- 05 Dec, 2018 40 commits
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Thomas Gleixner authored
commit 6d991ba5 upstream The seccomp speculation control operates on all tasks of a process, but only the current task of a process can update the MSR immediately. For the other threads the update is deferred to the next context switch. This creates the following situation with Process A and B: Process A task 2 and Process B task 1 are pinned on CPU1. Process A task 2 does not have the speculation control TIF bit set. Process B task 1 has the speculation control TIF bit set. CPU0 CPU1 MSR bit is set ProcB.T1 schedules out ProcA.T2 schedules in MSR bit is cleared ProcA.T1 seccomp_update() set TIF bit on ProcA.T2 ProcB.T1 schedules in MSR is not updated <-- FAIL This happens because the context switch code tries to avoid the MSR update if the speculation control TIF bits of the incoming and the outgoing task are the same. In the worst case ProcB.T1 and ProcA.T2 are the only tasks scheduling back and forth on CPU1, which keeps the MSR stale forever. In theory this could be remedied by IPIs, but chasing the remote task which could be migrated is complex and full of races. The straight forward solution is to avoid the asychronous update of the TIF bit and defer it to the next context switch. The speculation control state is stored in task_struct::atomic_flags by the prctl and seccomp updates already. Add a new TIF_SPEC_FORCE_UPDATE bit and set this after updating the atomic_flags. Check the bit on context switch and force a synchronous update of the speculation control if set. Use the same mechanism for updating the current task. Reported-by:
Tim Chen <tim.c.chen@linux.intel.com> Signed-off-by:
Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Jiri Kosina <jkosina@suse.cz> Cc: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com> Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com> Cc: Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com> Cc: David Woodhouse <dwmw@amazon.co.uk> Cc: Tim Chen <tim.c.chen@linux.intel.com> Cc: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com> Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com> Cc: Casey Schaufler <casey.schaufler@intel.com> Cc: Asit Mallick <asit.k.mallick@intel.com> Cc: Arjan van de Ven <arjan@linux.intel.com> Cc: Jon Masters <jcm@redhat.com> Cc: Waiman Long <longman9394@gmail.com> Cc: Greg KH <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> Cc: Dave Stewart <david.c.stewart@intel.com> Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/alpine.DEB.2.21.1811272247140.1875@nanos.tec.linutronix.deSigned-off-by:
Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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Thomas Gleixner authored
commit e6da8bb6 upstream The update of the TIF_SSBD flag and the conditional speculation control MSR update is done in the ssb_prctl_set() function directly. The upcoming prctl support for controlling indirect branch speculation via STIBP needs the same mechanism. Split the code out and make it reusable. Reword the comment about updates for other tasks. Signed-off-by:
Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Jiri Kosina <jkosina@suse.cz> Cc: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com> Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com> Cc: Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com> Cc: David Woodhouse <dwmw@amazon.co.uk> Cc: Tim Chen <tim.c.chen@linux.intel.com> Cc: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com> Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com> Cc: Casey Schaufler <casey.schaufler@intel.com> Cc: Asit Mallick <asit.k.mallick@intel.com> Cc: Arjan van de Ven <arjan@linux.intel.com> Cc: Jon Masters <jcm@redhat.com> Cc: Waiman Long <longman9394@gmail.com> Cc: Greg KH <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> Cc: Dave Stewart <david.c.stewart@intel.com> Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20181125185005.652305076@linutronix.deSigned-off-by:
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Thomas Gleixner authored
commit 46f7ecb1 upstream The IBPB control code in x86 removed the usage. Remove the functionality which was introduced for this. Signed-off-by:
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Thomas Gleixner authored
