- 03 Feb, 2024 1 commit
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Borislav Petkov (AMD) authored
It was meant well at the time but nothing's using it so get rid of it. Signed-off-by:
Borislav Petkov (AMD) <bp@alien8.de> Acked-by:
Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240202163510.GDZb0Zvj8qOndvFOiZ@fat_crate.local
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- 02 Feb, 2024 1 commit
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Michael Roth authored
A missing newline after "::" resulted in the htmldocs build failing to recognize the start of a pre-formatted block of text, resulting in kernel/linux/Documentation/virt/coco/sev-guest.rst:75: WARNING: Inline emphasis start-string without end-string. kernel/linux/Documentation/virt/coco/sev-guest.rst:78: WARNING: Inline emphasis start-string without end-string. kernel/linux/Documentation/virt/coco/sev-guest.rst:81: WARNING: Inline emphasis start-string without end-string. kernel/linux/Documentation/virt/coco/sev-guest.rst:83: WARNING: Definition list ends without a blank line; unexpected unindent. Fix it. Fixes: f5db8841 ("crypto: ccp: Add the SNP_PLATFORM_STATUS command") Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-next/20240202145932.31c62fd6@canb.auug.org.au/Reported-by:
Stephen Rothwell <sfr@canb.auug.org.au> Signed-off-by:
Michael Roth <michael.roth@amd.com> Signed-off-by:
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- 29 Jan, 2024 29 commits
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Brijesh Singh authored
The SEV-SNP firmware provides the SNP_CONFIG command used to set various system-wide configuration values for SNP guests, such as the reported TCB version used when signing guest attestation reports. Add an interface to set this via userspace. [ mdr: Squash in doc patch from Dionna, drop extended request/ certificate handling and simplify this to a simple wrapper around SNP_CONFIG fw cmd. ] Signed-off-by:Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com> Co-developed-by:
Alexey Kardashevskiy <aik@amd.com> Signed-off-by:
Dionna Glaze <dionnaglaze@google.com> Signed-off-by:
Ashish Kalra <ashish.kalra@amd.com> Signed-off-by:
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Tom Lendacky authored
The SNP_COMMIT command is used to commit the currently installed version of the SEV firmware. Once committed, the firmware cannot be replaced with a previous firmware version (cannot be rolled back). This command will also update the reported TCB to match that of the currently installed firmware. [ mdr: Note the reported TCB update in the documentation/commit. ] Signed-off-by:
Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com> Signed-off-by:
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Brijesh Singh authored
This command is used to query the SNP platform status. See the SEV-SNP spec for more details. Signed-off-by:
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Michael Roth authored
With all the required host changes in place, it should now be possible to initialize SNP-related MSR bits, set up RMP table enforcement, and initialize SNP support in firmware while maintaining legacy support for SEV/SEV-ES guests. Go ahead and enable the SNP feature now. Signed-off-by:
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Brijesh Singh authored
Implement a workaround for an SNP erratum where the CPU will incorrectly signal an RMP violation #PF if a hugepage (2MB or 1GB) collides with the RMP entry of a VMCB, VMSA or AVIC backing page. When SEV-SNP is globally enabled, the CPU marks the VMCB, VMSA, and AVIC backing pages as "in-use" via a reserved bit in the corresponding RMP entry after a successful VMRUN. This is done for _all_ VMs, not just SNP-Active VMs. If the hypervisor accesses an in-use page through a writable translation, the CPU will throw an RMP violation #PF. On early SNP hardware, if an in-use page is 2MB-aligned and software accesses any part of the associated 2MB region with a hugepage, the CPU will incorrectly treat the entire 2MB region as in-use and signal a an RMP violation #PF. To avoid this, the recommendation is to not use a 2MB-aligned page for the VMCB, VMSA or AVIC pages. Add a generic allocator that will ensure that the page returned is not 2MB-aligned and is safe to be used when SEV-SNP is enabled. Also implement similar handling for the VMCB/VMSA pages of nested guests. [ mdr: Squash in nested guest handling from Ashish, commit msg fixups. ] Reported-by: Alper Gun <alpergun@google.com> # for nested VMSA case Signed-off-by:
Marc Orr <marcorr@google.com> Signed-off-by:
Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@suse.cz> Acked-by:
Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240126041126.1927228-22-michael.roth@amd.com
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Ashish Kalra authored
