- 08 Jul, 2018 33 commits
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Eric Biggers authored
Some aead algorithms set .cra_flags = CRYPTO_ALG_TYPE_AEAD. But this is redundant with the C structure type ('struct aead_alg'), and crypto_register_aead() already sets the type flag automatically, clearing any type flag that was already there. Apparently the useless assignment has just been copy+pasted around. So, remove the useless assignment from all the aead algorithms. This patch shouldn't change any actual behavior. Signed-off-by:Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com> Signed-off-by:
Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
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Eric Biggers authored
Some ahash algorithms set .cra_type = &crypto_ahash_type. But this is redundant with the C structure type ('struct ahash_alg'), and crypto_register_ahash() already sets the .cra_type automatically. Apparently the useless assignment has just been copy+pasted around. So, remove the useless assignment from all the ahash algorithms. This patch shouldn't change any actual behavior. Signed-off-by:Gilad Ben-Yossef <gilad@benyossef.com> Signed-off-by:
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Eric Biggers authored
Many ahash algorithms set .cra_flags = CRYPTO_ALG_TYPE_AHASH. But this is redundant with the C structure type ('struct ahash_alg'), and crypto_register_ahash() already sets the type flag automatically, clearing any type flag that was already there. Apparently the useless assignment has just been copy+pasted around. So, remove the useless assignment from all the ahash algorithms. This patch shouldn't change any actual behavior. Signed-off-by: -
Eric Biggers authored
Many shash algorithms set .cra_flags = CRYPTO_ALG_TYPE_SHASH. But this is redundant with the C structure type ('struct shash_alg'), and crypto_register_shash() already sets the type flag automatically, clearing any type flag that was already there. Apparently the useless assignment has just been copy+pasted around. So, remove the useless assignment from all the shash algorithms. This patch shouldn't change any actual behavior. Signed-off-by: -
Eric Biggers authored
With all the crypto modules enabled on x86, and with a CPU that supports AVX-2 but not SHA-NI instructions (e.g. Haswell, Broadwell, Skylake), the "multibuffer" implementations of SHA-1, SHA-256, and SHA-512 are the highest priority. However, these implementations only perform well when many hash requests are being submitted concurrently, filling all 8 AVX-2 lanes. Otherwise, they are incredibly slow, as they waste time waiting for more requests to arrive before proceeding to execute each request. For example, here are the speeds I see hashing 4096-byte buffers with a single thread on a Haswell-based processor: generic avx2 mb (multibuffer) ------- -------- ---------------- sha1 602 MB/s 997 MB/s 0.61 MB/s sha256 228 MB/s 412 MB/s 0.61 MB/s sha512 312 MB/s 559 MB/s 0.61 MB/s So, the multibuffer implementation is 500 to 1000 times slower than the other implementations. Note that with smaller buffers or more update()s per digest, the difference would be even greater. I believe the vast majority of people are in the boat where the multibuffer code is much slower, and only a small minority are doing the highly parallel, hashing-intensive, latency-flexible workloads (maybe IPsec on servers?) where the multibuffer code may be beneficial. Yet, people often aren't familiar with all the crypto config options and so the multibuffer code may inadvertently be built into the kernel. Also the multibuffer code apparently hasn't been very well tested, seeing as it was sometimes computing the wrong SHA-256 digest. So, let's make the multibuffer algorithms low priority. Users who want to use them can either request them explicitly by driver name, or use NETLINK_CRYPTO (crypto_user) to increase their priority at runtime. Signed-off-by: -
Eric Biggers authored
sha512-generic and sha384-generic had a cra_priority of 0, so it wasn't possible to have a lower priority SHA-512 or SHA-384 implementation, as is desired for sha512_mb which is only useful under certain workloads and is otherwise extremely slow. Change them to priority 100, which is the priority used for many of the other generic algorithms. Signed-off-by:
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Eric Biggers authored
sha256-generic and sha224-generic had a cra_priority of 0, so it wasn't possible to have a lower priority SHA-256 or SHA-224 implementation, as is desired for sha256_mb which is only useful under certain workloads and is otherwise extremely slow. Change them to priority 100, which is the priority used for many of the other generic algorithms. Signed-off-by:
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Eric Biggers authored
sha1-generic had a cra_priority of 0, so it wasn't possible to have a lower priority SHA-1 implementation, as is desired for sha1_mb which is only useful under certain workloads and is otherwise extremely slow. Change it to priority 100, which is the priority used for many of the other generic algorithms. Signed-off-by:
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Eric Biggers authored