commit 4c71a2b6 upstream The IBPB speculation barrier is issued from switch_mm() when the kernel switches to a user space task with a different mm than the user space task which ran last on the same CPU. An additional optimization is to avoid IBPB when the incoming task can be ptraced by the outgoing task. This optimization only works when switching directly between two user space tasks. When switching from a kernel task to a user space task the optimization fails because the previous task cannot be accessed anymore. So for quite some scenarios the optimization is just adding overhead. The upcoming conditional IBPB support will issue IBPB only for user space tasks which have the TIF_SPEC_IB bit set. This requires to handle the following cases: 1) Switch from a user space task (potential attacker) which has TIF_SPEC_IB set to a user space task (potential victim) which has TIF_SPEC_IB not set. 2) Switch from a user space task (potential attacker) which has TIF_SPEC_IB not set to a user space task (potential victim) which has TIF_SPEC_IB set. This needs to be optimized for the case where the IBPB can be avoided when only kernel threads ran in between user space tasks which belong to the same process. The current check whether two tasks belong to the same context is using the tasks context id. While correct, it's simpler to use the mm pointer because it allows to mangle the TIF_SPEC_IB bit into it. The context id based mechanism requires extra storage, which creates worse code. When a task is scheduled out its TIF_SPEC_IB bit is mangled as bit 0 into the per CPU storage which is used to track the last user space mm which was running on a CPU. This bit can be used together with the TIF_SPEC_IB bit of the incoming task to make the decision whether IBPB needs to be issued or not to cover the two cases above. As conditional IBPB is going to be the default, remove the dubious ptrace check for the IBPB always case and simply issue IBPB always when the process changes. Move the storage to a different place in the struct as the original one created a hole. Signed-off-by:
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Thomas Gleixner authored
commit 5635d999 upstream The TIF_SPEC_IB bit does not need to be evaluated in the decision to invoke __switch_to_xtra() when: - CONFIG_SMP is disabled - The conditional STIPB mode is disabled The TIF_SPEC_IB bit still controls IBPB in both cases so the TIF work mask checks might invoke __switch_to_xtra() for nothing if TIF_SPEC_IB is the only set bit in the work masks. Optimize it out by masking the bit at compile time for CONFIG_SMP=n and at run time when the static key controlling the conditional STIBP mode is disabled. Signed-off-by:
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Thomas Gleixner authored
commit ff16701a upstream Move the conditional invocation of __switch_to_xtra() into an inline function so the logic can be shared between 32 and 64 bit. Remove the handthrough of the TSS pointer and retrieve the pointer directly in the bitmap handling function. Use this_cpu_ptr() instead of the per_cpu() indirection. This is a preparatory change so integration of conditional indirect branch speculation optimization happens only in one place. Signed-off-by:
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Tim Chen authored
commit 5bfbe3ad upstream To avoid the overhead of STIBP always on, it's necessary to allow per task control of STIBP. Add a new task flag TIF_SPEC_IB and evaluate it during context switch if SMT is active and flag evaluation is enabled by the speculation control code. Add the conditional evaluation to x86_virt_spec_ctrl() as well so the guest/host switch works properly. This has no effect because TIF_SPEC_IB cannot be set yet and the static key which controls evaluation is off. Preparatory patch for adding the control code. [ tglx: Simplify the context switch logic and make the TIF evaluation depend on SMP=y and on the static key controlling the conditional update. Rename it to TIF_SPEC_IB because it controls both STIBP and IBPB ] Signed-off-by:
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Thomas Gleixner authored
commit fa1202ef upstream Add command line control for user space indirect branch speculation mitigations. The new option is: spectre_v2_user= The initial options are: - on: Unconditionally enabled - off: Unconditionally disabled -auto: Kernel selects mitigation (default off for now) When the spectre_v2= command line argument is either 'on' or 'off' this implies that the application to application control follows that state even if a contradicting spectre_v2_user= argument is supplied. Originally-by:
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Thomas Gleixner authored
commit 495d470e upstream There is no point in having two functions and a conditional at the call site. Signed-off-by:
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Thomas Gleixner authored
commit 30ba72a9 upstream No point to keep that around. Signed-off-by:
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Thomas Gleixner authored
commit 8770709f upstream checkpatch.pl muttered when reshuffling the code: WARNING: static const char * array should probably be static const char * const Fix up all the string arrays. Signed-off-by:
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Thomas Gleixner authored
commit 15d6b7aa upstream Reorder the code so it is better grouped. No functional change. Signed-off-by:
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Thomas Gleixner authored
commit 130d6f94 upstream Use the now exposed real SMT state, not the SMT sysfs control knob state. This reflects the state of the system when the mitigation status is queried. This does not change the warning in the VMX launch code. There the dependency on the control knob makes sense because siblings could be brought online anytime after launching the VM. Signed-off-by:
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Thomas Gleixner authored
commit a74cfffb upstream arch_smt_update() is only called when the sysfs SMT control knob is changed. This means that when SMT is enabled in the sysfs control knob the system is considered to have SMT active even if all siblings are offline. To allow finegrained control of the speculation mitigations, the actual SMT state is more interesting than the fact that siblings could be enabled. Rework the code, so arch_smt_update() is invoked from each individual CPU hotplug function, and simplify the update function while at it. Signed-off-by:
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Thomas Gleixner authored
commit 321a874a upstream Make the scheduler's 'sched_smt_present' static key globaly available, so it can be used in the x86 speculation control code. Provide a query function and a stub for the CONFIG_SMP=n case. Signed-off-by:
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Thomas Gleixner authored
commit dbe73364 upstream CONFIG_SCHED_SMT is enabled by all distros, so there is not a real point to have it configurable. The runtime overhead in the core scheduler code is minimal because the actual SMT scheduling parts are conditional on a static key. This allows to expose the scheduler's SMT state static key to the speculation control code. Alternatively the scheduler's static key could be made always available when CONFIG_SMP is enabled, but that's just adding an unused static key to every other architecture for nothing. Signed-off-by:
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Peter Zijlstra (Intel) authored
commit c5511d03 upstream Currently the 'sched_smt_present' static key is enabled when at CPU bringup SMT topology is observed, but it is never disabled. However there is demand to also disable the key when the topology changes such that there is no SMT present anymore. Implement this by making the key count the number of cores that have SMT enabled. In particular, the SMT topology bits are set before interrrupts are enabled and similarly, are cleared after interrupts are disabled for the last time and the CPU dies. Signed-off-by:
Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org> Signed-off-by:
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Tim Chen authored
commit 01daf568 upstream The logic to detect whether there's a change in the previous and next task's flag relevant to update speculation control MSRs is spread out across multiple functions. Consolidate all checks needed for updating speculation control MSRs into the new __speculation_ctrl_update() helper function. This makes it easy to pick the right speculation control MSR and the bits in MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL that need updating based on TIF flags changes. Originally-by:
Thomas Lendacky <Thomas.Lendacky@amd.com> Signed-off-by:
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Thomas Gleixner authored
commit 26c4d75b upstream During context switch, the SSBD bit in SPEC_CTRL MSR is updated according to changes of the TIF_SSBD flag in the current and next running task. Currently, only the bit controlling speculative store bypass disable in SPEC_CTRL MSR is updated and the related update functions all have "speculative_store" or "ssb" in their names. For enhanced mitigation control other bits in SPEC_CTRL MSR need to be updated as well, which makes the SSB names inadequate. Rename the "speculative_store*" functions to a more generic name. No functional change. Signed-off-by:
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Tim Chen authored
commit 34bce7c9 upstream If enhanced IBRS is active, STIBP is redundant for mitigating Spectre v2 user space exploits from hyperthread sibling. Disable STIBP when enhanced IBRS is used. Signed-off-by:
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Tim Chen authored
commit a8f76ae4 upstream The Spectre V2 printout in cpu_show_common() handles conditionals for the various mitigation methods directly in the sprintf() argument list. That's hard to read and will become unreadable if more complex decisions need to be made for a particular method. Move the conditionals for STIBP and IBPB string selection into helper functions, so they can be extended later on. Signed-off-by:
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Tim Chen authored
commit b86bda04 upstream Signed-off-by:
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Tim Chen authored
commit 24848509 upstream Remove the unnecessary 'else' statement in spectre_v2_parse_cmdline() to save an indentation level. Signed-off-by:
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Tim Chen authored
commit 8eb729b7 upstream "Reduced Data Speculation" is an obsolete term. The correct new name is "Speculative store bypass disable" - which is abbreviated into SSBD. Signed-off-by:
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Zhenzhong Duan authored
commit ef014aae upstream Now that CONFIG_RETPOLINE hard depends on compiler support, there is no reason to keep the minimal retpoline support around which only provided basic protection in the assembly files. Suggested-by:
Zhenzhong Duan <zhenzhong.duan@oracle.com> Signed-off-by:
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Zhenzhong Duan authored
commit 4cd24de3 upstream Since retpoline capable compilers are widely available, make CONFIG_RETPOLINE hard depend on the compiler capability. Break the build when CONFIG_RETPOLINE is enabled and the compiler does not support it. Emit an error message in that case: "arch/x86/Makefile:226: *** You are building kernel with non-retpoline compiler, please update your compiler.. Stop." [dwmw: Fail the build with non-retpoline compiler] Suggested-by:
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Zhenzhong Duan authored
commit 0cbb76d6 upstream ..so that they match their asm counterpart. Add the missing ANNOTATE_NOSPEC_ALTERNATIVE in CALL_NOSPEC, while at it. Signed-off-by:
Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Cc: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Cc: David Woodhouse <dwmw@amazon.co.uk> Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com> Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com> Cc: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: Wang YanQing <udknight@gmail.com> Cc: dhaval.giani@oracle.com Cc: srinivas.eeda@oracle.com Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/c3975665-173e-4d70-8dee-06c926ac26ee@defaultSigned-off-by:
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Jiri Kosina authored
commit bb4b3b77 upstream If spectrev2 mitigation has been enabled, RSB is filled on context switch in order to protect from various classes of spectrev2 attacks. If this mitigation is enabled, say so in sysfs for spectrev2. Signed-off-by:
Jiri Kosina <jkosina@suse.cz> Signed-off-by:
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Jiri Kosina authored
commit dbfe2953 upstream Currently, IBPB is only issued in cases when switching into a non-dumpable process, the rationale being to protect such 'important and security sensitive' processess (such as GPG) from data leaking into a different userspace process via spectre v2. This is however completely insufficient to provide proper userspace-to-userpace spectrev2 protection, as any process can poison branch buffers before being scheduled out, and the newly scheduled process immediately becomes spectrev2 victim. In order to minimize the performance impact (for usecases that do require spectrev2 protection), issue the barrier only in cases when switching between processess where the victim can't be ptraced by the potential attacker (as in such cases, the attacker doesn't have to bother with branch buffers at all). [ tglx: Split up PTRACE_MODE_NOACCESS_CHK into PTRACE_MODE_SCHED and PTRACE_MODE_IBPB to be able to do ptrace() context tracking reasonably fine-grained ] Fixes: 18bf3c3e ("x86/speculation: Use Indirect Branch Prediction Barrier in context switch") Originally-by:
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Jiri Kosina authored