Add a kdump safe version of sev_firmware_shutdown() and register it as a crash_kexec_post_notifier so it will be invoked during panic/crash to do SEV/SNP shutdown. This is required for transitioning all IOMMU pages to reclaim/hypervisor state, otherwise re-init of IOMMU pages during crashdump kernel boot fails and panics the crashdump kernel. This panic notifier runs in atomic context, hence it ensures not to acquire any locks/mutexes and polls for PSP command completion instead of depending on PSP command completion interrupt. [ mdr: Remove use of "we" in comments. ] Signed-off-by:
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Ashish Kalra authored
Add a new IOMMU API interface amd_iommu_snp_disable() to transition IOMMU pages to Hypervisor state from Reclaim state after SNP_SHUTDOWN_EX command. Invoke this API from the CCP driver after SNP_SHUTDOWN_EX command. Signed-off-by:
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Brijesh Singh authored
The behavior of legacy SEV commands is altered when the firmware is initialized for SNP support. In that case, all command buffer memory that may get written to by legacy SEV commands must be marked as firmware-owned in the RMP table prior to issuing the command. Additionally, when a command buffer contains a system physical address that points to additional buffers that firmware may write to, special handling is needed depending on whether: 1) the system physical address points to guest memory 2) the system physical address points to host memory To handle case #1, the pages of these buffers are changed to firmware-owned in the RMP table before issuing the command, and restored to hypervisor-owned after the command completes. For case #2, a bounce buffer is used instead of the original address. Signed-off-by:
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Tom Lendacky authored
For SEV/SEV-ES, a buffer can be used to access non-volatile data so it can be initialized from a file specified by the init_ex_path CCP module parameter instead of relying on the SPI bus for NV storage, and afterward the buffer can be read from to sync new data back to the file. When SNP is enabled, the pages comprising this buffer need to be set to firmware-owned in the RMP table before they can be accessed by firmware for subsequent updates to the initial contents. Implement that handling here. [ bp: Carve out allocation into a helper. ] Signed-off-by:
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Brijesh Singh authored
The behavior and requirement for the SEV-legacy command is altered when the SNP firmware is in the INIT state. See SEV-SNP firmware ABI specification for more details. Allocate the Trusted Memory Region (TMR) as a 2MB-sized/aligned region when SNP is enabled to satisfy new requirements for SNP. Continue allocating a 1MB-sized region for !SNP configuration. [ bp: Carve out TMR allocation into a helper. ] Signed-off-by:
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Ashish Kalra authored
Pages are unsafe to be released back to the page-allocator if they have been transitioned to firmware/guest state and can't be reclaimed or transitioned back to hypervisor/shared state. In this case, add them to an internal leaked pages list to ensure that they are not freed or touched/accessed to cause fatal page faults. [ mdr: Relocate to arch/x86/virt/svm/sev.c ] Suggested-by:
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Brijesh Singh authored
Export sev_do_cmd() as a generic API for the hypervisor to issue commands to manage an SEV or an SNP guest. The commands for SEV and SNP are defined in the SEV and SEV-SNP firmware specifications. Signed-off-by:
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Brijesh Singh authored
Before SNP VMs can be launched, the platform must be appropriately configured and initialized via the SNP_INIT command. During the execution of SNP_INIT command, the firmware configures and enables SNP security policy enforcement in many system components. Some system components write to regions of memory reserved by early x86 firmware (e.g. UEFI). Other system components write to regions provided by the operation system, hypervisor, or x86 firmware. Such system components can only write to HV-fixed pages or Default pages. They will error when attempting to write to pages in other page states after SNP_INIT enables their SNP enforcement. Starting in SNP firmware v1.52, the SNP_INIT_EX command takes a list of system physical address ranges to convert into the HV-fixed page states during the RMP initialization. If INIT_RMP is 1, hypervisors should provide all system physical address ranges that the hypervisor will never assign to a guest until the next RMP re-initialization. For instance, the memory that UEFI reserves should be included in the range list. This allows system components that occasionally write to memory (e.g. logging to UEFI reserved regions) to not fail due to RMP initialization and SNP enablement. Note that SNP_INIT(_EX) must not be executed while non-SEV guests are