- 25 Jun, 2019 40 commits
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Dan Carpenter authored
BugLink: https://bugs.launchpad.net/bugs/1830176 commit 6a024330 upstream. The "param.count" value is a u64 thatcomes from the user. The code later in the function assumes that param.count is at least one and if it's not then it leads to an Oops when we dereference the ZERO_SIZE_PTR. Also the addition can have an integer overflow which would lead us to allocate a smaller "pages" array than required. I can't immediately tell what the possible run times implications are, but it's safest to prevent the overflow. Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20181218082129.GE32567@kadam Fixes: 6db71994 ("drivers/virt: introduce Freescale hypervisor management driver") Signed-off-by:
Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@oracle.com> Reviewed-by:
Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Timur Tabi <timur@freescale.com> Cc: Mihai Caraman <mihai.caraman@freescale.com> Cc: Kumar Gala <galak@kernel.crashing.org> Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> Signed-off-by:
Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by:
Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> Signed-off-by:
Juerg Haefliger <juergh@canonical.com> Signed-off-by:
Kleber Sacilotto de Souza <kleber.souza@canonical.com>
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Dan Carpenter authored
BugLink: https://bugs.launchpad.net/bugs/1830176 commit c8ea3663 upstream. strndup_user() returns error pointers on error, and then in the error handling we pass the error pointers to kfree(). It will cause an Oops. Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20181218082003.GD32567@kadam Fixes: 6db71994 ("drivers/virt: introduce Freescale hypervisor management driver") Signed-off-by:
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Jarod Wilson authored
BugLink: https://bugs.launchpad.net/bugs/1830176 [ Upstream commit a9b8a2b3 ] There's currently a problem with toggling arp_validate on and off with an active-backup bond. At the moment, you can start up a bond, like so: modprobe bonding mode=1 arp_interval=100 arp_validate=0 arp_ip_targets=192.168.1.1 ip link set bond0 down echo "ens4f0" > /sys/class/net/bond0/bonding/slaves echo "ens4f1" > /sys/class/net/bond0/bonding/slaves ip link set bond0 up ip addr add 192.168.1.2/24 dev bond0 Pings to 192.168.1.1 work just fine. Now turn on arp_validate: echo 1 > /sys/class/net/bond0/bonding/arp_validate Pings to 192.168.1.1 continue to work just fine. Now when you go to turn arp_validate off again, the link falls flat on it's face: echo 0 > /sys/class/net/bond0/bonding/arp_validate dmesg ... [133191.911987] bond0: Setting arp_validate to none (0) [133194.257793] bond0: bond_should_notify_peers: slave ens4f0 [133194.258031] bond0: link status definitely down for interface ens4f0, disabling it [133194.259000] bond0: making interface ens4f1 the new active one [133197.330130] bond0: link status definitely down for interface ens4f1, disabling it [133197.331191] bond0: now running without any active interface! The problem lies in bond_options.c, where passing in arp_validate=0 results in bond->recv_probe getting set to NULL. This flies directly in the face of commit 3fe68df9, which says we need to set recv_probe = bond_arp_recv, even if we're not using arp_validate. Said commit fixed this in bond_option_arp_interval_set, but missed that we can get to that same state in bond_option_arp_validate_set as well. One solution would be to universally set recv_probe = bond_arp_recv here as well, but I don't think bond_option_arp_validate_set has any business touching recv_probe at all, and that should be left to the arp_interval code, so we can just make things much tidier here. Fixes: 3fe68df9 ("bonding: always set recv_probe to bond_arp_rcv in arp monitor") CC: Jay Vosburgh <j.vosburgh@gmail.com> CC: Veaceslav Falico <vfalico@gmail.com> CC: Andy Gospodarek <andy@greyhouse.net> CC: "David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net> CC: netdev@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by:
Jarod Wilson <jarod@redhat.com> Signed-off-by:
Jay Vosburgh <jay.vosburgh@canonical.com> Signed-off-by:
David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Signed-off-by:
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David Ahern authored
