for the x86 interrupt code:

   - Unbreak the magic 'search the timer interrupt' logic in IO/APIC
     code which got wreckaged when the core interrupt code made the
     state tracking logic stricter.

     That caused the interrupt line to stay masked after switching from
     IO/APIC to PIC delivery mode, which obviously prevents interrupts
     from being delivered.

   - Make run_on_irqstack_code() typesafe. The function argument is a
     void pointer which is then cast to 'void (*fun)(void *).

     This breaks Control Flow Integrity checking in clang. Use proper
     helper functions for the three variants reuqired"

* tag 'x86-urgent-2020-09-27' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip:
  x86/ioapic: Unbreak check_timer()
  x86/irq: Make run_on_irqstack_cond() typesafe