commit 53c613fe upstream STIBP is a feature provided by certain Intel ucodes / CPUs. This feature (once enabled) prevents cross-hyperthread control of decisions made by indirect branch predictors. Enable this feature if - the CPU is vulnerable to spectre v2 - the CPU supports SMT and has SMT siblings online - spectre_v2 mitigation autoselection is enabled (default) After some previous discussion, this leaves STIBP on all the time, as wrmsr on crossing kernel boundary is a no-no. This could perhaps later be a bit more optimized (like disabling it in NOHZ, experiment with disabling it in idle, etc) if needed. Note that the synchronization of the mask manipulation via newly added spec_ctrl_mutex is currently not strictly needed, as the only updater is already being serialized by cpu_add_remove_lock, but let's make this a little bit more future-proof. Signed-off-by:
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Tom Lendacky authored
commit 612bc3b3 upstream On AMD, the presence of the MSR_SPEC_CTRL feature does not imply that the SSBD mitigation support should use the SPEC_CTRL MSR. Other features could have caused the MSR_SPEC_CTRL feature to be set, while a different SSBD mitigation option is in place. Update the SSBD support to check for the actual SSBD features that will use the SPEC_CTRL MSR. Signed-off-by:
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Tom Lendacky authored
commit 845d382b upstream If either the X86_FEATURE_AMD_SSBD or X86_FEATURE_VIRT_SSBD features are present, then there is no need to perform the check for the LS_CFG SSBD mitigation support. Signed-off-by:
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Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk authored
commit 108fab4b upstream Both AMD and Intel can have SPEC_CTRL_MSR for SSBD. However AMD also has two more other ways of doing it - which are !SPEC_CTRL MSR ways. Signed-off-by:
Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com> Signed-off-by:
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Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk authored
commit 6ac2f49e upstream The AMD document outlining the SSBD handling 124441_AMD64_SpeculativeStoreBypassDisable_Whitepaper_final.pdf mentions that if CPUID 8000_0008.EBX[24] is set we should be using the SPEC_CTRL MSR (0x48) over the VIRT SPEC_CTRL MSR (0xC001_011f) for speculative store bypass disable. This in effect means we should clear the X86_FEATURE_VIRT_SSBD flag so that we would prefer the SPEC_CTRL MSR. See the document titled: 124441_AMD64_SpeculativeStoreBypassDisable_Whitepaper_final.pdf A copy of this document is available at https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=199889Signed-off-by:
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Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk authored
commit 24809860 upstream The AMD document outlining the SSBD handling 124441_AMD64_SpeculativeStoreBypassDisable_Whitepaper_final.pdf mentions that the CPUID 8000_0008.EBX[26] will mean that the speculative store bypass disable is no longer needed. A copy of this document is available at: https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=199889Signed-off-by:
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Peter Zijlstra authored
commit ce48c146 upstream Tejun reported the following cpu-hotplug lock (percpu-rwsem) read recursion: tg_set_cfs_bandwidth() get_online_cpus() cpus_read_lock() cfs_bandwidth_usage_inc() static_key_slow_inc() cpus_read_lock() Reported-by:
Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org> Tested-by:
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Bernd Eckstein authored
[ Upstream commit 45611c61 ] The bug is not easily reproducable, as it may occur very infrequently (we had machines with 20minutes heavy downloading before it occurred) However, on a virual machine (VMWare on Windows 10 host) it occurred pretty frequently (1-2 seconds after a speedtest was started) dev->tx_skb mab be freed via dev_kfree_skb_irq on a callback before it is set. This causes the following problems: - double free of the skb or potential memory leak - in dmesg: 'recvmsg bug' and 'recvmsg bug 2' and eventually general protection fault Example dmesg output: [ 134.841986] ------------[ cut here ]------------ [ 134.841987] recvmsg bug: copied 9C24A555 seq 9C24B557 rcvnxt 9C25A6B3 fl 0 [ 134.841993] WARNING: CPU: 7 PID: 2629 at /build/linux-hwe-On9fm7/linux-hwe-4.15.0/net/ipv4/tcp.c:1865 tcp_recvmsg+0x44d/0xab0 [ 134.841994] Modules linked in: ipheth(OE) kvm_intel kvm irqbypass crct10dif_pclmul crc32_pclmul ghash_clmulni_intel pcbc aesni_intel aes_x86_64 crypto_simd glue_helper cryptd vmw_balloon intel_rapl_perf joydev input_leds serio_raw vmw_vsock_vmci_transport vsock shpchp i2c_piix4 mac_hid binfmt_misc vmw_vmci parport_pc ppdev lp parport autofs4 vmw_pvscsi vmxnet3 hid_generic usbhid hid vmwgfx ttm drm_kms_helper syscopyarea sysfillrect mptspi