BugLink: https://bugs.launchpad.net/bugs/1830176 [ Upstream commit 19e4e768 ] inet_iif should be used for the raw socket lookup. inet_iif considers rt_iif which handles the case of local traffic. As it stands, ping to a local address with the '-I <dev>' option fails ever since ping was changed to use SO_BINDTODEVICE instead of cmsg + IP_PKTINFO. IPv6 works fine. Fixes: 1da177e4 ("Linux-2.6.12-rc2") Signed-off-by:
David Ahern <dsahern@gmail.com> Signed-off-by:
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Stephen Suryaputra authored
BugLink: https://bugs.launchpad.net/bugs/1830176 [ Upstream commit ff6ab32b ] VRF netdev mtu isn't typically set and have an mtu of 65536. When the link of a tunnel is set, the tunnel mtu is changed from 1480 to the link mtu minus tunnel header. In the case of VRF netdev is the link, then the tunnel mtu becomes 65516. So, fix it by not setting the tunnel mtu in this case. Signed-off-by:
Stephen Suryaputra <ssuryaextr@gmail.com> Reviewed-by:
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Hangbin Liu authored
BugLink: https://bugs.launchpad.net/bugs/1830176 [ Upstream commit 873017af ] With NET_ADMIN enabled in container, a normal user could be mapped to root and is able to change the real device's rx filter via ioctl on vlan, which would affect the other ptp process on host. Fix it by disabling SIOCSHWTSTAMP in container. Fixes: a6111d3c ("vlan: Pass SIOC[SG]HWTSTAMP ioctls to real device") Signed-off-by:
Hangbin Liu <liuhangbin@gmail.com> Acked-by:
Richard Cochran <richardcochran@gmail.com> Signed-off-by:
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YueHaibing authored
BugLink: https://bugs.launchpad.net/bugs/1830176 [ Upstream commit 36096f2f ] kernel BUG at lib/list_debug.c:47! invalid opcode: 0000 [#1 CPU: 0 PID: 12914 Comm: rmmod Tainted: G W 5.1.0+ #47 Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS rel-1.9.3-0-ge2fc41e-prebuilt.qemu-project.org 04/01/2014 RIP: 0010:__list_del_entry_valid+0x53/0x90 Code: 48 8b 32 48 39 fe 75 35 48 8b 50 08 48 39 f2 75 40 b8 01 00 00 00 5d c3 48 89 fe 48 89 c2 48 c7 c7 18 75 fe 82 e8 cb 34 78 ff <0f> 0b 48 89 fe 48 c7 c7 50 75 fe 82 e8 ba 34 78 ff 0f 0b 48 89 f2 RSP: 0018:ffffc90001c2fe40 EFLAGS: 00010286 RAX: 000000000000004e RBX: ffffffffa0184000 RCX: 0000000000000000 RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: ffff888237a17788 RDI: 00000000ffffffff RBP: ffffc90001c2fe40 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000 R10: ffffc90001c2fe10 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: 0000000000000000 R13: ffffc90001c2fe50 R14: ffffffffa0184000 R15: 0000000000000000 FS: 00007f3d83634540(0000) GS:ffff888237a00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: 0000555c350ea818 CR3: 0000000231677000 CR4: 00000000000006f0 Call Trace: unregister_pernet_operations+0x34/0x120 unregister_pernet_subsys+0x1c/0x30 packet_exit+0x1c/0x369 [af_packet __x64_sys_delete_module+0x156/0x260 ? lockdep_hardirqs_on+0x133/0x1b0 ? do_syscall_64+0x12/0x1f0 do_syscall_64+0x6e/0x1f0 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x49/0xbe When modprobe af_packet, register_pernet_subsys fails and does a cleanup, ops->list is set to LIST_POISON1, but the module init is considered to success, then while rmmod it, BUG() is triggered in __list_del_entry_valid which is called from unregister_pernet_subsys. This patch fix error handing path in packet_init to avoid possilbe issue if some error occur. Reported-by:
Hulk Robot <hulkci@huawei.com> Signed-off-by:
YueHaibing <yuehaibing@huawei.com> Signed-off-by:
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Christophe Leroy authored
BugLink: https://bugs.launchpad.net/bugs/1830176 [ Upstream commit ee0df193 ] When changing the number of buffers in the RX ring while the interface is running, the following Oops is encountered due to the new number of buffers being taken into account immediately while their allocation is done when opening the device only. [ 69.882706] Unable to handle kernel paging request for data at address 0xf0000100 [ 69.890172] Faulting instruction address: 0xc033e164 [ 69.895122] Oops: Kernel access of bad area, sig: 11 [#1] [ 69.900494] BE PREEMPT CMPCPRO [ 69.907120] CPU: 0 PID: 0 Comm: swapper Not tainted 4.14.115-00006-g179ade8ce3-dirty #269 [ 69.915956] task: c0684310 task.stack: c06da000 [ 69.920470] NIP: c033e164 LR: c02e44d0 CTR: c02e41fc [ 69.925504] REGS: dfff1e20 TRAP: 0300 Not tainted (4.14.115-00006-g179ade8ce3-dirty) [ 69.934161] MSR: 00009032 <EE,ME,IR,DR,RI> CR: 22004428 XER: 20000000 [ 69.940869] DAR: f0000100 DSISR: 20000000 [ 69.940869] GPR00: c0352d70 dfff1ed0 c0684310 f00000a4 00000040 dfff1f68 00000000 0000001f [ 69.940869] GPR08: df53f410 1cc00040 