executing, otherwise it is possible that the system could reset or hang. The psp_init_on_probe module parameter was added for SEV/SEV-ES support and the init_ex_path module parameter to allow for time for the necessary file system to be mounted/available. SNP_INIT(_EX) does not use the file associated with init_ex_path. So, to avoid running into issues where SNP_INIT(_EX) is called while there are other running guests, issue it during module probe regardless of the psp_init_on_probe setting, but maintain the previous deferrable handling for SEV/SEV-ES initialization. [ mdr: Squash in psp_init_on_probe changes from Tom, reduce proliferation of 'probe' function parameter where possible. bp: Fix 32-bit allmodconfig build. ] Signed-off-by:Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@profian.com> Signed-off-by:
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Brijesh Singh authored
AMD introduced the next generation of SEV called SEV-SNP (Secure Nested Paging). SEV-SNP builds upon existing SEV and SEV-ES functionality while adding new hardware security protection. Define the commands and structures used to communicate with the AMD-SP when creating and managing the SEV-SNP guests. The SEV-SNP firmware spec is available at developer.amd.com/sev. [ mdr: update SNP command list and SNP status struct based on current spec, use C99 flexible arrays, fix kernel-doc issues. ] Signed-off-by: -
Michael Roth authored
If the kernel uses a 2MB or larger directmap mapping to write to an address, and that mapping contains any 4KB pages that are set to private in the RMP table, an RMP #PF will trigger and cause a host crash. SNP-aware code that owns the private PFNs will never attempt such a write, but other kernel tasks writing to other PFNs in the range may trigger these checks inadvertently due to writing to those other PFNs via a large directmap mapping that happens to also map a private PFN. Prevent this by splitting any 2MB+ mappings that might end up containing a mix of private/shared PFNs as a result of a subsequent RMPUPDATE for the PFN/rmp_level passed in. Another way to handle this would be to limit the directmap to 4K mappings in the case of hosts that support SNP, but there is potential risk for performance regressions of certain host workloads. Handling it as-needed results in the directmap being slowly split over time, which lessens the risk of a performance regression since the more the directmap gets split as a result of running SNP guests, the more likely the host is being used primarily to run SNP guests, where a mostly-split directmap is actually beneficial since there is less chance of TLB flushing and cpa_lock contention being needed to perform these splits. Cases where a host knows in advance it wants to primarily run SNP guests and wishes to pre-split the directmap can be handled by adding a tuneable in the future, but preliminary testing has shown this to not provide a signficant benefit in the common case of guests that are backed primarily by 2MB THPs, so it does not seem to be warranted currently and can be added later if a need arises in the future. Signed-off-by:
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Brijesh Singh authored
The RMPUPDATE instruction updates the access restrictions for a page via its corresponding entry in the RMP Table. The hypervisor will use the instruction to enforce various access restrictions on pages used for confidential guests and other specialized functionality. See APM3 for details on the instruction operations. The PSMASH instruction expands a 2MB RMP entry in the RMP table into a corresponding set of contiguous 4KB RMP entries while retaining the state of the validated bit from the original 2MB RMP entry. The hypervisor will use this instruction in cases where it needs to re-map a page as 4K rather than 2MB in a guest's nested page table. Add helpers to make use of these instructions. [ mdr: add RMPUPDATE retry logic for transient FAIL_OVERLAP errors. ] Signed-off-by:
Liam Merwick <liam.merwick@oracle.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240126041126.1927228-11-michael.roth@amd.com
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Michael Roth authored
RMP faults on kernel addresses are fatal and should never happen in practice. They indicate a bug in the host kernel somewhere. Userspace RMP faults shouldn't occur either, since even for VMs the memory used for private pages is handled by guest_memfd and by design is not mappable by userspace. Dump RMP table information about the PFN corresponding to the faulting HVA to help diagnose any issues of this sort when show_fault_oops() is triggered by an RMP fault. Signed-off-by:
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Brijesh Singh authored
Bit 31 in the page fault-error bit will be set when processor encounters an RMP violation. While at it, use the BIT() macro. Signed-off-by:
Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240126041126.1927228-9-michael.roth@amd.com