mptscsih sysimgblt ahci psmouse fb_sys_fops pata_acpi mptbase libahci e1000 drm scsi_transport_spi [ 134.842046] CPU: 7 PID: 2629 Comm: python Tainted: G W OE 4.15.0-34-generic #37~16.04.1-Ubuntu [ 134.842046] Hardware name: VMware, Inc. VMware Virtual Platform/440BX Desktop Reference Platform, BIOS 6.00 05/19/2017 [ 134.842048] RIP: 0010:tcp_recvmsg+0x44d/0xab0 [ 134.842048] RSP: 0018:ffffa6630422bcc8 EFLAGS: 00010286 [ 134.842049] RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffff997616f4f200 RCX: 0000000000000006 [ 134.842049] RDX: 0000000000000007 RSI: 0000000000000082 RDI: ffff9976257d6490 [ 134.842050] RBP: ffffa6630422bd98 R08: 0000000000000001 R09: 000000000004bba4 [ 134.842050] R10: 0000000001e00c6f R11: 000000000004bba4 R12: ffff99760dee3000 [ 134.842051] R13: 0000000000000000 R14: ffff99760dee3514 R15: 0000000000000000 [ 134.842051] FS: 00007fe332347700(0000) GS:ffff9976257c0000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 [ 134.842052] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 [ 134.842053] CR2: 0000000001e41000 CR3: 000000020e9b4006 CR4: 00000000003606e0 [ 134.842055] DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000 [ 134.842055] DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400 [ 134.842057] Call Trace: [ 134.842060] ? aa_sk_perm+0x53/0x1a0 [ 134.842064] inet_recvmsg+0x51/0xc0 [ 134.842066] sock_recvmsg+0x43/0x50 [ 134.842070] SYSC_recvfrom+0xe4/0x160 [ 134.842072] ? __schedule+0x3de/0x8b0 [ 134.842075] ? ktime_get_ts64+0x4c/0xf0 [ 134.842079] SyS_recvfrom+0xe/0x10 [ 134.842082] do_syscall_64+0x73/0x130 [ 134.842086] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x3d/0xa2 [ 134.842086] RIP: 0033:0x7fe331f5a81d [ 134.842088] RSP: 002b:00007ffe8da98398 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 000000000000002d [ 134.842090] RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: ffffffffffffffff RCX: 00007fe331f5a81d [ 134.842094] RDX: 00000000000003fb RSI: 0000000001e00874 RDI: 0000000000000003 [ 134.842095] RBP: 00007fe32f642c70 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000 [ 134.842097] R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 00007fe332347698 [ 134.842099] R13: 0000000001b7e0a0 R14: 0000000001e00874 R15: 0000000000000000 [ 134.842103] Code: 24 fd ff ff e9 cc fe ff ff 48 89 d8 41 8b 8c 24 10 05 00 00 44 8b 45 80 48 c7 c7 08 bd 59 8b 48 89 85 68 ff ff ff e8 b3 c4 7d ff <0f> 0b 48 8b 85 68 ff ff ff e9 e9 fe ff ff 41 8b 8c 24 10 05 00 [ 134.842126] ---[ end trace b7138fc08c83147f ]--- [ 134.842144] general protection fault: 0000 [#1] SMP PTI [ 134.842145] Modules linked in: ipheth(OE) kvm_intel kvm irqbypass crct10dif_pclmul crc32_pclmul ghash_clmulni_intel pcbc aesni_intel aes_x86_64 crypto_simd glue_helper cryptd vmw_balloon intel_rapl_perf joydev input_leds serio_raw vmw_vsock_vmci_transport vsock shpchp i2c_piix4 mac_hid binfmt_misc vmw_vmci parport_pc ppdev lp parport autofs4 vmw_pvscsi vmxnet3 hid_generic usbhid hid vmwgfx ttm drm_kms_helper syscopyarea sysfillrect mptspi mptscsih sysimgblt ahci psmouse fb_sys_fops pata_acpi mptbase libahci e1000 drm scsi_transport_spi [ 134.842161] CPU: 7 PID: 2629 Comm: python Tainted: G W OE 4.15.0-34-generic #37~16.04.1-Ubuntu [ 134.842162] Hardware name: VMware, Inc. VMware Virtual Platform/440BX Desktop Reference Platform, BIOS 6.00 05/19/2017 [ 134.842164] RIP: 0010:tcp_close+0x2c6/0x440 [ 134.842165] RSP: 0018:ffffa6630422bde8 EFLAGS: 00010202 [ 134.842167] RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffff99760dee3000 RCX: 0000000180400034 [ 134.842168] RDX: 5c4afd407207a6c4 RSI: ffffe868495bd300 RDI: ffff997616f4f200 [ 134.842169] RBP: ffffa6630422be08 R08: 0000000016f4d401 R09: 0000000180400034 [ 134.842169] R10: ffffa6630422bd98 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: 000000000000600c [ 134.842170] R13: 0000000000000000 R14: ffff99760dee30c8 R15: ffff9975bd44fe00 [ 134.842171] FS: 00007fe332347700(0000) GS:ffff9976257c0000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 [ 134.842173] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 [ 134.842174] CR2: 0000000001e41000 CR3: 000000020e9b4006 CR4: 00000000003606e0 [ 134.842177] DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000 [ 134.842178] DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400 [ 134.842179] Call Trace: [ 134.842181] inet_release+0x42/0x70 [ 134.842183] __sock_release+0x42/0xb0 [ 134.842184] sock_close+0x15/0x20 [ 134.842187] __fput+0xea/0x220 [ 134.842189] ____fput+0xe/0x10 [ 134.842191] task_work_run+0x8a/0xb0 [ 134.842193] exit_to_usermode_loop+0xc4/0xd0 [ 134.842195] do_syscall_64+0xf4/0x130 [ 