00000021 c0781640 42004424 100c82b6 f00000a4 df53f5b0 [ 69.940869] GPR16: df53f6c0 c05daf84 00000040 00000000 00000040 c0782be4 00000000 00000001 [ 69.940869] GPR24: 00000000 df53f400 000001b0 df53f410 df53f000 0000003f df708220 1cc00044 [ 69.978348] NIP [c033e164] skb_put+0x0/0x5c [ 69.982528] LR [c02e44d0] ucc_geth_poll+0x2d4/0x3f8 [ 69.987384] Call Trace: [ 69.989830] [dfff1ed0] [c02e4554] ucc_geth_poll+0x358/0x3f8 (unreliable) [ 69.996522] [dfff1f20] [c0352d70] net_rx_action+0x248/0x30c [ 70.002099] [dfff1f80] [c04e93e4] __do_softirq+0xfc/0x310 [ 70.007492] [dfff1fe0] [c0021124] irq_exit+0xd0/0xd4 [ 70.012458] [dfff1ff0] [c000e7e0] call_do_irq+0x24/0x3c [ 70.017683] [c06dbe80] [c0006bac] do_IRQ+0x64/0xc4 [ 70.022474] [c06dbea0] [c001097c] ret_from_except+0x0/0x14 [ 70.027964] --- interrupt: 501 at rcu_idle_exit+0x84/0x90 [ 70.027964] LR = rcu_idle_exit+0x74/0x90 [ 70.037585] [c06dbf60] [20000000] 0x20000000 (unreliable) [ 70.042984] [c06dbf80] [c004bb0c] do_idle+0xb4/0x11c [ 70.047945] [c06dbfa0] [c004bd14] cpu_startup_entry+0x18/0x1c [ 70.053682] [c06dbfb0] [c05fb034] start_kernel+0x370/0x384 [ 70.059153] [c06dbff0] [00003438] 0x3438 [ 70.063062] Instruction dump: [ 70.066023] 38a00000 38800000 90010014 4bfff015 80010014 7c0803a6 3123ffff 7c691910 [ 70.073767] 38210010 4e800020 38600000 4e800020 <80e3005c> 80c30098 3107ffff 7d083910 [ 70.081690] ---[ end trace be7ccd9c1e1a9f12 ]--- This patch forbids the modification of the number of buffers in the ring while the interface is running. Fixes: ac421852 ("ucc_geth: add ethtool support") Signed-off-by:
Christophe Leroy <christophe.leroy@c-s.fr> Signed-off-by:
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Tobin C. Harding authored
BugLink: https://bugs.launchpad.net/bugs/1830176 [ Upstream commit bdfad5ae ] Currently error return from kobject_init_and_add() is not followed by a call to kobject_put(). This means there is a memory leak. We currently set p to NULL so that kfree() may be called on it as a noop, the code is arguably clearer if we move the kfree() up closer to where it is called (instead of after goto jump). Remove a goto label 'err1' and jump to call to kobject_put() in error return from kobject_init_and_add() fixing the memory leak. Re-name goto label 'put_back' to 'err1' now that we don't use err1, following current nomenclature (err1, err2 ...). Move call to kfree out of the error code at bottom of function up to closer to where memory was allocated. Add comment to clarify call to kfree(). Signed-off-by:
Tobin C. Harding <tobin@kernel.org> Signed-off-by:
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Johan Hovold authored
BugLink: https://bugs.launchpad.net/bugs/1830176 [ Upstream commit 3f5edd58 ] Fix two long-standing bugs which could potentially lead to memory corruption or leave the port throttled until it is reopened (on weakly ordered systems), respectively, when read-URB completion races with unthrottle(). First, the URB must not be marked as free before processing is complete to prevent it from being submitted by unthrottle() on another CPU. CPU 1 CPU 2 ================ ================ complete() unthrottle() process_urb(); smp_mb__before_atomic(); set_bit(i, free); if (test_and_clear_bit(i, free)) submit_urb(); Second, the URB must be marked as free before checking the throttled flag to prevent unthrottle() on another CPU from failing to observe that the URB needs to be submitted if complete() sees that the throttled flag is set. CPU 1 CPU 2 ================ ================ complete() unthrottle() set_bit(i, free); throttled = 0; smp_mb__after_atomic(); smp_mb(); if (throttled) if (test_and_clear_bit(i, free)) return; submit_urb(); Note that test_and_clear_bit() only implies barriers when the test is successful. To handle the case where the URB is still in use an explicit barrier needs to be added to unthrottle() for the second race condition. Fixes: d83b4053 ("USB: serial: add support for multiple read urbs") Signed-off-by:
Johan Hovold <johan@kernel.org> Signed-off-by:
Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org> Signed-off-by:
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Oliver Neukum authored
BugLink: https://bugs.launchpad.net/bugs/1830176 [ Upstream commit 3161da97 ] This patch turns status in a variable read once from the URB. The long term plan is to deliver status to the callback. In addition it makes the code a bit more elegant. Signed-off-by:
Oliver Neukum <oneukum@suse.com> Signed-off-by:
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Andi Kleen authored