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Brijesh Singh authored
This information will be useful for debugging things like page faults due to RMP access violations and RMPUPDATE failures. [ mdr: move helper to standalone patch, rework dump logic as suggested by Boris. ] Signed-off-by: -
Brijesh Singh authored
Add a helper that can be used to access information contained in the RMP entry corresponding to a particular PFN. This will be needed to make decisions on how to handle setting up mappings in the NPT in response to guest page-faults and handling things like cleaning up pages and setting them back to the default hypervisor-owned state when they are no longer being used for private data. [ mdr: separate 'assigned' indicator from return code, and simplify function signatures for various helpers. ] Signed-off-by: -
Ashish Kalra authored
SNP enabled platforms require the MtrrFixDramModeEn bit to be set across all CPUs when SNP is enabled. Therefore, don't print error messages when MtrrFixDramModeEn is set when bringing CPUs online. Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/kvm/68b2d6bf-bce7-47f9-bebb-2652cc923ff9@linux.microsoft.com/Reported-by:
Jeremi Piotrowski <jpiotrowski@linux.microsoft.com> Signed-off-by:
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Brijesh Singh authored
The memory integrity guarantees of SEV-SNP are enforced through a new structure called the Reverse Map Table (RMP). The RMP is a single data structure shared across the system that contains one entry for every 4K page of DRAM that may be used by SEV-SNP VMs. The APM Volume 2 section on Secure Nested Paging (SEV-SNP) details a number of steps needed to detect/enable SEV-SNP and RMP table support on the host: - Detect SEV-SNP support based on CPUID bit - Initialize the RMP table memory reported by the RMP base/end MSR registers and configure IOMMU to be compatible with RMP access restrictions - Set the MtrrFixDramModEn bit in SYSCFG MSR - Set the SecureNestedPagingEn and VMPLEn bits in the SYSCFG MSR - Configure IOMMU RMP table entry format is non-architectural and it can vary by processor. It is defined by the PPR document for each respective CPU family. Restrict SNP support to CPU models/families which are compatible with the current RMP table entry format to guard against any undefined behavior when running on other system types. Future models/support will handle this through an architectural mechanism to allow for broader compatibility. SNP host code depends on CONFIG_KVM_AMD_SEV config flag which may be enabled even when CONFIG_AMD_MEM_ENCRYPT isn't set, so update the SNP-specific IOMMU helpers used here to rely on CONFIG_KVM_AMD_SEV instead of CONFIG_AMD_MEM_ENCRYPT. Signed-off-by:
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Ashish Kalra authored
Currently, the expectation is that the kernel will call amd_iommu_snp_enable() to perform various checks and set the amd_iommu_snp_en flag that the IOMMU uses to adjust its setup routines to account for additional requirements on hosts where SNP is enabled. This is somewhat fragile as it relies on this call being done prior to IOMMU setup. It is more robust to just do this automatically as part of IOMMU initialization, so rework the code accordingly. There is still a need to export information about whether or not the IOMMU is configured in a manner compatible with SNP, so relocate the existing amd_iommu_snp_en flag so it can be used to convey that information in place of the return code that was previously provided by calls to amd_iommu_snp_enable(). While here, also adjust the kernel messages related to IOMMU SNP enablement for consistency/grammar/clarity. Suggested-by:
Joerg Roedel <jroedel@suse.de> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240126041126.1927228-4-michael.roth@amd.com
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Kim Phillips authored
Without SEV-SNP, Automatic IBRS protects only the kernel. But when SEV-SNP is enabled, the Automatic IBRS protection umbrella widens to all host-side code, including userspace. This protection comes at a cost: reduced userspace indirect branch performance. To avoid this performance loss, don't use Automatic IBRS on SEV-SNP hosts and all back to retpolines instead. [ mdr: squash in changes from review discussion. ] Signed-off-by:
Kim Phillips <kim.phillips@amd.com> Signed-off-by:
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Brijesh Singh authored
Add CPU feature detection for Secure Encrypted Virtualization with Secure Nested Paging. This feature adds a strong memory integrity protection to help prevent malicious hypervisor-based attacks like data replay, memory re-mapping, and more. Since enabling the SNP CPU feature imposes a number of additional requirements on host initialization and handling legacy firmware APIs for SEV/SEV-ES guests, only introduce the CPU feature bit so that the relevant handling can be added, but leave it disabled via a disabled-features mask. Once all the necessary changes needed to maintain legacy SEV/SEV-ES support are introduced in subsequent patches, the SNP feature bit will be unmasked/enabled. Signed-off-by:
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Ard Biesheuvel authored
Commit cbebd68f ("x86/mm: Fix use of uninitialized buffer in sme_enable()") 'fixed' an issue in sme_enable() detected by static analysis, and broke the common case in the process. cmdline_find_option() will return < 0 on an error, or when the command line argument does not appear at all. In this particular case, the latter is not an error condition, and so the early exit is wrong. Instead, without mem_encrypt= on the command line, the compile time default should be honoured, which could be to enable memory encryption, and this is currently broken. Fix it by setting sme_me_mask to a preliminary value based on the compile time default, and only omitting the command line argument test when cmdline_find_option() returns an error. [ bp: Drop active_by_default while at it. ] Fixes: cbebd68f ("x86/mm: Fix use of uninitialized buffer in sme_enable()") Signed-off-by:
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Kirill A. Shutemov authored
When memory encryption is enabled, the kernel prints the encryption flavor that the system supports. The check assumes that everything is AMD SME/SEV if it doesn't have the TDX CPU feature set. Hyper-V vTOM sets cc_vendor to CC_VENDOR_INTEL when it runs as L2 guest on top of TDX, but not X86_FEATURE_TDX_GUEST. Hyper-V only needs memory encryption enabled for I/O without the rest of CoCo enabling. To avoid confusion, check the cc_vendor directly. [ bp: Massage commit message. ] Signed-off-by:
Kirill A. Shutemov <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com> Signed-off-by:
Kuppuswamy Sathyanarayanan <sathyanarayanan.kuppuswamy@linux.intel.com> Acked-by:
Kai Huang <kai.huang@intel.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240124140217.533748-1-kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com
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Borislav Petkov (AMD) authored
Compare the opcode bytes at rIP for each #VC exit reason to verify the instruction which raised the #VC exception is actually the right one. Signed-off-by:
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Linus Torvalds authored
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- 28 Jan, 2024 7 commits
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git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/cxl/cxlLinus Torvalds authored
Pull cxl fixes from Dan Williams: "A build regression fix, a device compatibility fix, and an original bug preventing creation of large (16 device) interleave sets: - Fix unit test build regression fallout from global "missing-prototypes" change - Fix compatibility with devices that do not support interrupts - Fix overflow when calculating the capacity of large interleave sets" * tag 'cxl-fixes-6.8-rc2' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/cxl/cxl: cxl/region：Fix overflow issue in alloc_hpa() cxl/pci: Skip irq features if MSI/MSI-X are not supported tools/testing/nvdimm: Disable "missing prototypes / declarations" warnings tools/testing/cxl: Disable "missing prototypes / declarations" warnings -
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/mips/linuxLinus Torvalds authored
Pull MIPS fixes from Thomas Bogendoerfer: - fix boot issue on single core Lantiq Danube devices - fix boot issue on Loongson64 platforms - fix improper FPU setup - fix missing prototypes issues * tag 'mips-fixes_6.8_1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/mips/linux: mips: Call lose_fpu(0) before initializing fcr31 in mips_set_personality_nan MIPS: loongson64: set nid for reserved memblock region Revert "MIPS: loongson64: set nid for reserved memblock region" MIPS: lantiq: register smp_ops on non-smp platforms MIPS: loongson64: set nid for reserved memblock region MIPS: reserve exception vector space ONLY ONCE MIPS: BCM63XX: Fix missing prototypes MIPS: sgi-ip32: Fix missing prototypes MIPS: sgi-ip30: Fix missing prototypes MIPS: fw arc: Fix missing prototypes MIPS: sgi-ip27: Fix missing prototypes MIPS: Alchemy: Fix missing prototypes MIPS: Cobalt: Fix missing prototypes
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git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tipLinus Torvalds authored
Pull locking fix from Borislav Petkov: - Prevent an inconsistent futex operation leading to stale state exposure * tag 'locking_urgent_for_v6.8_rc2' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip: futex: Prevent the reuse of stale pi_state
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git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tipLinus Torvalds authored