"arch/x86/crypto/sha*-mb" needs a trailing slash, since it refers to directories. Otherwise get_maintainer.pl doesn't find the entry. Signed-off-by:
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Eric Biggers authored
There is a copy-paste error where sha256_mb_mgr_get_comp_job_avx2() copies the SHA-256 digest state from sha256_mb_mgr::args::digest to job_sha256::result_digest. Consequently, the sha256_mb algorithm sometimes calculates the wrong digest. Fix it. Reproducer using AF_ALG: #include <assert.h> #include <linux/if_alg.h> #include <stdio.h> #include <string.h> #include <sys/socket.h> #include <unistd.h> static const __u8 expected[32] = "\xad\x7f\xac\xb2\x58\x6f\xc6\xe9\x66\xc0\x04\xd7\xd1\xd1\x6b\x02" "\x4f\x58\x05\xff\x7c\xb4\x7c\x7a\x85\xda\xbd\x8b\x48\x89\x2c\xa7"; int main() { int fd; struct sockaddr_alg addr = { .salg_type = "hash", .salg_name = "sha256_mb", }; __u8 data[4096] = { 0 }; __u8 digest[32]; int ret; int i; fd = socket(AF_ALG, SOCK_SEQPACKET, 0); bind(fd, (void *)&addr, sizeof(addr)); fork(); fd = accept(fd, 0, 0); do { ret = write(fd, data, 4096); assert(ret == 4096); ret = read(fd, digest, 32); assert(ret == 32); } while (memcmp(digest, expected, 32) == 0); printf("wrong digest: "); for (i = 0; i < 32; i++) printf("%02x", digest[i]); printf("\n"); } Output was: wrong digest: ad7facb2000000000000000000000000ffffffef7cb47c7a85dabd8b48892ca7 Fixes: 172b1d6b ("crypto: sha256-mb - fix ctx pointer and digest copy") Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # v4.8+ Signed-off-by: -
Ofer Heifetz authored
This patch main goal is to improve driver performance by moving the crypto request from a list to a RDR ring shadow. This is possible since there is one producer and one consume for this RDR request shadow and one ring descriptor is left unused. Doing this change eliminates the use of spinlock when accessing the descriptor ring and the need to dynamicaly allocate memory per crypto request. The crypto request is placed in the first RDR shadow descriptor only if there are enough descriptors, when the result handler is invoked, it fetches the first result descriptor from RDR shadow. Signed-off-by:
Ofer Heifetz <oferh@marvell.com> Signed-off-by:
Antoine Tenart <antoine.tenart@bootlin.com> Signed-off-by:
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Ofer Heifetz authored
This patch adds support for two new algorithms in the Inside Secure SafeXcel cryptographic engine driver: ecb(des3_ede) and cbc(des3_ede). Signed-off-by:
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Ofer Heifetz authored
This patch adds support for two algorithms in the Inside Secure SafeXcel cryptographic engine driver: ecb(des) and cbc(des). Signed-off-by:
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Ofer Heifetz authored
This patch adds support for the hmac(md5) algorithm in the Inside Secure SafeXcel cryptographic engine driver. Signed-off-by:
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Ofer Heifetz authored
This patch adds the MD5 algorithm support to the Inside Secure SafeXcel cryptographic engine driver. Signed-off-by:
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Ofer Heifetz authored
The ORO bridge (connected to the EIP197 write channel) does not generate back pressure towards the EIP197 when its internal FIFO is full. It assumes that the EIP will not drive more write transactions than the maximal supported outstanding (32). Hence tx_max_cmd_queue must be configured to 5 (or less). Signed-off-by:
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Ofer Heifetz authored
This patch adds extra steps in the module removal path, to reset the command and result rings. The corresponding interrupts are cleared, and the ring address configuration is reset. Signed-off-by:
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Ofer Heifetz authored
This patch updates the TRC configuration so that the version of the EIP197 engine being used is taken into account, as the configuration differs between the EIP197B and the EIP197D. Signed-off-by:
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Antoine Tenart authored
This patch documents the new compatible used for the eip197d engine, as this new engine is now supported by the Inside Secure SafeXcel cryptographic driver. Signed-off-by:
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Antoine Tenart authored
This patch adds support for the eip197d engine to the Inside Secure SafeXcel cryptographic driver. This new engine is similar to the eip197b and reuse most of its code. Signed-off-by:
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Ofer Heifetz authored
So far a single processing engine (PE) was configured and used in the Inside Secure SafeXcel cryptographic engine driver. Some versions have more than a single PE. This patch rework the driver's initialization to take this into account and to allow configuring more than one PE. Signed-off-by:
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Ofer Heifetz authored
The Inside Secure SafeXcel driver currently uses 4 rings, but the eip197d engines has 8 of them. This patch updates the driver so that rings are allocated dynamically based on the number of available rings supported by a given engine. Signed-off-by:
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Antoine Tenart authored
Add a flags field in the private structure, and a first flag for engines needing context invalidation (currently only the eip197b). The invalidation is needed when the engine includes a TRC cache, which will also be true for the upcoming addition of the eip197d engine. Suggested-by:
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Antoine Tenart authored
EIP engines do not support the same set of algorithms. So far the supported engines in the Inside Secure SafeXcel driver support the same set of algorithms, but that won't be true for all engines. This patch adds an 'engines' field in the algorithm definitions so that they only are registered when using a compatible cryptographic engine. Signed-off-by:
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Antoine Tenart authored
The compatibles were updated in the Inside Secure SafeXcel cryptographic driver, as the ones previously used were not specific enough. The old compatibles are still supported by the driver for backward compatibility. This patch updates the documentation accordingly. Signed-off-by:
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Antoine Tenart authored
At first we used two compatibles in the SafeXcel driver, named after the engine revision: eip97 and eip197. However this family of engines has more precise versions and in fact we're supporting the eip97ies and eip197b. More versions will be supported in the future, such as the eip197d, and we'll need to differentiate them. This patch fixes the compatibles used in the driver, to now use precise ones. The two historical compatibles are kept for backward compatibility. Signed-off-by:
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Antoine Tenart authored
This patch moves the firmware loaded by the Inside Secure SafeXcel driver from /lib/firmware/ to /lib/firmware/inside-secure/eip197b/. This prepares the driver for future patches which will support other revisions of the EIP197 crypto engine as they'll have their own firmwares. To keep the compatibility of what was done, the old path is still supported as a fallback for the EIP197b (currently the only one supported by the driver that loads a firmware). Signed-off-by:
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Stephan Mueller authored
According to SP800-56A section 5.6.2.1, the public key to be processed for the DH operation shall be checked for appropriateness. The check shall covers the full verification test in case the domain parameter Q is provided as defined in SP800-56A section 5.6.2.3.1. If Q is not provided, the partial check according to SP800-56A section 5.6.2.3.2 is performed. The full verification test requires the presence of the domain parameter Q. Thus, the patch adds the support to handle Q. It is permissible to not provide the Q value as part of the domain parameters. This implies that the interface is still backwards-compatible where so far only P and G are to be provided. However, if Q is provided, it is imported. Without the test, the NIST ACVP testing fails. After adding this check, the NIST ACVP testing passes. Testing without providing the Q domain parameter has been performed to verify the interface has not changed. Signed-off-by:
Stephan Mueller <smueller@chronox.de> Signed-off-by:
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lionel.debieve@st.com authored
Adding pm and pm_runtime support to STM32 CRC. Signed-off-by:
Lionel Debieve <lionel.debieve@st.com> Signed-off-by:
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lionel.debieve@st.com authored
Adding pm and pm_runtime support to STM32 HASH. Signed-off-by:
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lionel.debieve@st.com authored
Adding pm and pm_runtime support to STM32 CRYP. Signed-off-by:
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Stafford Horne authored
As of GCC 9.0.0 the build is reporting warnings like: crypto/ablkcipher.c: In function ‘crypto_ablkcipher_report’: crypto/ablkcipher.c:374:2: warning: ‘strncpy’ specified bound 64 equals destination size [-Wstringop-truncation] strncpy(rblkcipher.geniv, alg->cra_ablkcipher.geniv ?: "<default>", ^~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ sizeof(rblkcipher.geniv)); ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ This means the strnycpy might create a non null terminated string. Fix this by explicitly performing '\0' termination. Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> Cc: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de> Cc: Max Filippov <jcmvbkbc@gmail.com> Cc: Eric Biggers <ebiggers3@gmail.com> Cc: Nick Desaulniers <nick.desaulniers@gmail.com> Signed-off-by:Stafford Horne <shorne@gmail.com> Signed-off-by:
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Stephan Mueller authored
According to SP800-56A section 5.6.2.1, the public key to be processed for the ECDH operation shall be checked for appropriateness. When the public key is considered to be an ephemeral key, the partial validation test as defined in SP800-56A section 5.6.2.3.4 can be applied. The partial verification test requires the presence of the field elements of a and b. For the implemented NIST curves, b is defined in FIPS 186-4 appendix D.1.2. The element a is implicitly given with the Weierstrass equation given in D.1.2 where a = p - 3. Without the test, the NIST ACVP testing fails. After adding this check, the NIST ACVP testing passes. Signed-off-by:
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- 01 Jul, 2018 7 commits
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Denis Efremov authored
The function skcipher_walk_next declared as static and marked as EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL. It's a bit confusing for internal function to be exported. The area of visibility for such function is its .c file and all other modules. Other *.c files of the same module can't use it, despite all other modules can. Relying on the fact that this is the internal function and it's not a crucial part of the API, the patch just removes the EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL marking of skcipher_walk_next. Found by Linux Driver Verification project (linuxtesting.org). Signed-off-by:
Denis Efremov <efremov@linux.com> Signed-off-by:
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Farhan Ali authored
Register a crypto algo with the Linux crypto layer only if the algorithm is supported by the backend virtio-crypto device. Also route crypto requests to a virtio-crypto device, only if it can support the requested service and algorithm. Signed-off-by:
Farhan Ali <alifm@linux.ibm.com> Acked-by:
Gonglei <arei.gonglei@huawei.com> Acked-by:
Christian Borntraeger <borntraeger@de.ibm.com> Signed-off-by:
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Farhan Ali authored
Read the crypto services and algorithm masks which provides information about the services and algorithms supported by virtio-crypto backend. Signed-off-by:
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Eric Biggers authored
Remove the original version of the VMAC template that had the nonce hardcoded to 0 and produced a digest with the wrong endianness. I'm unsure whether this had users or not (there are no explicit in-kernel references to it), but given that the hardcoded nonce made it wildly insecure unless a unique key was used for each message, let's try removing it and see if anyone complains. Leave the new "vmac64" template that requires the nonce to be explicitly specified as the first 16 bytes of data and uses the correct endianness for the digest. Signed-off-by:
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Eric Biggers authored
Currently the VMAC template uses a "nonce" hardcoded to 0, which makes it insecure unless a unique key is set for every message. Also, the endianness of the final digest is wrong: the implementation uses little endian, but the VMAC specification has it as big endian, as do other VMAC implementations such as the one in Crypto++. Add a new VMAC template where the nonce is passed as the first 16 bytes of data (similar to what is done for Poly1305's nonce), and the digest is big endian. Call it "vmac64", since the old name of simply "vmac" didn't clarify whether the implementation is of VMAC-64 or of VMAC-128 (which produce 64-bit and 128-bit digests respectively); so we fix the naming ambiguity too. Signed-off-by:
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Eric Biggers authored
syzbot reported a crash in vmac_final() when multiple threads concurrently use the same "vmac(aes)" transform through AF_ALG. The bug is pretty fundamental: the VMAC template doesn't separate per-request state from per-tfm (per-key) state like the other hash algorithms do, but rather stores it all in the tfm context. That's wrong. Also, vmac_final() incorrectly zeroes most of the state including the derived keys and cached pseudorandom pad. Therefore, only the first VMAC invocation with a given key calculates the correct digest. Fix these bugs by splitting the per-tfm state from the per-request state and using the proper init/update/final sequencing for requests. Reproducer for the crash: #include <linux/if_alg.h> #include <sys/socket.h> #include <unistd.h> int main() { int fd; struct sockaddr_alg addr = { .salg_type = "hash", .salg_name = "vmac(aes)", }; char buf[256] = { 0 }; fd = socket(AF_ALG, SOCK_SEQPACKET, 0); bind(fd, (void *)&addr, sizeof(addr)); setsockopt(fd, SOL_ALG, ALG_SET_KEY, buf, 16); fork(); fd = accept(fd, NULL, NULL); for (;;) write(fd, buf, 256); } The immediate cause of the crash is that vmac_ctx_t.partial_size exceeds VMAC_NHBYTES, causing vmac_final() to memset() a negative length. Reported-by: syzbot+264bca3a6e8d645550d3@syzkaller.appspotmail.com Fixes: f1939f7c ("crypto: vmac - New hash algorithm for intel_txt support") Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # v2.6.32+ Signed-off-by: -
Eric Biggers authored
The VMAC template assumes the block cipher has a 128-bit block size, but it failed to check for that. Thus it was possible to instantiate it using a 64-bit block size cipher, e.g. "vmac(cast5)", causing uninitialized memory to be used. Add the needed check when instantiating the template. Fixes: f1939f7c ("crypto: vmac - New hash algorithm for intel_txt support") Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # v2.6.32+ Signed-off-by:
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