BugLink: https://bugs.launchpad.net/bugs/1830176 commit 1de7edbb upstream. Some of the recently added const tables use __initdata which causes section attribute conflicts. Use __initconst instead. Fixes: fa1202ef ("x86/speculation: Add command line control") Signed-off-by:
Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com> Signed-off-by:
Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190330004743.29541-9-andi@firstfloor.orgSigned-off-by:
Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk> Signed-off-by:
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Thomas Gleixner authored
BugLink: https://bugs.launchpad.net/bugs/1830176 commit 55a97402 upstream. Provide the possibility to enable IBPB always in combination with 'prctl' and 'seccomp'. Add the extra command line options and rework the IBPB selection to evaluate the command instead of the mode selected by the STIPB switch case. Signed-off-by:
Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Jiri Kosina <jkosina@suse.cz> Cc: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com> Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com> Cc: Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com> Cc: David Woodhouse <dwmw@amazon.co.uk> Cc: Tim Chen <tim.c.chen@linux.intel.com> Cc: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com> Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com> Cc: Casey Schaufler <casey.schaufler@intel.com> Cc: Asit Mallick <asit.k.mallick@intel.com> Cc: Arjan van de Ven <arjan@linux.intel.com> Cc: Jon Masters <jcm@redhat.com> Cc: Waiman Long <longman9394@gmail.com> Cc: Greg KH <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> Cc: Dave Stewart <david.c.stewart@intel.com> Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20181125185006.144047038@linutronix.de [bwh: Backported to 4.4: adjust filename] Signed-off-by:
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Thomas Gleixner authored
BugLink: https://bugs.launchpad.net/bugs/1830176 commit 6b3e64c2 upstream. If 'prctl' mode of user space protection from spectre v2 is selected on the kernel command-line, STIBP and IBPB are applied on tasks which restrict their indirect branch speculation via prctl. SECCOMP enables the SSBD mitigation for sandboxed tasks already, so it makes sense to prevent spectre v2 user space to user space attacks as well. The Intel mitigation guide documents how STIPB works: Setting bit 1 (STIBP) of the IA32_SPEC_CTRL MSR on a logical processor prevents the predicted targets of indirect branches on any logical processor of that core from being controlled by software that executes (or executed previously) on another logical processor of the same core. Ergo setting STIBP protects the task itself from being attacked from a task running on a different hyper-thread and protects the tasks running on different hyper-threads from being attacked. While the document suggests that the branch predictors are shielded between the logical processors, the observed performance regressions suggest that STIBP simply disables the branch predictor more or less completely. Of course the document wording is vague, but the fact that there is also no requirement for issuing IBPB when STIBP is used points clearly in that direction. The kernel still issues IBPB even when STIBP is used until Intel clarifies the whole mechanism. IBPB is issued when the task switches out, so malicious sandbox code cannot mistrain the branch predictor for the next user space task on the same logical processor. Signed-off-by:
Jiri Kosina <jkosina@suse.cz> Signed-off-by:
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Thomas Gleixner authored
BugLink: https://bugs.launchpad.net/bugs/1830176 commit 7cc765a6 upstream. Now that all prerequisites are in place: - Add the prctl command line option - Default the 'auto' mode to 'prctl' - When SMT state changes, update the static key which controls the conditional STIBP evaluation on context switch. - At init update the static key which controls the conditional IBPB evaluation on context switch. Signed-off-by:
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Thomas Gleixner authored