134.842197] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x3d/0xa2 [ 134.842197] RIP: 0033:0x7fe331f5a560 [ 134.842198] RSP: 002b:00007ffe8da982e8 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000003 [ 134.842200] RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: 00007fe32f642c70 RCX: 00007fe331f5a560 [ 134.842201] RDX: 00000000008f5320 RSI: 0000000001cd4b50 RDI: 0000000000000003 [ 134.842202] RBP: 00007fe32f6500f8 R08: 000000000000003c R09: 00000000009343c0 [ 134.842203] R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 00007fe32f6500d0 [ 134.842204] R13: 00000000008f5320 R14: 00000000008f5320 R15: 0000000001cd4770 [ 134.842205] Code: c8 00 00 00 45 31 e4 49 39 fe 75 4d eb 50 83 ab d8 00 00 00 01 48 8b 17 48 8b 47 08 48 c7 07 00 00 00 00 48 c7 47 08 00 00 00 00 <48> 89 42 08 48 89 10 0f b6 57 34 8b 47 2c 2b 47 28 83 e2 01 80 [ 134.842226] RIP: tcp_close+0x2c6/0x440 RSP: ffffa6630422bde8 [ 134.842227] ---[ end trace b7138fc08c831480 ]--- The proposed patch eliminates a potential racing condition. Before, usb_submit_urb was called and _after_ that, the skb was attached (dev->tx_skb). So, on a callback it was possible, however unlikely that the skb was freed before it was set. That way (because dev->tx_skb was not set to NULL after it was freed), it could happen that a skb from a earlier transmission was freed a second time (and the skb we should have freed did not get freed at all) Now we free the skb directly in ipheth_tx(). It is not passed to the callback anymore, eliminating the posibility of a double free of the same skb. Depending on the retval of usb_submit_urb() we use dev_kfree_skb_any() respectively dev_consume_skb_any() to free the skb. Signed-off-by:
Oliver Zweigle <Oliver.Zweigle@faro.com> Signed-off-by:
Bernd Eckstein <3ernd.Eckstein@gmail.com> Signed-off-by:
David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Signed-off-by:
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Julian Wiedmann authored
[ Upstream commit 9a764c1e ] The response for a SNMP request can consist of multiple parts, which the cmd callback stages into a kernel buffer until all parts have been received. If the callback detects that the staging buffer provides insufficient space, it bails out with error. This processing is buggy for the first part of the response - while it initially checks for a length of 'data_len', it later copies an additional amount of 'offsetof(struct qeth_snmp_cmd, data)' bytes. Fix the calculation of 'data_len' for the first part of the response. This also nicely cleans up the memcpy code. Fixes: 1da177e4 ("Linux-2.6.12-rc2") Signed-off-by:
Julian Wiedmann <jwi@linux.ibm.com> Reviewed-by:
Ursula Braun <ubraun@linux.ibm.com> Signed-off-by:
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Pan Bian authored
[ Upstream commit cfc43519 ] skb is freed via dev_kfree_skb_any, however, skb->len is read then. This may result in a use-after-free bug. Fixes: e6161d64 ("rapidio/rionet: rework driver initialization and removal") Signed-off-by:
Pan Bian <bianpan2016@163.com> Signed-off-by:
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Willem de Bruijn authored
[ Upstream commit 5cd8d46e ] tpacket_snd sends packets with user pages linked into skb frags. It notifies that pages can be reused when the skb is released by setting skb->destructor to tpacket_destruct_skb. This can cause data corruption if the skb is orphaned (e.g., on transmit through veth) or cloned (e.g., on mirror to another psock). Create a kernel-private copy of data in these cases, same as tun/tap zerocopy transmission. Reuse that infrastructure: mark the skb as SKBTX_ZEROCOPY_FRAG, which will trigger copy in skb_orphan_frags(_rx). Unlike other zerocopy packets, do not set shinfo destructor_arg to struct ubuf_info. tpacket_destruct_skb already uses that ptr to notify when the original skb is released and a timestamp is recorded. Do not change this timestamp behavior. The ubuf_info->callback is not needed anyway, as no zerocopy notification is expected. Mark destructor_arg as not-a-uarg by setting the lower bit to 1. The resulting value is not a valid ubuf_info pointer, nor a valid tpacket_snd frame address. Add skb_zcopy_.._nouarg helpers for this. The fix relies on features introduced in commit 52267790 ("sock: add MSG_ZEROCOPY"), so can be backported as is only to 4.14. Tested with from `./in_netns.sh ./txring_overwrite` from http://github.com/wdebruij/kerneltools/tests Fixes: 69e3c75f ("net: TX_RING and packet mmap") Reported-by:
Anand H. Krishnan <anandhkrishnan@gmail.com> Signed-off-by:
Willem de Bruijn <willemb@google.com> Signed-off-by:
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