Pull irq fix from Borislav Petkov: - Initialize the resend node of each IRQ descriptor, not only the first one * tag 'irq_urgent_for_v6.8_rc2' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip: genirq: Initialize resend_node hlist for all interrupt descriptors
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git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tipLinus Torvalds authored
Pull timer fixes from Borislav Petkov: - Preserve the number of idle calls and sleep entries across CPU hotplug events in order to be able to compute correct averages - Limit the duration of the clocksource watchdog checking interval as too long intervals lead to wrongly marking the TSC as unstable * tag 'timers_urgent_for_v6.8_rc2' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip: tick/sched: Preserve number of idle sleeps across CPU hotplug events clocksource: Skip watchdog check for large watchdog intervals
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git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tipLinus Torvalds authored
Pull x86 fixes from Borislav Petkov: - Make sure 32-bit syscall registers are properly sign-extended - Add detection for AMD's Zen5 generation CPUs and Intel's Clearwater Forest CPU model number - Make a stub function export non-GPL because it is part of the paravirt alternatives and that can be used by non-GPL code * tag 'x86_urgent_for_v6.8_rc2' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip: x86/CPU/AMD: Add more models to X86_FEATURE_ZEN5 x86/entry/ia32: Ensure s32 is sign extended to s64 x86/cpu: Add model number for Intel Clearwater Forest processor x86/CPU/AMD: Add X86_FEATURE_ZEN5 x86/paravirt: Make BUG_func() usable by non-GPL modules
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git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/rppt/memblockLinus Torvalds authored
Pull memblock fix from Mike Rapoport: "Fix crash when reserved memory is not added to memory. When CONFIG_DEFERRED_STRUCT_PAGE_INIT is enabled, the initialization of reserved pages may cause access of NODE_DATA() with invalid nid and crash. Add a fall back to early_pfn_to_nid() in memmap_init_reserved_pages() to ensure a valid node id is always passed to init_reserved_page()" * tag 'fixes-2024-01-28' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/rppt/memblock: memblock: fix crash when reserved memory is not added to memory
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- 27 Jan, 2024 2 commits
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Linus Torvalds authored
Merge tag 'platform-drivers-x86-v6.8-2' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/pdx86/platform-drivers-x86 Pull x86 platform driver fixes from Hans de Goede: - WMI bus driver fixes - Second attempt (previously reverted) at P2SB PCI rescan deadlock fix - AMD PMF driver improvements - MAINTAINERS updates - Misc other small fixes and hw-id additions * tag 'platform-drivers-x86-v6.8-2' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/pdx86/platform-drivers-x86: platform/x86: touchscreen_dmi: Add info for the TECLAST X16 Plus tablet platform/x86/intel/ifs: Call release_firmware() when handling errors. platform/x86/amd/pmf: Fix memory leak in amd_pmf_get_pb_data() platform/x86/amd/pmf: Get ambient light information from AMD SFH driver platform/x86/amd/pmf: Get Human presence information from AMD SFH driver platform/mellanox: mlxbf-pmc: Fix offset calculation for crspace events platform/mellanox: mlxbf-tmfifo: Drop Tx network packet when Tx TmFIFO is full MAINTAINERS: remove defunct acpi4asus project info from asus notebooks section MAINTAINERS: add Luke Jones as maintainer for asus notebooks MAINTAINERS: Remove Perry Yuan as DELL WMI HARDWARE PRIVACY SUPPORT maintainer platform/x86: silicom-platform: Add missing "Description:" for power_cycle sysfs attr platform/x86: intel-wmi-sbl-fw-update: Fix function name in error message platform/x86: p2sb: Use pci_resource_n() in p2sb_read_bar0() platform/x86: p2sb: Allow p2sb_bar() calls during PCI device probe platform/x86: intel-uncore-freq: Fix types in sysfs callbacks platform/x86: wmi: Fix wmi_dev_probe() platform/x86: wmi: Fix notify callback locking platform/x86: wmi: Decouple legacy WMI notify handlers from wmi_block_list platform/x86: wmi: Return immediately if an suitable WMI event is found platform/x86: wmi: Fix error handling in legacy WMI notify handler functions
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Linus Torvalds authored
Merge tag 'loongarch-fixes-6.8-1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/chenhuacai/linux-loongson Pull LoongArch fixes from Huacai Chen: "Fix boot failure on machines with more than 8 nodes, and fix two build errors about KVM" * tag 'loongarch-fixes-6.8-1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/chenhuacai/linux-loongson: LoongArch: KVM: Add returns to SIMD stubs LoongArch: KVM: Fix build due to API changes LoongArch/smp: Call rcutree_report_cpu_starting() at tlb_init()
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