BugLink: https://bugs.launchpad.net/bugs/1830176 commit 9137bb27 upstream. Add the PR_SPEC_INDIRECT_BRANCH option for the PR_GET_SPECULATION_CTRL and PR_SET_SPECULATION_CTRL prctls to allow fine grained per task control of indirect branch speculation via STIBP and IBPB. Invocations: Check indirect branch speculation status with - prctl(PR_GET_SPECULATION_CTRL, PR_SPEC_INDIRECT_BRANCH, 0, 0, 0); Enable indirect branch speculation with - prctl(PR_SET_SPECULATION_CTRL, PR_SPEC_INDIRECT_BRANCH, PR_SPEC_ENABLE, 0, 0); Disable indirect branch speculation with - prctl(PR_SET_SPECULATION_CTRL, PR_SPEC_INDIRECT_BRANCH, PR_SPEC_DISABLE, 0, 0); Force disable indirect branch speculation with - prctl(PR_SET_SPECULATION_CTRL, PR_SPEC_INDIRECT_BRANCH, PR_SPEC_FORCE_DISABLE, 0, 0); See Documentation/userspace-api/spec_ctrl.rst. Signed-off-by:
Tim Chen <tim.c.chen@linux.intel.com> Signed-off-by:
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Thomas Gleixner authored
BugLink: https://bugs.launchpad.net/bugs/1830176 commit 6d991ba5 upstream. The seccomp speculation control operates on all tasks of a process, but only the current task of a process can update the MSR immediately. For the other threads the update is deferred to the next context switch. This creates the following situation with Process A and B: Process A task 2 and Process B task 1 are pinned on CPU1. Process A task 2 does not have the speculation control TIF bit set. Process B task 1 has the speculation control TIF bit set. CPU0 CPU1 MSR bit is set ProcB.T1 schedules out ProcA.T2 schedules in MSR bit is cleared ProcA.T1 seccomp_update() set TIF bit on ProcA.T2 ProcB.T1 schedules in MSR is not updated <-- FAIL This happens because the context switch code tries to avoid the MSR update if the speculation control TIF bits of the incoming and the outgoing task are the same. In the worst case ProcB.T1 and ProcA.T2 are the only tasks scheduling back and forth on CPU1, which keeps the MSR stale forever. In theory this could be remedied by IPIs, but chasing the remote task which could be migrated is complex and full of races. The straight forward solution is to avoid the asychronous update of the TIF bit and defer it to the next context switch. The speculation control state is stored in task_struct::atomic_flags by the prctl and seccomp updates already. Add a new TIF_SPEC_FORCE_UPDATE bit and set this after updating the atomic_flags. Check the bit on context switch and force a synchronous update of the speculation control if set. Use the same mechanism for updating the current task. Reported-by:
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Thomas Gleixner authored
BugLink: https://bugs.launchpad.net/bugs/1830176 commit 6893a959 upstream. The upcoming fine grained per task STIBP control needs to be updated on CPU hotplug as well. Split out the code which controls the strict mode so the prctl control code can be added later. Mark the SMP function call argument __unused while at it. Signed-off-by:
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Thomas Gleixner authored
BugLink: https://bugs.launchpad.net/bugs/1830176 commit e6da8bb6 upstream. The update of the TIF_SSBD flag and the conditional speculation control MSR update is done in the ssb_prctl_set() function directly. The upcoming prctl support for controlling indirect branch speculation via STIBP needs the same mechanism. Split the code out and make it reusable. Reword the comment about updates for other tasks. Signed-off-by:
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Thomas Gleixner authored
BugLink: https://bugs.launchpad.net/bugs/1830176 commit 4c71a2b6 upstream. The IBPB speculation barrier is issued from switch_mm() when the kernel switches to a user space task with a different mm than the user space task which ran last on the same CPU. An additional optimization is to avoid IBPB when the incoming task can be ptraced by the outgoing task. This optimization only works when switching directly between two user space tasks. When switching from a kernel task to a user space task the optimization fails because the previous task cannot be accessed anymore. So for quite some scenarios the optimization is just adding overhead. The upcoming conditional IBPB support will issue IBPB only for user space tasks which have the TIF_SPEC_IB bit set. This requires to handle the following cases: 1) Switch from a user space task (potential attacker) which has TIF_SPEC_IB set to a user space task (potential victim) which has TIF_SPEC_IB not set. 2) Switch from a user space task (potential attacker) which has TIF_SPEC_IB not set to a user space task (potential victim) which has TIF_SPEC_IB set. This needs to be optimized for the case where the IBPB can be avoided when only kernel threads ran in between user space tasks which belong to the same process. The current check whether two tasks belong to the same context is using the tasks context id. While correct, it's simpler to use the mm pointer because it allows to mangle the TIF_SPEC_IB bit into it. The context id based mechanism requires extra storage, which creates worse code. When a task is scheduled out its TIF_SPEC_IB bit is mangled as bit 0 into the per CPU storage which is used to track the last user space mm which was running on a CPU. This bit can be used together with the TIF_SPEC_IB bit of the incoming task to make the decision whether IBPB needs to be issued or not to cover the two cases above. As conditional IBPB is going to be the default, remove the dubious ptrace check for the IBPB always case and simply issue IBPB always when the process changes. Move the storage to a different place in the struct as the original one created a hole. Signed-off-by:
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Thomas Gleixner authored
BugLink: https://bugs.launchpad.net/bugs/1830176 commit 5635d999 upstream. The TIF_SPEC_IB bit does not need to be evaluated in the decision to invoke __switch_to_xtra() when: - CONFIG_SMP is disabled - The conditional STIPB mode is disabled The TIF_SPEC_IB bit still controls IBPB in both cases so the TIF work mask checks might invoke __switch_to_xtra() for nothing if TIF_SPEC_IB is the only set bit in the work masks. Optimize it out by masking the bit at compile time for CONFIG_SMP=n and at run time when the static key controlling the conditional STIBP mode is disabled. Signed-off-by:
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Thomas Gleixner authored
BugLink: https://bugs.launchpad.net/bugs/1830176 commit ff16701a upstream. Move the conditional invocation of __switch_to_xtra() into an inline function so the logic can be shared between 32 and 64 bit. Remove the handthrough of the TSS pointer and retrieve the pointer directly in the bitmap handling function. Use this_cpu_ptr() instead of the per_cpu() indirection. This is a preparatory change so integration of conditional indirect branch speculation optimization happens only in one place. Signed-off-by:
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Tim Chen authored
BugLink: https://bugs.launchpad.net/bugs/1830176 commit 5bfbe3ad upstream. To avoid the overhead of STIBP always on, it's necessary to allow per task control of STIBP. Add a new task flag TIF_SPEC_IB and evaluate it during context switch if SMT is active and flag evaluation is enabled by the speculation control code. Add the conditional evaluation to x86_virt_spec_ctrl() as well so the guest/host switch works properly. This has no effect because TIF_SPEC_IB cannot be set yet and the static key which controls evaluation is off. Preparatory patch for adding the control code. [ tglx: Simplify the context switch logic and make the TIF evaluation depend on SMP=y and on the static key controlling the conditional update. Rename it to TIF_SPEC_IB because it controls both STIBP and IBPB ] Signed-off-by:
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Thomas Gleixner authored
BugLink: https://bugs.launchpad.net/bugs/1830176 commit fa1202ef upstream. Add command line control for user space indirect branch speculation mitigations. The new option is: spectre_v2_user= The initial options are: - on: Unconditionally enabled - off: Unconditionally disabled -auto: Kernel selects mitigation (default off for now) When the spectre_v2= command line argument is either 'on' or 'off' this implies that the application to application control follows that state even if a contradicting spectre_v2_user= argument is supplied. Originally-by:
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Thomas Gleixner authored
BugLink: https://bugs.launchpad.net/bugs/1830176 commit 30ba72a9 upstream. No point to keep that around. Signed-off-by:
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Thomas Gleixner authored
BugLink: https://bugs.launchpad.net/bugs/1830176 commit 8770709f upstream. checkpatch.pl muttered when reshuffling the code: WARNING: static const char * array should probably be static const char * const Fix up all the string arrays. Signed-off-by:
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Thomas Gleixner authored
BugLink: https://bugs.launchpad.net/bugs/1830176 commit dbe73364 upstream. CONFIG_SCHED_SMT is enabled by all distros, so there is not a real point to have it configurable. The runtime overhead in the core scheduler code is minimal because the actual SMT scheduling parts are conditional on a static key. This allows to expose the scheduler's SMT state static key to the speculation control code. Alternatively the scheduler's static key could be made always available when CONFIG_SMP is enabled, but that's just adding an unused static key to every other architecture for nothing. Signed-off-by:
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Tim Chen authored
BugLink: https://bugs.launchpad.net/bugs/1830176 commit 01daf568 upstream. The logic to detect whether there's a change in the previous and next task's flag relevant to update speculation control MSRs is spread out across multiple functions. Consolidate all checks needed for updating speculation control MSRs into the new __speculation_ctrl_update() helper function. This makes it easy to pick the right speculation control MSR and the bits in MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL that need updating based on TIF flags changes. Originally-by:
Thomas Lendacky <Thomas.Lendacky@amd.com> Signed-off-by:
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Thomas Gleixner authored
BugLink: https://bugs.launchpad.net/bugs/1830176 commit 26c4d75b upstream. During context switch, the SSBD bit in SPEC_CTRL MSR is updated according to changes of the TIF_SSBD flag in the current and next running task. Currently, only the bit controlling speculative store bypass disable in SPEC_CTRL MSR is updated and the related update functions all have "speculative_store" or "ssb" in their names. For enhanced mitigation control other bits in SPEC_CTRL MSR need to be updated as well, which makes the SSB names inadequate. Rename the "speculative_store*" functions to a more generic name. No functional change. Signed-off-by:
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Tim Chen authored
BugLink: https://bugs.launchpad.net/bugs/1830176 commit 34bce7c9 upstream. If enhanced IBRS is active, STIBP is redundant for mitigating Spectre v2 user space exploits from hyperthread sibling. Disable STIBP when enhanced IBRS is used. Signed-off-by:
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Tim Chen authored
BugLink: https://bugs.launchpad.net/bugs/1830176 commit a8f76ae4 upstream. The Spectre V2 printout in cpu_show_common() handles conditionals for the various mitigation methods directly in the sprintf() argument list. That's hard to read and will become unreadable if more complex decisions need to be made for a particular method. Move the conditionals for STIBP and IBPB string selection into helper functions, so they can be extended later on. Signed-off-by:
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Tim Chen authored
BugLink: https://bugs.launchpad.net/bugs/1830176 commit 24848509 upstream. Remove the unnecessary 'else' statement in spectre_v2_parse_cmdline() to save an indentation level. Signed-off-by:
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Tim Chen authored
BugLink: https://bugs.launchpad.net/bugs/1830176 commit 8eb729b7 upstream. "Reduced Data Speculation" is an obsolete term. The correct new name is "Speculative store bypass disable" - which is abbreviated into SSBD. Signed-off-by:
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Jiri Kosina authored
BugLink: https://bugs.launchpad.net/bugs/1830176 commit bb4b3b77 upstream. If spectrev2 mitigation has been enabled, RSB is filled on context switch in order to protect from various classes of spectrev2 attacks. If this mitigation is enabled, say so in sysfs for spectrev2. Signed-off-by:
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Jiri Kosina authored
BugLink: https://bugs.launchpad.net/bugs/1830176 commit 53c613fe upstream. STIBP is a feature provided by certain Intel ucodes / CPUs. This feature (once enabled) prevents cross-hyperthread control of decisions made by indirect branch predictors. Enable this feature if - the CPU is vulnerable to spectre v2 - the CPU supports SMT and has SMT siblings online - spectre_v2 mitigation autoselection is enabled (default) After some previous discussion, this leaves STIBP on all the time, as wrmsr on crossing kernel boundary is a no-no. This could perhaps later be a bit more optimized (like disabling it in NOHZ, experiment with disabling it in idle, etc) if needed. Note that the synchronization of the mask manipulation via newly added spec_ctrl_mutex is currently not strictly needed, as the only updater is already being serialized by cpu_add_remove_lock, but let's make this a little bit more future-proof. Signed-off-by:
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Jiri Kosina authored
BugLink: https://bugs.launchpad.net/bugs/1830176 commit dbfe2953 upstream. Currently, IBPB is only issued in cases when switching into a non-dumpable process, the rationale being to protect such 'important and security sensitive' processess (such as GPG) from data leaking into a different userspace process via spectre v2. This is however completely insufficient to provide proper userspace-to-userpace spectrev2 protection, as any process can poison branch buffers before being scheduled out, and the newly scheduled process immediately becomes spectrev2 victim. In order to minimize the performance impact (for usecases that do require spectrev2 protection), issue the barrier only in cases when switching between processess where the victim can't be ptraced by the potential attacker (as in such cases, the attacker doesn't have to bother with branch buffers at all). [ tglx: Split up PTRACE_MODE_NOACCESS_CHK into PTRACE_MODE_SCHED and PTRACE_MODE_IBPB to be able to do ptrace() context tracking reasonably fine-grained ] Fixes: 18bf3c3e ("x86/speculation: Use Indirect Branch Prediction Barrier in context switch") Originally-by:
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Nadav Amit authored
BugLink: https://bugs.launchpad.net/bugs/1830176 commit 9bc4f28a upstream. When page-table entries are set, the compiler might optimize their assignment by using multiple instructions to set the PTE. This might turn into a security hazard if the user somehow manages to use the interim PTE. L1TF does not make our lives easier, making even an interim non-present PTE a security hazard. Using WRITE_ONCE() to set PTEs and friends should prevent this potential security hazard. I skimmed the differences in the binary with and without this patch. The differences are (obviously) greater when CONFIG_PARAVIRT=n as more code optimizations are possible. For better and worse, the impact on the binary with this patch is pretty small. Skimming the code did not cause anything to jump out as a security hazard, but it seems that at least move_soft_dirty_pte() caused set_pte_at() to use multiple writes. Signed-off-by:
Nadav Amit <namit@vmware.com> Signed-off-by:
Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com> Cc: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com> Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com> Cc: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.com> Cc: Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@suse.cz> Cc: Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@intel.com> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180902181451.80520-1-namit@vmware.com [bwh: Backported to 4.4: - Drop changes in pmdp_establish(), native_set_p4d(), pudp_set_access_flags() - Adjust context] Signed-off-by:
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Filippo Sironi authored
BugLink: https://bugs.launchpad.net/bugs/1830176 commit 8da38eba upstream. Handle the case where microcode gets loaded on the BSP's hyperthread sibling first and the boot_cpu_data's microcode revision doesn't get updated because of early exit due to the siblings sharing a microcode engine. For that, simply write the updated revision on all CPUs unconditionally. Signed-off-by:
Filippo Sironi <sironi@amazon.de> Signed-off-by:
Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Signed-off-by:
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Prarit Bhargava authored
BugLink: https://bugs.launchpad.net/bugs/1830176 commit 370a132b upstream. When preparing an MCE record for logging, boot_cpu_data.microcode is used to read out the microcode revision on the box. However, on systems where late microcode update has happened, the microcode revision output in a MCE log record is wrong because boot_cpu_data.microcode is not updated when the microcode gets updated. But, the microcode revision saved in boot_cpu_data's microcode member should be kept up-to-date, regardless, for consistency. Make it so. Fixes: fa94d0c6 ("x86/MCE: Save microcode revision in machine check records") Signed-off-by:
Prarit Bhargava <prarit@redhat.com> Signed-off-by:
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Tom Lendacky authored
BugLink: https://bugs.launchpad.net/bugs/1830176 commit 612bc3b3 upstream. On AMD, the presence of the MSR_SPEC_CTRL feature does not imply that the SSBD mitigation support should use the SPEC_CTRL MSR. Other features could have caused the MSR_SPEC_CTRL feature to be set, while a different SSBD mitigation option is in place. Update the SSBD support to check for the actual SSBD features that will use the SPEC_CTRL MSR. Signed-off-by:
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